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Threat reportBotnetTL-2026-1084

FBI Seizes NetNut Residential Proxy Platform Tied to Popa Botnet (2M+ Devices) — Alarum Technologies, Kimwolf/Vo1d Convergence

highACTIVE

The FBI and IRS Criminal Investigation, with assistance from Google, Lumen, and Shadowserver, seized domains and infrastructure tied to NetNut, a residential proxy service operated by publicly-traded Alarum Technologies (NASDAQ: ALAR). NetNut/Popa distributed proxy-enlisting SDKs to Android-based smart TVs, streaming boxes, and pirated app ecosystems from LG, Samsung, and generic Android TV manufacturers, converting at least 2 million (researchers estimate 9-26 million total pool) devices into always-on residential proxy nodes used for content scraping, advertising fraud, and account takeover.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1084
Also known asPopa botnet, Kimwolf botnet, NetNut seizure
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsLG webOS Smart TV app ecosystem; Samsung Tizen Smart TV app ecosystem; Generic/unbranded Android TV boxes and streaming devices (e.g., X96 Mini Box, Superbox, and unbranded models); Various Digital photo frames running the Uhale app; Alarum Technologies / NetNut NetNut residential proxy platform and reseller network
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-1188, CWE-306, CWE-284
MalwarePopa, RoboVPN, aisuru, kimwolf, vo1d
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1018 Remote System Discovery, T1021 Remote Services, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1072 Software Deployment Tools, T1090 Proxy, T1102 Web Service, T1110 Brute Force and 17 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsmediaentertainment, technology, ecommerce, financialservices, government administration, pharmacy, foodandbeverage, banking, consumerelectronics
Target regionsGlobal, North America, Europe, israel
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources13 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1084 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 35 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Mass ADB Port 5555 Scan-and-Connect (Kimwolf Exploitation)

Detects the Kimwolf initial-access pattern: mass TCP/5555 (Android Debug Bridge) scanning followed by successful unauthenticated `adb connect` sessions against consumer/IoT-segment hosts, matching the technique used to obtain root shell access to smart TVs and Android TV boxes.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1595.001, T1133
  • Data sources: network_traffic, firewall_logs, netflow
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=network sourcetype="cisco:asa" OR sourcetype="pan:traffic" OR sourcetype="netflow" dest_port=5555
| bin _time span=5m
| stats dc(dest_ip) as unique_targets count as attempts values(action) as actions by src_ip, _time
| where unique_targets >= 10 OR (attempts >= 5 AND actions="allowed")
| eval risk="ADB mass-scan / unauthenticated adb connect"
| table _time, src_ip, unique_targets, attempts, actions, risk
| sort -attempts

Microsoft KQL

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemotePort == 5555
| summarize UniqueTargets = dcount(RemoteIP), Attempts = count() by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| where UniqueTargets >= 10 or Attempts >= 5
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, UniqueTargets, Attempts
| order by Attempts desc

Sigma

title: Mass Outbound Connection Attempts to ADB Port 5555
id: c1a2b3d4-1084-4001-9001-tl20261084spl1
status: experimental
description: Detects mass scanning and connection attempts to TCP/5555 (Android Debug Bridge), consistent with the Kimwolf botnet's unauthenticated adb connect technique used against exposed Android TV/STB/proxy-network devices.
references:
    - https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/01/the-kimwolf-botnet-is-stalking-your-local-network/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-02
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1595.001
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.tool.kimwolf
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        dst_port: 5555
        connection_state: 'established'
    timeframe: 5m
    condition: selection | count(dst_ip) by src_ip > 10
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Android developer/QA workflows using ADB over TCP within a controlled lab network
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate ADB-over-TCP usage during authorized Android development/QA in a lab or CI environment

Tuning notes: Baseline against known internal QA/CI subnets that legitimately use adb-over-TCP; raise the unique_targets threshold in large IoT/consumer VLANs to reduce noise from benign device discovery broadcasts.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Residential-Proxy SDK Device Check-in / Botnet Registration (Popa) · unlock with TL Creds
  • On-Demand Proxy Tunnel / Resource Hijacking from Consumer Device Segment · unlock with TL Creds
  • Credential-Stuffing Burst via Residential-Proxy-Attributed Source IPs · unlock with TL Creds
  • Network Service Discovery / Scanning of ADB Port Range (Kimwolf) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Unauthenticated ADB Root Shell Session Establishment (Kimwolf Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Obfuscated Payload / Elliptic-Curve-Signed C2 Artifact Indicator Removal (Kimwolf) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Kimwolf/Popa Disguised Persistence Process ([indicator] / [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS-over-TLS Beacon to ENS/.eth Blockchain-Resolved C2 (Kimwolf) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 35 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1084.

