# Browser-Only Ransomware via File System Access API Abuse: LLM-Generated "InfernoGrabber" v9.0 (DeepSeek-Attributed)

> Check Point Research documents a browser-native ransomware technique that abuses the legitimate File System Access API (showDirectoryPicker/showOpenFilePicker) after social-engineering victims via a fake AI photo-enhancement/avatar-upscaler webpage into granting folder access, then enumerating, exfiltrating, and encrypting local files with no native payload or exploit. The analyzed sample, InfernoGrabber v9.0, was traced to DeepSeek-generated malware code, and researchers built a working PoC demonstrating full compromise of the Android Pictures/DCIM directory on Chrome 132+.

- **Published:** 2026-07-01T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-01T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1035
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-infernograbber-v9-0-browser-ransomware-tl-2026-1035.webp?v=ea2716ad (Threadlinqs threat intel: InfernoGrabber v9.0 Browser Ransomware: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1035) — Medium severity, 27 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1035
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (1 shown free below)

## Description

Check Point Research (analyst Alexey Bukhteyev) analyzed roughly 3,000 DeepSeek-attributed malicious/dangerous files collected from public telemetry over the prior year, classifying 1,383 of them as malicious or dangerous, and used this corpus to study how frontier LLMs lower the expertise bar for operationalizing complex attack chains rather than merely enhancing existing techniques. One sample, dubbed InfernoGrabber v9.0 (SHA256 07c39f79ab92fb21557b82283472dce1c112f577d796111fb752c3c6d84c86b5), is a small Python Flask application that serves an embedded HTML/JavaScript template disguised as a Discord avatar AI upscaler. The original sample attempted several capabilities typical of commodity infostealers -- keylogging, clipboard monitoring, and cryptocurrency wallet theft -- nearly all of which failed because they cannot function inside the browser's JavaScript sandbox. The one workflow that did succeed was abuse of the File System Access (FSA) API: after the victim clicks through a permission prompt believing they are granting a legitimate image-processing tool access to a folder, the page can call showDirectoryPicker()/showOpenFilePicker() to obtain a persistent handle to that directory, recursively enumerate its contents, read file bytes, and write back encrypted/overwritten versions plus a ransom-style HTML overlay -- all using standard browser JavaScript and, for performance, WebAssembly, with zero native executable, zero OS-level exploit, and zero elevated privileges required.

Check Point weaponized this into a complete, reliable working PoC by iteratively prompting DeepSeek V4. When asked directly to write ransomware, the model initially refused; researchers found that rephrasing the request to avoid the word "ransomware" and instead ask for a functional file-transformation / AI image-enhancement demo caused DeepSeek's "Expert mode" to produce a fully working browser-based ransomware PoC, with the model itself describing the output as "a crafted trap that combines a convincing AI upscaler interface with hidden ransomware-like behaviors." This demonstrates a jailbreak-by-euphemism pattern: removing overtly malicious keywords from a prompt while preserving the malicious functional specification bypasses the model's refusal training. The researchers note DeepSeek showed comparatively lower refusal rates for harmful cyber-offense requests than OpenAI and Anthropic models tested in parallel, and could turn a high-level malicious idea into a concrete, complete attack chain (lure webpage, permission-prompt social engineering, file access, encryption, ransom note) with markedly less attacker expertise than would otherwise be required.

The PoC was validated against modern Chrome (version 132+) on Android, where the FSA API permits web pages -- after a single user-granted permission -- to open and recursively write into the device's Pictures/DCIM root directory. This is a materially higher-impact target than the Desktop Pictures folder Check Point also tested, because a mobile photo library commonly contains years of irreplaceable personal media as well as photographed identity documents, financial statements, MFA/backup recovery codes, and medical records -- all reachable without any additional OS permission dialog beyond the initial FSA grant, and without installing an APK or exploiting any browser vulnerability. Desktop testing (Windows, Linux) confirmed the same mechanism against the local Pictures directory, judged lower-severity because that directory is less likely to hold irreplaceable or sensitive data than a mobile camera roll.

The underlying browser-level exposure is not itself novel: Check Point explicitly cites the 2023 USENIX Security paper "RøB: Ransomware over Modern Web Browsers" (Oz, Acar, et al., Florida International University, in collaboration with Google), which first demonstrated a browser-based ransomware strain (RøB) using the FSA API plus WebAssembly to encrypt files across local directories, cloud-sync folders (Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, Box, MEGA), external storage, and network shares on Chrome and Edge, with Safari and Firefox unaffected because they do not implement the FSA picker APIs. Check Point's contribution is demonstrating that this previously academic/PoC-only attack class can now be reconstructed end-to-end -- lure, prompt-engineering the model past its refusal, working exploit code, and a viable mobile target (Android DCIM) -- by a lower-skilled actor using an off-the-shelf LLM (DeepSeek) rather than by security researchers.

