Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-1010
TONResolver Remote Access Trojan - Active Campaign Targeting Japanese Hospitality Sector
TONResolver is an active Remote Access Trojan (RAT) targeting Japanese hospitality and tourism businesses since late May 2026. The malware leverages TON blockchain smart contracts as a dead-drop resolver for command-and-control infrastructure, enabling attackers to switch C2 domains without recompiling the malware.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-1010 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | TONResolver, Blockchain C2 RAT, TON-Dead-Drop-RAT, Booking.com Phishing Campaign |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows; Google Chrome; Microsoft Microsoft Edge; Booking.com Partner Portal / Extranet; Hotel Management Systems PMS (Property Management System) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-1104, CWE-426, CWE-427, CWE-434, CWE-506 |
| Malware | TONResolver |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1001 Data Obfuscation, T1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1005 Data from Local System, T1008 Fallback Channels, T1012 Query Registry, T1021 Remote Services, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1056 Input Capture and 35 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | hospitality, tourism, travel, accommodation, hotel-chains, booking-platforms, payment-processing |
| Target regions | japan, East Asia, Southeast Asia |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-06-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1010 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: TONResolver Blockchain C2 Infrastructure and Exfiltration — TON Smart Contract Queries + Encrypted Channels
Detects TONResolver command-and-control communication via TON blockchain smart contract queries (T1568.003), encrypted HTTPS channels (T1573.001), DNS queries to .ton domains (T1071.004), and outbound traffic to Russian bulletproof hosting (T1090.003). Monitors for HTTPS traffic containing encoded smart contract addresses, DNS resolution of .ton domains, and characteristic beacon callback patterns to C2 infrastructure.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1568.003, T1573.001, T1090.003, T1071.001, T1071.004, T1001, T1041
- Data sources: zeek, network_flow, firewall, dns_logs, proxy
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=zeek sourcetype=http | search (uri contains "api/resolve" AND uri contains "EQBrXVeJ7ZJrxRQcvmV5aLPmj7qNSSDNx8VWZ3EqSLZPxW2") OR (host="ton-resolver-gate.top") OR (dest_ip="185.220.101.45" AND dest_port=443) | stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, host, method, uri | where count > 0 | append [search index=zeek sourcetype=dns query="*.ton" | stats count by src_ip, query]Microsoft KQL
NetworkConnectionEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) and ((RemoteUrl contains "api/resolve" and RemoteUrl contains "EQBrXVeJ7ZJrxRQcvmV5aLPmj7qNSSDNx8VWZ3EqSLZPxW2") or RemoteUrl contains "ton-resolver-gate.top") and RemotePort in (443, 8443) | project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIp, RemotePort | union (NetworkConnectionEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) and (RemoteIp == "185.220.101.45" or RemoteIp == "185.220.101.63" or RemoteIp == "185.220.101.89" or RemoteIp startswith "185.220.101.") and RemotePort == 443) | union (NetworkConnectionEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) and RemoteUrl endswith ".ton")Sigma
title: TONResolver Blockchain-Based C2 Communication and Exfiltration via TON Smart Contracts
id: a7b8c9d0-e1f2-53m4-n5o6-p7q8r9s0t1u2
status: experimental
description: Detects TONResolver C2 communication using TON blockchain smart contracts as dead-drop resolver (T1568.003). Monitors for HTTPS POST/GET requests to resolver endpoint, DNS queries for .ton domains, encrypted C2 channels (T1573.001), outbound traffic to Russian bulletproof hosting (185.220.101.x/24 ASN39798), and characteristic beacon callback intervals (~30 minutes).
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/30
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004/
- https://cybersecuritynews.com/tonresolver-malware-uses-ton-smart-contracts/
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1568_003
- attack.t1573_001
- attack.t1090_003
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1071_004
- attack.t1001
- attack.t1041
- attack.tool.tonresolver
- attack.malware.blockchain_c2
logsource:
product: zeek
category: http_request
detection:
http_query:
uri|contains:
- '/api/resolve?contract=EQBrXVeJ7ZJrxRQcvmV5aLPmj7qNSSDNx8VWZ3EqSLZPxW2'
- 'ton-resolver-gate.top'
method: ['POST', 'GET']
resolver_endpoint:
host|endswith: 'ton-resolver-gate.top'
dest_port: 443
russian_asn:
dest_ip|startswith: ['185.220.101.45', '185.220.101.63', '185.220.101.89']
dest_port: 443
blockchain_signature:
uri|contains: 'EQBrXVeJ'
encrypted:
proto: 'https'
condition: (http_query or resolver_endpoint or (russian_asn and blockchain_signature)) and encrypted
level: critical
falsepositive: |
Legitimate cryptocurrency exchange or TON ecosystem services (extremely rare)
Security research labs analyzing TON network (expected in research context only)
Cryptocurrency wallets with TON support (must be documented)
fingerprint: HTTPS POST/GET to ton-resolver-gate.top:443 with TON smart contract ID (EQBrXVeJ...) in URI; outbound to 185.220.101.x:443; DNS queries for *.ton domain.Known false positives:
- Legitimate TON blockchain services (extremely rare)
- Cryptocurrency trading platforms with TON support
- Security research on TON infrastructure
- Decentralized application (DApp) usage via TON
Tuning notes: Block ton-resolver-gate.top and 185.220.101.0/24 at firewall/proxy level immediately. DNS sinkhole for *.ton domains. Alert on any HTTPS traffic to TON resolver endpoint from internal systems. Monitor for periodic callback patterns (~30-minute intervals). Correlate with host-level credential access detections for C2 beacon confirmation.
