Skip to navigation

Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0684

HazyBeacon (CL-STA-1020) — AWS Lambda Function URL Abuse for Covert C2 Against Southeast Asian Governments

highACTIVE

CL-STA-1020 is a suspected state-aligned espionage cluster targeting Southeast Asian government entities since late 2024 to collect data on tariffs and trade disputes. It deploys HazyBeacon, a Windows backdoor that abuses AWS Lambda Function URLs (AuthType=NONE) as a covert C2 relay through trusted AWS infrastructure, with Google Drive and Dropbox used for exfiltration. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0684
Also known asHazyBeacon, CL-STA-1020
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows; Amazon Web Services AWS Lambda Function URLs
AttributionCL-STA-1020 (medium confidence)
MalwareHazyBeacon
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1056 Input Capture, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1102 Web Service, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1543 Create or Modify System Process and 8 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment
Target regionsSoutheast Asia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0684 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 17 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: HazyBeacon msdnetsvc Persistence Service and C:\ProgramData Tooling — Post-Exploitation Phase

Detects creation of the HazyBeacon persistence service 'msdnetsvc' (System EID 7045 / Sysmon registry write) and execution of dropped modular tools from C:\ProgramData (igfx.exe, GoogleGet.exe, google.exe, GoogleDrive.exe, GoogleDriveUpload.exe, Dropbox.exe, 7z.exe). Legitimate igfx lives in driver/system paths, not C:\ProgramData.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1543.003, T1547, T1105
  • Data sources: windows_security, sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=windows (sourcetype="WinEventLog:System" EventCode=7045 (Service_Name="msdnetsvc" OR Service_File_Name="*C:\\ProgramData\\*"))
OR (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image IN ("C:\\ProgramData\\igfx.exe","C:\\ProgramData\\GoogleGet.exe","C:\\ProgramData\\google.exe","C:\\ProgramData\\GoogleDrive.exe","C:\\ProgramData\\GoogleDriveUpload.exe","C:\\ProgramData\\Dropbox.exe","C:\\ProgramData\\7z.exe"))
| eval indicator=coalesce(Service_Name, Image)
| stats count min(_time) as firstSeen by host, indicator, Service_File_Name, ParentImage, SHA256
| eval firstSeen=strftime(firstSeen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| table host indicator Service_File_Name ParentImage SHA256 count firstSeen

Microsoft KQL

let badHashes = dynamic(["d20b536c88ecd326f79d7a9180f41a2e47a40fcf2cc6a2b02d68a081c89eaeaa","304c615f4a8c2c2b36478b693db767d41be998032252c8159cc22c18a65ab498","f0c9481513156b0cdd216d6dfb53772839438a2215d9c5b895445f418b64b886","3255798db8936b5b3ae9fed6292413ce20da48131b27394c844ecec186a1e92f","279e60e77207444c7ec7421e811048267971b0db42f4b4d3e975c7d0af7f511e","d961aca6c2899cc1495c0e64a29b85aa226f40cf9d42dadc291c4f601d6e27c3"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FolderPath has @"C:\ProgramData" and FileName in~ ("igfx.exe","GoogleGet.exe","google.exe","GoogleDrive.exe","GoogleDriveUpload.exe","Dropbox.exe","7z.exe"))
    or SHA256 in (badHashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, SHA256

Sigma

title: HazyBeacon msdnetsvc Persistence Service and C:\ProgramData Tooling
id: 7a2b3d5f-1c4e-4b28-9d3f-2e8c6a0b1f02
status: experimental
description: Detects the HazyBeacon msdnetsvc persistence service and dropped modular tools executing from C:\ProgramData (CL-STA-1020).
references:
  - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/windows-backdoor-for-novel-c2-communication/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/05
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1543.003
  - attack.t1105
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection_service:
    EventID: 7045
    ServiceName: 'msdnetsvc'
  selection_service_path:
    EventID: 7045
    ImagePath|contains: 'C:\ProgramData\'
  condition: selection_service or selection_service_path
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate software installing services with binaries under C:\ProgramData; validate binary signature
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate applications that install services or stage binaries under C:\ProgramData; verify service name and binary hash/signer

Tuning notes: Allow-list known-good C:\ProgramData service binaries. The literal service name 'msdnetsvc' and any of the listed tool hashes are high-confidence; treat as critical when a hash matches.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • HazyBeacon DLL Side-Load with Discovery Burst — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • HazyBeacon Segmented Archive Staging and Credential File Access — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • HazyBeacon Ingress Tool Transfer After on.aws C2 — C2 Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • HazyBeacon Known-Bad Tool Hash Execution — Exploitation/Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • HazyBeacon SaaS Exfiltration via ProgramData Uploaders — Exfiltration Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • CL-STA-1020 AWS Lambda Function URL AuthType=NONE Creation and IAM Recon — C2 Setup Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • HazyBeacon [indicator] Side-Loading via mscorsvw.exe — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • HazyBeacon AWS Lambda Function URL C2 Beacon — C2 Phase · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 17 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0684.

Sample indicators (3 of 17)

  • Domain: lambda-url[.]ap-southeast-1[.]on[.]aws
  • File hash: 4931df8650521cfd686782919bda0f376475f9fc5f1fee9d7cf3a4e0d9c73e30
  • File hash: d20b536c88ecd326f79d7a9180f41a2e47a40fcf2cc6a2b02d68a081c89eaeaa

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 17 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

17 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

HazyBeacon is a previously undocumented Windows backdoor used by the suspected state-aligned cluster CL-STA-1020 against government entities across Southeast Asia. The campaign, active since late 2024, focuses on collecting sensitive government documents related to tariffs, trade measures, and disputes — including a targeted search for a 'letter to US President on Tariffs measures.'

The infection chain begins with the malicious DLL mscorsvc.dll planted at C:\Windows\assembly\, which is sideloaded by the legitimate Microsoft binary mscorsvw.exe (the .NET service trigger). Persistence is achieved by registering a Windows service named msdnetsvc that loads the HazyBeacon DLL on reboot. Once running, the backdoor enumerates the host (hostname, IP, user privileges, OS version) and beacons to a threat-actor-controlled AWS Lambda Function URL endpoint in the format <id>.lambda-url.ap-southeast-1.on.aws.

The novel C2 technique abuses AWS Lambda Function URLs configured with AuthType=NONE, exposing an unauthenticated public HTTPS endpoint directly off a Lambda function without API Gateway. Because the traffic terminates on legitimate *.on.aws / amazonaws.com infrastructure — frequently allow-listed due to genuine business dependencies — it blends with normal cloud traffic and evades network-based detection. In broader CL-STA-1020 tradecraft, attackers deploy these relay Lambdas inside victim or third-party AWS accounts using stolen static IAM access keys (harvested from exposed credentials, phishing, or ~/.aws files), validating access with low-noise calls such as 'aws sts get-caller-identity' and 'aws iam list-attached-user-policies' before creating functions (lambda:CreateFunction) and URL configs (lambda:CreateFunctionUrlConfig) under benign names like 'UpdateWorker', often in less-monitored regions. The Lambda strips headers, logs metadata, and transparently proxies encrypted payloads to the attacker's backend, so the issuing infrastructure is never attacker-owned.

Post-exploitation, HazyBeacon downloads a modular toolset to C:\ProgramData\: a file collector (igfx.exe) that searches by timeframe and file extension, a 7-Zip utility (7z.exe) that creates 200MB segmented ZIP archives named after the compromised machine, a Google Drive connector (GoogleGet.exe) accepting drive-ID arguments, multiple custom Google Drive uploaders (google.exe, GoogleDrive.exe, GoogleDriveUpload.exe), and a custom Dropbox uploader (Dropbox.exe). Exfiltration over Google Drive and Dropbox is chosen specifically to blend with sanctioned SaaS traffic. The operators practice cleanup, deleting archives and payloads after exfiltration. Qualys republished an analysis of the campaign on 2026-06-02, reinforcing the original Unit 42 disclosure of 2025-07-14.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1056 Input Capture; T1560 Archive Collected Data

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1648 Serverless Execution

Defense Evasion

T1070 Indicator Removal; T1564 Hide Artifacts; T1574 Hijack Execution Flow

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery; T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery

Persistence

T1543 Create or Modify System Process; T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Credential Access

T1552 Unsecured Credentials

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Hunt for C:\Windows\assembly\mscorsvc.dll and validate the signature/hash of any mscorsvc.dll loaded by mscorsvw.exe
  • Look for a Windows service named msdnetsvc and remove it
  • Block/alert on outbound connections to *.lambda-url.*.on.aws from non-developer endpoints
  • Hunt for the dropped tools in C:\ProgramData\ (igfx.exe, GoogleGet.exe, google.exe, GoogleDrive.exe, GoogleDriveUpload.exe, Dropbox.exe, 7z.exe)

Workarounds

  • Apply Service Control Policies that deny creation of Function URLs with AuthType=NONE unless explicitly tagged/whitelisted
  • Set AWS budget/cost alerts for Lambda invocation spikes in non-production regions

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for DLL sideloading and unusual service creation
  • Enforce egress filtering and SaaS DLP for Google Drive and Dropbox uploads from servers
  • Enable AWS CloudTrail across all regions and alert on lambda:CreateFunctionUrlConfig with AuthType=NONE
  • Rotate and remove unused static IAM access keys; require MFA

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints/servers running mscorsvw.exe (.NET)
  • Amazon Web Services — AWS Lambda Function URLs
    Vulnerable versions: Function URLs configured with AuthType=NONE

Timeline

  • AWS introduces Lambda Function URLs, the feature later abused (with AuthType=NONE) as a covert C2 relay.
  • CL-STA-1020 activity begins targeting Southeast Asian government entities to collect data on tariffs and trade disputes.
  • Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) publicly discloses HazyBeacon and the novel AWS Lambda Function URL C2 abuse; findings shared with Cyber Threat Alliance.
  • Qualys republishes a technical analysis of HazyBeacon and the AWS Lambda Function URL command-and-control abuse.
  • Threadlinqs Intelligence opens TL-2026-0684 to track HazyBeacon/CL-STA-1020 and build dedicated detection coverage.

Sources cited

Previous and next in malware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats