# GitBait: GitHub Pages (github.io) Phishing Campaign Targeting Mexican Banking & Financial Sector

> GitBait is a long-running, modular credential-phishing campaign that abuses GitHub Pages (github.io) to host pages impersonating Mexican banks. Active for roughly three years and continuously maintained since at least January 2025, it has targeted at least 12 local and foreign financial institutions operating in Mexico, exfiltrating harvested credentials primarily through the legitimate SheetBest API to attacker-controlled Google Sheets, with a Telegram-bot exfiltration path as an alternative.

- **Published:** 2026-06-17T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-17T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0832
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-gitbait-github-pages-phishing-tl-2026-0832.webp?v=9778023c (Threadlinqs threat intel: GitBait GitHub Pages Bank Phishing: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0832) — High severity, 32 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0832
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** GitBait operators
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 32 (3 shown free below)

## Description

GitBait is a phishing operation tracked by Group-IB that weaponizes the trust and free hosting of GitHub Pages to impersonate at least 12 Mexican financial institutions. Rather than registering and burning standalone phishing domains, the operators publish credential-harvesting sites as Jekyll-based GitHub Pages projects deployed through GitHub Actions, producing 100+ distinct github.io subdomains (e.g. soporte-index25.github.io, sntdr-soporte25.github.io, support-vh.github.io). Because github.io is a high-reputation domain that defenders cannot easily blocklist without breaking legitimate developer content, the pages routinely bypass domain-reputation and email-security controls.

Victims are lured via messaging-app links (WhatsApp, SMS, Telegram) using brand-themed lure paths such as /cancelacion (57 observed), /soporte (43), /mb1, /st1, /soporte-cancelacion and /stdr, landing on harvesting endpoints like /index.html, /login.html, /1023.html and /159enlace.html. Pages are built on Bootstrap 5.3.0-alpha3 with Kanit/Play Google Fonts and carry Open Graph metadata so the links render convincing previews inside messaging apps, plus a `<meta name="robots" content="noindex,nofollow">` directive to evade search-engine indexing and crawler-based discovery.

The credential-capture logic lives in externally loaded JavaScript referenced through deliberately randomized, high-entropy path structures (e.g. src="/Vm7LSL59GGpJ8EK-ew/atw1fpkSb6ai/b3o0AQ/EE4aPHI/MCy8") to frustrate static analysis and signature matching. A form with id="contact-form" intercepts submissions using e.preventDefault() and a fetch() POST, then dynamically swaps the login interface for a verification screen (toggling elements id="registro" and id="exito"), consistent with capture of one-time codes / MFA tokens in addition to primary credentials.

Exfiltration relies on the legitimate SheetBest REST service (api.sheetbest.com), which turns attacker-controlled Google Sheets into a write-capable JSON API. Stolen data is POSTed as JSON using numeric keys ('1','2','3') mapped to credential field values, landing directly in the operators' spreadsheets via endpoints such as https://api.sheetbest.com/sheets/0e2a1336-e971-496f-9eb2-cd8dcd25565c. A secondary path embeds hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs in the JavaScript for real-time delivery. An exfiltration server at 159.89.254.93:443 was also observed.

Group-IB attributes the operation to a small, persistent crew: the GitHub repository shows 66 commits by 3 contributors, with the earliest operator activity on 2025-01-16 (account ss-soporte, rronromo@gmail.com) and the most recent on 2026-03-12 (SheetBest endpoint rotation). The accounts ce-soporte and soporte-s1 share the email jejrvsbdb@gmail.com, indicating at least one operator manages multiple accounts. The campaign is financially motivated credential theft (no CVE, no malware binary involved) and remains active, posing a direct fraud and account-takeover risk to Mexican banks and their customers.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1598 Phishing for Information
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1585 Establish Accounts
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1566 Phishing
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1102 Web Service
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GitBait — SheetBest / Telegram / 159.89.254.93 Credential Exfiltration C2 (C2 / Exfiltration)** (`TL-2026-0832-SPL-003`)

