Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0849
Fake GitHub 'EQVita' Homebrew Repo Delivers SmartLoader and Lumma Stealer to the Retro Gaming / PlayStation Vita Modding Community
A malicious GitHub campaign impersonates EQVita, a free audio/EQ tool for the PlayStation Vita homebrew scene, distributing a trojanized EQ_Vita_v1.3.zip. A legitimate luajit.exe is abused to execute a disguised obfuscated Lua script (x64.txt) that performs geolocation checks and beacons to attacker C2 at 85.137.52.21, deploying SmartLoader which in turn fetches the Lumma Stealer (LummaC2) information stealer to harvest saved browser passwords, session cookies, and cryptocurrency wallets.
Key facts for SmartLoader EQVita GitHub lure
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0849 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | EQVita fake repo campaign, Voistace EQVita, SmartLoader retro-gaming lure |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Exploitation status | Exploited in the wild |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows; Chromium / Mozilla Web browsers (saved credentials, cookies, autofill); Cryptocurrency wallets MetaMask / Electrum / Exodus and similar |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-506, CWE-829 |
| Attribution | Water Kurita, Storm-2477 (medium confidence) |
| Malware | Lumma Stealer - S1213, SmartLoader |
| Tools | AutoIt |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204 User Execution, T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution, T1518 Software Discovery and 9 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | gaming, consumer, technology, individual-users |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage for SmartLoader EQVita GitHub lure
As of 2026-06-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0849 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 21 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Lumma C2 — Edge Remote-Debugging Cookie Scrape + Beacon to Hardcoded IP (C2 / Exfiltration)
Detects the Lumma Stealer collection and C2 stage: Microsoft Edge launched with --remote-debugging-port=9222 by a non-browser parent (live browser-session/cookie scraping via Chrome DevTools Protocol), and outbound beacons to the campaign C2 IP 85.137.52.21 or domain pasteflawwed.world following interpreter launch. Covers credential/cookie theft, web-protocol C2, ingress tool transfer of the renamed search.exe payload, and exfiltration over the C2 channel.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1539, T1555.003, T1071.001, T1105, T1041
- Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, zeek_network, firewall_proxy
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=3)
| eval edge_debug=if(EventCode=1 AND match(lower(Image),"msedge\.exe$|chrome\.exe$") AND match(CommandLine,"--remote-debugging-port=9222") AND NOT match(lower(ParentImage),"msedge\.exe$|explorer\.exe$|chrome\.exe$"),1,0)
| eval c2_beacon=if(EventCode=3 AND (DestinationIp="85.137.52.21" OR match(lower(DestinationHostname),"pasteflawwed\.world$")),1,0)
| where edge_debug=1 OR c2_beacon=1
| stats count sum(edge_debug) as debug_events sum(c2_beacon) as c2_events values(CommandLine) as cmdlines values(ParentImage) as parents values(DestinationIp) as dest_ips values(DestinationHostname) as dest_hosts min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, User
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| where debug_events>0 OR c2_events>0
| sort - lastTimeMicrosoft KQL
let edge_debug = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("msedge.exe","chrome.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "--remote-debugging-port=9222"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("msedge.exe","chrome.exe","explorer.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Signal="edge_remote_debug", Detail=ProcessCommandLine, Parent=InitiatingProcessFileName;
let c2 = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIP == "85.137.52.21" or RemoteUrl has "pasteflawwed.world"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Signal="c2_beacon", Detail=strcat(RemoteIP," ",RemoteUrl), Parent=InitiatingProcessFileName;
union edge_debug, c2
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Lumma C2 — Edge Remote-Debugging Cookie Scrape and Beacon to EQVita Campaign Infrastructure
id: 8c3f4a62-ae5d-4b43-c2d3-3e4f5a6b7c82
status: experimental
description: Detects Microsoft Edge launched with --remote-debugging-port=9222 by a non-browser parent (live cookie/session scraping) and outbound C2 to EQVita campaign infrastructure, the Lumma Stealer collection/C2 stage (TL-2026-0849).