- TONResolver Multi-Vector Persistence and System Reconnaissance — Registry + Process Discovery · unlock with TL Creds
- TONResolver C2 Beacon Communication and Lateral Movement — Encrypted Channels with Stolen Credentials · unlock with TL Creds
- TONResolver Lateral Movement Exploitation — Pass-the-Hash + RDP + SMB Abuse with Stolen Credentials · unlock with TL Creds
- TONResolver Credential Harvesting and Lateral Movement Prep — LSASS + Browser + Registry Access · unlock with TL Creds
- TONResolver Multi-Stage Credential and Lateral Movement Chain — LSASS + Browser + RDP · unlock with TL Creds
- TONResolver Data Exfiltration and Defense Evasion — C2 Exfiltration + Log Clearing + Registry Tampering · unlock with TL Creds
- TONResolver .LNK File Execution via Windows Explorer Parent — Initial Access Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- TONResolver System Discovery and Defense Evasion — Account Enumeration and Registry Queries · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-06-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1010.
Sample indicators (3 of 20)
- IP address:
185.220.101[.]45 - Domain:
ton-resolver-gate[.]top - File hash:
d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Delivers via spear-phishing emails impersonating Booking.com with malicious .LNK files, exfiltrates system information, browser credentials, and payment data.
TONResolver represents a sophisticated, multi-stage RAT campaign demonstrating innovative abuse of blockchain technology to maintain resilient and decentralized command-and-control infrastructure. The attack chain begins with spear-phishing emails targeting Booking.com partner hotel management across Japan, crafted to appear as urgent guest complaints or booking alerts requiring immediate action. These emails contain Windows shortcut (.LNK) files that exploit Windows Explorer's icon rendering functionality to execute arbitrary PowerShell or batch scripts without triggering Windows Defender SmartScreen due to file type obfuscation. Once executed, the RAT establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: registry run keys, scheduled tasks, Windows services, and startup folder entries, ensuring resilience across reboots. The malware communicates with TON blockchain smart contracts deployed on the TON network, where encoded C2 domain information is stored as immutable contract data (dead-drop resolver pattern). This design allows threat actors to pivot C2 infrastructure without requiring malware recompilation or re-distribution, significantly extending campaign longevity and evading traditional domain/IP-based takedown operations. The malware performs extensive system enumeration (hostname, Windows version, AD domain membership, user accounts, installed software), harvests stored credentials from Chrome and Microsoft Edge browsers by directly accessing LevelDB databases in the user profile directory, enumerates running processes to identify security software, and establishes remote interactive shell access via reverse TCP or HTTP tunneling. Post-compromise, attackers move laterally using harvested credentials and exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-21674 variant exploitation techniques observed). The targeting of Japan's hospitality and tourism sector indicates economic espionage motivation, with secondary financial theft objectives: hotel booking data, guest payment card information, staff credentials for lateral network movement, and customer records from reservation systems. The use of blockchain-based C2 infrastructure demonstrates sophisticated adversary OpSec and knowledge of emerging evasion techniques, positioning this threat at the intersection of financial cybercrime and state-sponsored espionage. Campaign infrastructure analysis reveals registrations across multiple bullet-proof hosting providers with weak KYC, primarily Eastern European and Russian-affiliated providers, suggesting state-nexus operations or well-resourced criminal syndicate.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
command-and-control
Credential Access
T1003 OS Credential Dumping; T1187 Forced Authentication; T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1056 Input Capture; T1113 Screen Capture; T1115 Clipboard Data
Command and Control
T1008 Fallback Channels; T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1092 Communication Through Removable Media; T1568 Dynamic Resolution; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1573 Encrypted Channel
Discovery
T1012 Query Registry; T1057 Process Discovery; T1069 Permission Groups Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1087 Account Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery
Lateral Movement
T1021 Remote Services; T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1070 Indicator Removal; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution
Persistence
T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1543 Create or Modify System Process; T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Privilege Escalation
T1134 Access Token Manipulation; T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Initial Access
Resource Development
T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1585 Establish Accounts; T1586 Compromise Accounts; T1588 Obtain Capabilities
Reconnaissance
T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
Impact
defense-impairment
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block all known TONResolver C2 domains, IPs, and ASNs at perimeter firewalls and DNS filters
- Isolate and reimagine any systems infected with TONResolver (hash-based detection via MD5/SHA-256)
- Scan browser profile directories for evidence of LevelDB credential database access and file timestamps
- Review email gateway logs for inbound messages with .LNK attachments and impersonated Booking.com sender domains
- Revoke all cached domain credentials and multi-factor authentication tokens for affected user accounts
- Block TON blockchain network traffic (port 30303 TCP/UDP) and TON RPC endpoints at egress firewalls
- Implement DNS sinkhole rules for TON smart contract query domains (*.ton, etc.)
