# UAC-0239 Spearphishing Campaign Against Ukrainian Defense Forces and Local Government Using the OrcaC2 Framework and FILEMESS Stealer (CERT-UA#17691)

> CERT-UA tracks UAC-0239, a cyber-espionage cluster that since mid-September 2025 has targeted Ukraine's Defense Forces and local self-government bodies with SBU-themed spearphishing ("countering Russian sabotage/reconnaissance groups") delivering VHD-borne payloads. The intrusion set pairs the open-source Go-based OrcaC2 framework (Orca Puppet agent) with FILEMESS, a custom Go file-stealer that exfiltrates documents to Telegram.

- **Published:** 2026-05-21T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-05-21T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0759
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-uac-0239-orcac2-campaign-tl-2026-0759.webp?v=13c44bee (Threadlinqs threat intel: UAC-0239 OrcaC2 and FILEMESS Stealer: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0759) — High severity, 59 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0759
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UAC-0239
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 59 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Ukraine's national cyber incident response team CERT-UA, in cooperation with the Armed Forces of Ukraine cyber unit (A0334), has tracked targeted attacks since the second half of September 2025 against the Defense Forces of Ukraine and local self-government bodies in several regions, using a lure theme of "countering Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRG)" impersonating the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). The activity is tracked under the identifier UAC-0239.

Initial access is achieved by distributing emails via services such as Ukr.net and Gmail (but not exclusively) containing links to download an archive (sometimes password-protected) holding a VHD (Virtual Hard Drive) file, or by attaching the VHD directly. The mounted VHD contains an executable plus several PDF decoy documents impersonating SBU regional-office appeals. Execution of the payload chains PowerShell and curl.exe (LOLBin) to retrieve follow-on stages from paste.c-net.org and an actor-controlled site (sbufiles.cloud), drops a VBScript (gupdate.vbs) and an executable masquerading as GoogleUpdate.exe (the Orca Puppet agent), and opens a decoy PDF.

Two malware families are deployed. FILEMESS is a Go file-stealer that recursively searches Desktop/Downloads/Documents and logical drives D-Z for a broad list of document and image extensions, computes MD5 hashes, and exfiltrates matching files via the Telegram Bot API. Its Telegram bot token is XOR-encrypted and BASE64-encoded; persistence is via a Run registry key; mutex-style single-instance enforcement checks for an existing process. A leaked PDB path (C:/Users/U7RY6W3E/Downloads/CLIMess/FIleMess/coreFile.go) confirms the Go build. OrcaC2 is a multifunction WebSocket-encrypted C2 framework written in Go (open source, github.com/Ptkatz/OrcaC2, last release 2022); its Orca Puppet agent supports remote command execution, interactive shell, file transfer, screenshots, keylogging, process management and dumping, UAC bypass, shellcode execution, multiple process-injection techniques, proxying (RUDP/TCP/RICMP/RHTTP/KCP/QUIC), SOCKS, traffic tunneling (SSH/SMB), and a port scanner. Persistence for OrcaC2 can use scheduled tasks, Run registry entries, or services.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1204 User Execution
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
- T1543 Create or Modify System Process
- T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1102 Web Service
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1090 Proxy
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**FILEMESS Telegram Bot-API Exfiltration & OrcaC2 Non-Standard-Port Beacon** (`TL-2026-0759-SPL-003`)

