# ClickFix Campaign Delivers GULoader via EtherHiding Blockchain Payload Retrieval (BNB Smart Chain Testnet)

> A ClickFix social-engineering campaign first observed in April 2026 abuses compromised European small-business WordPress/WooCommerce sites to serve fake reCAPTCHA overlays that trick Windows users into a Win+R → Ctrl+V → Enter clipboard-paste sequence. The pasted command invokes the Microsoft-signed rundll32.exe against a remote WebDAV UNC path to load GULoader shellcode entirely in memory. Second-stage payloads are staged in smart contracts on the BNB Smart Chain Testnet using the EtherHiding technique, evading SmartScreen and takedowns; GULoader is a staging loader for infostealers (Lumma, Vidar) and RATs (Remcos, AgentTesla).

- **Published:** 2026-06-20T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-20T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0887
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-clickfix-guloader-bnb-etherhiding-tl-2026-0887.webp?v=686a265f (Threadlinqs threat intel: GULoader ClickFix via BNB Smart Chain: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0887) — High severity, 22 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0887
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 22 (3 shown free below)

## Description

This campaign chains three modern delivery primitives — ClickFix social engineering, EtherHiding blockchain payload hosting, and the GULoader memory-resident shellcode loader — into a fileless infection path that targets Windows desktop browser users in Europe.

Initial access is achieved by compromising legitimate small-business WordPress/WooCommerce sites (an ErrTraffic-style web backdoor) while preserving normal site functionality. Attacker-injected JavaScript fingerprints each visitor (browser, OS, screen resolution, referrer, IP metadata) and forwards the data to a Traffic Direction System (TDS). The TDS serves the malicious chain only to Windows desktop users and shows clean content to mobile devices, crawlers, and analysis sandboxes — a built-in anti-analysis gate. Yandex Metrika tracking was observed, suggesting the operators monitor victim interaction.

Approximately two seconds after page load, the injected script connects to the BNB Smart Chain Testnet over public JSON-RPC endpoints (bsc-testnet.drpc.org, with data-seed-prebsc-1-s1.bnbchain.org as a fallback node on port 8545) and performs read-only eth_call queries to retrieve the second-stage payload stored inside a smart contract. This EtherHiding approach replaces a centralized C2 with immutable, decentralized blockchain storage that resists takedown and permits silent payload rotation. The retrieved JavaScript is Base64-decoded/decompressed and executed in the browser, rendering a counterfeit reCAPTCHA "verification" overlay.

The overlay instructs the victim to press Win+R, Ctrl+V, and Enter. Malicious JavaScript has already written the attack command to the clipboard (a 'malicious copy and paste' / ClickFix lure), so the victim unknowingly executes it. The command launches rundll32.exe against a remote WebDAV UNC path (\\autum-path.vo8xalon.in.net\05fe317c-0981-4de2-bc8a-930d369db441\ck-3d) with an ordinal-based export call. Because rundll32.exe is a Microsoft-signed living-off-the-land binary and the payload is loaded directly from the remote share into memory, the chain bypasses SmartScreen reputation checks, browser download warnings, and file-based antivirus — no payload touches disk. The loaded DLL is GULoader, a shellcode-based loader that runs entirely in memory and is a known staging vector for infostealers (Lumma, Vidar) and RATs (Remcos, AgentTesla), enabling credential theft and full system compromise.

In the observed corporate incident, behavioral endpoint protection blocked the rundll32.exe execution in under 300 milliseconds, preventing final GULoader delivery; the family was confirmed via ANY.RUN sandbox detonation and endpoint telemetry correlation. The campaign demonstrates a notable convergence of new TTPs: blockchain-hosted payload staging plus rundll32/WebDAV UNC SmartScreen bypass, with the front-end C2 domain fronted by Cloudflare reverse-proxy IPs (188.114.96.7, 188.114.97.7).

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1566 Phishing
- T1204 User Execution
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1592 Gather Victim Host Information
- T1102 Web Service
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1090 Proxy
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**ClickFix rundll32 Proxy Execution Against Remote WebDAV UNC Path — Exploitation** (`TL-2026-0887-SPL-001`)

