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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-0806

SearchLeak: Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise One-Click Data Exfiltration (CVE-2026-42824)

criticalPATCHED

SearchLeak is a one-click data-exfiltration vulnerability chain in Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise Search discovered by Varonis Threat Labs. It chains parameter-to-prompt injection via the 'q' URL parameter, an HTML rendering race condition during Copilot's response streaming that fires attacker <img> tags before sanitization wraps output in <code> blocks, and a Content-Security-Policy bypass via server-side request forgery (SSRF) through Bing's allowlisted 'Search by Image' endpoint to leak mailbox contents, MFA/one-time codes, calendar data, and SharePoint/OneDrive files.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0806, CVE-2026-42824
Also known asSearchLeak
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS7.5
EPSSCVE-2026-42824: 0.5% (38.9th percentile)
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise (Copilot Enterprise Search)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-1427, CWE-918, CWE-79, CWE-362, CWE-200, CWE-77
ToolsSearchLeak proof-of-concept (Varonis Threat Labs)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1102 Web Service, T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, T1114 Email Collection, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1204 User Execution, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1552 Unsecured Credentials, T1566 Phishing and 3 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsenterprise
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0806 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 16 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: SearchLeak — Copilot Search Lure Followed by Bing Search-by-Image Beacon (Post-Exploitation)

Detects the post-exploitation data-harvest/exfil-construction window: a Copilot Enterprise Search request closely followed (within seconds) by an outbound Bing 'Search by Image' request (iss=sbi & q=imgurl:) from the same user/host. This correlation captures the moment the injected prompt has harvested mailbox/calendar/SharePoint values and the streamed <img> beacon fires. Time-proximity correlation reduces false positives from standalone Bing image searches. Targets proxy/SWG web logs.

Splunk SPL

index=proxy (url="*m365.cloud.microsoft/search*" OR url="*bing.com/images/search*")
| eval phase=case(match(url,"m365\.cloud\.microsoft/search"),"copilot_search", match(url,"bing\.com/images/search") AND match(url,"(?i)iss=sbi"),"bing_sbi", true(),"other")
| where phase!="other"
| sort 0 user _time
| streamstats current=f last(_time) as prev_time last(phase) as prev_phase by user
| eval gap=_time-prev_time
| where phase="bing_sbi" AND prev_phase="copilot_search" AND gap<=30
| stats count min(_time) as firstSeen by user src_ip
| eval firstSeen=strftime(firstSeen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| table firstSeen user src_ip count
| sort - count

Microsoft KQL

// Copilot Search immediately followed by Bing Search-by-Image beacon (same user, <=30s)
let lookback = 24h;
let events = CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where RequestURL has "m365.cloud.microsoft/search" or (RequestURL has "bing.com/images/search" and RequestURL has "iss=sbi")
| extend phase = iff(RequestURL has "m365.cloud.microsoft/search", "copilot_search", "bing_sbi")
| project TimeGenerated, SourceUserName, SourceIP, phase, RequestURL;
events
| sort by SourceUserName asc, TimeGenerated asc
| serialize
| extend prevPhase = prev(phase), prevTime = prev(TimeGenerated), prevUser = prev(SourceUserName)
| where phase == "bing_sbi" and prevPhase == "copilot_search" and SourceUserName == prevUser
| extend gapSeconds = datetime_diff('second', TimeGenerated, prevTime)
| where gapSeconds <= 30
| project TimeGenerated, SourceUserName, SourceIP, gapSeconds, RequestURL

Sigma

title: SearchLeak Copilot Search to Bing Search-by-Image Beacon Sequence
id: 6f1c2a40-2d3e-4b21-9b7a-0806e1a10002
status: experimental
description: Detects a Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise Search request closely followed by an outbound Bing Search-by-Image (iss=sbi) request, indicating SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824) post-exploitation data harvest and streamed img-beacon firing.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-attack-turned-microsoft-365-copilot-into-1-click-data-theft-tool/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/15
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1114.002
    - attack.t1213.002
    - attack.t1530
    - cve.2026.42824
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    copilot_search:
        c-uri|contains: 'm365.cloud.microsoft/search'
    bing_beacon:
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'bing.com/images/search'
            - 'iss=sbi'
    timeframe: 30s
    condition: copilot_search | near bing_beacon
falsepositives:
    - A user running a legitimate Copilot search and an unrelated Bing image search within the same 30s window
level: high

