Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0981
TeamPCP Malware Injection into Microsoft-Linked GitHub Repositories (42+ repos, 236 branches, 2026-06-05)
On June 5, 2026, threat actor TeamPCP leveraged a compromised GitHub account to inject malicious code into 42+ repositories and 236 branches across Microsoft, Azure, and Azure-Samples GitHub organizations. Attack occurred 02:36-03:22 UTC via direct code injection (trojanized packages), establishing a high-impact supply chain compromise vector affecting enterprise SDK consumers.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0981 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | GitHub Supply Chain Attack - Microsoft Repositories, Azure SDK Malware Injection Campaign |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| Affected products | Microsoft Azure SDK for .NET; Microsoft Azure SDK for Python; Microsoft Azure SDK for JavaScript; Microsoft Azure SDK for Java; Microsoft Azure Samples; Microsoft GitHub Enterprise |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-434, CWE-427, CWE-662, CWE-501 |
| Attribution | TeamPCP (high confidence) |
| Malware | TeamPCP, TeamPCP-SDK-Trojan |
| Tools | Azure SDK for .NET, Azure SDK for Java, Azure SDK for JavaScript, Azure SDK for Python, GitHub-based C2 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1021 Remote Services, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1072 Software Deployment Tools, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1098 Account Manipulation, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1110 Brute Force and 17 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | software development, cloud computing, enterprise technology, financial services, health, government administration, manufacturing, telecoms |
| Target regions | North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, Global (via SDK distribution) |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-06-28, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0981 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 30 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: GitHub Repository Commit Anomaly — Off-Hours SDK Push to Microsoft Org
Detects suspicious commits to Microsoft-linked GitHub repositories during off-hours (02:00-04:00 UTC) from non-standard account IPs or geographies, consistent with the TeamPCP attack pattern. Triggers on direct code commits to Azure SDK, Azure-Samples, or Microsoft org repos with rapid branch modification activity.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1195.002, T1078.004
- Data sources: github_audit_log, github.com
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=github_audit_log source="github.com" (organization="Azure" OR organization="Azure-Samples" OR organization="Microsoft") event_type="push" OR event_type="create" branch|regex="(main|master|develop|release)" NOT action_actor_location_geo="United States" NOT action_actor_login_source_country="US" earliest="2026-06-05T02:30:00Z" latest="2026-06-05T03:30:00Z" | stats count by action_actor_login, repository_name, branch, timestamp | where count > 5Microsoft KQL
GitHubAuditLog | where Timestamp between (datetime(2026-06-05 02:30:00Z) .. datetime(2026-06-05 03:30:00Z)) | where Organization in ('Azure', 'Azure-Samples', 'Microsoft') | where EventType in ('push', 'create', 'commit') | where isnotempty(Repository) | extend HourOfDay = hour(Timestamp) | where HourOfDay >= 2 and HourOfDay <= 4 | where ActorCountry != 'US' or isempty(ActorCountry) | summarize CommitCount = count() by ActorLogin, Repository, Timestamp | where CommitCount > 3Sigma
title: GitHub Supply Chain Attack — Off-Hours SDK Repository Commits
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious commits to Microsoft GitHub repositories during off-hours, consistent with TeamPCP GitHub account compromise and SDK poisoning attack
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-28
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1195_002
- attack.t1078_004
- github-compromise
- supply-chain-attack
logsource:
product: github
service: audit_log
detection:
selection:
organization:
- Azure
- Azure-Samples
- Microsoft
event_type:
- push
- create
timestamp|gte: 2026-06-05T02:30:00Z
timestamp|lte: 2026-06-05T03:30:00Z
branch|contains:
- main
- master
- develop
- release
actor_geo|exclude:
- United States
- US
filter:
push_count|gte: 5
condition: selection and filter
falsepositives:
- Legitimate off-hours deployment by on-call engineers (typical in cloud organizations)
- Automated CI/CD pipelines syncing repos during maintenance windows
- GitHub Actions workflows running code pushes from scheduled jobs
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate off-hours CI/CD deployments to develop/release branches
- Automated security patch pushes from GitHub Actions workflows
- On-call engineers deploying from non-US locations or VPNs
Tuning notes: Baseline expected commit counts and timing for your organization. Whitelist known CI/CD automation accounts. Adjust off-hours window based on team timezone. Consider correlation with MFA bypass or token anomalies for higher confidence.
- Azure DevOps / GitHub — Bulk Repository Access by Service Principal · unlock with TL Creds
- Python Environment Variable Harvesting — Credential Access During SDK Import · unlock with TL Creds
- Child Process Spawning from SDK Runtime — C2 Execution Capability · unlock with TL Creds
- CodeQL / SAST Tool Abuse — Scanning for Credentials in Repositories · unlock with TL Creds
- Temporary File Creation with Staged Credentials — Post-Exploitation Data Prep · unlock with TL Creds
- DNS Query Anomaly — C2 Domain Resolution from SDK Process · unlock with TL Creds
- PowerShell Registry Modification — Persistence via Run Keys During SDK Load · unlock with TL Creds
- Outbound Network Connection from SDK Process to Non-Azure Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-06-28, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 30 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0981.
Technical analysis
TeamPCP conducted a sophisticated supply chain attack against Microsoft's public GitHub repositories, demonstrating advanced capability to maintain persistent access to high-value target accounts. The attack was executed through a single compromised GitHub account with write access across multiple Microsoft-controlled organizations (Azure, Azure-Samples, Microsoft).
Attack Chain & Analysis: 1. INITIAL ACCESS: Compromised GitHub account with elevated privileges in Microsoft organizations (likely phishing, credential theft, or session hijacking) 2. EXPLOITATION VECTOR: Direct repository code injection via git commits to 42+ repositories across multiple organizations 3. PAYLOAD DELIVERY: Malicious code embedded in source code across 236 branches, creating persistent trojanized packages 4. SCOPE: Attack affected high-profile repositories including Azure SDK libraries, Azure sample projects, and Microsoft-owned technology repositories 5. DETECTION: First observed during code review/monitoring on June 5, 2026; attack likely designed for downstream dependency chain execution
Key Characteristics: - Breadth: 42+ repositories represents significant organizational compromise scope - Depth: 236 branches affected indicates multiple active development branches and release channels were compromised - Sophistication: Ability to maintain access across multiple GitHub organizations suggests organizational account compromise at management/admin level - Stealth: Attack window (02:36-03:22 UTC) suggests timing for minimal detection (off-hours deployment) - Impact: Supply chain poisoning threatens downstream consumers of Azure SDK libraries and sample code
Attack Infrastructure: - Primary access point: Compromised GitHub account with organization-level permissions - Attack surface: GitHub.com cloud platform (no on-premises infrastructure required) - Persistence mechanism: Code commits embedded directly in repositories (difficult to detect without commit review)
Post-Compromise Objectives: - Distribute malicious code through major SDK libraries to enterprise consumers - Establish secondary access points through dependency chain compromise - Enable downstream exploitation of systems consuming affected libraries
This attack demonstrates TeamPCP's capability to compromise high-value SaaS accounts and leverage them for supply chain operations affecting Fortune 500 customers and developers globally.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture
Lateral Movement
T1021 Remote Services; T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1070 Indicator Removal
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1072 Software Deployment Tools
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1566 Phishing
Persistence
T1098 Account Manipulation; T1136 Create Account; T1556 Modify Authentication Process
Command and Control
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
Credential Access
T1110 Brute Force; T1552 Unsecured Credentials
initial-access
T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1566 Phishing
Impact
T1491 Defacement; T1561 Disk Wipe
privilege-escalation
T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Resource Development
T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1587 Develop Capabilities
Reconnaissance
T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1594 Search Victim-Owned Websites; T1598 Phishing for Information
stealth
Remediation
Patches
- Revert all commits from compromised account
- Release patched versions of affected Azure SDK libraries
- Publish security advisories for all affected repositories
- Coordinate with NuGet, npm, and other package managers for removal of trojanized versions
Immediate actions
- Revoke compromised GitHub account access across all Microsoft organizations immediately
- Audit all commits from compromised account between 2026-06-04 and 2026-06-05 for malicious code
- Quarantine affected branches and commits from 02:36-03:22 UTC on 2026-06-05
- Review git logs and audit trails for account access patterns and unusual activities
- Notify all downstream consumers of affected Azure SDK versions
- Implement emergency code review and scanning of all 42+ affected repositories
- Rotate authentication tokens and API keys for GitHub account
- Enable MFA enforcement and review GitHub organization security settings
Workarounds
- Pin dependency versions to commits before 2026-06-05 02:36 UTC
- Implement runtime code verification and sandboxing
- Use alternative SDK versions or vendors during incident response
- Monitor for network indicators of compromise from trojanized code execution
Longer-term hardening
- Implement mandatory code signing for all repository commits
- Deploy binary authorization and software supply chain verification
- Establish SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) requirements for all releases
- Implement hardware security keys for GitHub account access by privileged admins
- Deploy continuous monitoring and anomaly detection for repository activity
- Establish repository access controls with principle of least privilege
- Implement branch protection rules with required peer review for all Microsoft organizations
- Deploy OSS-to-Enterprise (O2E) threat intelligence integration for upstream vulnerability tracking
- Establish Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) compliance
- Create automated scanning for malicious code patterns in commits
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Azure SDK for .NET
Vulnerable versions: All versions from packages published 2026-06-05 02:36-03:22 UTC
Fixed in: Patched versions post-incident - Microsoft — Azure SDK for Python
Vulnerable versions: All versions from packages published 2026-06-05 02:36-03:22 UTC
Fixed in: Patched versions post-incident - Microsoft — Azure SDK for JavaScript
Vulnerable versions: All versions from packages published 2026-06-05 02:36-03:22 UTC
Fixed in: Patched versions post-incident - Microsoft — Azure SDK for Java
Vulnerable versions: All versions from packages published 2026-06-05 02:36-03:22 UTC
Fixed in: Patched versions post-incident - Microsoft — Azure Samples
Vulnerable versions: All sample projects with commits from 2026-06-05 02:36-03:22 UTC
Fixed in: Reverted/patched versions - Microsoft — GitHub Enterprise
Vulnerable versions: On-premises instances using affected Azure repos
Fixed in: N/A - depends on remediation of source repos
Timeline
- Likely date of GitHub account compromise; threat actor gains access to Azure, Azure-Samples, and Microsoft GitHub organizations
- Microsoft Security Response Center and GitHub Security team initiate public disclosure and notification to affected users
- Wiz Threat Intelligence publishes incident report: 'TeamPCP adds malware to multiple Microsoft-linked GitHub projects'
- Attack detected by Microsoft security team and Wiz threat intelligence analysts
- 03:22 UTC: Last malicious commit detected; attack window closes
- 02:36-03:22 UTC: Threat actor TeamPCP injects malicious code into 42+ repositories across 236 branches (46-minute window)
- 02:36 UTC: First malicious commit injected into Microsoft-linked GitHub repositories by compromised account
- GitHub revokes compromised account access; Microsoft rotates affected credentials and begins repository audits
- Microsoft releases patched versions of affected Azure SDK libraries and sample repositories
- Comprehensive threat intelligence analysis complete; attribution to TeamPCP confirmed with HIGH confidence
- Wiz report updated; incident status changed to 'Finalized' and marked as contained
Sources cited
- CISA: Software Supply Chain Attacks and Mitigations CISA · Advisory · 2026-06-05
- GitHub Security: Preventing account takeover and unauthorized repository access GitHub · Vendor report · 2026-06-05
- MITRE ATT&CK: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) MITRE · Research · 2026-06-05
- Microsoft Security Response Center - GitHub Account Compromise Microsoft Security Response Center · Vendor report · 2026-06-05
- GitHub: Securing code with branch protection rules GitHub · Vendor report · 2026-06-05
- Supply Chain Attack Framework and Detection MITRE · Research · 2026-06-05
- Azure Security Best Practices for Repository Access Control Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-06-05
- TeamPCP adds malware to multiple Microsoft-linked GitHub projects Wiz · 2026-06-05
More from TeamPCP
- Software Supply Chain Attacks Weaponizing Trusted Developer Workflows (Shai-Hulud, Miasma, Hades, TeamPCP)
- AI Is Both Target and Tool for Threat Actors: AI-Involved Supply-Chain, Malware and Extortion Trends (Insikt Group, Jul 2025 - Jul 2026)
- Developer credential exposure on dev machines: StepSecurity Dev Machine Guard credential-source inventory (context: TeamPCP stealer, Bitwarden CLI npm hijack, Shai-Hulud)
- Open Source Supply Chain Attack Surge: 56 Confirmed Attacks in 12 Months Across npm, PyPI, RubyGems, Composer, Rust Crates and GitHub Actions (Shai-Hulud, TeamPCP, Axios, Miasma, ChainDrop)
- Mini Shai-Hulud: Compromised @antv npm Packages Steal Developer and CI/CD Credentials (TeamPCP)
- Re-Enabled actions-cool GitHub Actions (issues-helper, maintain-one-comment) Resume Executing Mini Shai-Hulud CI/CD Credential-Theft Payload
Previous and next in malware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.