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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0863

Operation Endgame Dismantles SocGholish (FakeUpdates) Initial-Access Malware Network — 106 Servers and 101 Domains Seized (TA569 / Evil Corp)

highMITIGATED

On 18 June 2026, Operation Endgame disrupted the SocGholish (FakeUpdates) malware-as-a-service network operated by TA569/Mustard Tempest, an initial-access broker linked to Russia's Evil Corp. Law enforcement seized 106 servers and 101 domains and remediated roughly 14,971 compromised websites. Active since at least 2017, SocGholish injects JavaScript into hacked legitimate (largely WordPress) sites to serve fake browser-update lures that drop RATs (NetSupport, AsyncRAT), infostealers, Cobalt Strike beacons, and follow-on ransomware (WastedLocker, LockBit, RansomHub).

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0863
Also known asOperation Endgame, SocGholish, FakeUpdates
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsWordPress / Automattic WordPress (self-hosted CMS sites); Microsoft Windows (end-user hosts running the fake-update JScript loader)
AttributionMustard Tempest (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareSocGholish - S1124
ToolsAsyncRAT - S1087, Cobalt Strike, NetSupport RAT, ParrotTDS / Keitaro TDS (TA2726)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036 Masquerading, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1074 Data Staged, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102 Web Service and 10 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsgovernment, financial, healthcare, education, manufacturing, technology, retail, professional services
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources14 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0863 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 33 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: SocGholish GhoLoader MSXML2.XMLHTTP C2 Beacon to Shadowed Domain (C2 / Lateral Movement)

Detects the GhoLoader C2 beacon: a Windows Script Host process (wscript/cscript) making an outbound HTTP/S POST (the MSXML2.XMLHTTP ActiveXObject channel) to external infrastructure, and/or proxy/DNS hits on known SocGholish C2 domains/IPs and recently-registered domain-shadowed subdomains carrying base64 campaign tokens. This catches the recon exfil and tasking channel that precedes Cobalt Strike and ransomware.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1105, T1102, T1048.003
  • Data sources: sysmon, proxy, dns, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, firewall
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=3
| where match(Image, "(?i)\\\\(wscript|cscript|mshta)\\.exe$")
| where (DestinationPort=80 OR DestinationPort=443)
| where NOT cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", DestinationIp) AND NOT cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12", DestinationIp) AND NOT cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", DestinationIp) AND NOT cidrmatch("127.0.0.0/8", DestinationIp)
| eval known_c2_ip=if(cidrmatch("190.211.252.0/22", DestinationIp) OR DestinationIp IN ("141.193.213.10","45.76.250.221","45.32.199.48","170.75.160.84","190.211.254.31","190.211.254.94"), 1, 0)
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime values(DestinationIp) as dest_ips values(DestinationHostname) as dest_hosts by Computer, User, Image
| convert ctime(firstTime)
| where count > 0
```Correlate with proxy logs below for the matching C2 domains```

Microsoft KQL

let knownC2Domains = dynamic(["js-new.newtoyourgame.com","editions.seattlemysterylovers.com","support.traininghub.world","clients.dedicatedservicesusa.com","dashnex.plexusmarket.fund","static.twalls5280.com","circle.innovativecsportal.com","cpanel.santechplumbing.com","store.alignfrisco.com","cloudwebhub.pro","searchgear.pro","rapiddevapi.com"]);
let knownC2Ips = dynamic(["190.211.254.31","141.193.213.10","45.76.250.221","45.32.199.48","170.75.160.84","190.211.254.94"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe")
| where RemotePort in (80, 443)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (knownC2Domains) or RemoteIP in (knownC2Ips) or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "190.211.252.0/22")
    or (RemoteIPType == "Public" and InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: SocGholish GhoLoader Script-Host C2 Beacon
id: 8d4b3c66-1e5a-4f33-ac99-3b2a4e6f7c03
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound web traffic initiated by a Windows Script Host process and connections to known SocGholish C2 infrastructure, matching the GhoLoader MSXML2.XMLHTTP beacon.
references:
    - https://www.silentpush.com/blog/socgholish/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/18
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_proc:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
    selection_infra:
        DestinationHostname:
            - 'js-new.newtoyourgame.com'
            - 'cpanel.santechplumbing.com'
            - 'store.alignfrisco.com'
            - 'cloudwebhub.pro'
            - 'searchgear.pro'
            - 'rapiddevapi.com'
    filter_internal:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
    condition: (selection_proc and not filter_internal) or selection_infra
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate scripts that fetch data over HTTP via MSXML/WinHTTP to external services
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate automation that uses MSXML2.XMLHTTP/WinHTTP from wscript to call external APIs
  • Security or monitoring agents that proxy script-host traffic

Tuning notes: Refresh the C2 domain/IP lists from seized-infrastructure IOCs; domain-shadowed subdomains rotate every 2-3 days, so weight newly-registered/low-prevalence destinations. Any script-host process making a public POST should be treated as critical regardless of destination reputation.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • SocGholish Fake-Update Download Chain in Browser Telemetry (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SocGholish Run-Key Persistence & WMI Recon by Script Host (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SocGholish C2 / TDS Beacon to Seized Infrastructure & Base64 Campaign Tokens (C2 / Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SocGholish Web-Inject — Obfuscated Loader Added to WordPress JS (Exploitation / Server-Side) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SocGholish Fake-Update Fetch Chain in Web/Proxy Logs (Post-Exploitation / Delivery) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SocGholish-to-Cobalt Strike / Ransomware Pivot — Named Pipes & Beacon Indicators (C2 / Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SocGholish Fake-Update Script Host Spawned by Browser (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SocGholish Script-Host Host Reconnaissance & NetSupport/AsyncRAT Follow-on (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 33 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0863.

Sample indicators (3 of 33)

  • IP address: 190.211.254[.]31
  • Domain: js-new[.]newtoyourgame[.]com
  • File hash: 8f896f3f0b5f33413217e9350dba6d4958cc9bdf568902a08d739b43db6f993b

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 33 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

33 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

SocGholish, also tracked as FakeUpdates, is a JavaScript-based loader and initial-access framework that has operated since at least 2017. It is run by the financially motivated actor Proofpoint tracks as TA569 (Microsoft: Mustard Tempest), an initial-access broker that sells footholds to Evil Corp affiliates and ransomware operators. Evil Corp is a Russian cybercriminal group previously responsible for the Zeus and Dridex banking trojans and large-scale ransomware and money-laundering operations.

The attack chain begins with compromised legitimate websites — disproportionately WordPress, which powers ~43% of the web. TA569 injects obfuscated JavaScript into these sites (often via domain shadowing on legitimate compromised domains, rotated every 2-3 days). Victim traffic is filtered through traffic distribution systems — TA569's actor-owned ParrotTDS and a malicious Keitaro TDS operated by TA2726 (the Apliteni-linked service) — to fingerprint and select targets. Selected visitors are shown a fake browser-update page. A click sends a postMessage to a hidden iframe that fetches a script (observed artifact: 'Google Launcher.js'), delivering a second-stage WSH JScript loader dubbed GhoLoader, which POSTs to its C2 via ActiveXObject(MSXML2.XMLHTTP) and performs host reconnaissance (process, software, domain-trust, system-information and network discovery).

From that foothold, SocGholish has dropped a range of second-stage payloads: NetSupport RAT (client32.exe), AsyncRAT, infostealers, and Cobalt Strike beacons — frequently culminating in hands-on-keyboard intrusion and ransomware deployment (WastedLocker, LockBit, RansomHub). The Center for Internet Security has repeatedly ranked SocGholish the top malware downloader, at times accounting for ~60% of observed downloader activity. A coordinated March 2026 wave (first seen 2026-03-02) deployed 11 stage-1 JavaScript injectors across 6 distinct C2 domains hosted across Panama, the United States, and Canada, linked by shared base64 campaign tokens.

On 18 June 2026, as part of Operation Endgame (launched 2024; the largest-ever international anti-cybercrime operation), the Netherlands NHTCU, Canada's RCMP, the U.S. FBI, and Germany's BKA — supported by Europol and Eurojust — seized 106 servers and 101 domains worldwide and remediated approximately 14,971 infected websites. Reporting also noted that login credentials for some 1.4 million WordPress sites had been found leaked and exposed to SocGholish-style compromise. This record documents the takedown and the historical TTPs and infrastructure for defender hunting and detection validation; it is not a vulnerability with a CVE.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1482 Domain Trust Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery; T1614 System Location Discovery

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading

Execution

T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

Exfiltration

T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Collection

T1074 Data Staged

Initial Access

T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1566 Phishing

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1584 Compromise Infrastructure; T1608 Stage Capabilities

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the seized/known SocGholish C2 and TDS domains and IPs at perimeter and DNS resolvers
  • Hunt endpoints for GhoLoader artifacts (WSH JScript executing MSXML2.XMLHTTP POSTs) and for 'Google Launcher.js' / fake-update download chains
  • Reset credentials and enforce MFA on all WordPress admin/CMS accounts; remove unauthorized admin accounts
  • Inspect compromised public web servers for injected/obfuscated JavaScript and unauthorized files; remove web injects

Workarounds

  • Disable Windows Script Host (WSH) where not required to break the JScript loader stage
  • Restrict execution of .js/.jse/.wsf/.hta via attack-surface-reduction rules or SRP/AppLocker

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for script-host execution (wscript/cscript/mshta) spawned from browsers and follow-on NetSupport/AsyncRAT/Cobalt Strike activity
  • Keep WordPress core, plugins, and themes patched; remove abandoned plugins and harden file-write permissions
  • Implement web-content integrity monitoring and a Content Security Policy to detect/limit injected scripts
  • User awareness: browsers never deliver updates via website pop-ups

Affected and fixed versions

  • WordPress / Automattic — WordPress (self-hosted CMS sites)
    Vulnerable versions: compromised/outdated installations with stolen or weak admin credentials
    Fixed in: N/A — abuse of legitimate compromised sites, not a single CVE
  • Microsoft — Windows (end-user hosts running the fake-update JScript loader)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows hosts executing the SocGholish JScript loader via Windows Script Host
    Fixed in: N/A

Timeline

  • SocGholish (FakeUpdates) first observed in the wild; operating as a JavaScript loader / initial-access framework since at least 2017 (MITRE ATT&CK S1124).
  • U.S. Treasury OFAC sanctions the Russia-based Evil Corp cybercrime group and the DOJ indicts leader Maksim Yakubets, formalizing the Evil Corp attribution later tied to SocGholish/TA569 operations.
  • Operation Endgame launched as the largest international law-enforcement operation against ransomware and cybercrime infrastructure.
  • UK National Crime Agency, with U.S. and Australian partners, sanctions additional Evil Corp members and publicly links Evil Corp to LockBit ransomware affiliation, reinforcing the actor nexus behind SocGholish initial-access activity.
  • Center for Internet Security ranks SocGholish the top malware downloader, at times accounting for roughly 60% of observed downloader activity.
  • Coordinated SocGholish wave deploys 11 stage-1 JavaScript injectors across 6 C2 domains (Panama, US, Canada) linked by shared base64 campaign tokens (Breakglass Intelligence).
  • Reporting notes login credentials for ~1.4 million WordPress sites found leaked and exposed to SocGholish-style compromise.
  • Authorities and vendors (Proofpoint, Orange Cyberdefense, CyberScoop) publicly tie SocGholish/TA569 to Russia's Evil Corp.
  • Operation Endgame seizes 106 servers and 101 domains worldwide and remediates ~14,971 infected websites, disrupting the TA569/SocGholish network.

Sources cited

More from Mustard Tempest

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 14 sources; published ; last updated —.

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