Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0889
Deno-Based Modular RAT & Internal Proxy Delivered via Mailbombing + Microsoft Teams Vishing ("DenoJSEnv")
A targeted intrusion paired email mailbombing with Microsoft Teams voice phishing impersonating internal IT help desk to coerce an employee into running a Deno (JavaScript/TypeScript) runtime that loaded a modular Remote Access Trojan and internal SOCKS-like proxy. The implant provides WebSocket C2 over Amazon CloudFront, arbitrary command execution, host/network reconnaissance, registry Run-key persistence, and a loopback-based TCP pivot for lateral movement into non-internet-facing systems.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0889 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | DenoJSEnv RAT, Deno-Based Proxy & RAT |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows; Microsoft Microsoft Teams |
| Attribution | MuddyWater (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Iran |
| Malware | DenoJSEnv RAT |
| Tools | Deno |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1021 Remote Services, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1087 Account Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1132 Data Encoding and 11 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | espionage |
| Target sectors | enterprise, technology |
| Target regions | Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-08-28, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0889 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: DenoJSEnv RAT — HKCU Run-Key Persistence & set/ipconfig/route/tasklist Recon Chain (Post-Exploitation)
Detects two post-exploitation behaviors of the DenoJSEnv RAT: (1) back.js writing the HKCU CurrentVersion\Run value 'Deno_AutoRun' (or any Run value pointing at deno.exe), and (2) the host/network reconnaissance command chain 'set && ipconfig /all && route print && tasklist' executed via cmd.exe with a Deno runtime ancestor and relayed to C2.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1547.001, T1059.003, T1082, T1016, T1057
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*" (TargetObject="*\\Deno_AutoRun" OR Details="*deno.exe*")) OR (EventCode=1 Image="*\\cmd.exe" CommandLine="*ipconfig /all*" CommandLine="*route print*" CommandLine="*tasklist*")
| eval signal=case(EventCode==13,"runkey_persistence", EventCode==1,"recon_chain")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime values(TargetObject) as run_values values(Details) as details values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parents by host, User, signal
| convert ctime(firstTime)
| sort - countMicrosoft KQL
union
( DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("RegistryValueSet", "RegistryKeyCreated")
| where RegistryKey has @"\CurrentVersion\Run"
| where RegistryValueName =~ "Deno_AutoRun" or RegistryValueData has "deno.exe"
| extend Signal = "runkey_persistence"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Signal, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName ),
( DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "ipconfig /all" and ProcessCommandLine has "route print" and ProcessCommandLine has "tasklist"
| extend Signal = "recon_chain"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Signal, RegistryKey="", RegistryValueName="", RegistryValueData=ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName )
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: DenoJSEnv RAT - Run-Key Persistence and Recon Command Chain
id: 1b6e2d77-9a44-4c0e-8f31-5d2c9e7a3b08
status: experimental
description: Detects the DenoJSEnv RAT post-exploitation footprint - HKCU Run value Deno_AutoRun (or any Run value referencing deno.exe) and the set/ipconfig/route/tasklist recon chain (TL-2026-0889).
references:
- https://dfir.ch/posts/deno/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-20
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1016
- attack.t1057
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_set
detection:
selection_runkey:
TargetObject|contains: '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\'
Details|contains: 'deno.exe'
selection_name:
TargetObject|endswith: '\Deno_AutoRun'
condition: selection_runkey or selection_name
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Deno-based tooling configured to autostart via a Run key
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate Deno-based tooling configured to autostart via a Run key
- Admin/inventory scripts that legitimately chain ipconfig/route/tasklist for diagnostics
Tuning notes: For the recon arm, relax to any 2-of-3 of {ipconfig /all, route print, tasklist} within a short window to catch reordering, and prioritize events whose process ancestry includes deno.exe/conhost --headless. Exclude sanctioned IT diagnostic toolchains by parent-image or signing certificate.
- DenoJSEnv RAT — Hidden Deno Runtime Execution from AppData with Permission Flags (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- DenoJSEnv RAT — Loopback RCE via cmd.exe Spawned by Deno Runtime (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- DenoJSEnv RAT — Follow-on LDAP & Certificate Reconnaissance After Deno Execution (C2 / Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
- DenoJSEnv RAT — Teams-Vishing Lure to Anomalous-Extension Archive & Deno Staging (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- DenoJSEnv RAT — Deno Run-Key Persistence Write (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- DenoJSEnv RAT — TLS Cert-Validation Bypass for CloudFront WebSocket C2 (C2 / Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
- DenoJSEnv RAT — Deno/Node/Bun Runtime Launched via conhost --headless from User-Writable Path (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- DenoJSEnv RAT — CloudFront WebSocket C2 & Loopback Proxy Pivot (C2 / Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-08-28, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0889.
Sample indicators (3 of 25)
- IP address:
51.120.77[.]97 - Domain:
d2cff16eusb8mg[.]cloudfront[.]net - File hash:
d317371cf2b4cd524849551ffd3b97d91edbc17f6b39c8693217383ba6a0370d
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
InfoGuard Labs / DFIR.ch documented an in-the-wild intrusion (telemetry timestamped 2026-06-04, reported 2026-06-15) that abused the legitimate, security-hardened Deno runtime as a living-off-trusted-tooling execution host for a bespoke modular RAT.
Initial access was a two-stage social-engineering chain. First, a high-volume email mailbombing campaign flooded three targeted employees over the course of a single day to induce alert fatigue and manufacture a pretext for 'IT support' contact. Attackers then placed Microsoft Teams calls impersonating internal help-desk staff, citing internal company context and employee names likely harvested from public sources such as LinkedIn. The victim was directed to a fake self-service portal mimicking ServiceNow and downloaded a file named patch09913.b — actually a ZIP/tar archive — which was extracted to C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\DenoJSEnv. Execution was launched as: conhost --headless C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\DenoJSEnv\deno.exe --allow-run C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\DenoJSEnv\app.js, using conhost.exe --headless to suppress any visible window.
The RAT is composed of four JavaScript modules executed under Deno with deliberately scoped, high-risk permission flags. app.js is the dropper/orchestrator that spawns three child Deno processes with distinct permission sets. back.js is the C2 bridge: launched with --unsafely-ignore-certificate-errors --allow-run, it maintains a WebSocket (wss://) connection to an Amazon CloudFront endpoint (d2cff16eusb8mg.cloudfront.net), pushes reconnaissance (environment variables, network configuration, running processes via 'set && ipconfig /all && route print && tasklist'), and establishes persistence by writing the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value Deno_AutoRun. helper.js (--allow-run --allow-env) is a stateless local HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:10021 that accepts POST /exec requests and pipes the body directly to cmd.exe /c, returning stdout/stderr as JSON. webui.js (--allow-net) listens on 127.0.0.1:10022 and exposes /connect, /send, and /closesocket endpoints implementing a SOCKS-like TCP proxy/pivot; internal traffic is base64-encoded and relayed back through back.js to the external WebSocket bridge, enabling access to internal hosts not reachable from the internet.
