Nimbus RAT (BackupBOX) — Microsoft Teams Vishing + Quick Assist Delivery of a Self-Contained Java RAT Using Google Drive/Sheets for C2 (BlackSuit Affiliate)

Nimbus RAT (BackupBOX) (TL-2026-0691), also tracked as BackupBOX, is a high-severity malware campaign, first published 2026-06-06. It is attributed to BlackSuit affiliate with medium confidence, affects Microsoft Microsoft Teams (External Access / Federation), maps to 26 MITRE ATT&CK techniques (T1005, T1008, T1016), and is covered by 9 detection rules and 30 indicators of compromise.

Key facts for TL-2026-0691

Threat ID
TL-2026-0691
Also known as
BackupBOX, Nimbus RAT, Nimbus Java RAT
Severity
HIGH
Status
ACTIVE
Category
MALWARE
First published
2026-06-06
Last reviewed
2026-06-06
Attribution
BlackSuit affiliate
Attribution confidence
MEDIUM
Motivation
FINANCIAL
Target sectors
legal, professional services, financial, technology
Target regions
North America, Europe
Detection rules
9
Indicators of compromise
30

Malware and tooling in Nimbus RAT (BackupBOX)

Malware and tooling: BackupBOX (Google Drive OAuth application name), Microsoft Teams (external/federated chat), Quick Assist

Nimbus RAT is a self-contained Java implant (internal name BackupBOX) that bundles its own OpenJDK 25 runtime and uses Google Drive service-account/OAuth2 channels plus a direct TLS socket for command-and-control to blend with legitimate SaaS traffic. eSentire TRU documents a hands-on-keyboard intrusion chain: mailbox email-bombing, Microsoft Teams vishing from throwaway onmicrosoft.com tenants impersonating IT helpdesk, Quick Assist remote access, and payload retrieval from a compromised SharePoint/OneDrive tenant via a Pastebin instruction sheet. TRU links the activity to a BlackSuit affiliate that emerged after Black Basta's early-2025 internal conflict, observing 1,540 suspicious Teams interactions across 172 organizations over 12 months with a sharp surge in Dec 2025-Mar 2026.

How Nimbus RAT (BackupBOX) works

Nimbus RAT is a Java-based remote access trojan distributed through a fully social-engineered, hands-on-keyboard intrusion chain that abuses trusted SaaS and OS tooling across the entire kill chain. eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU) reconstructed a representative April 6, 2026 intrusion against a legal-sector organization.

INTRUSION CHAIN: (1) Email bombing — the victim mailbox was flooded with ~282 legitimate transactional/subscription-confirmation emails (peak 26/min) from 116 unique sender domains over ~90 minutes (16:00-17:30 UTC), manufacturing urgency and a pretext for help. (2) Teams vishing — within ~45 minutes (~17:45 UTC) an external Microsoft Teams account on a throwaway *.onmicrosoft.com trial tenant, posing as internal IT helpdesk, contacted the user referencing the inbox flood and offered to help. (3) Remote access — the actor directed the user to launch Quick Assist via Windows Explorer, gaining an interactive remote session by 17:48 UTC. (4) Instruction delivery — the actor pasted a Pastebin URL (pastebin.com/G6jA0PLU, visited 17:53 UTC) into Teams chat containing a four-line human-readable checklist: download path, extraction directory, registry import, and Startup persistence step. (5) Payload staging — the archive InboxCorePro.zip was hosted on a compromised Microsoft 365 tenant's personal OneDrive (*-my.sharepoint.com), downloaded 17:54-17:56 UTC. (6) Execution & persistence — the user extracted to C:\ProgramData\InboxCorePro\, imported InboxCorePro.reg via regedit.exe (17:59:28 UTC) placing a launcher in the Startup folder; javaw.exe then executed InboxCorePro.jar at 17:59:32 UTC under parent explorer.exe. The actor returned via a second Quick Assist session at 18:04 UTC.

MALWARE: Nimbus RAT (internal name BackupBOX, OAuth app name BackupBOX, campaign UUID 1hc1his4gmto0q1) is self-contained — it ships its own OpenJDK 25.0.1 javaw.exe so no system Java is required. A %TEMP%\java_app.lock file enforces single-instance execution, and a license.txt kill-switch file prevents relaunch if removed. Java packages are name-obfuscated (BlackStatelessness, DomitianUndrapedEpigrammatize, EpitaphDunderhead, Goferindubitably, Splendrousstile, WorldlySiege, sententiousness, ExtricableSophisticated); entry point Goferindubitably.Audiometric, command handler Splendrousstile.SomewhatJerky, code execution DomitianUndrapedEpigrammatize.MutagenInchoateness.

COMMAND-AND-CONTROL: Three RSA-4096-encrypted channels. (a) Google Drive service account (class Keenplainspokenness) via ServiceAccountCredentials JSON key; (b) Google Drive OAuth2 user (class Intervention) via client_id+client_secret+refresh_token with rate-limit retry (7 attempts); (c) direct TLS socket (class phonemicsVandalism) with certificate validation disabled and RSA length-prefixed messages. Normal poll interval 45-75s, accelerated 4-8s wakeup poll. C2 files follow entry_{campaignUUID} (commands), exit_{campaignUUID} (responses), newconfig_* (config updates); large messages are chunked. All traffic uses a hardcoded 4096-bit RSA public key.

CAPABILITIES: Shell (cmd.exe /c, direct ProcessBuilder 'r' with 30s timeout, silent 'exec' to NUL); file ops (ls/dir, type, del/rm recursive, cd, tree max 5000, regex find max 5000, ZIP za/tz/z); registry full access (HKLM/HKCU/HKCR/HKU/HKCC query/add/delete); recon via JNA (GetNetworkParams/GetAdaptersInfo, sysinfo, domain/group membership); Robot screenshot to ZIP; and second-stage in-memory Java compile/execute (jc blocking, jcb backgrounded) accepting Base64 source where '/// https://' lines fetch dependency JARs to %TEMP%\libs\, compiled via javax.tools with no disk writes (MemoryClassLoader). Self-destruct ('self'): timeout /t 2 & RD /S /Q {jdkPath} then System.exit(0).

CREDENTIAL THEFT: 'lf' renders a fake Java Swing Windows Security dialog (DOMAIN\username pre-filled, 'Remember credentials' box) that fakes an 'incorrect' error on the first attempt and exfiltrates both password entries; 'cf' invokes the real CredUIPromptForCredentialsW (credui.dll) via JNA with caption 'Login', allows one retry, auto-closes after ~10 minutes via WM_CLOSE.

SECOND STAGE: An InboxSetupPro component (C:\ProgramData\InboxSetupPro\) exfiltrates to OneDrive, specifically targeting the Signal Desktop attachment cache (AppData\roaming\signal\attachments.noindex) and Outlook OST files (a 1.13 GB victim-named ZIP was recovered).

PERSISTENCE NOTE: Nimbus has no autonomous persistence — the operator manually stages the Startup launcher and .reg import during the Quick Assist session, so a host isolated before the operator acts will not retain the infection across reboot.

ATTRIBUTION: TRU attributes the activity to a BlackSuit affiliate (previously documented by Rapid7 in June 2025), emerging after Black Basta's early-2025 chat-leak fallout, with timing alignment to Storm-1811 and 3AM ransomware tradecraft (Dec 2025-Mar 2026). Initial-access telemetry: 1,540 suspicious external Teams messages across 172 environments (May 2025-May 2026); 65% from *.onmicrosoft.com trial tenants (235 unique throwaway tenants), 49% impersonating IT/helpdesk, 80% sourced from hosting/datacenter ASNs, with a fast-burning PDR-registered .top domain cluster (37% of non-onmicrosoft domains ≤7 days old).

