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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-1046

Ousaban (Javali) Banking Trojan Expands Grandoreiro-Linked Tetrade Campaign to Target Iberian Banking Users in Spain and Portugal

highACTIVE

FortiGuard Labs identified an active campaign delivering the Ousaban (Javali) banking trojan against banking users in Spain and Portugal, a geographic expansion beyond its traditional Brazilian/LATAM targeting. The campaign uses a steganography-laden phishing PDF, ClickFix-style social engineering, and heavy anti-analysis/geofencing to deploy a trojan capable of keylogging, screenshot capture, clipboard tampering, and remote-controlled live session hijacking against at least 20 banks including Banco Santander, BBVA, CaixaBank, Bankinter, and Caixa Geral de Depositos.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1046
Also known asJavali, Ousaban/Javali Iberian Campaign
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows; Multiple Online banking portals (Banco Santander, BBVA, CaixaBank, Bankinter, Caixa Geral de Depositos, and 15+ other Iberian banks)
AttributionTetrade (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusBrazil
MalwareAstaroth, Grandoreiro - S0531, Javali - S0528, Melcoz - S0530, Metamorfo, Ousaban
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.003 Steganography, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1056.001 Keylogging, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery and 18 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinance, banking
Target regionsspain, portugal, Iberian Peninsula, Europe, brazil, Latin America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1046 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 21 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Ousaban PDF-Triggered Steganographic Payload Extraction — SPL

Detects the Ousaban/Javali exploitation-phase behavior where a PDF reader spawns a default browser to a newly seen domain (ClickFix-style hidden-JavaScript auto-navigation), followed within seconds by a non-browser process (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, mshta.exe) reading a .jpg/.png file and spawning an unsigned child process — the steganographic unpack-and-execute pattern used to hide the executable inside an image with a fake PDF icon.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1027.003, T1036, T1204.002, T1204.001
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_telemetry
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| eval ParentImageLower=lower(ParentImage), ImageLower=lower(Image)
| where match(ParentImageLower, "(acrord32|acrobat|foxitreader|sumatrapdf)\.exe$")
| eval browser_child=if(match(ImageLower, "(chrome|msedge|firefox|iexplore)\.exe$"), 1, 0)
| join type=left _time [
    search index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
    | eval ImageLower=lower(Image)
    | where match(ImageLower, "(rundll32|regsvr32|mshta)\.exe$") AND match(lower(CommandLine), "\.(jpg|jpeg|png)")
    | rename Image as unpack_image, CommandLine as unpack_cmdline, ProcessGuid as unpack_guid, _time as unpack_time
  ]
| where browser_child=1 OR isnotnull(unpack_image)
| table _time, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, unpack_image, unpack_cmdline, unpack_time
| sort _time

Microsoft KQL

let pdfReaders = dynamic(['acrord32.exe','acrobat.exe','foxitreader.exe','sumatrapdf.exe']);
let unpackers = dynamic(['rundll32.exe','regsvr32.exe','mshta.exe']);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has_any (pdfReaders) or FileName has_any (unpackers)
| where (FileName has_any (unpackers) and ProcessCommandLine has_any (".jpg", ".jpeg", ".png"))
   or (InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (pdfReaders) and FileName has_any ('chrome.exe','msedge.exe','firefox.exe','iexplore.exe'))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp asc

Sigma

title: Ousaban Steganographic Payload Extraction via PDF-Triggered Unpacker
id: 7a1c4f2e-8b3d-4e9a-b1c5-2d6e8f0a3b41
status: experimental
description: Detects a non-browser LOLBin (rundll32/regsvr32/mshta) reading an image file and spawning a child process immediately after a PDF reader opens a browser to a new domain, consistent with the Ousaban/Javali steganographic unpack-and-execute chain.
references:
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/ousaban-banking-trojan-targets-iberian.html
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/05/05/ousaban-private-photo-collection-hidden-cabinet/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-01
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1027.003
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.tool.ousaban
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_unpack:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.png'
    selection_pdf_browser:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\AcroRd32.exe'
            - '\Acrobat.exe'
            - '\FoxitReader.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of rundll32/regsvr32 for signed application installers referencing image resources
    - Help/documentation PDFs that intentionally open a browser to a vendor site
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate installers or help systems that use rundll32/regsvr32 against bundled image resources; PDF-embedded vendor links that intentionally open a browser

