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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-0800

Wazuh Manager 5.0 inventory_sync NDJSON Injection in OpenSearch _bulk API (GHSA-ff9g-85jq-r3g3, CVSS 10.0)

criticalACTIVE

An unauthenticated NDJSON injection flaw in the Wazuh Manager 5.0 inventory_sync subsystem lets any enrolled agent smuggle arbitrary OpenSearch _bulk operations through the unsanitized DataValue.index flatbuffer field, enabling deletion of security alerts, tampering of vulnerability/inventory data, and persistent payload injection into Kibana saved objects.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0800
Also known asGHSA-ff9g-85jq-r3g3, Wazuh inventory_sync NDJSON Injection
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS10 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Affected productsWazuh Wazuh Manager; Wazuh Wazuh (4.x branch)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-74, CWE-93, CWE-863
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1046 Network Service Discovery, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1078.001 Default Accounts, T1133 External Remote Services, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1485 Data Destruction, T1491.001 Internal Defacement, T1505 Server Software Component, T1552.001 Credentials In Files, T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation, T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation and 3 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstechnology, managed-security-services, government, financial, healthcare, enterprise
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0800 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 17 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Bulk Delete / Drop in wazuh-alerts-* Doc Count From Indexer Service Account (Evidence Destruction)

Detects the anti-forensic impact stage of GHSA-ff9g-85jq-r3g3: bulk delete operations against wazuh-alerts-* (or other security indices) executed under the wazuh-indexer/admin all_access keystore credential, and the corresponding sudden drop in alert document counts inconsistent with normal ingest/retention. This is defense evasion and data destruction used to erase post-compromise evidence.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1485, T1070, T1685, T1565.001
  • Data sources: opensearch_audit, wazuh_indexer
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=wazuh_indexer sourcetype="opensearch:audit" action="indices:data/write/bulk" request="*\"delete\"*"
| rex field=request "_index\"\s*:\s*\"(?<target_index>wazuh-[^\"]+)\""
| search target_index="wazuh-alerts*" OR target_index="wazuh-states-vulnerabilities*"
| stats count as delete_ops dc(target_index) as indices values(target_index) as targets min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen by principal src_ip
| where delete_ops>0 AND (principal="admin" OR principal="*all_access*" OR principal="wazuh-indexer")
| eval note="bulk delete on security indices under indexer service account"
| `ctime(firstSeen)` | `ctime(lastSeen)`

Microsoft KQL

let lookback = 24h;
OpenSearchAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where Action_s == "indices:data/write/bulk" and Request_s has '"delete"'
| extend TargetIndex = extract(@"_index\"\s*:\s*\"(wazuh-[^\"]+)\"", 1, Request_s)
| where TargetIndex startswith "wazuh-alerts" or TargetIndex startswith "wazuh-states-vulnerabilities"
| where Principal_s in ("admin", "wazuh-indexer") or Principal_s has "all_access"
| summarize DeleteOps = count(), Targets = make_set(TargetIndex), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by Principal_s, SrcIp_s
| where DeleteOps > 0
| order by DeleteOps desc

Sigma

title: Bulk Delete Against wazuh-alerts-* From Wazuh Indexer Service Account (Evidence Destruction)
id: b2e1d1ef-0800-4c11-8d22-3f5a7b9c1e33
status: experimental
description: Detects bulk delete operations against wazuh-alerts-* or vulnerability-state indices executed under the admin/all_access or wazuh-indexer service account, the data-destruction / indicator-removal impact of GHSA-ff9g-85jq-r3g3 used to erase forensic evidence.
references:
    - https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/security/advisories/GHSA-ff9g-85jq-r3g3
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-15
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1485
    - attack.t1565.001
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: opensearch
    category: audit
detection:
    selection:
        action: 'indices:data/write/bulk'
        request|contains: '"delete"'
        index|startswith: 'wazuh-alerts'
    filter_legitimate:
        layer: 'ism'
    condition: selection and not filter_legitimate
falsepositives:
    - ISM/ILM retention rollover or snapshot lifecycle deletes during scheduled maintenance
    - Authorized administrative index cleanup
level: high

Known false positives:

  • ISM/ILM retention rollover or snapshot lifecycle deletes during scheduled maintenance windows
  • Authorized administrative index cleanup or reindex operations

Tuning notes: Exclude the ISM/ILM service principal and known retention schedules; pair with a metric monitor that alerts on a >X% drop in wazuh-alerts-* doc count over a short interval. Downscope the indexer keystore credential so any all_access delete becomes inherently anomalous.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • OpenSearch _bulk NDJSON Action/Source Line Ratio Anomaly (inventory_sync Injection) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Unattended Write to [indicator] Saved Objects Under Indexer Credential (Persistence) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Privileged all_access Keystore Credential Used for Destructive Bulk Ops (Credential Abuse / Impact) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Newline/CRLF Bytes In Wazuh inventory_sync Index Field (Injection Primitive) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Wazuh Keystore Credential Read / indexer Service Account Spike (Credentials-in-Files Access) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Wazuh Alert Index Tampering / Mass Document Drop (Indicator Removal & Stored-Data Manipulation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Wazuh inventory_sync NDJSON Injection — Smuggled _bulk Action via Unescaped _index (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Anonymous Wazuh Agent Enrollment Followed by Immediate inventory_sync Traffic (Exploitation Setup) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 17 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0800.

17 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Tracked as GHSA-ff9g-85jq-r3g3 with a maximum CVSS 3.1 score of 10.0.

GHSA-ff9g-85jq-r3g3 is a critical (CVSS 10.0) injection vulnerability in the inventory_sync subsystem introduced in Wazuh Manager 5.0.0-beta1 — a code path that does not exist in the Wazuh 4.x branch. When an enrolled agent sends inventory data to the manager, the agent-controlled DataValue.index flatbuffer field is appended directly into the body of an OpenSearch _bulk NDJSON (newline-delimited JSON) request without any escaping or validation. In indexerConnectorSyncImpl.hpp the _index value is appended raw at both the bulkIndex and bulkDelete call sites (m_bulkData.append(index); // Untrusted input), while the adjacent _id field is correctly sanitized via appendEscapedId() — an asymmetry that is the root cause.

By embedding newline characters and crafted JSON action/metadata lines into the index field, an attacker injects additional bulk operations (delete, index, update) into the NDJSON payload the manager posts to the indexer. Because the injected operations execute under the manager's OpenSearch credentials — which in default deployments resolve to the admin account with the all_access role stored in the Wazuh keystore — a single agent-side injection is elevated to effective cluster-admin control over all indexed security data.

Exploitation is unauthenticated and network-reachable: Wazuh's default wazuh-authd configuration permits anonymous agent enrollment (use_password=no, ssl_verify_host=no) over TCP/1515, after which the attacker communicates over the standard remoted AES channel on TCP/1514. End-to-end public proof-of-concept code in the advisory (18-cve-f-remoted-aes.py) performs anonymous enrollment, AES-256-CBC session-key derivation, construction of a poisoned DataValue flatbuffer, and confirms targeted document deletion within ten seconds; a second harness (15-cve-f-sink-harness.cpp) isolates the NDJSON injection at the bulkIndex sink.

Impact spans defense evasion and data integrity destruction across an entire SIEM deployment: attackers can delete alerts in wazuh-alerts-* indices to erase post-compromise evidence, overwrite inventory and vulnerability state for monitored agents, write persistent payloads into .kibana_1 saved objects, and perform cross-tenant manipulation in shared environments. The Wazuh security team shipped three layered fixes in 5.0.0-beta3: sink-level escaping of _index (mirroring the existing _id escaping), boundary validation of index names in inventorySyncFacade.hpp, and downscoping the keystore credential from admin/all_access to a narrower wazuh-server role. No CVE identifier was assigned at publication; the issue is tracked solely via GHSA-ff9g-85jq-r3g3.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1046 Network Service Discovery

Defense Evasion

T1070 Indicator Removal

Privilege Escalation

T1078.001 Default Accounts

Initial Access

T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Collection

T1213 Data from Information Repositories

Impact

T1485 Data Destruction; T1491.001 Internal Defacement; T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation; T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation

Persistence

T1505 Server Software Component

Credential Access

T1552.001 Credentials In Files

Reconnaissance

T1595 Active Scanning

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools; T1685.006 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs

Remediation

Patches

  • Wazuh Manager 5.0.0-beta3 (fixes GHSA-ff9g-85jq-r3g3)

Immediate actions

  • Upgrade Wazuh Manager to 5.0.0-beta3 or later, which escapes the _index field at the sink, validates index names at the boundary, and downscopes keystore credentials
  • Disable anonymous agent enrollment: set use_password=yes in wazuh-authd and require agent enrollment passwords
  • Enforce ssl_verify_host=yes and certificate-based agent verification on the enrollment service (TCP/1515)

Workarounds

  • Disable anonymous agent enrollment (use_password=no -> use_password=yes)
  • Downscope the indexer service account away from admin/all_access
  • Block untrusted access to TCP/1514 and TCP/1515 at the network perimeter

Longer-term hardening

  • Replace the default OpenSearch admin/all_access keystore credential with a narrowly scoped wazuh-server role limited to required indices and actions
  • Implement strict index-name validation per OpenSearch naming rules for all manager-to-indexer bulk requests
  • Restrict network access to TCP/1514 and TCP/1515 to known agent subnets via firewall/segmentation
  • Enable immutable/append-only or snapshot-based protection on wazuh-alerts-* indices to preserve forensic evidence

Affected and fixed versions

  • Wazuh — Wazuh Manager
    Vulnerable versions: 5.0.0-beta1; 5.0.0-beta2
    Fixed in: 5.0.0-beta3
  • Wazuh — Wazuh (4.x branch)
    Fixed in: not affected - inventory_sync subsystem absent in 4.x

Timeline

  • Vulnerability publicly reported by Cyber Security News and Cyberpress, highlighting alert tampering and forensic-evidence destruction across affected Wazuh 5.0 deployments.
  • Fix shipped in Wazuh Manager 5.0.0-beta3: sink-level escaping of _index, boundary validation of index names in inventorySyncFacade.hpp, and credential downscoping from admin/all_access to a narrower wazuh-server role.
  • At publication no CVE identifier had been assigned; the vulnerability is tracked solely via GHSA-ff9g-85jq-r3g3 despite its maximum CVSS 10.0 rating.
  • The advisory documented a concrete injection payload — a crafted _index value carrying a newline and a smuggled {"delete":{"_index":"wazuh-alerts-*","_id":"target-doc"}} bulk action — proving arbitrary OpenSearch operations can be injected into the manager's _bulk request.
  • Researchers demonstrated targeted document deletion within ten seconds via anonymous enrollment, AES-256-CBC session-key derivation, and a poisoned DataValue flatbuffer.
  • End-to-end public proof-of-concept released in the advisory: locked-ioc-2 (full attack chain) and locked-ioc-1 (isolated NDJSON injection at the bulkIndex sink).
  • Maximum CVSS 3.1 base score of 10.0 assigned (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H); classified under CWE-74, CWE-93, and CWE-863.
  • GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-ff9g-85jq-r3g3 published for the Wazuh Manager 5.0 inventory_sync NDJSON injection.
  • The inventory_sync subsystem — including the indexerConnectorSyncImpl.hpp code path that appends the agent-controlled DataValue.index directly into the OpenSearch _bulk NDJSON body — was introduced in Wazuh Manager 5.0.0-beta1; the code path does not exist in the Wazuh 4.x branch.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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