MITRE ATT&CK techniques used in TL-2026-0691

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture; T1560 Archive Collected Data

Command and Control

T1008 Fallback Channels; T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Credential Access

T1056 Input Capture

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution; T1559 Inter-Process Communication

Defense Evasion

T1070 Indicator Removal; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1564 Hide Artifacts

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry

Initial Access

T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566 Phishing

Persistence

T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure

Affected products and versions in Nimbus RAT (BackupBOX)

  • Microsoft — Microsoft Teams (External Access / Federation)
    Vulnerable versions: External chat enabled for unknown tenants
  • Microsoft — Quick Assist (Windows remote assistance)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 10; Windows 11
  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365 / SharePoint / OneDrive (compromised tenant abuse)
    Vulnerable versions: M365 tenants
  • Google — Google Drive / Google Sheets API (C2 abuse)
    Vulnerable versions: Drive API v3

Remediation for Nimbus RAT (BackupBOX)

Immediate actions

  • Block or restrict inbound external Microsoft Teams chat/calls from unknown and *.onmicrosoft.com tenants (External Access allowlist)
  • Disable or restrict Quick Assist (remove/AppLocker-block quickassist.exe) where not operationally required
  • Hunt for and remove C:\ProgramData\InboxCorePro\ and C:\ProgramData\InboxSetupPro\ directories and Startup-folder launchers
  • Terminate javaw.exe running -jar from non-standard paths; isolate affected hosts before the operator can re-establish
  • Revoke OAuth grants to the 'BackupBOX' application and any unauthorized Drive-scope service accounts in Google Workspace

Workarounds

  • Set Teams external access to allowlist-only trusted federated domains
  • Block pastebin.com at proxy or alert on browser visits following external Teams messages
  • Alert on bulk inbound mail spikes (email-bombing) per mailbox

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for explorer.exe->javaw.exe and regedit.exe importing .reg from C:\ProgramData
  • Implement user awareness training on email-bombing + IT-helpdesk vishing lures
  • Enforce least privilege and block user-writable autostart locations
  • Monitor Google Workspace audit logs for service-account/OAuth Drive activity from non-authorized apps

Timeline of Nimbus RAT (BackupBOX)

  • Start of eSentire TRU 12-month telemetry window tracking suspicious external Teams messages (May 2025-May 2026).
  • Rapid7 publishes prior reporting on the BlackSuit-affiliate Java RAT activity later tracked as Nimbus RAT.
  • Sharp rise in Teams-vishing activity begins; Dec 2025-Mar 2026 accounts for 57% of annual volume.
  • February 2026 alone records 408 suspicious Teams events — roughly 8x baseline.
  • 18:04 UTC: threat actor returns via a second Quick Assist session for hands-on-keyboard operations.
  • 17:59:28 UTC InboxCorePro.reg imported via regedit.exe; 17:59:32 UTC javaw.exe executes InboxCorePro.jar under explorer.exe.
  • 17:54-17:56 UTC: InboxCorePro.zip downloaded from a compromised M365 *-my.sharepoint.com OneDrive.
  • 17:53 UTC: victim visits pastebin.com/G6jA0PLU containing the four-line download/persistence checklist.
  • 17:48 UTC: victim launches Quick Assist, granting the actor an interactive remote session.
  • ~17:45 UTC: external Teams account on a throwaway onmicrosoft.com tenant posing as IT helpdesk contacts the victim.
  • 16:00-17:30 UTC: victim mailbox flooded with ~282 subscription-confirmation emails (peak 26/min) from 116 sender domains.
  • eSentire TRU publishes the Nimbus RAT analysis detailing the full chain, malware internals, and telemetry.
  • SOC Prime publishes detection-focused coverage of Nimbus RAT delivery via Teams and Google Drive.

Sources cited for Nimbus RAT (BackupBOX)

Threats related to Nimbus RAT (BackupBOX)

Detection coverage for TL-2026-0691

As of 2026-06-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0691 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 30 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account; a free account unlocks full detection query text in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma; paid tiers add raw indicator values, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

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