Detects the core ClickFix/GULoader execution primitive: Microsoft-signed rundll32.exe launched with a remote UNC/WebDAV path argument (\\host\...) and an ordinal/named export (e.g. ,#1 or ,ck-3d). The campaign uses rundll32 as a signed LOLBin to load GULoader shellcode directly from a remote share into memory, bypassing SmartScreen, browser download warnings, and file-based AV. Legitimate rundll32 usage references local DLLs on C:\ or known system DLLs, not internet UNC paths.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1218.011, T1204.004, T1036
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_events
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\rundll32.exe"
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| where like(cmd,"%\\\\%") AND NOT (like(cmd,"%c:\\%") OR like(cmd,"%shell32.dll%") OR like(cmd,"%\\\\.\\pipe%"))
| rex field=CommandLine "(?i)(?<unc_path>\\\\\\\\[^,\"\s]+)"
| rex field=CommandLine "(?i),(?<export>#\d+|[a-z0-9\-]+)\s*$"
| eval webdav_ssl=if(like(cmd,"%@ssl%"),"yes","no")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(unc_path) as unc_path values(export) as export values(webdav_ssl) as webdav_ssl values(ParentImage) as parent by host, User, CommandLine
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| where count > 0
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// Primary flavor is SPL; KQL provided for cross-platform coverage
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "rundll32.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "\\\\"
| where ProcessCommandLine !contains "C:\\" and ProcessCommandLine !contains "shell32.dll"
| extend WebDavSsl = iff(ProcessCommandLine contains "@SSL", "yes", "no")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, WebDavSsl
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Rundll32 Proxy Execution Against Remote WebDAV UNC Path (ClickFix/GULoader)
id: 7c1b9a42-0887-4a11-9e21-1a0c1d2e3f01
status: experimental
description: Detects Microsoft-signed rundll32.exe invoked with a remote UNC/WebDAV path and an ordinal/named export, used by the ClickFix/EtherHiding GULoader campaign to load shellcode from a remote share into memory and bypass SmartScreen and file-based AV.
references:
    - https://cybersecuritynews.com/clickfix-campaign-uses-etherhiding-and-guloader/
    - https://cyberpress.org/clickfix-evades-powershell-detection/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\\\\'
    filter_local:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'C:\'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - '\\.\pipe'
    condition: selection and not filter_local
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative scripts loading DLLs from trusted internal file shares
    - Software deployment tools invoking rundll32 against internal UNC paths
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate admin scripts loading DLLs from trusted internal file shares
- Software deployment tooling invoking rundll32 against internal UNC paths

**Tuning notes:** Allow-list known-good internal file-share hosts and deployment service accounts. Tighten by alerting only when the UNC host is internet-routable or resolves to Cloudflare edge IPs (188.114.96.7, 188.114.97.7), or when the export is an ordinal (#N) or matches 'ck-3d'.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Rundll32 Loading Remote WebDAV UNC Payload — Exploitation (Defender) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Explorer-Spawned rundll32 With Fileless Module Load — Post-Exploitation (Defender) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EtherHiding Blockchain JSON-RPC eth_call From Browser Process — C2 Retrieval (Defender) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GULoader Payload Hash and C2 Domain Indicator Match — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- WebClient Service Enabled via Run-Dialog Followed by rundll32 UNC Load — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Fake-CAPTCHA Web Lure: Clipboard Write Then Run-Dialog Execution — C2/Delivery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Run-Dialog Chain: Explorer Spawns rundll32 After RunMRU Write — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- WebDAV/WebClient Outbound to Internet UNC Host With In-Memory Loader — C2/Staging (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 22)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `188.114.96[.]7`
- Domain: `vo8xalon[.]in[.]net`
- File hash: `172a25a9ed8b798d8baeec29424b46627b5b39723b37c787f928d3700509001e`

Full set of 22 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [ClickFix Campaign Uses EtherHiding and GULoader](https://cybersecuritynews.com/clickfix-campaign-uses-etherhiding-and-guloader/)
- [Compromised WordPress Site Uses Traffic Direction System to Target Windows Users With GULoader](https://cyberpress.org/wordpress-site-spreads-guloader/)
- [ClickFix Campaign Abuses Rundll32 and WebDAV To Bypass PowerShell Defenses](https://cyberpress.org/clickfix-evades-powershell-detection/)
- [New Group on the Block: UNC5142 Leverages EtherHiding to Distribute Malware (Google Threat Intelligence)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc5142-etherhiding-distribute-malware)
- [EtherHiding: How Web3 Infrastructure Enables Stealthy Malware Distribution (Picus Security)](https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/etherhiding-how-web3-infrastructure-enables-stealthy-malware-distribution)
- [Beyond The Click: Unveiling Fake CAPTCHA Campaigns (Splunk)](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/unveiling-fake-captcha-clickfix-attacks.html)
- [EtherHiding gives cybercriminals access to blockchain networks impervious to takedowns (Barracuda)](https://blog.barracuda.com/2025/10/31/etherhiding-cybercriminals-blockchain-networks)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0887