Detects the C2/exfiltration stage: FILEMESS POSTs collected documents to api.telegram.org/bot<digits>/sendDocument, and the OrcaC2 Orca Puppet agent beacons over WebSocket to non-standard high ports (promoukrnet.xyz:2264/ws, tcp 185.186.26.98:7324) or to known actor C2 IPs. Either a Telegram sendDocument request from an endpoint or an outbound connection to the campaign's C2 ports/IPs is a strong post-compromise signal.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1567, T1071.001, T1102, T1573, T1095
- **Data sources:** proxy, sysmon, edr_network_telemetry, firewall
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
(index=proxy OR index=network sourcetype="*proxy*") (uri_path="*/sendDocument*" url="*api.telegram.org/bot*") OR (index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=3 (DestinationPort=2264 OR DestinationPort=7324 OR DestinationIp IN ("185.186.26.98","87.120.93.239","87.120.126.184","87.120.93.143","64.188.91.87","92.53.116.149"))) 
| eval signal=case(match(url,"(?i)api\.telegram\.org/bot\d+") AND match(uri_path,"(?i)/sendDocument"),"filemess_telegram_exfil", (DestinationPort==2264 OR DestinationPort==7324),"orcac2_nonstd_beacon", isnotnull(DestinationIp),"orcac2_known_c2_ip") 
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(url) as urls values(DestinationIp) as dst_ips values(DestinationPort) as dst_ports values(Image) as proc by Computer,User,signal 
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let tg = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has "api.telegram.org/bot" and RemoteUrl has "/sendDocument"
| extend Signal = "filemess_telegram_exfil";
let c2 = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemotePort in (2264, 7324) or RemoteIP in ("185.186.26.98","87.120.93.239","87.120.126.184","87.120.93.143","64.188.91.87","92.53.116.149")
| extend Signal = "orcac2_beacon";
union tg, c2
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Signal
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: FILEMESS Telegram Exfiltration and OrcaC2 Beacon (UAC-0239)
id: 8f1d2c3a-0759-4a03-9b33-aa03c2e7d103
status: experimental
description: Detects FILEMESS document exfiltration via the Telegram Bot API (sendDocument) and OrcaC2 Orca Puppet WebSocket beacons to non-standard high ports or known UAC-0239 C2 IPs.
references:
    - https://cert.gov.ua/article/6285731
    - https://github.com/Ptkatz/OrcaC2
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/10
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.t1573
    - attack.t1095
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_tg:
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'api.telegram.org/bot'
        c-uri|contains: '/sendDocument'
    selection_c2:
        dst_port:
            - 2264
            - 7324
        c-uri|endswith: '/ws'
    selection_ip:
        dst_ip:
            - '185.186.26.98'
            - '87.120.93.239'
            - '87.120.126.184'
            - '87.120.93.143'
            - '64.188.91.87'
    condition: selection_tg or selection_c2 or selection_ip
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate corporate use of Telegram bots for notifications (rare in enterprise, verify per environment)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Sanctioned internal use of Telegram bots for alerting/notifications
- Security tooling beaconing on overlapping high ports (validate process and destination)

**Tuning notes:** Promote the C2 IP/domain set to a threat-intel lookup so new UAC-0239 infrastructure is appended without query edits. If Telegram is sanctioned for any business unit, scope the api.telegram.org rule by source subnet or correlate it with a preceding recursive document-discovery burst to raise fidelity.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- UAC-0239 PowerShell+curl LOLBin Ingress Chain (Sentinel/Defender) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAC-0239 Run-Key Persistence (Google Update / misspelled 'Sustem') (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- FILEMESS Recursive Document Discovery Preceding Telegram Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAC-0239 VHD/ISO Container Mount Followed by Volume Execution (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OrcaC2 UAC-Bypass and Process Injection Post-Exploitation (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OrcaC2 WebSocket C2 Beacon to Non-Standard Ports / Known UAC-0239 Infrastructure (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAC-0239 Hidden PowerShell Spawning curl.exe Download Chain (VHD Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAC-0239 VHD Mount Followed by EXE/VBS Execution from Mounted Volume (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 59)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.186.26[.]98`
- Domain: `ssu-gov[.]com`
- URL: `hxxps://drive[.]google[.]com/open?id=1TB2pnMfFpPuyV6Ggq6f8OcO5FhzpVnJE`

Full set of 59 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [CERT-UA#17691: UAC-0239 attacks using OrcaC2 and FILEMESS (primary advisory)](https://cert.gov.ua/article/6285731)
- [SOC Prime — UAC-0239 Activity Detection: Spearphishing via OrcaC2 and FILEMESS](https://socprime.com/blog/uac-0239-attack-detection/)
- [cybersecurity-help.cz — UAC-0239 targets Ukraine's Defense Forces with OrcaC2 and Filemess](https://www.cybersecurity-help.cz/blog/5014.html)
- [Broadcom Symantec Protection Bulletin — UAC-0239 group targets Ukraine with OrcaC2 and FILEMESS](https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/uac-0239-group-targets-ukraine-with-orcac2-framework-and-filemess-stealer)
- [OrcaC2 source code (Ptkatz/OrcaC2) — WebSocket-encrypted Go C2 framework](https://github.com/Ptkatz/OrcaC2)
- [OrcaC2 Orca_Puppet/main.go — agent source](https://github.com/Ptkatz/OrcaC2/blob/master/Orca_Puppet/main.go)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0759
