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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-0881

CVE-2026-55706: 27-Year-Old OpenBSD sppp(4) PAP Authentication Bypass in sppp_pap_input()

mediumPATCHED

A 27-year-old flaw (present since the July 1999 FreeBSD import) in OpenBSD's sppp(4) subsystem lets an unauthenticated attacker bypass PAP authentication entirely. sppp_pap_input() in sys/net/if_spppsubr.c trusts attacker-controlled length fields, so zero-length name/password values make bcmp() return 0 and the credential check always passes; a secondary heap over-read leaks adjacent kernel memory when supplied lengths exceed the credential buffer.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0881, CVE-2026-55706
Also known as27-Year-Old OpenBSD PAP Authentication Bypass, OpenBSD sppp PAP Empty-Credential Bypass
SeverityMEDIUM
CVSS5.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L)
Exploitation statusPublic proof-of-concept exploit for a linked CVE
EPSSCVE-2026-55706: 0.2% (14.6th percentile)
Affected productsOpenBSD OpenBSD (sppp(4) / sys/net/if_spppsubr.c)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-287, CWE-1284, CWE-125
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1021 Remote Services, T1040 Network Sniffing, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1133 External Remote Services, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1211 Exploitation for Stealth, T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstelecommunications, internet-service-providers, managed-network-services, government, critical-infrastructure
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0881 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 17 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: CVE-2026-55706 Zero-Length PAP Authenticate-Request — sppp(4) Empty-Credential Bypass (Exploitation)

Detects the core CVE-2026-55706 exploitation primitive: a PAP Authenticate-Request frame carrying peerid_len=0 and passwd_len=0 on a PPP/PPPoE link. Empty credential length fields force bcmp(buf,ref,0) to return 0 (equal) inside sppp_pap_input(), making OpenBSD's PAP check pass without any valid secret. This is the single most distinctive on-wire signal of the attack and should fire on any PPP-aware sensor (Zeek/Suricata/PPP daemon log) parsing PAP length fields.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1190, T1078
  • Data sources: zeek_ppp, suricata, ppp_daemon_log
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=network sourcetype="zeek:ppp" OR sourcetype="suricata:ppp" protocol=PAP message_type="Authenticate-Request"
| eval peerid_len=coalesce(peerid_len, name_len), passwd_len=coalesce(passwd_len, secret_len)
| where peerid_len=0 OR passwd_len=0
| stats count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(src_mac) as src_mac values(pppoe_session_id) as session_id by src_ip dest_ip pap_id
| eval reason="PAP Authenticate-Request with zero-length credential field — CVE-2026-55706 empty-credential bypass"
| where count > 0

Microsoft KQL

// Sentinel custom PPP/PPPoE network table (CommonSecurityLog or custom PppAuthEvents_CL)
PppAuthEvents_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Protocol_s == "PAP" and MessageType_s == "Authenticate-Request"
| extend PeerIdLen = toint(PeerIdLen_d), PasswdLen = toint(PasswdLen_d)
| where PeerIdLen == 0 or PasswdLen == 0
| project TimeGenerated, SrcIp_s, SrcMac_s, DstIp_s, PppoeSessionId_s, PapId_d, PeerIdLen, PasswdLen
| summarize Count = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by SrcIp_s, SrcMac_s, DstIp_s, PppoeSessionId_s

Sigma

title: CVE-2026-55706 Zero-Length PAP Authenticate-Request (sppp Empty-Credential Bypass)
id: 6a1f2c44-0881-4a01-9b11-0a55d1e7a001
status: experimental
description: Detects a PAP Authenticate-Request with zero-length peer-id and password fields, the empty-credential bypass primitive for CVE-2026-55706 in OpenBSD sppp(4) sppp_pap_input().
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55706
  - https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/16/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/19
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1190
  - attack.t1078
  - cve.2026.55706
logsource:
  product: network
  service: ppp
detection:
  selection:
    protocol: PAP
    message_type: 'Authenticate-Request'
  empty_creds:
    - peerid_len: 0
    - passwd_len: 0
  condition: selection and empty_creds
falsepositives:
  - Misconfigured or malfunctioning PPP client sending blank PAP credentials
  - Protocol fuzzing or conformance testing on a lab PPP link
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Misconfigured PPP client emitting blank PAP username/password
  • PPP protocol fuzzing or conformance testing in a lab

