# Hola Browser for Windows Supply-Chain Compromise — Undeclared me.exe XMRig Monero Cryptominer (Troj/GoMiner-B)

> The Windows build of the Chromium-based Hola Browser (v1.251.91.0) was compromised in a supply-chain attack that bundled an undeclared executable, me.exe, into C:\Program Files\Hola\. Sophos identified the binary (detection Troj/GoMiner-B) as a Go-wrapped XMRig Monero cryptominer that runs only when the host is idle. Hola confirmed the distribution-pipeline compromise (~0.1% of users affected) and engaged Sygnia for forensics.

- **Published:** 2026-06-06T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-06T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0698
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-hola-browser-cryptominer-tl-2026-0698.webp?v=6649576f (Threadlinqs threat intel: Hola Browser Trojan XMRig Miner: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0698) — High severity, 16 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0698
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 16 (3 shown free below)

## Description

In early June 2026, Sophos discovered an undeclared executable, me.exe, bundled into the Windows distribution of the Chromium-based Hola Browser version 1.251.91.0. The file was found during AppEsteem certification checks of the Hola installer and was independently observed by incident-response firm Sygnia. Sophos detects the binary as Troj/GoMiner-B; static analysis showed it is a Go-compiled wrapper around the open-source XMRig miner, evidenced by the embedded Go module path 'm/cmd/xmrig-idle' and runtime strings such as 'killed orphan miner pid %d' and 'user active, stopping miner'.

The miner was delivered through a compromise of Hola's software update/distribution pipeline rather than a code vulnerability in the browser itself — a classic supply-chain attack against widely-used consumer software. The legitimate, code-signed Hola installer (SHA256 174086534a2de730058465a4a4e231ce3778ab17ebebfd7f62b3bf9750bc7bdb) silently delivered the unsigned me.exe (SHA256 e3541caf708c075f0bb22fc68b03acd8457fea7cf0732ea935b1eb016d1c7721) into the Hola program directory.

Once on disk, me.exe establishes persistence by copying itself to C:\Program Files\Hola\HolaMonitorService.exe and registering an auto-start Windows service named hola_monitor_svc, masquerading as a legitimate Hola monitoring component. For defense evasion the malware adds a Windows Defender exclusion for its working directory; the binary is unsigned, carries no compile timestamp, is obfuscated, and writes mining code into memory. The 'idle miner' design suppresses CPU-intensive mining while the user is active and resumes when the host is idle, reducing the chance a victim notices performance degradation.

The payload is a Monero (XMR) cryptocurrency miner, monetizing victim CPU resources for the attacker. No command-and-control domains, mining pool URLs, or Monero wallet addresses were disclosed in the public reporting at time of analysis. Hola confirmed the supply-chain compromise affecting approximately 0.1% of its user base, rebuilt its distribution pipeline, implemented advanced code-signing verification, and tightened access controls. Sygnia was engaged for forensic investigation.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1195.001 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
- T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1496 Resource Hijacking

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**hola_monitor_svc Auto-Start Service Persistence (Post-Exploitation)** (`TL-2026-0698-SPL-002`)

Detects the persistence stage of Troj/GoMiner-B: registration of the masquerading auto-start Windows service 'hola_monitor_svc' whose binPath points at HolaMonitorService.exe (a self-copy of me.exe). Catches both the sc.exe create command line (Sysmon EventCode 1) and the service-installed system event (EventCode 7045), masquerading as a legitimate Hola monitoring component.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1543.003, T1569.002, T1036.005
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\sc.exe" CommandLine="*create*" CommandLine="*hola_monitor_svc*") OR (index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:System" EventCode=7045 (Service_Name="hola_monitor_svc" OR Service_File_Name="*HolaMonitorService.exe*")) | eval svc=coalesce(Service_Name,"hola_monitor_svc") | stats count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(CommandLine) as cmd values(Service_File_Name) as binpath by host, svc | convert ctime(firstSeen) ctime(lastSeen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where FileName =~ "sc.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "create" and ProcessCommandLine has "hola_monitor_svc" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine | union (DeviceEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where ActionType == "ServiceInstalled" and (AdditionalFields has "hola_monitor_svc" or AdditionalFields has "HolaMonitorService.exe") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, AdditionalFields) | order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Hola Monitor Service Persistence (Troj/GoMiner-B)
id: 9f3c1a72-4d8e-4b2a-9c11-0698aa000002
status: experimental
description: Detects creation/installation of the masquerading auto-start Windows service hola_monitor_svc used by the me.exe XMRig idle miner for persistence.
references:
    - https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/you-do-surprise-me-exe-an-unexpected-executable-in-hola-browser
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_sc:
        Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'create'
            - 'hola_monitor_svc'
    condition: selection_sc
falsepositives:
    - None expected; hola_monitor_svc is not a legitimate Hola service name
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- None expected — hola_monitor_svc is not a real Hola service. Investigate any occurrence.

**Tuning notes:** Pair the sc.exe process-creation and 7045 service-install signals to reduce noise. Extend binPath matching to any executable under \Hola\ that registers as auto-start to catch renamed variants.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Compromised Hola Installer Dropping Undeclared [indicator] (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] Service Installation via Self-Copy (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Idle XMRig Miner — Defender Tampering, Idle-Time CPU & Stratum Mining Traffic (C2/Impact) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma — Undeclared [indicator] Dropped in Hola Directory (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma — [indicator] Persistence & Masquerade (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma — Defender Exclusion + XMRig Idle-Miner Markers (C2/Impact) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Hola Supply-Chain Drop — Unsigned [indicator] Written to Hola Program Directory (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Defender Exclusion for Hola Directory + Idle XMRig Miner Behavior (C2/Impact) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 16)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- File hash: `e3541caf708c075f0bb22fc68b03acd8457fea7cf0732ea935b1eb016d1c7721`
- File hash: `174086534a2de730058465a4a4e231ce3778ab17ebebfd7f62b3bf9750bc7bdb`
- File hash: `8046735d354814bf9ef9a053cb9cad8cfec261f2`

Full set of 16 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [You do surprise me.exe: An unexpected executable in Hola Browser](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/you-do-surprise-me-exe-an-unexpected-executable-in-hola-browser)
- [Hola Browser for Windows compromised to deliver cryptominer](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hola-browser-for-windows-compromised-to-deliver-cryptominer/)
- [XMRig — open-source Monero miner (abused payload)](https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1496 Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0698
