# SolyxImmortal Python Infostealer — Chromium/Firefox Credential & Cookie Theft, Keylogging, Discord Webhook Exfiltration (Turkish-Speaking Actor)

> SolyxImmortal is a Python-based Windows infostealer first observed in January 2026, sold on an underground Telegram commodity-malware channel and attributed with medium confidence to a Turkish-speaking actor. A ~10KB monolithic script (Lethalcompany.py) steals Chromium credentials via DPAPI/AES-GCM, copies Firefox cookie databases, logs keystrokes, captures screenshots on financial/auth window triggers, harvests documents, persists via an AppData self-copy plus a user Run key, and exfiltrates everything over two hardcoded Discord webhooks.

- **Published:** 2026-06-02T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-02T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0659
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-solyximmortal-discord-stealer-tl-2026-0659.webp?v=44c593f1 (Threadlinqs threat intel: SolyxImmortal Discord Webhook Stealer: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0659) — High severity, 16 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0659
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 16 (3 shown free below)

## Description

SolyxImmortal is a commodity Python information stealer targeting Windows endpoints, first observed in January 2026 and analyzed publicly by CYFIRMA, SecurityWeek, PolySwarm, SOC Prime, and Cyber Security News. The sample (Lethalcompany.py, 10.29 KB, SHA-256 5a1b440861ef652cc207158e7e129f0b3a22ed5ef5d2ea5968e1d9eff33017bc) is a single, dependency-light script that bundles credential theft, cookie theft, keylogging, screen surveillance, document harvesting, and persistence into one continuously running implant. It runs entirely in user context with no UI or console output and requires no administrative privileges.

Execution flow: a central controller class initializes on launch, resolving %TEMP% and the user home directory for staging, then establishes persistence before spawning concurrent surveillance threads. Persistence is achieved by copying the script (packaged as an executable) into %APPDATA%\WindowsGraphics\win_gfx_driver.exe, applying Hidden and System attributes to reduce visibility, and writing the value 'WindowsGfxDriver' under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run so the implant relaunches at every user logon (T1547.001, T1564.001).

Credential theft targets Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave, OperaGX). The malware reads the AES-GCM master key from each browser's Local State file, unwraps it with the Windows DPAPI bound to the current user, and decrypts the Login Data SQLite database to recover plaintext usernames and passwords (T1555.003, T1552.001). Recovered credentials are aggregated in plaintext into a file named sifreler.txt (Turkish for 'passwords'). Firefox cookies are stolen by directly copying the profile's cookie database rather than decrypting them.

Surveillance runs on dedicated threads. A persistent keyboard listener buffers keystrokes in memory, converting special keys (Enter, Backspace, modifiers) to readable tokens, and a background thread serializes the buffer to JSON and exfiltrates it roughly every 60 seconds before clearing it (T1056.001). An active-window monitor compares foreground window titles against keyword sets (including Turkish-language terms for banking sites, Gmail, and sign-in pages); on a match it captures and immediately transmits a screenshot (saved as alert.png) to a dedicated screenshot webhook, and it also takes routine screenshots roughly every 2 minutes regardless of activity (T1113). Document harvesting recursively enumerates the user home directory, filtering by extension (.doc, .pdf, .xls, etc.) and size thresholds, stages files in a %TEMP% folder named Solyx_Pack_Final, and compresses them into Solyx_Final_Data.zip (T1083, T1005).

Exfiltration uses two hardcoded Discord webhooks over HTTPS POST (via the Python requests library): one for structured data (credentials, document archives, keystroke logs) and a second dedicated to screenshots (T1041, T1567.004, T1102.003). A hardcoded Discord user ID is embedded so the operator is @-mentioned on high-value events. After successful transmission, staging files are deleted to reduce forensic artifacts, although the implant itself persists indefinitely. The actual webhook URLs and Discord user ID were not disclosed in public reporting.

The malware uses limited obfuscation — it relies on Discord's trusted HTTPS infrastructure and reputation for evasion, compresses harvested data, and wraps operations in silent exception handling so it does not crash or surface error dialogs (T1027). Attribution is medium confidence to a Turkish-speaking developer based on linguistic, structural, and operational indicators (e.g., the sifreler.txt artifact and Turkish keyword lists) and distribution via Telegram channels serving low-to-medium-sophistication, hacktivist-oriented actors rather than structured cybercrime. The threat is opportunistic: any organization whose users execute the script is at risk of browser credential, cookie, document, keystroke, and screen compromise.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1102.003 Web Service: One-Way Communication
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1567.004 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration Over Webhook

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SolyxImmortal Chromium Credential Store Access by Python — Exploitation Phase** (`TL-2026-0659-SPL-001`)