Tuning notes: Scope the index/table to interfaces where sppp(4)/PPPoE is actually used. Allowlist any known test harness source MACs. If your sensor does not parse PAP length fields, deploy a Zeek PPP analyzer or Suricata PPP keyword first.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • CVE-2026-55706 PPPoE LCP-Up Immediately Followed by Zero-Length PAP (Exploit Sequence) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-55706 IPCP FULL LINK ESTABLISHED After Empty-Credential PAP (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-55706 Rogue PPPoE Access Concentrator — Unsanctioned PADO/PADS (C2 / AitM Setup) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-55706 PPPoE Discovery Sequence From Unsanctioned Concentrator (PADI/PADO/PADR/PADS) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-55706 sppp(4) PAP Auth Success Without Secret Verification — Kernel Log (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-55706 Credential-Less PPP Tunnel Traffic — IPCP + ICMP From Unverified Peer (C2 / Tunneling) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-55706 PAP_ACK Without Credential Verification — Successful sppp Bypass (Exploitation Confirmation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-55706 Oversized PAP Credential Length — sppp Kernel Heap Over-Read (Post-Exploitation / Info Disclosure) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 17 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0881.

17 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Disclosed by researcher shj and fixed by commit 076e2b1 (mvs, 2026-06-14).

CVE-2026-55706 is an authentication-bypass vulnerability in the OpenBSD kernel's synchronous-PPP driver, sppp(4), implemented in sys/net/if_spppsubr.c. The defect lives in sppp_pap_input(), the handler for inbound PAP (Password Authentication Protocol) Authenticate-Request frames on PPP and PPPoE links.

Root cause — protocol-controlled length trusted in credential comparison: The validation logic compared the supplied username and password against the configured peer credentials using bcmp(), but used the length fields taken directly from the incoming PAP frame:

if (name_len > AUTHMAXLEN || passwd_len > AUTHMAXLEN || bcmp(name, sp->hisauth.name, name_len) != 0 || bcmp(passwd, sp->hisauth.secret, passwd_len) != 0)

The guard only enforced an UPPER bound (AUTHMAXLEN, 256 bytes) and never checked for a lower/exact length. Because bcmp(buf, ref, 0) unconditionally returns 0 (equal) regardless of buffer contents, an attacker who sends a PAP Authenticate-Request with name_len = 0 and passwd_len = 0 makes both comparisons succeed regardless of the real configured secret, and the stack issues a PAP_ACK — establishing a fully authenticated PPP session without any valid credentials.

Secondary heap over-read: A 2009-02-16 refactor that moved credential storage to dynamic allocation (malloc) and replaced the older fixed limits AUTHNAMELEN (64) and AUTHKEYLEN (16) with the AUTHMAXLEN (256) boundary introduced a kernel-memory disclosure. Because the same attacker-controlled length drives bcmp(), an oversized value (e.g. name_len = 200 against an 8-byte stored credential) reads ~192 bytes past the allocation, exposing adjacent kernel heap contents to comparison/oracle behavior.

Reachability and attack model: The vulnerable code is reached over the PPPoE data path pppoe_data_input -> pppoeintr -> sppp_input -> sppp_pap_input, requiring no prior credentials or access. An attacker who stands up a rogue PPPoE access concentrator within the victim's layer-2 broadcast domain can complete PPPoE discovery (PADI/PADO/PADR/PADS), perform LCP negotiation, drive the PAP exchange with empty credentials, and bring up an IP-configured link. A published proof of concept against OpenBSD 7.6 (amd64) demonstrated a rogue PPPoE server sending zero-length PAP credentials, receiving a PAP_ACK, completing IPCP to a "FULL LINK ESTABLISHED" state, and exchanging ICMP echo traffic over the established session.

Provenance: The flawed comparison originated in a Cronyx Engineering sppp implementation from 1994-1996, was carried into FreeBSD, and imported into OpenBSD on 1999-07-01, remaining effectively unchanged for ~27 years. The companion CHAP handler already performed the correct exact-length pre-check (if (name_len != strlen(sp->hisauth.name) || bcmp(name, sp->hisauth.name, name_len) != 0)); the PAP path never received the same treatment.

