# Iranian "Dream Job" Campaign (TA455 / Charming Kitten) — SnailResin Loader & SlugResin Backdoor Targeting Aerospace, Aviation & Defense

> TA455, an Iranian threat actor assessed as a subgroup of Charming Kitten / APT35 (tracked as UNC1549 by Mandiant and Yellow Dev 13 by PwC), has run a social-engineering "Dream Job" campaign since at least September 2023 against aerospace, aviation, and defense personnel. Fake recruiting sites (careers2find[.]com) and AI-generated LinkedIn recruiter personas deliver a ZIP containing SignedConnection.exe and a malicious secur32.dll that is DLL side-loaded as the SnailResin loader, activating the SlugResin backdoor (an updated BassBreaker variant). The toolset's deliberate overlap with North Korean Kimsuky/Lazarus "Dream Job" operations creates attribution ambiguity.

- **Published:** 2026-06-10T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-10-17T15:28:21.674Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0763
- **ID:** TL-2026-0763
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** TA455 (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 26 (3 shown free below)

## Description

ClearSky Cyber Security published the "Iranian Dream Job" report on 2024-11-12, attributing an espionage campaign active since at least September 2023 to the Iranian threat actor TA455. TA455 is assessed to be a sub-cluster of Charming Kitten (APT35 / Mint Sandstorm / CALANQUE), tracked by Mandiant as UNC1549 and by PwC as Yellow Dev 13, and linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The campaign targets the aerospace, aviation, and defense sectors with a particular focus on Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, India, and possibly Albania.

The operation borrows the well-known "Dream Job" social-engineering playbook. TA455 operators impersonate recruiters using fake LinkedIn personas decorated with AI-generated profile photographs and stolen identities of real individuals. Victims are engaged through LinkedIn messaging and a fraudulent recruitment portal, careers2find[.]com, fronted through Cloudflare to obscure the true hosting location. The site (and accompanying PDF "instructions") guide the target through downloading a ZIP archive that mixes benign job-related documents with a signed executable, SignedConnection.exe, and a malicious secur32.dll.

When SignedConnection.exe is launched, it side-loads the trojanized secur32.dll — the SnailResin loader (Trojan:Win64/SnailResin) — which decrypts and runs SlugResin (Backdoor:Win64/SlugResin), an updated version of the BassBreaker backdoor that grants remote access for follow-on credential theft, lateral movement, and secondary payload deployment. To resolve command-and-control infrastructure, SnailResin uses GitHub as a dead-drop resolver: it reads encoded C2 locations from seemingly innocuous GitHub accounts such as "msdnedgesupport", then communicates with backend infrastructure (e.g., xboxapicenter[.]com) while blending into the traffic of trusted services including GitHub, Cloudflare, and Microsoft Azure.

The campaign's most notable analytic feature is intentional tradecraft overlap with North Korean "Dream Job" operations (Lazarus/Kimsuky), which ClearSky assesses may be deliberate false-flag/attribution-confusion or evidence of tool-sharing, complicating attribution for defenders.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1585 Establish Accounts
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- T1588 Obtain Capabilities
- T1566 Phishing
- T1204 User Execution
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1553 Subvert Trust Controls
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1102 Web Service
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1090 Proxy
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1656 Impersonation

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SnailResin secur32.dll Side-Load From User-Writable Path — Exploitation** (`TL-2026-0763-SPL-001`)