Detects a Python interpreter reading Chromium-based browser Local State (which holds the DPAPI-wrapped AES-GCM master key) and the Login Data SQLite database. This is the SolyxImmortal credential-theft precursor before DPAPI key unwrap and plaintext password recovery.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1555.003, T1552.001, T1059.006
- **Data sources:** windows_security, sysmon, microsoft_defender_endpoint
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4663
(Object_Name="*\\User Data\\Local State" OR Object_Name="*\\User Data\\*\\Login Data" OR Object_Name="*\\Login Data")
(Process_Name="*\\python.exe" OR Process_Name="*\\pythonw.exe")
| eval store=case(like(Object_Name,"%Local State"),"AES-GCM master key (Local State)",like(Object_Name,"%Login Data"),"credential DB (Login Data)",1==1,Object_Name)
| stats count AS access_count min(_time) AS firstSeen max(_time) AS lastSeen values(store) AS stores_touched by Computer Process_Name Process_ID Account_Name
| where access_count>=1
| `comment("SolyxImmortal: python interpreter reads Chromium Local State (AES-GCM key) + Login Data for DPAPI unwrap")`
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("python.exe","pythonw.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("Local State","Login Data")
    and FolderPath has @"\User Data\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, FolderPath, ActionType
| summarize Accesses=count(), Stores=make_set(FolderPath, 25), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp)
    by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId
| where Accesses >= 1
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: SolyxImmortal Chromium Credential Store Access by Python Interpreter
id: 3f9a7c12-8b4e-4d61-9a2c-1e5f7b9d0a11
status: experimental
description: Detects a Python interpreter (python.exe/pythonw.exe) accessing Chromium-based browser Local State (AES-GCM master key) and Login Data SQLite databases, matching SolyxImmortal credential theft prior to DPAPI key unwrap.
references:
    - https://www.cyfirma.com/research/solyximmortal-python-malware-analysis/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/02
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1555.003
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_access
detection:
    selection_proc:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\python.exe'
            - '\pythonw.exe'
    selection_files:
        FileName|endswith:
            - '\User Data\Local State'
            - '\Login Data'
    condition: selection_proc and selection_files
falsepositives:
    - Browser-automation or QA frameworks (Selenium, Playwright) driving Chromium via Python
    - Legitimate password-migration or backup utilities written in Python
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Python browser-automation frameworks (Selenium, Playwright) accessing Chromium profiles
- Legitimate Python-based password migration or backup utilities

**Tuning notes:** Baseline known automation/QA hosts and exclude their service accounts. If SACL object-access auditing (4663) is unavailable, rely on the EDR/Sysmon variants. Alert with higher fidelity when the same python PID also touches Login Data across multiple browser vendors in one session.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- SolyxImmortal Plaintext Credential Aggregation & Firefox Cookie Theft — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SolyxImmortal Masquerading Self-Copy Drop ([indicator]) — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SolyxImmortal Surveillance & Staging Artifacts (Keylog/Screenshot/Archive) — C2/Exfiltration Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SolyxImmortal Browser Credential & Cookie Store Access by Python — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SolyxImmortal Hidden+System Attribute Set on Self-Copy — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SolyxImmortal Discord Webhook C2 Egress from Interpreter — C2/Exfiltration Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SolyxImmortal Run Key Persistence 'WindowsGfxDriver' — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SolyxImmortal Discord Webhook Exfiltration from Python — C2/Exfiltration Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 16)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `discord[.]com`
- File hash: `5a1b440861ef652cc207158e7e129f0b3a22ed5ef5d2ea5968e1d9eff33017bc`
- File hash: `2690f7c685784fff006fe451fa3b154c`

Full set of 16 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [CYFIRMA — SolyxImmortal: Python Malware Analysis](https://www.cyfirma.com/research/solyximmortal-python-malware-analysis/)
- [SecurityWeek — 'SolyxImmortal' Information Stealer Emerges](https://www.securityweek.com/solyximmortal-information-stealer-emerges/)
- [PolySwarm — SOLYXIMMORTAL: A Python-Based Infostealer](https://blog.polyswarm.io/solyximmortal-a-python-based-infostealer)
- [SOC Prime — SolyxImmortal Python Stealer Exfiltrates via Discord](https://socprime.com/active-threats/solyximmortal-python-malware-analysis/)
- [Cyber Security News — SolyxImmortal Python Malware Steals Browser Passwords, Cookies, Files, and Keystrokes](https://cybersecuritynews.com/solyximmortal-python-malware/)
- [CyberPress — Python-Based SolyxImmortal Malware Abuses Discord to Silently Steal Sensitive Data](https://cyberpress.org/solyximmortal-python-malware-discord-data-theft/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0659