Workarounds
- Disable .LNK file execution from email attachments via email gateway attachment blocking rules
- Restrict user-level file downloads via AppLocker and enforce read-only permissions on Desktop/Downloads
- Disable PowerShell execution policy override via Group Policy (DisableScriptBlockLogging = false for auditing)
- Block TON protocol resolution and blockchain RPC traffic at the firewall (port 30303, 443/8443 for RPC)
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy advanced EDR with behavioral detection for .LNK file execution and child process spawning from Windows Explorer
- Implement browser credential storage isolation via Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) hardening
- Deploy application allowlisting (AppLocker/WDAC) to restrict PowerShell/cmd.exe execution from user-writable directories
- Enforce Windows Defender Device Guard / Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (HVCI) on high-value systems
- Implement Host-Based Firewall rules to restrict scheduled task and Windows service creation by non-admin processes
- Deploy network segmentation to isolate booking/reservation systems from general user workstations
- Enable and centralize Windows Security Event logging for process creation (4688), file access, and registry modifications
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: Windows 7 SP1; Windows 8.1; Windows 10 (1909 - 22H2); Windows 11 (21H2 - 23H2); Windows Server 2012 R2; Windows Server 2016; Windows Server 2019; Windows Server 2022 - Google — Chrome
Vulnerable versions: All versions (credential theft via LevelDB access) - Microsoft — Microsoft Edge
Vulnerable versions: All versions (credential theft via LevelDB access) - Booking.com — Partner Portal / Extranet
Vulnerable versions: All versions (targeted via spear-phishing) - Hotel Management Systems — PMS (Property Management System)
Vulnerable versions: Common PMS platforms (Micros, Agilysys, etc.) when compromised via endpoint
Timeline
- TONResolver phishing campaign begins targeting Japanese hospitality sector; initial reconnaissance and email list preparation by threat actors
- First wave of spear-phishing emails sent to Booking.com partner hotels in Japan impersonating guest complaints and booking alerts
- First confirmed infections of TONResolver RAT on Booking.com partner hotel systems in Nagasaki, Kyoto, and Tokyo prefectures
- Compromised systems used for lateral movement; credential harvesting from browsers escalates compromise to additional hotel network systems and PMS platforms
- Campaign expands with additional phishing waves; TONResolver variants deployed across 50+ hospitality organizations in Japan
- Security researchers at SentinelOne identify blockchain-based C2 infrastructure using TON smart contracts; reverse engineering reveals sophisticated dead-drop resolver mechanism
- Initial security analysis and threat report published on blockchain-based C2 techniques; IOC sharing begins among cybersecurity vendors
- JPCERT/CC and cybersecurity vendors issue formal threat alert for Japanese hospitality sector; hotel associations advised of active compromise campaign
- Trend Micro publishes detailed technical analysis of TONResolver; detection rules released for SPL, KQL, and Sigma
- Malwarebytes Labs publishes comprehensive deep-dive analysis of RAT capabilities, C2 infrastructure, and indicators of compromise
- Japanese law enforcement and METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) issue incident response guidance; request for victim organizations to report compromises
- Comprehensive threat report on TONResolver published by cybersecurity research community; campaign documented as ongoing with active C2 infrastructure and continued targeting
Sources cited
- Threat Alert: Japanese Hospitality Sector Under Targeted Attack cybersecuritynews.com · Advisory · 2026-06-20
- JPCERT/CC: Alert on Japanese Hospitality Sector Targeting JPCERT/CC · Advisory · 2026-06-28
- Windows .LNK File Exploitation Techniques and Detection Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-05-30
- TON Network Security Analysis: Smart Contract Exploitation Vectors ton.org · Research · 2026-06-10
- Trend Micro: Blockchain-Based RAT Infrastructure Detection Trend Micro · Vendor report · 2026-06-22
- Blockchain-Based Command and Control Infrastructure in Malware SentinelOne · Blog · 2026-06-15
- Malwarebytes Labs: TONResolver Malware Deep Dive labs.malwarebytes.com · Blog · 2026-06-25
- TONResolver Malware Uses TON Smart Contracts as Dead Drop Resolver for C2 Switching cybersecuritynews.com · Threat-report · 2026-06-30
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.