references:
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/06/retro-gaming-fans-are-the-new-target-for-fake-github-malware
- https://www.huntress.com/threat-library/malware/lumma-stealer
author: AII-Detector — ThreadLinqs Intelligence
date: 2026-06-18
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1539
- attack.t1555.003
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1041
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\msedge.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '--remote-debugging-port=9222'
filter_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\msedge.exe'
- '\explorer.exe'
condition: selection and not filter_parent
falsepositives:
- Developers or automated browser tests (Selenium/Puppeteer/Playwright) legitimately using remote-debugging
level: highKnown false positives:
- Browser-automation frameworks (Selenium, Puppeteer, Playwright) or developers legitimately using --remote-debugging-port
- Security tooling that proxies/inspects browser sessions
Tuning notes: Allowlist known automation hosts/service accounts for the remote-debugging branch. Keep the IOC list (85.137.52.21, pasteflawwed.world) refreshed from current threat intel and treat it as exact-match high-confidence. Escalate when the Edge remote-debug event and a C2 beacon occur on the same host within minutes of a SPL-001 LuaJIT hit.
- SmartLoader Package Pattern — Bundled Interpreter Spawned by [indicator] (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- SmartLoader In-Memory Deobfuscation + Geolocation/Host Recon Following LuaJIT Launch (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Lumma C2 / Ingress Tool Transfer — Beacon to [indicator] and [indicator] Retrieval (C2 / Lateral) · unlock with TL Creds
- SmartLoader LuaJIT .txt Loader From User-Writable Path — Sigma (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- SmartLoader HKCU Run-Key Persistence To User-Writable Launcher — Sigma (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Lumma Edge Remote-Debugging Cookie Scrape by Non-Browser Parent — Sigma (C2 / Lateral) · unlock with TL Creds
- SmartLoader LuaJIT LOLBin — Signed Interpreter Executing .txt Loader From User-Writable Path (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- SmartLoader Post-Exploitation — Findstr AV Reconnaissance + HKCU Run-Key Persistence (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise for SmartLoader EQVita GitHub lure
As of 2026-06-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 21 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0849.
Sample indicators (3 of 21)
- IP address:
85.137.52[.]21 - Domain:
voistace[.]github[.]io - Domain:
pasteflawwed[.]world
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 21 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
How SmartLoader EQVita GitHub lure works
Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence reported on June 18, 2026 that operators behind the broader SmartLoader/Lumma Stealer fake-GitHub ecosystem (overlapping with the actor cluster Trend Micro tracks as Water Kurita and the Lumma developer Microsoft tracks as Storm-2477) have pivoted to social-engineering the retro gaming and console homebrew/modding community. The threat actor stood up a counterfeit GitHub repository at github.com/Voistace/EQVita with a paired GitHub Pages site at voistace.github.io, impersonating EQVita, a legitimate free equalizer/audio utility for the PlayStation Vita homebrew scene. To appear authentic while evading takedown, the fake repo is published as version 1.3 while the genuine project is at version 1.10.
The delivered archive, EQ_Vita_v1.3.zip, follows the signature SmartLoader packaging pattern: a launcher batch file (Launch.bat), a legitimately-signed LuaJIT interpreter (luajit.exe) accompanied by the lua51.dll runtime, and an obfuscated Lua script disguised with a benign .txt extension (x64.txt). Because the EXE and DLL are themselves clean, static AV and reputation checks frequently pass. Launch.bat invokes luajit.exe with x64.txt as an argument; the Lua loader deobfuscates itself in memory, performs geolocation/host reconnaissance, and establishes command-and-control over 'scrambled' (obfuscated/encoded) URLs to attacker infrastructure including the C2 IP 85.137.52.21.
Consistent with the wider Water Kurita campaign, the SmartLoader stage retrieves the Lumma Stealer payload (commonly renamed search.exe) from GitHub-hosted releases, stages an AutoIt interpreter and script (observed elsewhere via Excel/%TEMP% staging and an interpreter masquerading as Research.com), performs findstr-based reconnaissance for endpoint security products (Avast, Norton, Sophos), and launches Microsoft Edge with --remote-debugging-port=9222 to programmatically scrape live browser session data. Lumma Stealer (LummaC2), distributed under a malware-as-a-service model, then exfiltrates Chromium/Gecko browser saved passwords, cookies, autofill data, MFA/login codes, and cryptocurrency wallet artifacts (e.g., MetaMask, Electrum, Exodus) to C2 (campaign infrastructure includes pasteflawwed.world). The campaign demonstrates that any retro platform with an active modding scene is now a viable targeting surface for infostealer delivery.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution; T1564 Hide Artifacts
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery; T1614 System Location Discovery
Credential Access
T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Persistence
T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Initial Access
Resource Development
Remediation for SmartLoader EQVita GitHub lure
Immediate actions
- Block C2 IP 85.137.52.21 and domain pasteflawwed.world at the perimeter/DNS layer
- Block/monitor the malicious distribution hosts github.com/Voistace/EQVita and voistace.github.io
- Hunt for luajit.exe / lua51.dll executing from user-writable paths (Downloads, %TEMP%, Desktop) with a .txt script argument
- Hunt for msedge.exe launched with --remote-debugging-port=9222 by a non-browser parent process
- Quarantine any EQ_Vita_v1.3.zip, x64.txt, Launch.bat, or search.exe artifacts and force-reset credentials/wallet seeds on affected hosts
Workarounds
- Only download homebrew tools from verified official project sources and confirm version numbers (genuine EQVita is v1.10, not v1.3)
- Disable browser remote-debugging where not required and monitor port 9222 binds
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for LOLBin abuse (LuaJIT loader pattern) and browser remote-debugging scraping
- Restrict execution of unsigned/interpreter binaries from user-writable directories via WDAC/AppLocker
- Enforce application allowlisting and block AutoIt interpreters outside approved use
- Security-awareness training for staff who use homebrew/modding/gaming tools on managed devices
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: 10; 11 - Chromium / Mozilla — Web browsers (saved credentials, cookies, autofill)
Vulnerable versions: Chromium-based; Gecko-based - Cryptocurrency wallets — MetaMask / Electrum / Exodus and similar
Vulnerable versions: browser-extension and desktop wallets
Timeline of SmartLoader EQVita GitHub lure
- locked-ioc-11 (LummaC2), a C-language infostealer, is first observed advertised on Russian-speaking underground forums and sold under a malware-as-a-service model (developer later tracked by Microsoft as Storm-2477).
- Trend Micro's Threat Hunting team publishes its report on the Water Kurita campaign, documenting AI-generated fake GitHub repositories that deploy locked-ioc-14 to deliver locked-ioc-11, disguising malware as gaming cheats, cracked software, and system tools.
- Start of the window during which Microsoft identifies over 394,000 Windows computers worldwide infected by locked-ioc-11 (March 16 - May 16, 2025).
- Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit, the U.S. DOJ, and global partners disrupt locked-ioc-11 infrastructure, seizing/blocking approximately 2,300 malicious domains along with the malware's command structure and sales marketplaces.
- Despite the takedown, Lumma operators rapidly restore command-and-control infrastructure and resume distribution, underscoring the resilience of the MaaS platform.
- locked-ioc-14 stage fetches and executes locked-ioc-11 to harvest browser passwords, cookies, login/MFA codes, and cryptocurrency wallets.
- locked-ioc-15 invokes legitimate locked-ioc-16 to run the disguised obfuscated Lua script locked-ioc-20, which performs geolocation checks and beacons to C2 locked-ioc-12 via an obfuscated web address.
- Malicious repository locked-ioc-18/Voistace/EQVita and Pages site locked-ioc-7 observed distributing locked-ioc-10 (fake v1.3 mimicking genuine v1.10).
- Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence publishes analysis of the fake EQVita GitHub repo targeting the PlayStation Vita homebrew / retro gaming modding community.
Sources cited for SmartLoader EQVita GitHub lure
- AI Assisted Fake GitHub Repositories Fuel SmartLoader and LummaStealer Distribution Trend Micro · Research · 2025-03-11
- Disrupting Lumma Stealer: Microsoft leads global action against favored cybercrime tool Microsoft · Vendor report · 2025-05-21
- Fake GitHub Repos Spread SmartLoader, Lumma Stealer Malware anvilogic.com · Research · 2025-03-01
- Lumma Stealer: Breaking down the delivery techniques and capabilities of a prolific infostealer Microsoft · Vendor report · 2025-05-21
- Lumma Stealer Malware: Analysis, Detection, Removal (Huntress Threat Library) Huntress · Research · 2025-01-01
- Retro gaming fans are the new target for fake GitHub malware malwarebytes.com · Blog · 2026-06-18
- Disrupting Lumma Stealer Malware - Microsoft Leads Global Action socradar.io · Blog · 2025-05-21
- Lumma malware threat disrupted as DOJ and Microsoft takedown over 2300 malicious domains cybernews.com · News · 2025-05-21
- AI-Powered Deception: Fake GitHub Repositories Spread SmartLoader and Lumma Stealer securityonline.info · News · 2025-03-01
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.