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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-0760

Houthi/Yemen-Based Disinformation & Influence Campaign Targeting Israel and the Gulf States (ClearSky)

mediumACTIVE

A persistent Yemeni/Houthi-aligned influence operation, active since 2016 and first exposed by ClearSky in 2019, that runs tens of fake media-outlet websites plus fake Facebook/Twitter personas to push fabricated news against Israel and the Gulf. After concentrating on Saudi Arabia and the UAE through 2019-2022, it refocused on Israel from late 2024 and remained active as of April 2025. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0760
Also known asYemen-Based Disinformation Campaign Distributing Fake News in Israel and the Arab World, Houthi Influence Campaign
SeverityMEDIUM
First disclosed
Affected productsIsrael Israeli public / media information space; Saudi Arabia Saudi public information space; United Arab Emirates UAE public information space
Nation-state nexusYemen
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1566 Phishing, T1583 Acquire Infrastructure, T1585 Establish Accounts, T1586 Compromise Accounts, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information, T1591 Gather Victim Org Information, T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains, T1608 Stage Capabilities, T1684.001 Impersonation
MotivationHACKTIVISM
Target sectorsmedia, government, general public, civil society
Target regionsIsrael, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Arabian Peninsula, Middle East
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0760 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 30 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Fake Media-Outlet Access via URL-Shortener Redirect Chain — Exploitation

Detects the initial-access vector of the Houthi/Yemen disinformation campaign: a user's web proxy logs show a 302 redirect from the operator-controlled url-short.net shortener immediately followed by a fetch to a hyphenated '<brand>-news / <brand>-press' fake outlet (e.g. nashr-news.com, dubai-press.com, gulf-press.net, noor-press.com, gulfecho.net). This is the staged-link (T1608.005) + spearphishing-link (T1566.002) delivery that seeds fabricated stories impersonating trusted Gulf/Israeli media brands (T1656).

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1608.005, T1566.002, T1656, T1583.001
  • Data sources: proxy, squid:access, bluecoat:proxysg, DeviceNetworkEvents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=proxy sourcetype="squid:access" OR sourcetype="bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog" earliest=-24h
| eval host=lower(coalesce(c_uri_host, url_domain, dest_host))
| eval is_shortener=if(match(host,"(?i)^url-short\.net$"),1,0)
| eval is_fake_outlet=if(match(host,"(?i)^[a-z0-9]+-(news|press)\.(com|net|online|news)$") OR match(host,"(?i)^(nashr-news|dubai-press|gulf-press|noor-press|gulfecho|gulf4news|alraqi-news|nshr|almshhd-news|raqebpress|shahd24|sada-news|asdaadubai|jdednews|alwasatalarby)\."),1,0)
| eval known_hosting_ip=if(cidrmatch("62.210.102.63/32",dest_ip) OR cidrmatch("163.172.232.163/32",dest_ip) OR cidrmatch("138.201.160.9/32",dest_ip) OR cidrmatch("138.201.160.2/32",dest_ip),1,0)
| where is_shortener=1 OR is_fake_outlet=1 OR known_hosting_ip=1
| transaction src_ip maxspan=30s
| where (is_shortener>0 AND is_fake_outlet>0) OR is_fake_outlet>0 OR known_hosting_ip>0
| stats min(_time) as first_seen values(host) as hosts values(status) as http_status values(dest_ip) as dest_ips by src_ip user
| eval detection="Houthi influence-op fake-outlet access chain"
| table first_seen src_ip user hosts http_status dest_ips detection

Microsoft KQL

let fakeOutletRegex = @"(?i)^[a-z0-9]+-(news|press)\.(com|net|online|news)$";
let knownIPs = dynamic(["62.210.102.63","163.172.232.163","138.201.160.9","138.201.160.2"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl matches regex fakeOutletRegex
    or RemoteUrl has "url-short.net"
    or RemoteIP in (knownIPs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp asc

Sigma

title: Fake Media-Outlet Access via URL-Shortener Redirect Chain (Houthi Influence Campaign)
id: 7c2f1a90-1f4b-4e1a-9a2d-0760aa000001
status: experimental
description: Proxy access showing a url-short.net 302 redirect followed by a hyphenated <brand>-news/<brand>-press fake-outlet fetch, the campaign's staged-link delivery of fabricated impersonation content.
references:
    - https://www.clearskysec.com/houthi-influence-campaign/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/10
tags:
    - attack.resource_development
    - attack.t1608.005
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1656
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    fake_outlet:
        c-uri-host|re: '(?i)^[a-z0-9]+-(news|press)\.(com|net|online|news)$'
    shortener:
        c-uri-host: 'url-short.net'
    known_hosts:
        c-uri-host:
            - 'nashr-news.com'
            - 'dubai-press.com'
            - 'gulf-press.net'
            - 'noor-press.com'
            - 'gulfecho.net'
    condition: fake_outlet or shortener or known_hosts
fields:
    - c-uri-host
    - cs-username
    - sc-status
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate news aggregators or marketing links that happen to match the hyphenated news/press pattern
level: medium

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate news aggregators or marketing campaigns using hyphenated news/press domains
  • Users sharing benign shortened links

Tuning notes: Tighten the regex to a curated allowlist of legitimate hyphenated outlets in your region to cut FPs; raise severity when the fetch destination IP is in the documented Online SAS (62.210.x) / Hetzner (138.201.x) ranges. Correlate with the 302-then-200 transaction sequence to confirm the redirect chain.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Endpoint Fetch of Hyphenated Fake-Outlet After Shortener Redirect — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Automated Content-Mirroring of RT/Sputnik Articles by Fake-Outlet Host — Distribution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Brand-Impersonation Recon & Persona Enumeration of Trusted Media Pages — Network · unlock with TL Creds
  • Hyphenated Fake Media-Outlet Domain Access — Exploitation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • URL-Shortener 302 Redirect Into Fake-Outlet Article — Distribution (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS Resolution For Influence-Op Outlet Pattern & Hosting Cluster — Network (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Coordinated Inauthentic Persona Posting Burst on Trusted Media Pages — Distribution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Passive-DNS Fake-Outlet Hosting Cluster & Shared-Nameserver Infrastructure — Network · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 30 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0760.

