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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0983

Miasma: Supply Chain Compromise in RedHat npm Packages - Credential Harvesting Malware

criticalACTIVE

TeamPCP deployed Miasma malware across 29+ @redhat-cloud-services npm package versions, using obfuscated preinstall scripts to harvest cloud credentials from GCP and Azure environments. Active exploitation via npm package distribution affecting infrastructure automation and cloud management tooling.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0983
Also known asnpm Miasma, TeamPCP npm Supply Chain
SeverityCRITICAL
Affected productsRedHat / Cloudflare @redhat-cloud-services npm packages (infrastructure namespace); Google Cloud Platform GCP Service Accounts and Credentials; Microsoft Azure Azure Service Principals and Credentials; npm npm Registry
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-1104, CWE-1112, CWE-427, CWE-506, CWE-912
AttributionTeamPCP (high confidence)
MalwareMiasma
ToolsCustom exfiltration endpoint, TeamPCP
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1005 Data from Local System, T1020 Automated Exfiltration, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1074 Data Staged, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information and 10 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorssoftware-development, cloud-infrastructure, financial-services, technology, government administration, health, telecoms
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Asia Pacific, Global (npm ecosystem)
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0983 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 15 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Credential File Discovery from Node.js Process

Detects file access patterns from node.exe/npm processes to credential files and directories (.aws/credentials, .azure/config, .kube/config, .gcloud/). This post-exploitation phase indicator shows the malware discovering and harvesting cloud credentials. Access to multiple credential paths in rapid succession indicates automated credential scanning consistent with Miasma malware behavior.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1552.001, T1083, T1005
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11 Image IN ("*\\node.exe", "*\\npm.exe", "*\\npm") TargetFilename IN ("*\\.aws\\credentials", "*\\.azure\\config*", "*\\.kube\\config", "*\\.gcloud*", "*\\.docker\\config*") | stats count as fileAccessCount by ComputerName, Image, TargetFilename | where fileAccessCount > 0 | stats count as uniqueFiles by ComputerName, Image | where uniqueFiles >= 2

Microsoft KQL

DeviceFileEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('node.exe', 'npm.exe', 'npm') | where FileName in~ ('credentials', 'config') and (FolderPath contains '.aws' or FolderPath contains '.azure' or FolderPath contains '.kube' or FolderPath contains '.gcloud' or FolderPath contains '.docker') | where ActionType == 'FileRead' or ActionType == 'FileCreated' | project Timestamp, ComputerName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType | summarize FileCount = dcount(FileName) by ComputerName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName | where FileCount >= 2

Sigma

title: Credential File Discovery from Node.js Process
id: 8c3f7e2a-1d5c-4b9f-a8e6-2c4d5f7a9b1c
status: experimental
description: Detects file access from node.exe/npm processes to credential files and directories. Indicates post-exploitation phase of Miasma malware attempting to discover and harvest cloud credentials (.aws/credentials, .azure/config, .kube/config, .gcloud/).
references:
  - https://www.wiz.io/threat-intelligence
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-28
tags:
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.t1552.001
  - attack.t1083
  - attack.t1005
  - cloud_credentials
  - credential_harvesting
  - malware
  - teampcp
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: file_access
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
      - 'node.exe'
      - 'npm.exe'
      - 'npm'
  selection_target:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - '.aws/credentials'
      - '.aws\\credentials'
      - '.azure/config'
      - '.azure\\config'
      - '.kube/config'
      - '.kube\\config'
      - '.gcloud'
      - '.docker/config'
  selection_action:
    EventType:
      - 'FileRead'
      - 'FileOpen'
  condition: selection_process and selection_target and selection_action
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate cloud SDK tools and CLI utilities reading configuration
  - Development workflows accessing cloud credentials
  - Security scanning tools enumerating credential files
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate cloud SDKs (awscli, azure-cli, gsutil) reading config, Development workflows accessing credentials, System administration tools accessing credential files

Tuning notes: Baseline legitimate cloud SDK access in your environment. Exclude known cloud CLI tools and their parent processes. Consider the timing — rapid access to multiple credential files in succession is more suspicious than normal. Correlate with npm preinstall script execution for higher confidence. Monitor for access from unexpected user contexts.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • npm Preinstall Script Execution — Process Tree Anomaly · unlock with TL Creds
  • Credential File Discovery from Node.js Process · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound HTTPS Connection from npm/Node Process to Suspicious Domain · unlock with TL Creds
  • npm Preinstall Script Execution — Process Tree Anomaly · unlock with TL Creds
  • Credential File Discovery from Node.js Process · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound HTTPS Connection from npm/Node Process to Suspicious Domain · unlock with TL Creds
  • npm Preinstall Script Execution — Process Tree Anomaly · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound HTTPS Connection from npm/Node Process to Suspicious Domain · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 15 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0983.

15 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Miasma represents a sophisticated supply chain compromise targeting the npm ecosystem, specifically the @redhat-cloud-services namespace which provides widely-deployed infrastructure packages. The threat actor TeamPCP compromised package maintainer credentials or leveraged registry account takeover to inject malicious preinstall scripts into multiple package versions. The malware employs obfuscation techniques to evade automated and manual detection during code review. Upon installation, the preinstall hook executes automatically without user interaction, executing Node.js code that enumerates and harvests cloud service credentials from the victim system. Targeted credential sources include environment variables, configuration files in home directories (.aws/credentials, .azure/config, ~/.kube/config, GCP service account JSON files), and cloud SDK credential stores. Harvested credentials are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled infrastructure, enabling unauthorized access to cloud accounts and lateral movement within affected organizations. The 29+ compromised releases span multiple packages over an extended timeframe, indicating sustained access to the package maintenance infrastructure. This attack represents one of the most critical supply chain compromises in the npm ecosystem due to the privileged nature of infrastructure and cloud management packages.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003 OS Credential Dumping; T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552 Unsecured Credentials

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1074 Data Staged

Exfiltration

T1020 Automated Exfiltration; T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Persistence

T1053 Scheduled Task/Job

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery

credential-access

T1187 Forced Authentication

Initial Access

T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1199 Trusted Relationship

Impact

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1531 Account Access Removal

Remediation

Patches

  • Use only @redhat-cloud-services package versions released after 2026-06-10 (post-compromise remediation)
  • Verify package signatures and checksums against official RedHat/Cloudflare repositories

Immediate actions

  • Rotate all GCP service account credentials and Azure credentials that may have been present in ~/.azure, ~/.kube, or environment variables
  • Scan audit logs in GCP and Azure for unauthorized access from June 2026 onwards
  • Block npm package installations from @redhat-cloud-services namespace in package-lock and dependency trees
  • Revoke all tokens and credentials stored in npm configurations
  • Isolate and quarantine all systems where @redhat-cloud-services packages were installed

Workarounds

  • Temporarily replace @redhat-cloud-services packages with equivalent alternatives
  • Use npm offline mode with pre-verified package copies
  • Deploy application containers with reduced credential access and assume-role patterns instead of direct credential storage

Longer-term hardening

  • Implement npm package signing verification and checksum validation in CI/CD pipelines
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for Node.js preinstall script execution
  • Establish npm2fa enforcement for all package maintainers
  • Monitor npm registry for unauthorized releases using package integrity verification
  • Implement cloud credential detection in file system scanning (AWS/Azure/GCP credential patterns)
  • Establish baseline for credential file access patterns and alert on anomalies

Affected and fixed versions

  • RedHat / Cloudflare — @redhat-cloud-services npm packages (infrastructure namespace)
    Vulnerable versions: @redhat-cloud-services/*, versions released between 2026-04-15 and 2026-06-01 (29+ releases across multiple packages)
    Fixed in: All versions released after 2026-06-10 (post-incident remediation)
  • Google Cloud Platform — GCP Service Accounts and Credentials
    Vulnerable versions: All credentials potentially exposed from affected systems
  • Microsoft Azure — Azure Service Principals and Credentials
    Vulnerable versions: All credentials potentially exposed from affected systems
  • npm — npm Registry
    Vulnerable versions: All systems using npm versions <9.0 without preinstall script validation

Timeline

  • Suspected initial compromise of npm package maintainer credentials or registry account takeover by TeamPCP
  • First compromised @redhat-cloud-services package version released to npm registry with Miasma preinstall script
  • Miasma malware actively distributed through npm ecosystem as part of dependency chains for infrastructure and cloud management packages
  • 29+ compromised package releases identified spanning multiple @redhat-cloud-services projects
  • CISA issues alert regarding supply chain compromise in npm ecosystem
  • RedHat and Cloudflare issue security advisories regarding compromised @redhat-cloud-services packages
  • Wiz Threat Report publicly discloses Miasma supply chain compromise and TeamPCP attribution
  • npm and package maintainers reset compromised account credentials and regain control of package namespace
  • Post-incident remediated versions of @redhat-cloud-services packages released without malicious payloads

Sources cited

More from TeamPCP

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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