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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-0813

North Korean Threat Actors Weaponize Developer Tools (VS Code, npm, GitHub) for Cross-Platform Malware Delivery — Contagious Interview / UNK_DeadDrop

highACTIVE

North Korean state-sponsored clusters (Contagious Interview/Famous Chollima, BlueNoroff, Lazarus) are industrializing developer-targeted supply-chain attacks via malicious GitHub repos, hundreds of trojanized npm packages, and VS Code extensions, using fake-recruitment and code-review lures to deliver cross-platform stealers and backdoors (BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, Overlord) that loot cryptocurrency wallets and developer credentials.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0813
Also known asUNK_DeadDrop, Contagious Interview, Contagious Trader, TaskJacker, DEV#POPPER
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsnpm (OpenJS Foundation) npm Registry; Microsoft Visual Studio Code / Cursor (Marketplace extensions + tasks.json); GitHub GitHub repositories / git hooks; Packagist Packagist (PHP/Composer registry); Arch Linux Arch User Repository (AUR)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-829, CWE-94
AttributionContagious Interview (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusNorth Korea
MalwareBeaverTail - S1246, InvisibleFerret - S1245, OtterCookie, XORIndex Loader - S1248
ToolsOverlord, SharePoint + Microsoft Graph API C2
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1014 Rootkit, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1056 Input Capture, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1102 Web Service, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1115 Clipboard Data and 13 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, cryptocurrency, financial, education, software development
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, South America, Middle East
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0813 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 38 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: VS Code/Cursor Spawns Shell via tasks.json runOn:folderOpen — Contagious Interview Exploitation

Detects the Contagious Interview initial-execution TTP (adopted Dec 2025) where opening a malicious recruiter take-home repository triggers VS Code's tasks.json 'runOn: folderOpen' auto-execution, causing Code.exe/Cursor to spawn a child PowerShell, cmd, node, or wscript process that launches a staged loader (e.g. BeaverTail). The editor itself spawning an interpreter shortly after a workspace open is the high-fidelity signal.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1204.002, T1546.016, T1059.001
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_events
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage IN ("*\\Code.exe","*\\Cursor.exe") Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe","*\\pwsh.exe","*\\cmd.exe","*\\node.exe","*\\wscript.exe","*\\cscript.exe")
| eval susp_flags=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)-ExecutionPolicy\s+Bypass|-NoProfile|-EncodedCommand|\.vscode[\\/]"),1,0)
| where susp_flags=1 OR match(CommandLine,"(?i)stager|folderOpen|tasks\.json")
| stats count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(CommandLine) as cmdlines by host, User, ParentImage, Image
| convert ctime(firstSeen) ctime(lastSeen)
| sort - count

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("Code.exe", "Cursor.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "node.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-ExecutionPolicy Bypass", "-NoProfile", "-EncodedCommand", ".vscode", "stager", "tasks.json")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: VS Code/Cursor Spawns Shell via tasks.json folderOpen (Contagious Interview)
id: 7d2f3a14-6c9b-4e21-9a8e-1f0c5b2d8e41
status: experimental
description: Detects VS Code or Cursor spawning a command interpreter shortly after a workspace opens, consistent with malicious tasks.json runOn:folderOpen auto-execution used by the Contagious Interview / Famous Chollima developer supply-chain campaign.
references:
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/north-korean-hackers-are-turning.html
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/11/contagious-interview-malware-delivered-through-fake-developer-job-interviews/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1546.016
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\Code.exe'
            - '\Cursor.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\node.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
    susp:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass'
            - '-NoProfile'
            - '-EncodedCommand'
            - '.vscode'
            - 'stager'
            - 'tasks.json'
    condition: selection and susp
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate build/test tasks defined by trusted developers that launch shells on folder open
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate VS Code build/lint tasks configured to run on folder open by trusted developers
  • Extensions that legitimately invoke node.exe child processes on workspace load

Tuning notes: Baseline known-good build tasks per development team and exclude their command-line signatures. Tighten by requiring the child process to follow a workspace-open within a short window, and alert with higher severity when the child command line contains EncodedCommand or references a .vscode-relative script path.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Backdoored VS Code Marketplace Extension Install or node Spawn from Extensions Path — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • node/python Reads Browser Wallet, Keychain, SSH & Telegram Stores Post-Install — InvisibleFerret/OtterCookie Collection · unlock with TL Creds
  • SharePoint / Microsoft Graph API Abused as Command Queue + Exfil Channel — Living-off-Cloud C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Malicious npm Package postinstall Spawns Network-Capable Interpreter — Supply-Chain Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • InvisibleFerret Cython-Compiled Loader & Sandbox-Check-then-Beacon — Post-Exploitation Evasion · unlock with TL Creds
  • ClipViper Clipboard Crypto-Address Hijack + DPRK Beacon — C2/Impact · unlock with TL Creds
  • Git pre-commit Hook Spawns Interpreter + Credential Store Access — Contagious Trader Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Developer-Tool Process Beacons to Vercel C2 /api/ipcheck or Known DPRK Exfil IPs — BeaverTail/OtterCookie C2 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 38 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0813.

Sample indicators (3 of 38)

  • IP address: 23.137.105[.]75
  • Domain: cloudflareinsights[.]vercel[.]app
  • URL: hxxps://soc-log[.]vercel[.]app/api/ipcheck

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 38 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

38 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Proofpoint's UNK_DeadDrop campaign sent ~250 emails over six weeks to ~100 organizations, 75%+ U.S.-based.

