# Operation Endgame Dismantles SocGholish (FakeUpdates) Initial-Access Malware Network — 106 Servers and 101 Domains Seized (TA569 / Evil Corp)

> On 18 June 2026, Operation Endgame disrupted the SocGholish (FakeUpdates) malware-as-a-service network operated by TA569/Mustard Tempest, an initial-access broker linked to Russia's Evil Corp. Law enforcement seized 106 servers and 101 domains and remediated roughly 14,971 compromised websites. Active since at least 2017, SocGholish injects JavaScript into hacked legitimate (largely WordPress) sites to serve fake browser-update lures that drop RATs (NetSupport, AsyncRAT), infostealers, Cobalt Strike beacons, and follow-on ransomware (WastedLocker, LockBit, RansomHub).

- **Published:** 2026-06-18T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-18T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0863
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-socgholish-operation-endgame-takedown-tl-2026-0863.webp?v=fdae4fc7 (Threadlinqs threat intel: SocGholish FakeUpdates Takedown: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0863) — High severity, 33 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0863
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** MITIGATED
- **Actor:** Mustard Tempest (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 33 (3 shown free below)

## Description

SocGholish, also tracked as FakeUpdates, is a JavaScript-based loader and initial-access framework that has operated since at least 2017. It is run by the financially motivated actor Proofpoint tracks as TA569 (Microsoft: Mustard Tempest), an initial-access broker that sells footholds to Evil Corp affiliates and ransomware operators. Evil Corp is a Russian cybercriminal group previously responsible for the Zeus and Dridex banking trojans and large-scale ransomware and money-laundering operations.

The attack chain begins with compromised legitimate websites — disproportionately WordPress, which powers ~43% of the web. TA569 injects obfuscated JavaScript into these sites (often via domain shadowing on legitimate compromised domains, rotated every 2-3 days). Victim traffic is filtered through traffic distribution systems — TA569's actor-owned ParrotTDS and a malicious Keitaro TDS operated by TA2726 (the Apliteni-linked service) — to fingerprint and select targets. Selected visitors are shown a fake browser-update page. A click sends a postMessage to a hidden iframe that fetches a script (observed artifact: 'Google Launcher.js'), delivering a second-stage WSH JScript loader dubbed GhoLoader, which POSTs to its C2 via ActiveXObject(MSXML2.XMLHTTP) and performs host reconnaissance (process, software, domain-trust, system-information and network discovery).

From that foothold, SocGholish has dropped a range of second-stage payloads: NetSupport RAT (client32.exe), AsyncRAT, infostealers, and Cobalt Strike beacons — frequently culminating in hands-on-keyboard intrusion and ransomware deployment (WastedLocker, LockBit, RansomHub). The Center for Internet Security has repeatedly ranked SocGholish the top malware downloader, at times accounting for ~60% of observed downloader activity. A coordinated March 2026 wave (first seen 2026-03-02) deployed 11 stage-1 JavaScript injectors across 6 distinct C2 domains hosted across Panama, the United States, and Canada, linked by shared base64 campaign tokens.

On 18 June 2026, as part of Operation Endgame (launched 2024; the largest-ever international anti-cybercrime operation), the Netherlands NHTCU, Canada's RCMP, the U.S. FBI, and Germany's BKA — supported by Europol and Eurojust — seized 106 servers and 101 domains worldwide and remediated approximately 14,971 infected websites. Reporting also noted that login credentials for some 1.4 million WordPress sites had been found leaked and exposed to SocGholish-style compromise. This record documents the takedown and the historical TTPs and infrastructure for defender hunting and detection validation; it is not a vulnerability with a CVE.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1566 Phishing
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1204 User Execution
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1614 System Location Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- T1074 Data Staged
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1102 Web Service
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SocGholish GhoLoader MSXML2.XMLHTTP C2 Beacon to Shadowed Domain (C2 / Lateral Movement)** (`TL-2026-0863-SPL-003`)

Detects the GhoLoader C2 beacon: a Windows Script Host process (wscript/cscript) making an outbound HTTP/S POST (the MSXML2.XMLHTTP ActiveXObject channel) to external infrastructure, and/or proxy/DNS hits on known SocGholish C2 domains/IPs and recently-registered domain-shadowed subdomains carrying base64 campaign tokens. This catches the recon exfil and tasking channel that precedes Cobalt Strike and ransomware.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.001, T1105, T1102, T1048.003
- **Data sources:** sysmon, proxy, dns, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, firewall
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=3
| where match(Image, "(?i)\\\\(wscript|cscript|mshta)\\.exe$")
| where (DestinationPort=80 OR DestinationPort=443)
| where NOT cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", DestinationIp) AND NOT cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12", DestinationIp) AND NOT cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", DestinationIp) AND NOT cidrmatch("127.0.0.0/8", DestinationIp)
| eval known_c2_ip=if(cidrmatch("190.211.252.0/22", DestinationIp) OR DestinationIp IN ("141.193.213.10","45.76.250.221","45.32.199.48","170.75.160.84","190.211.254.31","190.211.254.94"), 1, 0)
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime values(DestinationIp) as dest_ips values(DestinationHostname) as dest_hosts by Computer, User, Image
| convert ctime(firstTime)
| where count > 0
```Correlate with proxy logs below for the matching C2 domains```
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let knownC2Domains = dynamic(["js-new.newtoyourgame.com","editions.seattlemysterylovers.com","support.traininghub.world","clients.dedicatedservicesusa.com","dashnex.plexusmarket.fund","static.twalls5280.com","circle.innovativecsportal.com","cpanel.santechplumbing.com","store.alignfrisco.com","cloudwebhub.pro","searchgear.pro","rapiddevapi.com"]);
let knownC2Ips = dynamic(["190.211.254.31","141.193.213.10","45.76.250.221","45.32.199.48","170.75.160.84","190.211.254.94"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe")
| where RemotePort in (80, 443)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (knownC2Domains) or RemoteIP in (knownC2Ips) or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "190.211.252.0/22")
    or (RemoteIPType == "Public" and InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: SocGholish GhoLoader Script-Host C2 Beacon
id: 8d4b3c66-1e5a-4f33-ac99-3b2a4e6f7c03
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound web traffic initiated by a Windows Script Host process and connections to known SocGholish C2 infrastructure, matching the GhoLoader MSXML2.XMLHTTP beacon.
references:
    - https://www.silentpush.com/blog/socgholish/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/18
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_proc:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
    selection_infra:
        DestinationHostname:
            - 'js-new.newtoyourgame.com'
            - 'cpanel.santechplumbing.com'
            - 'store.alignfrisco.com'
            - 'cloudwebhub.pro'
            - 'searchgear.pro'
            - 'rapiddevapi.com'
    filter_internal:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
    condition: (selection_proc and not filter_internal) or selection_infra
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate scripts that fetch data over HTTP via MSXML/WinHTTP to external services
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate automation that uses MSXML2.XMLHTTP/WinHTTP from wscript to call external APIs
- Security or monitoring agents that proxy script-host traffic

**Tuning notes:** Refresh the C2 domain/IP lists from seized-infrastructure IOCs; domain-shadowed subdomains rotate every 2-3 days, so weight newly-registered/low-prevalence destinations. Any script-host process making a public POST should be treated as critical regardless of destination reputation.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- SocGholish Fake-Update Download Chain in Browser Telemetry (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SocGholish Run-Key Persistence & WMI Recon by Script Host (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SocGholish C2 / TDS Beacon to Seized Infrastructure & Base64 Campaign Tokens (C2 / Lateral Movement) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SocGholish Web-Inject — Obfuscated Loader Added to WordPress JS (Exploitation / Server-Side) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SocGholish Fake-Update Fetch Chain in Web/Proxy Logs (Post-Exploitation / Delivery) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SocGholish-to-Cobalt Strike / Ransomware Pivot — Named Pipes & Beacon Indicators (C2 / Lateral Movement) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SocGholish Fake-Update Script Host Spawned by Browser (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SocGholish Script-Host Host Reconnaissance & NetSupport/AsyncRAT Follow-on (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 33)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `190.211.254[.]31`
- Domain: `js-new[.]newtoyourgame[.]com`
- File hash: `8f896f3f0b5f33413217e9350dba6d4958cc9bdf568902a08d739b43db6f993b`

Full set of 33 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Authorities Dismantle SocGholish Malware Network — 106 Servers and 101 Domains Seized](https://cybersecuritynews.com/authorities-dismantle-socgholish/)
- [Sayonara, SocGholish: Operation Endgame Disrupts Major Cybercrime Operation](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/sayonara-socgholish-operation-endgame-disrupts-major-cybercrime-operation)
- [Operation Endgame strikes SocGholish — a deep dive into a prolific initial access threat](https://www.orangecyberdefense.com/global/blog/cert-news/operation-endgame-strikes-socgholish-a-deep-dive-into-a-prolific-initial-access-threat)
- [Law enforcement hits SocGholish: 106 servers down, 15,000 sites cleaned](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/06/18/law-enforcement-socgholish-operation-endgame/)
- [International law enforcement initiate hunt on malware group SocGholish](https://www.politie.nl/en/news/2026/juni/18/11-international-law-enforcement-initiate-hunt-on-malware-group-socgholish.html)
- [Operation Endgame Disrupts SocGholish Malware Network Tied to Ransomware Attacks](https://www.esecurityplanet.com/threats/operation-endgame-disrupts-socgholish-malware-network-tied-to-ransomware-attacks/)
- [Authorities disrupt Evil Corp's SocGholish botnet](https://cyberscoop.com/socgholish-malware-botnet-takedown-evilcorp/)
- [SocGholish, Software S1124 — MITRE ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124/)
- [Unmasking SocGholish: Silent Push Untangles the Malware Web Behind TA569](https://www.silentpush.com/blog/socgholish/)
- [SocGholish March 2026 Wave: 11 Injectors, 6 C2 Domains, and the Shared Campaign Tokens](https://intel.breakglass.tech/post/socgholish-march-2026-wave-11-injectors-6-c2-domains-and-the-shared-campaign-tokens-that-linked-them-all)
- [SocGholish — Red Canary Threat Detection Report](https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/socgholish/)
- [Operation Endgame Disrupts SocGholish Malware Infrastructure](https://hackread.com/operation-endgame-disrupts-socgholish-malware/)
- [Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, Enabler of Ransomware](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845)
- [NCA leads international investigation targeting Evil Corp (LockBit links)](https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/nca-leads-international-investigation-targeting-evil-corp)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0863