Tuning notes: Baseline legitimate installer usage of rundll32/regsvr32 with image arguments in your environment and exclude known-signed vendor paths; narrow the PDF-reader list to only readers deployed in the environment to reduce noise.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Ousaban Phishing PDF 'Corrupted File' Lure with Hidden JavaScript Auto-Navigation — KQL · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ousaban Anti-Analysis Discovery Chain (Security Software, VM, Location) — KQL · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ousaban Live Session Hijack — Input Capture, Clipboard Tampering, Overlay Injection Targeting Iberian Banks — KQL · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ousaban Server-Side Geofenced Victim Screening Infrastructure Reuse — Sigma · unlock with TL Creds
  • SysMain-Style Decoy Staging Path Create-Then-Delete Anti-Forensic Burst — Sigma · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ousaban Remote-Access C2 Callback with Daily-Rotated Dead-Drop-Resolved Address — Sigma · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ousaban 'Financeiro' Registry Persistence + SysMain-Style Staging Path — SPL · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ousaban Dead-Drop-Resolver C2 via Pastebin/Google Docs/YouTube — SPL · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 21 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1046.

21 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Ousaban, also tracked as Javali, is a Delphi-based Brazilian banking trojan first documented between 2017 and 2018 as part of the 'Tetrade' cluster of LATAM banking malware families identified by Kaspersky (alongside Guildma/Astaroth, Melcoz, and Grandoreiro). Historically confined to Brazil and Mexico, Ousaban shares custom string-encryption routines with the related Casbaneiro family and has repeatedly abused legitimate cloud services -- Amazon S3 and Microsoft Azure for second-stage payload hosting, and Google Docs and YouTube for command-and-control (C2) configuration retrieval -- a tradecraft pattern common across the Tetrade families.

In the campaign identified by FortiGuard Labs in May 2026 and reported by The Hacker News on 2026-07-01, Ousaban operators pivoted the family's targeting from Brazil to the Iberian Peninsula, geofencing infections to victims in Spain and Portugal and targeting at least 20 regional banks. The infection chain begins with a phishing PDF disguised as a corrupted document containing an 'Atualizar' (Update) button; interacting with it triggers hidden JavaScript that autonomously opens a malicious webpage masquerading as a tax-document or installer portal, a ClickFix-style social-engineering pattern. The delivery infrastructure performs server-side victim screening -- checking IP address, browser language, timezone, screen size, font enumeration, and VPN usage -- before serving the payload; non-qualifying visitors receive a Spanish-language 'access denied' page, and current-version screening logic is server-side, obscuring detection rules from researchers.

Qualifying victims receive a payload that uses steganography: the actual executable is hidden inside an image file that is presented with a PDF icon. A script extracts the embedded executable, executes it, and deletes forensic artifacts. Ousaban establishes persistence via a 'Financeiro' Windows Run registry key and stages components under paths such as C:\SysMain_5874288. Command-and-control is deliberately obfuscated: a Pastebin link resolves to a decoy server address, with the true C2 address rotated daily using a formula combining the current date and a fixed secret -- consistent with the Tetrade families' history of abusing web services (Google Docs, YouTube, Pastebin) as C2 dead-drop resolvers rather than static IP/domain infrastructure.

Once resident, Ousaban waits for the victim to visit a targeted bank's website, then activates capabilities including keystroke logging, periodic screenshot capture, clipboard tampering/replacement, injection of fake overlay messages, and full remote-access/remote-control functionality enabling operators to hijack the victim's live authenticated banking session -- an account-takeover technique that bypasses many transaction-based anti-fraud and MFA controls because it rides the victim's own authenticated session rather than stealing static credentials.

