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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0721

Lucid Stealer — Node.js-Wrapped Windows Infostealer with Hidden Remote Access (HVNC)

highACTIVE

Lucid Stealer is a subscription-sold (MaaS) Windows infostealer wrapped inside a legitimate Node.js Single Executable Application (SEA) runtime for evasion. It steals credentials, cookies, autofill and history from 18 browsers; runs a clipboard crypto-clipper across 21 address formats; loots 7 desktop wallets, 7 wallet browser extensions, 4 Discord client variants, and Roblox session data; and pairs theft with live remote access via a hidden HVNC desktop-control module, remote shell, file manager, keylogger, and screenshot/stream capture.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0721
Also known asLucid, LucidPay
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows; Google Chrome / Chromium browsers; Mozilla Firefox / Gecko browsers; Discord Discord desktop (4 client variants)
AttributionLucid Stealer operators (low confidence)
MalwareLucid Stealer
ToolsLucid multi-tenant web panel (Telegram MaaS)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging, T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1113 Screen Capture, T1115 Clipboard Data, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1498 Network Denial of Service and 8 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsconsumer, gaming, cryptocurrency, technology
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources5 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0721 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 18 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Lucid Stealer — Run-Key Persistence & Browser Credential Loot Staging (Post-Exploitation)

Detects Lucid Stealer post-exploitation: the HKCU\...\Run\WindowsUpdate persistence value pointing at a hidden %TEMP%\winupd_<random>.exe self-copy, and node.exe reading browser credential stores (Login Data, cookies.sqlite) then writing the %TEMP%\Data_<hwid>.zip exfil-staging archive.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1547.001, T1555.003, T1560.001, T1005
  • Data sources: sysmon, edr, windows_security
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\WindowsUpdate" Details="*\\Temp\\winupd_*") OR (EventCode=11 (TargetFilename="*\\Data_*.zip" OR TargetFilename="*Login Data*" OR TargetFilename="*cookies.sqlite*") Image="*\\node.exe") | eval signal=case(match(TargetObject,"Run\\WindowsUpdate"),"runkey_persistence", match(TargetFilename,"Data_.*\.zip"),"loot_staging", 1=1,"browser_cred_access") | stats values(signal) as signals values(TargetObject) as regkey values(TargetFilename) as files count by host, User, Image | where count>=1 | table _time host User Image signals regkey files

Microsoft KQL

union (DeviceRegistryEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where RegistryKey has @"\CurrentVersion\Run" and RegistryValueName == "WindowsUpdate" | where RegistryValueData matches regex @"(?i)\\Temp\\winupd_" | extend Signal="runkey_persistence"), (DeviceFileEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "node.exe" | where FileName matches regex @"(?i)Data_[0-9]+\.zip" or FileName has_any ("Login Data", "cookies.sqlite") | extend Signal=iff(FileName endswith ".zip", "loot_staging", "browser_cred_access")) | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Signal, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, FolderPath, RegistryValueData

Sigma

title: Lucid Stealer Run-Key Persistence and Loot Staging
id: 8f2d0b53-4c9e-5a3b-0d7f-2b3c4d5e6f70
status: experimental
description: Detects Lucid Stealer HKCU Run WindowsUpdate persistence to a Temp winupd self-copy and Data_<hwid>.zip loot staging by node.exe
references:
    - https://gbhackers.com/lucid-stealer-hits-18-browsers/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/08
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1555.003
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1560.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\CurrentVersion\Run\WindowsUpdate'
        Details|contains: '\Temp\winupd_'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software using a 'WindowsUpdate' Run value (rare; verify target path)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Backup/security tools archiving browser profiles
  • Legitimate software abusing a generic 'WindowsUpdate' Run value (verify the target points to Temp)

Tuning notes: The combination of Run\WindowsUpdate -> %TEMP%\winupd_*.exe is high-fidelity; alert standalone. For loot staging, correlate node.exe touching browser stores within a short window of writing Data_*.zip to reduce FP from backup utilities.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Lucid Stealer — Node SEA Execution from User-Writable Path with Addon Load (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lucid Stealer — Discord Injection, Wallet Theft & Privilege Escalation (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lucid Stealer — HVNC Hidden Desktop & Remote Shell Spawned by Node (C2/Lateral) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lucid Stealer — Sigma: Node SEA Masquerade & RC4/XOR JS-Core Deobfuscation (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lucid Stealer — Sigma: Crypto-Clipper Clipboard Address Swap & Run-Key Persistence (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lucid Stealer — Sigma: C2/Exfil & DDoS Command Channel (C2/Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lucid Stealer — Node.js SEA Masquerade & .node Addon Staging (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lucid Stealer — C2 Beacon & HVNC Remote Access over HTTP/WebSocket (C2) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 18 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0721.

Sample indicators (3 of 18)

  • IP address: 45.138.16[.]107
  • Domain: lucidstealer[.]one
  • File hash: a380e66f381c9f88f4f221906f12b73e1f43517c8e5f6affcaca71fad3340d5f

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 18 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

18 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Lucid Stealer is a commercial Windows infostealer-plus-RAT analyzed by the Foresiet Threat Intel Team and reported publicly on 2026-06-08. It is distributed as a ~100 MB password-protected WinZip-AES archive containing a Windows x64 Node.js Single Executable Application (SEA). The SEA wrapping bundles a legitimate, signed Node.js runtime around a malicious NODE_SEA_BLOB JavaScript loader (~8.5 MB), allowing the payload to ride a trusted interpreter and evade signature- and reputation-based defenses.

The embedded JavaScript core is protected with an RC4-style PRGA keystream and an additional XOR pass. Once decoded, it drops and invokes a set of native Node addons staged under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Common\<id>\*.node: a bundled SQLite CLI for querying copied browser databases, a native elevation addon for privilege-escalation attempts, an HVNC addon for hidden virtual desktop / remote-screen control, RobotJS for synthetic input and screen capture, and a canvas image module for rendering screenshots and live streams.

Data theft is broad. Lucid harvests saved credentials, cookies, autofill, and history from 18 Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers; injects into and continuously exfiltrates from 4 Discord client variants; loots 7 local desktop wallets and 7 wallet browser extensions; reads Roblox session data; and runs a clipboard monitor that swaps copied cryptocurrency addresses against 21 supported formats (crypto-clipping). Staged loot is written to %TEMP%\Data_<hwid>.zip before exfiltration.

Persistence is established through an HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\WindowsUpdate registry value pointing at a hidden self-copy named %TEMP%\winupd_<random>.exe. Command and control runs over HTTP/WebSocket to 45.138.16.107:3001 and associated domains (lucidstealer.one, iloveyoulucid.space, 0kt.one) using /upload, /internal/log, /dc-injector, and /ws endpoints. Beyond theft the operator panel exposes live remote shell, file-manager operations, keylogging, hidden desktop control, and DDoS commands.

Lucid is sold as Malware-as-a-Service through a Telegram channel backed by a multi-tenant hosted web panel and per-customer license keys, with operator-branding strings such as "LUCIDPay" and "_LUCID*" variables. Operators briefly paused in late May 2026 and relaunched with a full site rebuild, announcing a planned migration from Node.js to Java for improved evasion — making this an active, evolving threat where behavioral hunting outperforms hash-based detection.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture; T1115 Clipboard Data; T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Credential Access

T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

Execution

T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

Impact

T1498 Network Denial of Service; T1657 Financial Theft

Persistence

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Privilege Escalation

T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

Initial Access

T1566 Phishing

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block C2 IP 45.138.16.107 and domains lucidstealer.one, iloveyoulucid.space, 0kt.one at perimeter and DNS
  • Hunt for HKCU Run value 'WindowsUpdate' pointing to %TEMP%\winupd_*.exe and remove
  • Treat any host that executed the payload as fully compromised — rotate all browser-saved credentials, Discord tokens, and crypto wallet keys
  • Quarantine %TEMP%\Data_<hwid>.zip staging archives and %LOCALAPPDATA%\Common\<id>\*.node addons

Workarounds

  • Block execution from %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA%\Common via WDAC/AppLocker
  • Disable clipboard access for untrusted processes where feasible

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for Node.js SEA executables spawning from user-writable paths
  • Alert on unexpected node.exe / *.node addon loads accessing browser credential stores
  • Move crypto users to hardware wallets to defeat clipboard clipping and key theft
  • Application allowlisting to block unsigned/oversized Node.js SEA binaries from TEMP

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: 10 x64; 11 x64
  • Google — Chrome / Chromium browsers
    Vulnerable versions: all
  • Mozilla — Firefox / Gecko browsers
    Vulnerable versions: all
  • Discord — Discord desktop (4 client variants)
    Vulnerable versions: all

Timeline

  • Lucid Stealer operators briefly suspended operations on their Telegram channel ahead of a site rebuild.
  • Operators relaunched with a full rebuild of the hosted web panel and announced a planned migration from Node.js to Java for improved evasion.
  • Foresiet Threat Intel Team statically analyzed a newly observed Lucid Stealer Node.js SEA build promoted via Telegram-linked underground channels.
  • C2 endpoint locked-ioc-14:3001, associated domains, payload hashes, and persistence artifacts published for defender hunting.
  • Public reporting of Lucid Stealer capabilities, IOCs, and C2 infrastructure by Cyber Security News and GBHackers.

Sources cited

Previous and next in malware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 5 sources; published ; last updated —.

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