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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0769

DeceptionAds: Fake CAPTCHA Malvertising Campaign Abusing the Monetag Ad Network to Distribute Lumma Infostealer via ClickFix

highACTIVE

DeceptionAds is a large-scale malvertising operation that abuses the Monetag ad network (and BeMob ad-tracking for cloaking) to serve fraudulent CAPTCHA verification pages. The pages use the ClickFix technique to coerce Windows users into pasting and running an obfuscated PowerShell one-liner that installs the Lumma infostealer.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0769
Also known asDeceptionAds, Fake Captcha Campaign, CAPTCHAgeddon, ClickFix
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (endpoints with PowerShell); Monetag (PropellerAds) Monetag Ad Network / Traffic Distribution System; BeMob BeMob Ad Tracking / Cloaking Service
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-451, CWE-1021
AttributionVane Viper (medium confidence)
MalwareLumma Stealer - S1213
ToolsMonetag TDS -> BeMob TDS redirect chain, mshta.exe
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102 Web Service, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1189 Drive-by Compromise, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise and 9 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsconsumer, media-streaming-audiences, general-public, gaming
Target regionsUnited States, Europe, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0769 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 32 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: ClickFix RunMRU-Origin PowerShell Download Cradle — Exploitation (DeceptionAds)

Detects the DeceptionAds/ClickFix initial-access execution: a PowerShell process spawned from explorer.exe (the Win+R Run dialog parent) carrying a download-and-execute cradle (iwr/Invoke-WebRequest/iex), hidden window, or encoded command. This is the moment the victim pastes the fake-CAPTCHA clipboard-seeded one-liner into the Run dialog and presses Enter, fetching the Lumma Stealer payload.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1204.004, T1059.001, T1105
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" Image="*\\powershell.exe" (CommandLine="*iwr *" OR CommandLine="*Invoke-WebRequest*" OR CommandLine="*iex*" OR CommandLine="*Invoke-Expression*" OR CommandLine="*-enc *" OR CommandLine="*-EncodedCommand*" OR CommandLine="*FromBase64String*") (CommandLine="*-w hidden*" OR CommandLine="*-WindowStyle hidden*" OR CommandLine="*-nop*" OR CommandLine="*-NoProfile*" OR CommandLine="*http*")
| eval risk="ClickFix RunMRU cradle"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host, User, ParentImage, Image
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| where count > 0

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("iwr ", "Invoke-WebRequest", "iex", "Invoke-Expression", "-enc", "-EncodedCommand", "FromBase64String")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-w hidden", "-WindowStyle hidden", "-nop", "-NoProfile", "http")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: ClickFix RunMRU-Origin PowerShell Download Cradle (DeceptionAds)
id: 7c1b4f02-9a3e-4d2c-8b71-0a6f3e9d1a01
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell spawned from explorer.exe (Win+R Run dialog) with a download-and-execute cradle, characteristic of the DeceptionAds fake-CAPTCHA ClickFix technique delivering Lumma Stealer.
references:
    - https://guard.io/labs/deceptionads-fake-captcha-driving-infostealer-infections-and-a-glimpse-to-the-dark-side-of
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/004/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
    selection_cradle:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'iwr '
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'iex'
            - 'Invoke-Expression'
            - '-enc'
            - '-EncodedCommand'
    selection_evasion:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-w hidden'
            - '-WindowStyle hidden'
            - '-nop'
            - 'http'
    condition: selection_parent and selection_cradle and selection_evasion
falsepositives:
    - Rare admin scripts launched manually via the Run dialog that download content
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Administrators manually launching download scripts from the Win+R Run dialog
  • Software deployment tooling that proxies through explorer.exe

Tuning notes: Baseline legitimate explorer-spawned PowerShell in your environment and exclude known admin accounts/hosts. Tighten by requiring an outbound HTTP connection (Sysmon EventCode 3) from the same powershell.exe PID within 60s to reduce noise.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Encoded PowerShell Download Cradle from Browser/Explorer Lineage — Exploitation (ClickFix) · unlock with TL Creds
  • mshta Proxy Execution + Browser Credential Store Access — Post-Exploitation (Lumma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Browser-to-Object-Storage Redirect then Script-Host C2 Beacon — C2/Lateral (DeceptionAds) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Clipboard Seed to RunMRU PowerShell Execution Sequence — Exploitation (ClickFix) · unlock with TL Creds
  • RunMRU Registry Paste Artifact with Download Cradle — Post-Exploitation (ClickFix) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lumma Stealer TeslaBrowser User-Agent C2 Beacon — C2/Exfiltration (DeceptionAds) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Suspicious RunMRU Entry Seeded with PowerShell/mshta Cradle — Post-Exploitation (ClickFix) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lumma Stealer C2 Beacon to CDN/Object-Storage Hosts — C2/Exfiltration (DeceptionAds) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 32 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0769.

Sample indicators (3 of 32)

  • IP address: 181.174.164[.]117
  • Domain: bot-check-v1[.]b-cdn[.]net
  • IP address: 88.119.175[.]52

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 32 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

32 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Guardio Labs (with Infoblox) reported over 1 million daily ad impressions across 3,000+ publisher sites and thousands of daily victims.

