# Lucid Stealer — Node.js-Wrapped Windows Infostealer with Hidden Remote Access (HVNC)

> Lucid Stealer is a subscription-sold (MaaS) Windows infostealer wrapped inside a legitimate Node.js Single Executable Application (SEA) runtime for evasion. It steals credentials, cookies, autofill and history from 18 browsers; runs a clipboard crypto-clipper across 21 address formats; loots 7 desktop wallets, 7 wallet browser extensions, 4 Discord client variants, and Roblox session data; and pairs theft with live remote access via a hidden HVNC desktop-control module, remote shell, file manager, keylogger, and screenshot/stream capture.

- **Published:** 2026-06-08T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-08T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0721
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-lucid-stealer-infostealer-tl-2026-0721.webp?v=1240b3b1 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Lucid Stealer Node.js HVNC Infostealer: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0721) — High severity, 18 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0721
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Lucid Stealer operators
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 18 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Lucid Stealer is a commercial Windows infostealer-plus-RAT analyzed by the Foresiet Threat Intel Team and reported publicly on 2026-06-08. It is distributed as a ~100 MB password-protected WinZip-AES archive containing a Windows x64 Node.js Single Executable Application (SEA). The SEA wrapping bundles a legitimate, signed Node.js runtime around a malicious NODE_SEA_BLOB JavaScript loader (~8.5 MB), allowing the payload to ride a trusted interpreter and evade signature- and reputation-based defenses.

The embedded JavaScript core is protected with an RC4-style PRGA keystream and an additional XOR pass. Once decoded, it drops and invokes a set of native Node addons staged under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Common\<id>\*.node: a bundled SQLite CLI for querying copied browser databases, a native elevation addon for privilege-escalation attempts, an HVNC addon for hidden virtual desktop / remote-screen control, RobotJS for synthetic input and screen capture, and a canvas image module for rendering screenshots and live streams.

Data theft is broad. Lucid harvests saved credentials, cookies, autofill, and history from 18 Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers; injects into and continuously exfiltrates from 4 Discord client variants; loots 7 local desktop wallets and 7 wallet browser extensions; reads Roblox session data; and runs a clipboard monitor that swaps copied cryptocurrency addresses against 21 supported formats (crypto-clipping). Staged loot is written to %TEMP%\Data_<hwid>.zip before exfiltration.

Persistence is established through an HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\WindowsUpdate registry value pointing at a hidden self-copy named %TEMP%\winupd_<random>.exe. Command and control runs over HTTP/WebSocket to 45.138.16.107:3001 and associated domains (lucidstealer.one, iloveyoulucid.space, 0kt.one) using /upload, /internal/log, /dc-injector, and /ws endpoints. Beyond theft the operator panel exposes live remote shell, file-manager operations, keylogging, hidden desktop control, and DDoS commands.

Lucid is sold as Malware-as-a-Service through a Telegram channel backed by a multi-tenant hosted web panel and per-customer license keys, with operator-branding strings such as "LUCIDPay" and "_LUCID*" variables. Operators briefly paused in late May 2026 and relaunched with a full site rebuild, announcing a planned migration from Node.js to Java for improved evasion — making this an active, evolving threat where behavioral hunting outperforms hash-based detection.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1657 Financial Theft
- T1498 Network Denial of Service

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Lucid Stealer — Run-Key Persistence & Browser Credential Loot Staging (Post-Exploitation)** (`TL-2026-0721-SPL-002`)

Detects Lucid Stealer post-exploitation: the HKCU\...\Run\WindowsUpdate persistence value pointing at a hidden %TEMP%\winupd_<random>.exe self-copy, and node.exe reading browser credential stores (Login Data, cookies.sqlite) then writing the %TEMP%\Data_<hwid>.zip exfil-staging archive.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1547.001, T1555.003, T1560.001, T1005
- **Data sources:** sysmon, edr, windows_security
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\WindowsUpdate" Details="*\\Temp\\winupd_*") OR (EventCode=11 (TargetFilename="*\\Data_*.zip" OR TargetFilename="*Login Data*" OR TargetFilename="*cookies.sqlite*") Image="*\\node.exe") | eval signal=case(match(TargetObject,"Run\\WindowsUpdate"),"runkey_persistence", match(TargetFilename,"Data_.*\.zip"),"loot_staging", 1=1,"browser_cred_access") | stats values(signal) as signals values(TargetObject) as regkey values(TargetFilename) as files count by host, User, Image | where count>=1 | table _time host User Image signals regkey files
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
union (DeviceRegistryEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where RegistryKey has @"\CurrentVersion\Run" and RegistryValueName == "WindowsUpdate" | where RegistryValueData matches regex @"(?i)\\Temp\\winupd_" | extend Signal="runkey_persistence"), (DeviceFileEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "node.exe" | where FileName matches regex @"(?i)Data_[0-9]+\.zip" or FileName has_any ("Login Data", "cookies.sqlite") | extend Signal=iff(FileName endswith ".zip", "loot_staging", "browser_cred_access")) | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Signal, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, FolderPath, RegistryValueData
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Lucid Stealer Run-Key Persistence and Loot Staging
id: 8f2d0b53-4c9e-5a3b-0d7f-2b3c4d5e6f70
status: experimental
description: Detects Lucid Stealer HKCU Run WindowsUpdate persistence to a Temp winupd self-copy and Data_<hwid>.zip loot staging by node.exe
references:
    - https://gbhackers.com/lucid-stealer-hits-18-browsers/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/08
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1555.003
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1560.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\CurrentVersion\Run\WindowsUpdate'
        Details|contains: '\Temp\winupd_'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software using a 'WindowsUpdate' Run value (rare; verify target path)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Backup/security tools archiving browser profiles
- Legitimate software abusing a generic 'WindowsUpdate' Run value (verify the target points to Temp)

**Tuning notes:** The combination of Run\WindowsUpdate -> %TEMP%\winupd_*.exe is high-fidelity; alert standalone. For loot staging, correlate node.exe touching browser stores within a short window of writing Data_*.zip to reduce FP from backup utilities.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Lucid Stealer — Node SEA Execution from User-Writable Path with Addon Load (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Lucid Stealer — Discord Injection, Wallet Theft & Privilege Escalation (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Lucid Stealer — HVNC Hidden Desktop & Remote Shell Spawned by Node (C2/Lateral) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Lucid Stealer — Sigma: Node SEA Masquerade & RC4/XOR JS-Core Deobfuscation (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Lucid Stealer — Sigma: Crypto-Clipper Clipboard Address Swap & Run-Key Persistence (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Lucid Stealer — Sigma: C2/Exfil & DDoS Command Channel (C2/Lateral Movement) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Lucid Stealer — Node.js SEA Masquerade & .node Addon Staging (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Lucid Stealer — C2 Beacon & HVNC Remote Access over HTTP/WebSocket (C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 18)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `45.138.16[.]107`
- Domain: `lucidstealer[.]one`
- File hash: `a380e66f381c9f88f4f221906f12b73e1f43517c8e5f6affcaca71fad3340d5f`

Full set of 18 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [New Lucid Stealer Targets 18 Browsers, Crypto Wallets, and Discord Tokens With Hidden Remote Access](https://cybersecuritynews.com/lucid-stealer-targets-18-browsers-crypto-wallets-and-discord-tokens/)
- [Lucid Stealer Hits 18 Browsers, Crypto Wallets, and Discord Tokens](https://gbhackers.com/lucid-stealer-hits-18-browsers/)
- [Foresiet Threat Intel — Stealer Operations and Threat Landscape](https://foresiet.com/blog/stealc-infostealer-operations-and-threat-landscape/)
- [FortiGuard Labs — Stealit Campaign Abuses Node.js Single Executable Application](https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/stealit-campaign-abuses-nodejs-single-executable-application)
- [Zscaler ThreatLabz — NodeLoader Node.js Malware Evading Detection](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/nodeloader-exposed-node-js-malware-evading-detection)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0721