The modules use string-array shifting (array rotation) obfuscation to reconstruct meaningful strings at runtime. The intrusion was ultimately surfaced not by the initial implant but by follow-on LDAP queries and certificate-related reconnaissance. No threat actor attribution was asserted by the source; the TTPs (mailbomb + Teams vishing → fake ServiceNow/IT portal → signed/trusted runtime abuse) overlap with multiple financially and access-brokerage-motivated clusters observed using the same playbook in 2026.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Discovery
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1087 Account Discovery
Lateral Movement
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1564 Hide Artifacts; T1656 Impersonation
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1132 Data Encoding; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
Persistence
T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Initial Access
Resource Development
Reconnaissance
T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains
stealth
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block and alert on the CloudFront C2 endpoint d2cff16eusb8mg.cloudfront.net at the web proxy/DNS/firewall
- Hunt for deno.exe executing from user-writable paths (AppData\Roaming\DenoJSEnv) and for conhost --headless launching deno.exe
- Search for and remove the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value 'Deno_AutoRun'
- Hunt for the five known SHA-256 hashes (app.js, back.js, helper.js, webui.js, patch09913.b) across endpoints
- Isolate hosts with listeners on 127.0.0.1:10021 or 127.0.0.1:10022 spawned by deno.exe
Workarounds
- Disable or tightly restrict external Microsoft Teams calls/chat from outside the organization
- Block downloads of archive files with anomalous extensions (e.g. .b) at the mail/web gateway
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR detections for Deno/Node/Bun runtimes invoked with high-risk permission flags (--allow-run, --allow-net, --allow-env, --unsafely-ignore-certificate-errors)
- Application control / WDAC allow-listing to prevent execution of unsanctioned interpreters from user profile directories
- Correlate Microsoft Teams external-call / impersonation events in the Unified Audit Log with mailbombing spikes for pre-execution warning
- User awareness training on mailbomb-then-call IT-impersonation vishing and fake ServiceNow self-service portals
- Restrict and monitor external Microsoft Teams federation / unmanaged-tenant chat and calls
Affected and fixed versions
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- Rapid7/Lyrie Research publish research documenting MuddyWater's use of Microsoft Teams-based IT-helpdesk impersonation as a false-flag-ransomware initial-access TTP, establishing the pattern this intrusion reuses.
- Later reporting refines the mailbombing start to roughly 24 hours before the 2026-06-04 Teams-vishing call, i.e. beginning 2026-06-03 rather than same-day.
- Intrusion surfaced via follow-on LDAP queries and certificate-related reconnaissance rather than the initial C2 implant itself.
- Reconnaissance executed via 'set && ipconfig /all && route print && tasklist' and relayed to C2; internal pivot established through base64-framed proxy.
- back.js writes HKCU Run value 'Deno_AutoRun' and opens a WebSocket C2 channel to locked-ioc-10; helper.js (10021) and webui.js (10022) loopback services start.
- Implant executed at 2026-06-04T15:12:05 via 'conhost --headless locked-ioc-16 --allow-run app.js'; app.js spawns back.js, helper.js, and webui.js.
- Victim directed to a fake ServiceNow-style self-service portal and downloads locked-ioc-13 (a ZIP/tar archive), extracted to AppData\Roaming\DenoJSEnv.
- Attackers place Microsoft Teams calls impersonating internal help-desk staff, using employee names and internal context likely sourced from LinkedIn.
- High-volume email mailbombing campaign floods three targeted employees over the course of a single day to induce alert fatigue and pretext IT-support contact.
- Daylight AI publishes a closely related Deno-RAT intrusion ('DinDoor') using the same module set and Deno_AutoRun persistence but a different C2 domain and sample hashes, assessed as consistent with MuddyWater/Seedworm tradecraft.
- InfoGuard Labs / DFIR.ch publish 'Anatomy of a Deno-Based Proxy & RAT' with full IOCs and TTP analysis.
- GBHackers and CyberPress republish technical analysis of the InfoGuard findings, reiterating Deno-execution detection guidance.
Update history
- 2026-08-28 — Deno-Based Proxy & RAT Deployed via Mailbombing and Fake Teams IT-Support Impersonation: What changed No field escalations: severity/exploitability/status are unchanged (HIGH/ACTIVE/ACTIVE), and the newer report actually expresses LOWER attribution confidence (LOW vs.
Sources cited
- Anatomy of a Deno-Based Proxy & RAT - InfoGuard Labs labs.infoguard.ch · Research · 2026-06-15
- Fake software on GitHub and SourceForge distribute Deno RAT - Malwarebytes malwarebytes.com · Vendor report · 2026-05-27
- Anatomy of a Deno-Based Proxy & RAT dfir.ch · Blog · 2026-06-15
- Malware Uses Deno Permission Flags to Run Commands and Proxy Internal Network Traffic gbhackers.com · News · 2026-06-16
- Deno-Based Malware Abuses CloudFront WebSocket C2 for Remote Access and Internal Pivoting cyberpress.org · News · 2026-06-16
- Fake ChatGPT and Claude installers on GitHub are dropping Deno RAT malware - Help Net Security Help Net Security · News · 2026-05-27
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated .