Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-0879
Operation Poisson: French-speaking junior operator "Poisson" abuses Tailscale, OpenSSH and RustDesk for C2-independent persistence in 33-day Havoc intrusion
A French-speaking junior threat actor tracked as "Poisson" maintained access to a small French automotive business and four French individuals over a 33-day intrusion (March 30 - May 1, 2026) using the Havoc C2 framework (Demon agent). Before his C2 went offline he pre-positioned OpenSSH Server, a Tailscale mesh VPN and RustDesk so access survived an 18-day C2 outage and reconnected automatically.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0879 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Operation Poisson |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows; Tailscale Tailscale VPN; RustDesk RustDesk |
| Attribution | Poisson (low confidence) |
| Tools | Havoc (Demon agent), OpenSSH Server (sshd), RustDesk, Tailscale |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1055 Process Injection, T1056 Input Capture, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1087 Account Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer and 11 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | automotive, individuals, consumer |
| Target regions | France, Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-06-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0879 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Operation Poisson VBScript Stager to PowerShell Loader Chain — Exploitation
Detects the Operation Poisson initial-execution chain: wscript.exe (or cscript.exe) running an AES-encrypted .vbs stager (sys.vbs) from a user staging/temp directory, immediately spawning powershell.exe that decodes and retrieves senti.dll. Catches the T1059.005 -> T1059.001 hand-off and the deobfuscation/ingress-fetch behavior that precedes reflective loading.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1059.005, T1059.001, T1204.002, T1140
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\wscript.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\cscript.exe" Image="*\\powershell.exe"
| eval vbs_from_staging=if(match(ParentCommandLine, "(?i)\\\\(Temp|AppData|Downloads|Public|Users\\\\[^\\\\]+\\\\)[^\\\\]*\.vbs"), 1, 0)
| eval susp_ps=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)(-enc|-encodedcommand|frombase64string|downloadstring|downloadfile|invoke-webrequest|iex|hidden|nop|-w hidden)"), 1, 0)
| where vbs_from_staging=1 OR susp_ps=1
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(CommandLine) as ps_cmdline values(ParentCommandLine) as vbs_cmdline by Computer, User, ParentImage, Image
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - countMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has ".vbs"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("\\Temp\\", "\\AppData\\", "\\Downloads\\", "\\Public\\")
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-enc", "EncodedCommand", "FromBase64String", "DownloadString", "DownloadFile", "Invoke-WebRequest", "-w hidden", "-nop")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Operation Poisson VBScript Stager Spawning PowerShell Loader
id: 6f1a2c4e-9b8d-4e21-a7c3-1d0879ab0001
status: experimental
description: Detects a Windows Script Host process (wscript/cscript) running a .vbs from a user staging directory and spawning powershell.exe, matching the Operation Poisson sys.vbs -> PowerShell senti.dll loader chain.
references:
- https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-operation-poisson-analyzing-a-cybercriminals-entire-operation/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.t1140
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
selection_vbs:
ParentCommandLine|contains: '.vbs'
filter_staging:
ParentCommandLine|contains:
- '\Temp\'
- '\AppData\'
- '\Downloads\'
- '\Public\'
condition: selection_parent and selection_vbs and filter_staging
falsepositives:
- Legacy line-of-business VBScript launchers that intentionally call PowerShell
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legacy VBScript-based deployment/login scripts that legitimately invoke PowerShell
- Software installers that drop and run helper .vbs from %TEMP%
Tuning notes: Allowlist known signed deployment scripts and software-distribution paths (SCCM/Intune cache). Tighten the staging-folder list to your environment, and consider raising fidelity by requiring an outbound connection from the child powershell.exe to a non-corporate host.
- Operation Poisson Reflective PE Loading and [indicator] — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation Poisson Keylogger + certutil Smart-Card Enumeration + powercfg Stay-Awake — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation Poisson Havoc Demon HTTPS Beacon + Mesh Egress — C2 / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation Poisson AES VBScript Stager Execution From User Staging Directory — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation Poisson Startup-Folder Shortcut Persistence ([indicator]) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation Poisson Tailscale/RustDesk LOTT Mesh and Reverse Tunnel Egress — C2 / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation Poisson Layered Logon Persistence — [indicator] + Startup Shortcut + RunAs · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation Poisson C2-Independent Mesh Persistence — sshd/Tailscale/RustDesk + [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-06-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0879.
Sample indicators (3 of 28)
- IP address:
217.154.217[.]139 - Domain:
wawsenti[.]duckdns[.]org - File hash:
aa7ea19e34567458b4ee66a7cd274181764984bf32123f756a7fdc64d5857b31
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
A Python pynput keylogger harvested banking and email credentials. Documented by Cato CTRL after the operator left SSH keys and a full playbook in an open Backblaze B2 bucket.
Operation Poisson is a credential-theft intrusion attributed to a low-skilled, French-speaking operator (handles "Poisson" and "Stikou68", Linux user avenger@ubuntu) who, despite junior tradecraft, executed a resilient multi-stage in-memory attack chain and engineered C2-independent persistence that defeated infrastructure takedown.
The kill chain began with an AES-encrypted VBScript stager (sys.vbs, ~1.1 KB) that decrypted and launched a PowerShell loader, which retrieved senti.dll (3.1 MB) from a Backblaze B2 bucket. senti.dll is a four-layer "matryoshka" reflective-PE loader (Donut-style, XOR key 0x02) that encodes the Havoc Demon agent shellcode as 207,813 English words, then injects it into Explorer.EXE for fileless execution. The Demon agent beaconed over HTTPS to a Havoc teamserver (217.154.217.139) fronted by a redirector (217.154.162.45), both IONOS SE VPS hosts in Berlin sharing the TLS certificate CN wawsenti.duckdns.org.
Privilege escalation used Start-Process -Verb RunAs, relying on a visible UAC consent dialog; the operator failed roughly seven attempts on one victim before a user clicked through. Persistence was layered: a scheduled task TaskAdmin1 running at logon with highest privileges, a startup-folder shortcut (sys.lnk), and Explorer.EXE shellcode injection. RustDesk (custom-compiled with the operator's relay config) was added as a secondary remote-access channel with dedicated inbound/outbound firewall rules.
The pivotal move came on April 7 during a 5-hour overnight session: the operator installed OpenSSH Server (sshd, auto-start) and Tailscale VPN on a victim workstation, configured key-based SSH auth, joined the host to his Tailscale mesh, and established a reverse SSH tunnel (ssh -R). When the Havoc C2 went offline on April 8, this mesh-based access survived; when the C2 returned on April 26 after an 18-day outage, all victims were still compromised and the Demon agents reconnected automatically with no re-compromise required. A 70-line Python keylogger (pynput) written KeyL.zip captured keystrokes locally for manual retrieval, focused on banking credentials, email passwords and government-portal logins. powercfg /change standby-timeout-ac 300 kept machines awake, and certutil -scinfo was run repeatedly to enumerate certificate stores and smart-card information. On April 30 the operator ran late-stage tooling from Thales.zip (WinFormsApp1.exe, Thal.exe) and deleted 17 files; the last command was issued at 18:14 UTC, and the C2 went offline May 1.
Infrastructure was exclusively free-tier (DuckDNS dynamic DNS, Backblaze B2 storage, a cheap IONOS Berlin VPS), and severe OPSEC failures - leaking /home/avenger/Desktop/ five times, naming buckets after his handle, and exposing his complete SSH playbook, victim keys and French installation notes on a public Backblaze bucket - allowed Cato CTRL to reconstruct all 339 commands across the 33-day operation. The defining lesson: the C2 was never the intrusion, merely one door into it; killing the teamserver left OpenSSH, Tailscale, the scheduled task and the keylogger fully operational on a separate encrypted mesh.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1055 Process Injection; T1070 Indicator Removal; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Persistence
T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1543 Create or Modify System Process; T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Credential Access
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1568 Dynamic Resolution; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery; T1087 Account Discovery
Privilege Escalation
T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Resource Development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block DNS resolution of wawsenti[.]duckdns[.]org and DuckDNS subdomains not required for business
- Block/deny the C2 IPs 217.154.217.139 and 217.154.162.45 (IONOS Berlin) at the perimeter
- Block the three Backblaze B2 staging hosts (pois43, w456w5, sentiwaw on s3.eu-central-003.backblazeb2.com) used to deliver senti.dll and tooling
- Hunt for and remove the TaskAdmin1 scheduled task and sys.lnk startup shortcut
- Identify and remove unauthorized OpenSSH Server (sshd), Tailscale and RustDesk installs on workstations; revoke the operator's Ed25519 SSH key and any authorized_keys entries
Workarounds
- Enforce UAC at the highest level and educate users not to approve unexpected RunAs consent prompts
- Egress filtering to flag SSH reverse tunnels (ssh -R) and unexpected Tailscale/WireGuard mesh egress from workstations
- Disable or restrict certutil and powercfg via application control where not operationally needed
Longer-term hardening
- Alert on OpenSSH Server / Tailscale / RustDesk installation on endpoints where they are not sanctioned (living-off-trusted-tools)
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for shellcode injection into Explorer.EXE and reflective PE loading
- Restrict and monitor scheduled-task creation with -RunLevel Highest invoking script interpreters
- Application control to block wscript.exe executing .vbs from user staging/temp directories
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: Windows 10/11 workstations (abused via legitimate features: OpenSSH Server, scheduled tasks, Explorer.EXE) - Tailscale — Tailscale VPN
Vulnerable versions: abused as legitimate mesh-VPN persistence channel - RustDesk — RustDesk
Vulnerable versions: custom-compiled build abused as backup remote access
Timeline
- Initial compromise of Victim 1 (French automotive small business); escalation to admin, TaskAdmin1 scheduled task deployed, RustDesk installed.
- Persistence planted on a third victim: startup shortcut (locked-ioc-16) and Explorer.EXE shellcode injection.
- 51 commands executed; ~7 failed Start-Process -Verb RunAs UAC bypass attempts before a user clicked the consent dialog, granting elevation.
- KeyL.zip Python pynput keylogger deployed; manual keystroke retrieval begins (~3,000 characters captured by day 3).
- Maintenance; a fourth French victim briefly registers (hostname carries '95' Val-d'Oise departement identifier).
- 5-hour overnight session: OpenSSH Server (sshd) and Tailscale VPN installed, key-based SSH auth configured, host joined operator's Tailscale mesh, reverse tunnel (ssh -R) tested - C2-independent persistence established.
- Havoc C2 teamserver goes offline; Tailscale/OpenSSH mesh persistence survives the takedown.
- C2 returns after an 18-day outage; all victims still compromised and Demon agents reconnect automatically with no re-compromise.
- Thales.zip accessed; locked-ioc-13 and Thal.exe executed (~32 minutes combined); 17 files deleted; last command issued at 18:14 UTC.
- C2 goes offline and operations cease; 33-day intrusion with 339 recorded commands.
- Cato CTRL (researcher Vitaly Simonovich) publishes the full operation reconstruction from the operator's exposed SSH keys and playbook in an open Backblaze B2 bucket.
Sources cited
- Operation Poisson Under the Spotlight - Analyzing a Cybercriminal's Entire Operation catonetworks.com · Vendor report · 2026-06-17
- MITRE ATT&CK T1219 Remote Access Software MITRE · Research · 2026-06-19
- Operation Poisson Exposes a Resilient Credential Theft Chain socprime.com · Blog · 2026-06-17
- Mesh Networks as Backdoors: How a Junior Threat Actor Bypassed C2 Detection with Tailscale and OpenSSH news.shield53.com · Blog · 2026-06-17
- Junior Hacker Used Tailscale and OpenSSH to Keep Access After His C2 Went Offline The Hacker News · News · 2026-06-17
- Attacker establishes persistent access to French business using OpenSSH and Tailscale scworld.com · News · 2026-06-17
Previous and next in threat intel
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.