# Houthi/Yemen-Based Disinformation & Influence Campaign Targeting Israel and the Gulf States (ClearSky)

> A persistent Yemeni/Houthi-aligned influence operation, active since 2016 and first exposed by ClearSky in 2019, that runs tens of fake media-outlet websites plus fake Facebook/Twitter personas to push fabricated news against Israel and the Gulf. After concentrating on Saudi Arabia and the UAE through 2019-2022, it refocused on Israel from late 2024 and remained active as of April 2025.

- **Published:** 2026-06-10T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-10T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0760
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-houthi-influence-campaign-tl-2026-0760.webp?v=1d448704 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Houthi Influence Campaign Fake Outlets: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0760) — Medium severity, 30 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0760
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 30 (3 shown free below)

## Description

ClearSky Cyber Security has tracked a large-scale, Yemen-based disinformation and influence operation that it assesses is connected to the Houthi (Ansar Allah) movement, an Iran-aligned actor. The infrastructure was established in 2016, publicly exposed in July 2019, and was found still operating in early April 2025 using the same methodology.

The operation is built around several dozen fake media outlets that impersonate legitimate Arab news brands from the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. Domains follow a consistent naming convention - the fake outlet name with a hyphen and a 'news' or 'press' token (e.g. nashr-news[.]com, dubai-press[.]com, gulf-press[.]net, noor-press[.]com, gulfecho[.]net). Article content is copied and lightly modified from the Arabic editions of RT and Sputnik, mirroring the tradecraft of the Iranian Global Disinformation Operation (GDO) that ClearSky exposed in November 2018.

Distribution relies on fake social-media personas - frequently impersonating attractive young women - that post links to the fake outlets on the Facebook pages of legitimate Israeli media and in marginal Israeli social-media groups. In the most prominent July 25, 2019 incident, accounts spread fabricated death reports for Israeli actor Yona Elian and singer Roni Dalumi; one persona, handle 'Eilat Takrit' ('Eilat Incident'), seeded the rumor on the official page of the Israeli public broadcaster Kan. Operational-security failures tied several personas to adult men in Yemen (e.g. a profile claiming employment at a Tarim, Yemen business), supporting Yemeni attribution.

Several Arabic-language fake sites also carried out-of-place Hebrew content - copied and translated celebrity, rape and murder stories - indicating dedicated personnel with at least some Hebrew proficiency. Hosting clustered on a small set of European bulletproof-style servers: Online SAS/Scaleway (62.210.102[.]63 / 163.172.232[.]163, poneytelecom.eu / dedibox.fr) and Hetzner (138.201.160[.]9 and 138.201.160[.]2, your-server.de), with shared nameservers and overlapping WHOIS records pointing to Yemen. ClearSky rates the technological link to the Iranian GDO at low-medium certainty while attributing the operation itself to Yemen/Houthi operators.

This is an information-operation threat, not a software vulnerability: there is no CVE, malware family or exploit. The risk is reputational and societal - viral fabricated news, impersonation of trusted media brands, and erosion of public trust during periods of regional conflict.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1585 Establish Accounts
- T1586 Compromise Accounts
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains
- T1591 Gather Victim Org Information
- T1566 Phishing
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Fake Media-Outlet Access via URL-Shortener Redirect Chain — Exploitation** (`TL-2026-0760-SPL-001`)