Detects the core TA455 SnailResin execution event: a signed-looking host EXE (SignedConnection.exe) loading a co-located, relocated secur32.dll from a user-writable directory (Temp/Downloads/Users) instead of System32/SysWOW64. This is DLL search-order hijack / side-loading where the malicious loader masquerades as the legitimate Windows Security Support Provider module. Fires when the secur32.dll image-load originates outside the legitimate system paths.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1574.002, T1036.005, T1204.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_defender_atp, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\secur32.dll" NOT (ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\System32\\*" OR ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*" OR ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*") 
| eval susp_path=if(match(lower(Image),"\\\\(users|temp|downloads|appdata)\\\\"),"user_writable","other") 
| where susp_path="user_writable" OR like(lower(Image),"%signedconnection.exe") 
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Image) as host_image values(ImageLoaded) as loaded_dll values(Signed) as signed by Computer User 
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime) 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "secur32.dll"
| where FolderPath !startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\" and FolderPath !startswith "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\" and FolderPath !startswith "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\"
| where FolderPath has_any ("\\Users\\", "\\Temp\\", "\\Downloads\\", "\\AppData\\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: SnailResin secur32.dll Side-Load From Non-System32 Path
id: 7c3a1e64-2d51-4b9a-9f0e-0763a1b2c3d4
status: experimental
description: Detects secur32.dll loaded from a user-writable path rather than System32/SysWOW64, indicating TA455 SnailResin DLL side-loading via SignedConnection.exe.
references:
    - https://www.clearskysec.com/irdreamjob24/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/10
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1574.002
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\secur32.dll'
    filter_legit:
        ImageLoaded|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Portable applications bundling their own secur32.dll (rare)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate portable software that ships and loads its own copy of secur32.dll from an application directory
- Software installers staging DLLs in Temp during setup

**Tuning notes:** Allow-list known good application directories that legitimately ship secur32.dll. Pair with code-signing checks on the host EXE and correlate with recent ZIP extraction events to reduce noise.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- [indicator] Execution From ZIP-Extracted User Path — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SMB Lateral Movement + Admin-Share Access Post-Compromise — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Periodic Web Beacon To Trusted-Service-Fronted C2 — Command & Control (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Code-Signed Host EXE Loading Relocated [indicator] — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Dream Job ZIP Drops EXE+DLL Pair To User Path — Exploitation/Delivery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitHub Dead-Drop Resolver Query From Loader Process — Command & Control (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Browser Credential-Store Access Following [indicator] Load — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitHub Dead-Drop Resolver + xboxapicenter C2 Beacon — Command & Control (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 26)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.186.244[.]130`
- Domain: `careers2find[.]com`
- File hash: `918e70e3f5fdafad28effd512b2f2d21c86cb3d3f14ec14f7ff9e7f0760fd760`

Full set of 26 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Iranian "Dream Job" Campaign 11.24](https://www.clearskysec.com/irdreamjob24/)
- [Iranian Dream Job campaign Ver 1.1 11/24 (full report PDF)](https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Iranian-Dream-Job-ver1.pdf)
- [Iranian Hackers Use "Dream Job" Lures to Deploy SnailResin Malware in Aerospace Attacks](https://thehackernews.com/2024/11/iranian-hackers-use-dream-job-lures-to.html)
- [TA455's Iranian Dream Job Campaign Targets Aerospace with Malware](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/ta455s-iranian-dream-job-campaign/)
- [Iranian Dream Job Campaign Targets Aerospace Industry with SnailResin Malware](https://securityonline.info/iranian-dream-job-campaign-targets-aerospace-industry-with-snailresin-malware/)
- [Iranian Cybercriminals Incorporate SnailResin Malware into Aerospace Attacks (Active IOCs)](https://rewterz.com/threat-advisory/iranian-cybercriminals-incorporate-snailresin-malware-into-aerospace-attacks-by-using-dream-job-lures-active-iocs)
- [Iranian TA455 Initiates Dream Job Campaign to Target Aviation and Other Critical Industries](https://rhisac.org/threat-intelligence/iranian-ta455-initiates-dream-job-campaign-to-target-aviation-and-other-critical-industries-with-malware/)
- [UNC1549 Hacks Devices in Telecom Firms via LinkedIn Job Lures and MINIBIKE Malware](https://thehackernews.com/2025/09/unc1549-hacks-34-devices-in-11-telecom.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0763