Known false positives:

  • A user performing a legitimate Copilot search and an unrelated Bing image search within the same 30-second window

Tuning notes: Adjust the correlation window (default 30s) to balance precision and recall; the documented exploit fires the beacon within the streaming window (seconds). Allowlist service accounts that legitimately drive both Copilot and Bing image search programmatically.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • SearchLeak — Copilot Search q-Parameter HTML/Encoded Injection (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SearchLeak — MFA/OTP-Bearing Outbound URL Shortly After Copilot Search (Post-Exploitation / Credential Theft) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SearchLeak — Bing SSRF Exfil Proxy to Rare/External imgurl Target (C2/Exfil) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SearchLeak — Pre-Sanitization img Tag in Copilot Streamed Response (Exploitation/Render Race) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SearchLeak — Trusted [indicator] Lure with Long Encoded Query (Defense Evasion/Delivery) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SearchLeak — Full Chain Correlation: Copilot Lure to Bing SSRF Exfil (C2/Exfil) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SearchLeak — Copilot Enterprise Search q-Parameter Prompt-Injection Lure (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SearchLeak — Bing Search-by-Image SSRF Exfiltration to Non-Microsoft URL (C2/Exfil) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 16 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0806.

Sample indicators (3 of 16)

  • Domain: bing[.]com
  • URL: hxxps://m365[.]cloud[.]microsoft/search?q=
  • Domain: microsoft[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 16 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

16 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Microsoft assigned CVE-2026-42824, rated it Critical, and fully mitigated it server-side; only a proof-of-concept was demonstrated, with no observed in-the-wild exploitation.

SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824) is a three-stage exploit chain against Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise Search demonstrated by Varonis Threat Labs researcher Dolev Taler. Individually the three bugs are insufficient for a meaningful attack; chained together they enable single-click theft of any data the victim's Copilot can reach through inherited Microsoft Graph access.

Stage 1 — Parameter-to-prompt injection: The Copilot Enterprise Search URL exposes a 'q' parameter intended for search terms. Copilot reads whatever sits in 'q' as instructions rather than a literal query, so an attacker crafts a link instructing Copilot to search the victim's mailbox (or other data sources), extract values such as email subjects or one-time codes, and embed them in an image URL — all without the victim typing anything. Because the crafted link points to a legitimate microsoft.com domain, traditional anti-phishing and URL-filtering tools are unlikely to flag it.

Stage 2 — HTML rendering race condition: As a guardrail, Microsoft wraps dangerous Copilot-generated HTML inside <code> blocks so markup is not interpreted. The wrapping, however, only happens after Copilot finishes generating, while the browser renders the response stream as it arrives. During this streaming window the raw HTML — including an attacker-injected <img> tag — is temporarily live in the DOM and the browser issues the image request before sanitization neutralizes it.

Stage 3 — CSP bypass via Bing SSRF: Copilot's Content-Security-Policy blocks direct attacker-controlled connections, but allowlists *.bing.com. Bing's 'Search by Image' feature accepts an image URL parameter and performs a server-side fetch of that URL. The attacker points this feature at their own server with the stolen data encoded in the URL. Because the outbound request originates from Bing's infrastructure rather than the browser, CSP never applies, and Bing acts as an unwitting exfiltration proxy. The attacker reads the stolen data from their own server logs.

The full flow: the victim clicks the crafted Copilot Search link; Copilot searches the victim's data; the streamed response embeds a value such as an email subject in a Bing image URL; the browser calls Bing during streaming; Bing fetches the attacker's URL carrying the stolen data. Exfiltratable data includes email content (including access codes and passwords), one-time/MFA codes enabling rapid account takeover, calendar events and meeting notes, and SharePoint/OneDrive files indexed by Copilot Enterprise Search.

SearchLeak belongs to a recurring AI-assistant bug class: Varonis' earlier Reprompt attack used the same one-click technique against Copilot Personal and held up against Enterprise Search despite its extra guardrails, and Aim Labs' 2025 EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711) was a zero-click variant. As the researchers note, SSRF and sanitizer races are old bug classes — the prompt injection is the new part. Microsoft assigned CVE-2026-42824 with a Critical (maximum) severity rating, CVSS 6.5 by Microsoft and 7.5 by NVD, and fully mitigated the flaw server-side in early June 2026; because Copilot Enterprise is a managed service, tenant administrators cannot patch the components themselves and no customer action is required.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service

Credential Access

T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception; T1552 Unsecured Credentials

Collection

T1114 Email Collection; T1213 Data from Information Repositories; T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1566 Phishing

Execution

T1204 User Execution

Exfiltration

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1608 Stage Capabilities

Remediation

Patches

  • Microsoft server-side mitigation deployed early June 2026 (managed service; no tenant-side patch to apply)

Immediate actions

  • No customer action required: Microsoft mitigated SearchLeak server-side in early June 2026 for all Copilot Enterprise tenants
  • Monitor Copilot Enterprise Search URLs for encoded payloads, HTML, or <img> tags in the 'q' parameter
  • Alert users to inspect Microsoft 365 links carrying long encoded query strings before clicking, even on legitimate microsoft.com domains

Workarounds

  • Disable or restrict Copilot Enterprise Search where business need does not justify the exposure (pre-patch mitigation)

Longer-term hardening

  • Treat AI streaming output as untrusted and sanitize at render time, not only after generation completes
  • Audit CSP allowlists for any domain (e.g. *.bing.com) that performs server-side fetches of user-supplied URLs and can act as an SSRF/exfiltration proxy
  • Restrict Copilot indexing scope and apply least-privilege to Microsoft Graph data sources to minimize blast radius of future Copilot data-leak bugs
  • Detect unusual outbound requests to Bing image-search endpoints correlated with Copilot sessions

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise (Copilot Enterprise Search)
    Vulnerable versions: Cloud service prior to early-June 2026 server-side fix
    Fixed in: Server-side mitigation deployed early June 2026

Timeline

  • EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711), a zero-click Microsoft 365 Copilot data-leak vulnerability by Aim Labs combining indirect prompt injection, markdown-image exfiltration and CSP bypass, established the bug class SearchLeak later builds on.
  • Varonis researcher Dolev Taler demonstrated the Reprompt one-click data-theft technique against Microsoft Copilot Personal, the precursor technique that held up against Copilot Enterprise Search.
  • Microsoft assigned CVE-2026-42824 (M365 Copilot Information Disclosure) and rated it Critical / maximum severity; CVSS 6.5 (Microsoft) and 7.5 (NVD).
  • Microsoft mitigated SearchLeak server-side in early June 2026 across Copilot Enterprise tenants; as a managed service, no customer action was required.
  • SearchLeak landed amid a broader June 2026 cluster of Microsoft Copilot information-disclosure fixes, including CVE-2026-47644 (Copilot Chat information disclosure affecting Microsoft Edge), reflecting a recurring AI-assistant data-leak bug class.
  • Coverage highlighted a CVSS scoring disagreement for CVE-2026-42824 — Microsoft scored it 6.5 while NVD scored it 7.5 — even though Microsoft assigned a Critical / maximum severity rating; NVD classified the root cause as command injection (CWE-77).
  • BleepingComputer, The Hacker News and Cyber Security News reported the SearchLeak chain (prompt injection + HTML streaming race condition + Bing SSRF/CSP bypass).
  • Varonis Threat Labs publicly disclosed SearchLeak with a proof-of-concept; no in-the-wild exploitation was observed.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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