DeceptionAds is a single-threat-actor malvertising operation publicly documented by Guardio Labs (Nati Tal) in collaboration with Infoblox on December 16, 2024, and tracked to the actor "Vane Viper" (also previously tracked by Infoblox as Omnatuor). It represents a more dangerous, ad-network-scaled variant of the ClickFix / "CAPTCHAgeddon" social-engineering technique.

The distribution chain begins on high-traffic pirated-content and streaming sites (anime, movies, manga, games, sports streams) that monetize via Monetag, a part of the PropellerAds network. Monetag JavaScript ad tags load obfuscated scripts from Monetag's Traffic Distribution System (TDS). To evade Monetag's content moderation, the actor submitted benign BeMob tracking URLs (leveraging BeMob's reputation) instead of the direct malicious creatives; once approved, the destination was swapped to redirect to fake CAPTCHA pages. The full redirect path is Monetag TDS -> BeMob TDS -> a fake CAPTCHA page hosted on legitimate cloud/CDN object storage (Bunny CDN b-cdn.net subdomains, Oracle Cloud Object Storage, Scaleway, EXOScale, Cloudflare R2, Netlify).

The fake CAPTCHA page imitates Google reCAPTCHA / hCaptcha. When the victim clicks the "I'm not a robot" / verify control, an embedded JavaScript snippet silently writes an obfuscated PowerShell one-liner to the system clipboard. The page then instructs the victim to open the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), paste (Ctrl+V), and press Enter -- the ClickFix "verification steps." Executing the command downloads and runs the Lumma Stealer payload from attacker infrastructure. Lumma harvests browser-stored credentials, cookies/session tokens, password-manager data, cryptocurrency wallets, banking and social-media accounts, and local files, exfiltrating them to C2. Multiple obfuscated PowerShell and JavaScript variants were rotated throughout the campaign to evade Google Safe Browsing and endpoint detection.

Responsibility was fragmented across the abuse chain: the ad network blamed cloaking, the tracking service claimed an analytics-only role, publishers disclaimed the creatives, and hosting providers claimed ignorance. After Guardio's disclosure, Monetag removed 200+ threat-actor accounts (registered with falsified documents) within eight days and BeMob removed cloaking accounts within four days; the campaign briefly paused but Guardio observed a resurgence on December 11, 2024 using Monetag and alternative ad networks, demonstrating actor persistence and platform diversity.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1218.005 Mshta

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.007 JavaScript; T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

Initial Access

T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1566 Phishing

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1583.007 Serverless; T1587.001 Malware; T1608.004 Drive-by Target

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block known fake-CAPTCHA hosting subdomains (b-cdn.net, OCI customer-oci.com, exo.io, r2.dev, netlify.app paths) and BeMob cloaking domains at the web proxy/DNS layer
  • Block the listed C2/relay IPs (181.174.164.117, 88.119.175.52, 195.201.221.109) and domains at the perimeter
  • Disable or restrict the Windows Run dialog and clipboard-to-Run workflows via policy where feasible; warn users that no legitimate CAPTCHA ever asks you to press Win+R and paste a command
  • Hunt for recent PowerShell executions launched from explorer.exe/RunMRU with download-and-execute (iwr/iex, mshta) patterns

Workarounds

  • Restrict outbound access so only approved hosts can run script interpreters
  • Use AppLocker/WDAC to constrain script-host execution
  • Reset credentials and browser sessions for any host that executed the pasted command (assume credential theft)

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for clipboard-seeded PowerShell and LOLBins (powershell.exe, mshta.exe) spawned from the Run dialog
  • Enforce PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and script-block + module logging; ship logs to SIEM
  • Roll out user-awareness training specifically on ClickFix / fake-CAPTCHA 'verification steps' social engineering
  • Use DNS filtering / protective DNS to block newly-registered and malvertising-associated domains
  • Deploy reputable ad-blocking / content-filtering on managed endpoints to cut the malvertising delivery vector

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (endpoints with PowerShell)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 10; Windows 11
  • Monetag (PropellerAds) — Monetag Ad Network / Traffic Distribution System
    Vulnerable versions: abused as delivery vector
  • BeMob — BeMob Ad Tracking / Cloaking Service
    Vulnerable versions: abused for cloaking

Timeline

  • Guardio Labs identifies the large-scale fake-CAPTCHA malvertising operation and begins tracking the Monetag-originated redirect chain (approx. initial notification window).
  • BeMob removes the ad-tracking/cloaking accounts used by the threat actor, four days after Guardio's disclosure.
  • Monetag removes 200+ threat-actor accounts (registered with falsified documents), eight days after Guardio's notification.
  • Across a 10-day analysis period in late November 2024, Guardio measures 1M+ daily ad impressions and thousands of daily victims across 3,000+ publisher sites.
  • Guardio observes a resurgence of the campaign using Monetag and alternative ad networks, indicating threat-actor persistence and platform diversity.
  • Guardio Labs (Nati Tal) publishes the DeceptionAds report in collaboration with Infoblox; BleepingComputer and InfoStealers mirror the disclosure the same day.
  • The Hacker News and TechRadar report on DeceptionAds delivering 1M+ daily impressions via 3,000 sites and fake CAPTCHA pages.
  • CircleID / WhoisXML API publish a CAPTCHAgeddon pivot analysis expanding the IOC set (156 domains, 16 IPs in the original set; registrant/IP/string-connected pivots).

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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