Detects GitBait credential exfiltration channels: browser POSTs to api.sheetbest.com/sheets/<uuid> (primary, abusing the legitimate Google-Sheets-to-REST API), POSTs to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org/bot.../sendMessage secondary path), and any connection to the observed exfil host 159.89.254.93:443. These are living-off-trusted-services exfil paths that evade domain reputation.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1567.002, T1041, T1102, T1071.001
- **Data sources:** proxy, secure_web_gateway, DeviceNetworkEvents, firewall
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy sourcetype="proxy:web"
| eval u=lower(coalesce(url, dest_host))
| where (match(u, "api\.sheetbest\.com/sheets/") AND http_method="POST")
    OR match(u, "api\.telegram\.org/bot.*/(sendmessage|senddocument)")
    OR dest_ip="159.89.254.93"
| eval channel=case(match(u,"sheetbest"),"sheetbest_primary", match(u,"telegram"),"telegram_secondary", dest_ip="159.89.254.93","exfil_host_do", true(),"other")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(url) as urls values(http_user_agent) as user_agents by src_ip user channel dest_ip
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let exfilHosts = dynamic(["api.sheetbest.com","api.telegram.org"]);
let exfilIp = "159.89.254.93";
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (exfilHosts) or RemoteIP == exfilIp
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| extend Channel = case(RemoteUrl has "sheetbest", "sheetbest_primary", RemoteUrl has "telegram", "telegram_secondary", RemoteIP == exfilIp, "exfil_host_do", "other")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, Channel
| summarize Count=count(), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), Urls=make_set(RemoteUrl, 25) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, Channel
| sort by Count desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: GitBait SheetBest Telegram and DigitalOcean Credential Exfiltration Channels
id: 8b5e3c92-3f40-4c9d-be23-0832c3d4e5f6
status: experimental
description: Detects GitBait credential exfiltration over trusted web services — POSTs to api.sheetbest.com/sheets/<uuid>, the Telegram Bot API secondary path, or connections to the observed exfil host 159.89.254.93.
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/gitbait-phishing-mexico-banking-finance/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-17
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1567.002
    - attack.t1041
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_sheetbest:
        c-uri|contains: 'api.sheetbest.com/sheets/'
        cs-method: 'POST'
    selection_telegram:
        c-uri|re: 'api\.telegram\.org/bot.*/(sendMessage|sendDocument)'
    selection_ip:
        dst_ip: '159.89.254.93'
    condition: selection_sheetbest or selection_telegram or selection_ip
fields:
    - src_ip
    - c-uri
    - dst_ip
    - cs-user-agent
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate business use of SheetBest or Telegram bots from sanctioned applications (allowlist those service accounts/hosts)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Sanctioned internal tools that legitimately use SheetBest or Telegram bot integrations from server/service accounts
- Personal Telegram usage on BYOD endpoints

**Tuning notes:** Scope to end-user browser processes to avoid flagging sanctioned server-side SheetBest/Telegram integrations; allowlist approved service accounts and the IPs of legitimate integrations. Highest fidelity when the initiating process is a browser and the session also accessed a github.io lure path.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- GitBait — Browser Navigation to github.io Lure Host (Exploitation / Initial Access) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitBait — Browser POST to SheetBest API From End-User Session (Post-Exploitation / Credential Capture) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitBait — Telegram Bot API & DigitalOcean Exfil Host Beacon (C2 / Lateral Movement) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitBait — Phishing Page Content Signature: noindex + OpenGraph + Bootstrap-alpha + Randomized Script Path (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitBait — Form-Intercept fetch() Credential Capture & Fake-Verification OTP Toggle (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitBait — Hardcoded Telegram Bot Token Secondary Exfil in Page Content (C2 / Exfiltration) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitBait — github.io Banking Support/Cancelacion Lure Access (Exploitation / Initial Access) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitBait — Numeric-Key Credential/OTP Exfil POST Body (Post-Exploitation / Credential Capture) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 32)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `159.89.254[.]93`
- Domain: `soporte-index25[.]github[.]io`
- Domain: `soporte-index09[.]github[.]io`

Full set of 32 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [GitBait: Phishing Campaign Targeting Mexico's Banking and Finance Sector](https://www.group-ib.com/blog/gitbait-phishing-mexico-banking-finance/)
- [The Growing Abuse of GitHub and GitLab in Phishing Campaigns](https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/the-growing-abuse-of-github-and-gitlab-in-phishing-campaigns/)
- [Phishing on GitHub: A Sophisticated Attack Leveraging Brand Trust](https://www.xorlab.com/en/blog/phishing-on-github)
- [Detecting Malware Abusing Google for Command-and-Control](https://www.intel471.com/blog/detecting-malware-abusing-google-for-c2)
- [Sheet Best Documentation: QuickStart (Google Sheets to REST API)](https://docs.sheetbest.com/)
- [Phishing and malware actors abuse Google services for credentials and data exfiltration](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/phishing-and-malware-actors-abuse-google-forms-for-credentials-data-exfiltration)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: Phishing (T1566)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0832