Throughout late 2025 into mid-2026, North Korea-aligned threat actors tracked as Contagious Interview (a.k.a. Famous Chollima, HexagonalRodent, Void Dokkaebi, DEV#POPPER) alongside BlueNoroff (Sapphire Sleet, UNC1069) and the broader Lazarus Group have shifted from bespoke social engineering to an industrialized supply-chain malware factory aimed squarely at software developers. The operation blends LinkedIn/X recruiter personas, fake job interviews, trojanized demo/take-home projects, and code-review requests with weaponized open-source ecosystems.

Delivery channels span the full developer toolchain. On npm, researchers documented 67 packages dropping the XORIndex and HexEval loaders (17,000+ downloads, April-July 2025), a 108-package/261-version factory campaign (March 20-April 20, 2026), and a 197-200 package wave delivering new OtterCookie infostealer variants. On VS Code, the actors abuse the editor's tasks.json 'runOn: folderOpen' auto-execution (adopted since December 2025) and publish backdoored extensions masquerading as Jupyter/Markdown developer tools (ByteBinTools.jupyter-powerdev, ToolCraft.jupyter-powertools, OLDev.markdown-mode-devtools) discovered on the official Marketplace on June 9, 2026. On GitHub, the Contagious Trader sub-cluster spread 50+ malicious packages across 100+ repos and planted malicious .githooks/pre-commit hooks. Packagist (PHP) and the Arch Linux AUR (400+ hijacked packages) were also abused.

The malware stack is cross-platform and modular. BeaverTail (JavaScript downloader/stealer) targets browser wallet extensions and Keychain/credential stores and stages InvisibleFerret, a Python backdoor that has migrated from readable scripts to Cython-compiled .pyd/.so binaries. OtterCookie (now v4, with VM/sandbox detection) is an infostealer flooded across npm. Newer tooling includes custom variants of the open-source Overlord Go framework, the DEV#POPPER multi-stage obfuscated JavaScript RAT, ClipViper (Windows clipboard stealer), and a SharePoint/Microsoft Graph API-based C2 that uses cloud storage as a command queue and exfiltration channel. Collection targets cryptocurrency wallets (desktop and browser), SSH keys, Telegram Desktop sessions, cloud configuration, and environment variables. Expel/Marcus Hutchins reporting ties the activity to $12M in crypto theft in Q1 2026 and 26,584 wallets exfiltrated from 2,726 infected developer systems. Heavy existing sanctions on the DPRK mean financially motivated cybercrime carries little marginal deterrence while funding the regime.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1056 Input Capture; T1115 Clipboard Data; T1119 Automated Collection

Defense Evasion

T1014 Rootkit; T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1217 Browser Information Discovery

Initial Access

T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1566 Phishing

Persistence

T1546 Event Triggered Execution

Credential Access

T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Resource Development

T1585 Establish Accounts; T1608 Stage Capabilities

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block C2 IOC 23.137.105.75 (port 5173) and 144.217.86.88 at the perimeter
  • Block the 144.172.0.0 and 107.189.22.20 OtterCookie exfil ranges and the *.vercel.app C2 hostnames
  • Remove the malicious VS Code extensions ByteBinTools.jupyter-powerdev, ToolCraft.jupyter-powertools, and OLDev.markdown-mode-devtools and audit Marketplace install history
  • Purge the listed malicious npm packages from lockfiles and caches; rotate any credentials present on affected developer hosts

Workarounds

  • Open untrusted repositories in VS Code Restricted Mode or a disposable VM
  • Treat recruiter take-home projects and code-review asks as untrusted; never run them on a primary developer workstation

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for VS Code/IDE-spawned shell, VBScript, and node processes
  • Enforce dependency all-listing, pinning, and provenance/signature verification in CI
  • Disable VS Code tasks.json runOn:folderOpen auto-execution and run untrusted repos in restricted/sandboxed workspaces

Affected and fixed versions

  • npm (OpenJS Foundation) — npm Registry
    Vulnerable versions: public registry packages
  • Microsoft — Visual Studio Code / Cursor (Marketplace extensions + tasks.json)
    Vulnerable versions: all (abuse of legitimate features)
  • GitHub — GitHub repositories / git hooks
    Vulnerable versions: malicious repos and .githooks
  • Packagist — Packagist (PHP/Composer registry)
    Vulnerable versions: public packages
  • Arch Linux — Arch User Repository (AUR)
    Vulnerable versions: 400+ hijacked packages

Timeline

  • Socket documents 67 Contagious Interview npm packages dropping XORIndex and HexEval loaders (17,000+ downloads, active April-July 2025).
  • S2 Grupo LAB52 details Lazarus Group 'Dream Job' attacks, part of the broader DPRK developer-targeting tradecraft.
  • Contagious Interview adopts VS Code tasks.json 'runOn: folderOpen' auto-execution to trigger malware when a cloned repo is opened.
  • Microsoft Security Blog publishes 'Contagious Interview: Malware delivered through fake developer job interviews.'
  • Start of a 31-day npm malware-factory campaign: 108 malicious packages across 261 versions (through April 20, 2026).
  • Panther tracks an OtterCookie infostealer campaign across npm (bjs-lint-builders et al.) with base91-like custom encoding.
  • Campaign pivots to requesting open-source project / code reviews as a delivery lure.
  • Yeeth Security discovers backdoored VS Code extensions (Jupyter/Markdown lures) live on the official Marketplace.
  • Reporting (Security Affairs, HackRead, SC Media) covers ~197-200 npm packages delivering new OtterCookie variants.
  • Proofpoint (Saher Naumaan, Carlos Rubio) reports the UNK_DeadDrop campaign: ~250 emails over six weeks to ~100 orgs, 75%+ U.S.-based.

Sources cited

More from Contagious Interview

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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