Detects the initial-access vector of the Houthi/Yemen disinformation campaign: a user's web proxy logs show a 302 redirect from the operator-controlled url-short.net shortener immediately followed by a fetch to a hyphenated '<brand>-news / <brand>-press' fake outlet (e.g. nashr-news.com, dubai-press.com, gulf-press.net, noor-press.com, gulfecho.net). This is the staged-link (T1608.005) + spearphishing-link (T1566.002) delivery that seeds fabricated stories impersonating trusted Gulf/Israeli media brands (T1656).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1608.005, T1566.002, T1656, T1583.001
- **Data sources:** proxy, squid:access, bluecoat:proxysg, DeviceNetworkEvents
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy sourcetype="squid:access" OR sourcetype="bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog" earliest=-24h
| eval host=lower(coalesce(c_uri_host, url_domain, dest_host))
| eval is_shortener=if(match(host,"(?i)^url-short\.net$"),1,0)
| eval is_fake_outlet=if(match(host,"(?i)^[a-z0-9]+-(news|press)\.(com|net|online|news)$") OR match(host,"(?i)^(nashr-news|dubai-press|gulf-press|noor-press|gulfecho|gulf4news|alraqi-news|nshr|almshhd-news|raqebpress|shahd24|sada-news|asdaadubai|jdednews|alwasatalarby)\."),1,0)
| eval known_hosting_ip=if(cidrmatch("62.210.102.63/32",dest_ip) OR cidrmatch("163.172.232.163/32",dest_ip) OR cidrmatch("138.201.160.9/32",dest_ip) OR cidrmatch("138.201.160.2/32",dest_ip),1,0)
| where is_shortener=1 OR is_fake_outlet=1 OR known_hosting_ip=1
| transaction src_ip maxspan=30s
| where (is_shortener>0 AND is_fake_outlet>0) OR is_fake_outlet>0 OR known_hosting_ip>0
| stats min(_time) as first_seen values(host) as hosts values(status) as http_status values(dest_ip) as dest_ips by src_ip user
| eval detection="Houthi influence-op fake-outlet access chain"
| table first_seen src_ip user hosts http_status dest_ips detection
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let fakeOutletRegex = @"(?i)^[a-z0-9]+-(news|press)\.(com|net|online|news)$";
let knownIPs = dynamic(["62.210.102.63","163.172.232.163","138.201.160.9","138.201.160.2"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl matches regex fakeOutletRegex
    or RemoteUrl has "url-short.net"
    or RemoteIP in (knownIPs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp asc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Fake Media-Outlet Access via URL-Shortener Redirect Chain (Houthi Influence Campaign)
id: 7c2f1a90-1f4b-4e1a-9a2d-0760aa000001
status: experimental
description: Proxy access showing a url-short.net 302 redirect followed by a hyphenated <brand>-news/<brand>-press fake-outlet fetch, the campaign's staged-link delivery of fabricated impersonation content.
references:
    - https://www.clearskysec.com/houthi-influence-campaign/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/10
tags:
    - attack.resource_development
    - attack.t1608.005
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1656
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    fake_outlet:
        c-uri-host|re: '(?i)^[a-z0-9]+-(news|press)\.(com|net|online|news)$'
    shortener:
        c-uri-host: 'url-short.net'
    known_hosts:
        c-uri-host:
            - 'nashr-news.com'
            - 'dubai-press.com'
            - 'gulf-press.net'
            - 'noor-press.com'
            - 'gulfecho.net'
    condition: fake_outlet or shortener or known_hosts
fields:
    - c-uri-host
    - cs-username
    - sc-status
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate news aggregators or marketing links that happen to match the hyphenated news/press pattern
level: medium
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate news aggregators or marketing campaigns using hyphenated news/press domains
- Users sharing benign shortened links

**Tuning notes:** Tighten the regex to a curated allowlist of legitimate hyphenated outlets in your region to cut FPs; raise severity when the fetch destination IP is in the documented Online SAS (62.210.x) / Hetzner (138.201.x) ranges. Correlate with the 302-then-200 transaction sequence to confirm the redirect chain.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Endpoint Fetch of Hyphenated Fake-Outlet After Shortener Redirect — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Automated Content-Mirroring of RT/Sputnik Articles by Fake-Outlet Host — Distribution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Brand-Impersonation Recon & Persona Enumeration of Trusted Media Pages — Network (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Hyphenated Fake Media-Outlet Domain Access — Exploitation (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- URL-Shortener 302 Redirect Into Fake-Outlet Article — Distribution (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DNS Resolution For Influence-Op Outlet Pattern & Hosting Cluster — Network (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Coordinated Inauthentic Persona Posting Burst on Trusted Media Pages — Distribution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Passive-DNS Fake-Outlet Hosting Cluster & Shared-Nameserver Infrastructure — Network (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 30)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `62.210.102[.]63`
- Domain: `nashr-news[.]com`
- IP address: `163.172.232[.]163`

Full set of 30 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Houthi Influence Campaign (2025 update)](https://www.clearskysec.com/houthi-influence-campaign/)
- [Yemen-Based Disinformation Campaign Distributing Fake News in Israel and the Arab World (full report w/ IOCs)](https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Yemen-Based-Disinformation-Campaign-Distributing-Fake-News-in-Israel-and-the-Arab-World.pdf)
- [ClearSky Cyber Security on X - Yemeni/Houthi influence campaign disclosure](https://x.com/ClearskySec/status/1910316630799704367)
- [Global Iranian Disinformation Operation (GDO)](https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Global-Iranian-Disinformation-Operation-Clearsky-Cyber-Security.pdf)
- [Houthi Influence Campaign - malware.news mirror](https://malware.news/t/houthi-influence-campaign/93049)
- [Yemen's Parallel War in Cyberspace](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/06/yemen-war-internet-media-houthis-iran-saudi-arabia/)
- [Amid US conflict, Houthis leverage Western social media to spread their message (Kharon)](https://www.kharon.com/brief/houthis-yemen-propaganda-us-social-media)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0760