The campaign is best understood in the context of the broader Tetrade cluster's 2024-2026 resurgence: Grandoreiro, historically distributed via nearly identical MSI/DGA tradecraft and also historically targeting Spain and Portugal, was disrupted by an INTERPOL-coordinated takedown in January 2024 but resurged within months (May 2024). Ousaban's Iberian expansion in 2026 mirrors this pattern of LATAM banking-trojan operators diversifying beyond Brazil toward Spanish/Portuguese-speaking markets in Europe where Spanish and Portuguese banks maintain large retail customer bases, leveraging language and cultural overlap to reuse lure content and mule/money-laundering networks.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1056.001 Keylogging; T1113 Screen Capture; T1115 Clipboard Data

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.003 Steganography; T1036 Masquerading; T1070.004 File Deletion; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Discovery

T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1518.001 Security Software Discovery; T1614 System Location Discovery

Execution

T1059.007 JavaScript; T1204.001 Malicious Link; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Impact

T1531 Account Access Removal

Persistence

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1584.006 Web Services; T1587.001 Malware

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block execution of unsigned/unexpected executables extracted from image or PDF attachments via application control (AppLocker/WDAC)
  • Alert on and block creation of the 'Financeiro' Run registry key and unexpected entries under HKCU/HKLM ...\Run
  • Block or heavily monitor outbound requests to Pastebin, generic file-hosting, and Google Docs/YouTube URLs from endpoint processes not associated with browsers
  • Deploy FortiMail/secure email gateway rules to flag PDFs containing 'corrupted file' lures with embedded JavaScript auto-navigation
  • Enforce banking-session step-up authentication (out-of-band transaction signing) resistant to live session/overlay hijacking

Workarounds

  • Disable JavaScript execution in PDF readers (e.g., Adobe Acrobat 'Enable JavaScript' setting) to break the autonomous-webpage-opening trigger

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for steganographic payload extraction (image-to-PE unpacking) and process injection into browser processes
  • Implement DNS/web filtering with geofencing-aware threat intel to catch server-side victim-screening infrastructure reuse
  • User awareness training on 'corrupted file / click to update' PDF phishing lures and ClickFix-style social engineering
  • Share IOCs and TTPs with regional banking-sector ISACs (Spain/Portugal) given active multi-bank targeting

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: all supported Windows desktop versions
  • Multiple — Online banking portals (Banco Santander, BBVA, CaixaBank, Bankinter, Caixa Geral de Depositos, and 15+ other Iberian banks)
    Vulnerable versions: N/A - client-side credential/session theft, not a banking-platform vulnerability

Timeline

  • Ousaban (Javali) banking trojan first emerges as part of Kaspersky's 'Tetrade' cluster of Brazilian banking malware families, initially targeting Brazil and Mexico
  • Kaspersky Securelist publishes 'The Tetrade: Brazilian banking malware goes global,' documenting Ousaban/Javali alongside Guildma, Melcoz, and Grandoreiro expanding beyond Brazil
  • ESET Research publishes 'Ousaban: Private photo collection hidden in a CABinet,' documenting the family's steganographic payload-concealment technique
  • Independent researcher publishes technical analysis of Ousaban's MSI installer delivery mechanism
  • Netskope publishes 'Ousaban: LATAM Banking Malware Abusing Cloud Services,' documenting abuse of Amazon S3, Microsoft Azure, and Google Docs for payload hosting and C2 configuration
  • INTERPOL-coordinated law enforcement operation disrupts Grandoreiro, a related Tetrade family with a similar Spain/Portugal targeting history
  • Grandoreiro operations resurge within months of the takedown, signaling continued Tetrade-cluster resilience
  • Fortinet observes prior-generation Ousaban campaign infrastructure using alternative initial-access entry points, later superseded by the PDF/steganography chain
  • FortiGuard Labs identifies the ongoing Ousaban campaign geofenced to Spain and Portugal, targeting at least 20 regional banks
  • The Hacker News publishes public reporting on the FortiGuard Labs findings, disclosing the campaign's phishing-PDF, steganography, and ClickFix-style delivery chain

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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