Sample indicators (3 of 30)

  • IP address: 62.210.102[.]63
  • Domain: nashr-news[.]com
  • IP address: 163.172.232[.]163

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 30 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

30 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

ClearSky Cyber Security has tracked a large-scale, Yemen-based disinformation and influence operation that it assesses is connected to the Houthi (Ansar Allah) movement, an Iran-aligned actor. The infrastructure was established in 2016, publicly exposed in July 2019, and was found still operating in early April 2025 using the same methodology.

The operation is built around several dozen fake media outlets that impersonate legitimate Arab news brands from the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. Domains follow a consistent naming convention - the fake outlet name with a hyphen and a 'news' or 'press' token (e.g. nashr-news[.]com, dubai-press[.]com, gulf-press[.]net, noor-press[.]com, gulfecho[.]net). Article content is copied and lightly modified from the Arabic editions of RT and Sputnik, mirroring the tradecraft of the Iranian Global Disinformation Operation (GDO) that ClearSky exposed in November 2018.

Distribution relies on fake social-media personas - frequently impersonating attractive young women - that post links to the fake outlets on the Facebook pages of legitimate Israeli media and in marginal Israeli social-media groups. In the most prominent July 25, 2019 incident, accounts spread fabricated death reports for Israeli actor Yona Elian and singer Roni Dalumi; one persona, handle 'Eilat Takrit' ('Eilat Incident'), seeded the rumor on the official page of the Israeli public broadcaster Kan. Operational-security failures tied several personas to adult men in Yemen (e.g. a profile claiming employment at a Tarim, Yemen business), supporting Yemeni attribution.

Several Arabic-language fake sites also carried out-of-place Hebrew content - copied and translated celebrity, rape and murder stories - indicating dedicated personnel with at least some Hebrew proficiency. Hosting clustered on a small set of European bulletproof-style servers: Online SAS/Scaleway (62.210.102[.]63 / 163.172.232[.]163, poneytelecom.eu / dedibox.fr) and Hetzner (138.201.160[.]9 and 138.201.160[.]2, your-server.de), with shared nameservers and overlapping WHOIS records pointing to Yemen. ClearSky rates the technological link to the Iranian GDO at low-medium certainty while attributing the operation itself to Yemen/Houthi operators.

This is an information-operation threat, not a software vulnerability: there is no CVE, malware family or exploit. The risk is reputational and societal - viral fabricated news, impersonation of trusted media brands, and erosion of public trust during periods of regional conflict.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Initial Access

T1566 Phishing

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1585 Establish Accounts; T1586 Compromise Accounts; T1608 Stage Capabilities

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1591 Gather Victim Org Information; T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains

stealth

T1684.001 Impersonation

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block and sinkhole the known fake media-outlet domains and hosting IPs (62.210.102.63, 163.172.232.163, 138.201.160.9, 138.201.160.2) at web proxies and DNS resolvers
  • Report impersonating Facebook pages, Twitter/X personas and fake outlet URLs to the respective platforms for takedown
  • Issue rapid official denials through verified channels when fabricated stories (e.g. false celebrity death reports) go viral

Workarounds

  • Pre-bunk and fact-check known recurring narratives (celebrity deaths, fabricated Gulf incidents)
  • Verify breaking stories against primary outlet domains before amplification

Longer-term hardening

  • Stand up a media-monitoring / brand-impersonation detection capability for trusted outlets and public figures
  • Educate the public and newsroom social teams on the campaign's hyphenated 'news'/'press' domain pattern and copied RT/Sputnik content
  • Coordinate with platform trust-and-safety and national CERTs on coordinated inauthentic behavior takedowns

Affected and fixed versions

  • Israel — Israeli public / media information space
    Vulnerable versions: Israeli media outlet Facebook pages; Israeli social media groups; public broadcaster Kan audience
  • Saudi Arabia — Saudi public information space
    Vulnerable versions: Saudi Arabia (primary 2019-2022 focus)
  • United Arab Emirates — UAE public information space
    Vulnerable versions: UAE (2019-2022 focus)

Timeline

  • Yemen-based disinformation infrastructure (fake media-outlet network) established, per WHOIS/passive-DNS records.
  • ClearSky exposes the Iranian Global Disinformation Operation (GDO); the Yemeni campaign later mirrors its methodology and copied RT/Sputnik content.
  • Fake personas spread fabricated death reports of Israeli actor Yona Elian and singer Roni Dalumi on Israeli media Facebook pages, including the 'Eilat Takrit' persona posting on the official Kan page.
  • ClearSky publishes its report exposing the large-scale Yemen-based fake-news campaign and its IOCs.
  • Through 2019-2022 the campaign concentrates on Gulf countries, most-covered being Saudi Arabia and Yemen, with UAE-themed outlets (e.g. dubai-press, asdaadubai).
  • Foreign Policy documents Yemen's parallel war in cyberspace involving Houthi/Iran/Saudi information operations.
  • From late 2024 the campaign refocuses targeting on Israel.
  • ClearSky discovers in early April 2025 that the campaign is still operating against Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE using the same 2019 methodology.
  • ClearSky publishes its 2025 'Houthi Influence Campaign' update confirming dedicated personnel, funding and Hebrew proficiency.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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