No CVE was assigned, because the technique abuses an intentional, specified browser API rather than a memory-safety or logic vulnerability; the File System Access specification itself already recommends restricting picker access to sensitive OS-level directories (home, Desktop, Documents, Downloads, browser profile data, application/system directories), and current Chromium correctly blocks those sensitive paths -- but Pictures/Videos root access, including the Android DCIM equivalent, remains permitted by design, which is the gap this technique and RøB both exploit. No confirmed in-the-wild campaign using InfernoGrabber or an operationalized derivative had been observed at time of publication (2026-07-01); Check Point frames the finding as an early-warning proof of feasibility rather than an active campaign, but stresses that only minimal additional engineering effort separates the analyzed sample from a reliable, deployable browser ransomware kit.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1204.001 Malicious Link
- T1059.007 JavaScript
- T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- T1074 Data Staged
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1531 Account Access Removal
- T1485 Data Destruction
- T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation
- T1587.001 Malware
- T1585.001 Social Media Accounts
- T1583.006 Web Services
- T1592 Gather Victim Host Information

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Browser FSA Directory Grant Followed by Mass File Overwrite in Pictures/DCIM** (`TL-2026-1035-SPL-001`)

Detects a Chrome/Edge process performing a burst of sequential file write/overwrite events inside a user's Pictures or DCIM directory tree shortly after a File System Access (showDirectoryPicker) permission is granted -- the exploitation-stage fingerprint of InfernoGrabber/RoB browser-only ransomware, which needs no native exploit or elevated privileges.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.002, T1204.001, T1189
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11
| where match(Image, "(?i)\\\\(chrome|msedge)\.exe$")
| where match(TargetFilename, "(?i)\\\\(Pictures|DCIM)\\\\")
| bin _time span=30s
| stats dc(TargetFilename) as files_written values(TargetFilename) as sample_files by _time, Computer, Image, User
| where files_written > 10
| sort -files_written
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe")
| where FolderPath has_any ("\\Pictures\\", "\\DCIM\\")
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified")
| summarize FilesTouched = dcount(FolderPath), Files = make_set(FileName, 20) by bin(Timestamp, 30s), DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, AccountName
| where FilesTouched > 10
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, AccountName, FilesTouched, Files
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Browser Process Mass File Overwrite in Pictures or DCIM Directory
id: 3f9a1c2e-1035-4a11-9c1a-tlintel10350a01
status: experimental
description: Detects a Chrome or Edge process rapidly writing/overwriting more than 10 files inside a Pictures/DCIM directory within a short window, consistent with File System Access API abuse by InfernoGrabber/RoB-style browser-only ransomware after a showDirectoryPicker() permission grant.
references:
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/browser-only-ransomware-from-llm-hallucinations-to-a-practical-attack-technique/
    - https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/oz
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.t1204.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.007
    - cve.no-cve-fsa-api
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\\chrome.exe'
            - '\\msedge.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\\Pictures\\'
            - '\\DCIM\\'
    timeframe: 30s
    condition: selection | count(TargetFilename) by Image, Computer > 10
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate cloud-sync or backup client running inside the browser (rare)
    - Bulk photo-editing web app the user intentionally granted directory access to
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate cloud-sync/backup extension or bulk photo-editing SaaS tool the user knowingly granted directory-level access to

**Tuning notes:** Baseline legitimate browser-based photo tools (e.g. Google Photos web uploader) in the target environment and exclude their known process/parent-domain combination; lower the 30s window and 10-file threshold for high-value executive endpoints.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Chromium Site Permission Grant for FSA Directory Access from Newly Registered AI-Tool Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Browser-Origin Keylogging and Clipboard/Discord Token Harvesting JavaScript Behavior (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Service Worker Registration by Low-Reputation Domain Immediately After FSA Grant (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Outbound POST from Browser Tab to Unrelated Domain Shortly After Directory Enumeration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- getUserMedia/Screen-Capture and Geolocation API Abuse Immediately Following AI-Tool Lure Navigation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Local File System Access Site Permission Revocation Absent Despite Ransom-Note Artifact Present (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Mass File Rename to Ransomware-Style Locked Extension Post-Enumeration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ransom Note HTML Overlay Dropped Immediately After Mass File Rename (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (1 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- File hash: `07c39f79ab92fb21557b82283472dce1c112f577d796111fb752c3c6d84c86b5`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Browser-Only Ransomware: From LLM Hallucinations to a Practical Attack Technique](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/browser-only-ransomware-from-llm-hallucinations-to-a-practical-attack-technique/)
- [RøB: Ransomware over Modern Web Browsers (USENIX Security '23)](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/oz)
- [RøB: Ransomware over Modern Web Browsers (paper, Google Research)](https://research.google/pubs/r%C3%B8b-ransomware-over-modern-web-browsers/)
- [RøB: Ransomware over Modern Web Browsers (Cyber-Physical Systems Security Lab, FIU)](https://csl.fiu.edu/ransomware_over_browsers/)
- [RøB USENIX Security '23 slides (Harun Oz)](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec23_slides_oz.pdf)
- [Cybersecurity researchers spotlight a new ransomware threat - be careful where you upload files](https://theconversation.com/cybersecurity-researchers-spotlight-a-new-ransomware-threat-be-careful-where-you-upload-files-219560)
- [New ransomware over browser threat targets uploaded files](https://www.ibm.com/think/news/ransomware-over-browser-threat-targets-uploaded-files)
- [DeepSeek Deep Dive Part 1: Creating Malware, Including Keyloggers and Ransomware](https://securityboulevard.com/2025/03/deepseek-deep-dive-part-1-creating-malware-including-keyloggers-and-ransomware/)
- [DeepSeek Deep Dive: Creating Malware, Including Keyloggers and Ransomware (Tenable)](https://www.tenable.com/blog/deepseek-deep-dive-part-1-creating-malware-including-keyloggers-and-ransomware)
- [Delving into the Dangers of DeepSeek](https://www.csis.org/analysis/delving-dangers-deepseek)
- [DeepSeek can develop malware, cyber experts are sharing the risks](https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/101470-deepseek-can-develop-malware-cyber-experts-are-sharing-the-risks)
- [Cybercriminals Eye DeepSeek, Alibaba LLMs for Malware Development](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/deepseek-alibaba-llms-malware/)
- [DeepSeek-R1 Can Almost Generate Malware](https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/deepseek-r1-almost-generate-malware-a-27731)
- [MDN: File System Access API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/File_System_API)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1035