Resolution: Reported to OpenBSD on 2026-06-12 by researcher shj (shahriyar@...eray.co.uk) and fixed two days later by developer mvs in commit 076e2b1c1fc4ac0883a72d3544131ad5cee7adf8 (2026-06-14), which adds exact-length pre-checks before any bcmp() call — rejecting zero-length and oversized inputs and closing both the bypass and the over-read. The issue was posted to the oss-security mailing list on 2026-06-16 and CVE-2026-55706 was published 2026-06-17. The practical effect — a remote-on-link, unauthenticated, full PAP bypass plus kernel-heap disclosure — is severe for any deployment using sppp/PPPoE with PAP, though scored Medium due to the Adjacent attack vector and high attack complexity (the attacker must be on the same broadcast domain).

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery

Lateral Movement

T1021 Remote Services

credential-access

T1040 Network Sniffing

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Command and Control

T1090 Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Defense Evasion

T1211 Exploitation for Stealth

Credential Access

T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Collection

T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure

Remediation

Patches

  • OpenBSD commit 076e2b1c1fc4ac0883a72d3544131ad5cee7adf8 (mvs, 2026-06-14) adds exact-length pre-checks before bcmp() in sppp_pap_input()

Immediate actions

  • Update OpenBSD to a build including commit 076e2b1c1fc4ac0883a72d3544131ad5cee7adf8 (sys/net/if_spppsubr.c) or apply the corresponding -stable errata patch
  • Where patching is not immediately possible, disable PAP on sppp(4)/PPPoE interfaces and require CHAP instead
  • Restrict PPPoE ingress to trusted, isolated layer-2 segments so a rogue access concentrator cannot reach clients in the broadcast domain

Workarounds

  • Switch sppp(4) peer authentication from PAP to CHAP
  • Disable PPPoE/sppp interfaces that are not strictly required
  • Confine PPPoE to point-to-point isolated VLANs / dedicated broadcast domains

Longer-term hardening

  • Permanently retire cleartext PAP for PPP/PPPoE authentication and standardize on CHAP or stronger transport-protected authentication
  • Segment management/PPPoE networks and enforce 802.1X / port security to prevent rogue concentrators on shared media
  • Add kernel-network regression tests asserting exact-length credential validation for all PPP auth handlers (PAP and CHAP)

Affected and fixed versions

  • OpenBSD — OpenBSD (sppp(4) / sys/net/if_spppsubr.c)
    Vulnerable versions: 7.6 and earlier; all releases since the 1999-07-01 import (before commit 076e2b1)
    Fixed in: builds including commit 076e2b1c1fc4ac0883a72d3544131ad5cee7adf8 (2026-06-14)

Timeline

  • Vulnerable sppp credential-comparison logic originates in a Cronyx Engineering synchronous-PPP implementation (circa 1994-1996) and is carried into FreeBSD.
  • sppp(4) code (locked-ioc-1) imported into OpenBSD from FreeBSD, carrying the flawed PAP length handling in sppp_pap_input().
  • Refactor to dynamic malloc credential storage replaces the legacy AUTHNAMELEN(64)/AUTHKEYLEN(16) limits with the AUTHMAXLEN(256) upper-bound check, introducing the secondary kernel heap over-read for oversized attacker-supplied lengths.
  • Vulnerability responsibly reported to OpenBSD by researcher shj (shahriyar@...eray.co.uk); PoC demonstrates full PAP bypass against OpenBSD 7.6 (amd64) via a rogue PPPoE server.
  • OpenBSD developer mvs commits fix 076e2b1c1fc4ac0883a72d3544131ad5cee7adf8 adding exact-length pre-checks before bcmp() in sppp_pap_input().
  • Issue posted to the oss-security mailing list by shj with technical details of the zero-length bypass and the kernel heap over-read.
  • CVE-2026-55706 published (CVSS v3.1 5.8 Medium, AV:A/AC:H); Argus Systems technical analysis and initial press coverage released.
  • Broader security-press and vendor advisory coverage (GBHackers, Mallory, BrinzTech) documents affected versions, the call chain, and mitigations.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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