Sample indicators (3 of 35)

  • IP address: 85.234.91[.]247
  • Domain: gmslb[.]net
  • URL: hxxps://www[.]cisa[.]gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 35 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

35 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Popa is a multi-year (operating since at least 2022), Android-based residential proxy botnet that silently enlists consumer smart TVs, Android TV boxes, and streaming devices as outbound traffic relays. Independent research from Synthient, Black Lotus Labs (Lumen Technologies), Nokia Deepfield, Spur, and Qurium converged in June 2026 to link Popa's control infrastructure to NetNut, the residential-proxy brand of publicly-traded Alarum Technologies Ltd (NASDAQ: ALAR), an Israeli company. Devices are enlisted via bundled or malicious SDKs embedded in pirated/free streaming apps (e.g., CRICFy, DooFlix, Sprozfy, RTS Tv, Flixoid, CyberFlix, Rapid Streamz, TvMob, HD/OceanStreams) and, per Spur's app-store analysis, in a startling proportion of official first-party apps — over 42% of LG webOS apps and more than 25% of Samsung Tizen apps were found to embed residential-proxy SDKs (e.g., Plainproxies Byteconnect-style bundlers). Once installed, the SDK establishes a persistent, encrypted communications layer capable of registering the device, maintaining long-lived C2 connections, and opening on-demand tunnels for NetNut's paying proxy customers — traffic resold to over 316 distinct clusters of threat actors observed by Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) using suspected NetNut exit nodes. Nokia Deepfield, monitoring a subset of relay infrastructure, measured 35,000-60,000 simultaneous clients per node and 750,000 unique proxy-egress sources in a 24-hour window; Black Lotus Labs measured 1.5-2.5 million distinct daily IPs against roughly 250-300 control infrastructure addresses. A related, technically distinct but operationally overlapping campaign — Kimwolf — was tracked separately by Synthient founder Benjamin Brundage beginning October 2025 and publicly disclosed by Krebs on Security and SecurityWeek in January 2026. Kimwolf propagates by mass-scanning for Android Debug Bridge (ADB) service exposed on TCP/5555 with no authentication, issuing `adb connect <ip>:5555` to obtain unrestricted root shell access, then using DNS manipulation of RFC-1918 address ranges to tunnel through victim home/enterprise networks and defeat domain-blocklist controls that assume proxy traffic cannot originate from private IP space. Kimwolf shares code and operational lineage with the AISURU DDoS botnet and carries a plugin component associated with the Vo1d botnet family, itself linked to the previously-dismantled Badbox 2.0 operation (Google/HUMAN Security/Trend Micro, July 2025) and to RoboVPN, a VPN app also attributed to NetNut/Alarum. Kimwolf's C2 uses DNS-over-TLS and blockchain-anchored ENS domains for resilience, elliptic-curve-signed and stack-XOR-obfuscated payloads, and has been observed issuing approximately 1.7 billion DDoS commands within a 3-day window, alongside credential-stuffing and residential-proxy-bandwidth monetization. Downstream corporate impact is severe: Infoblox found 65% of its enterprise customer base querying proxy-related domains, with 90% of pharmaceutical/food-and-beverage and 60% of government/banking customers exposed; a COAR survey found over 90% of monitored code repositories experiencing aggressive weekly bot scraping traffic, much of it feeding AI/LLM training pipelines. Following the public research disclosures, Alarum Technologies publicly disputed the findings as 'demonstrably inaccurate assertions and flawed deductions,' characterizing its SDKs as legitimate bandwidth-sharing tools rather than botnet malware. On July 2, 2026, the FBI and IRS Criminal Investigation, assisted by Google, Lumen Technologies, and the Shadowserver Foundation, executed a law-enforcement seizure of hundreds of NetNut-linked domains, disrupting the Popa proxy-resale infrastructure. A central individual named in the research is Moshe Yehuda Kramer (also referred to as Moishi Kramer), who registered NinjaTech SIA in 2020 and serves as SVP Research & Development at NetNut and Chief Strategy & Innovation Officer at Alarum Technologies; NinjaTech's control domain ninjatech[.]io was identified among Popa's control infrastructure despite Kramer's claim that NinjaTech ceased operations roughly five years prior.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery

Lateral Movement

T1021 Remote Services; T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1070 Indicator Removal

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1072 Software Deployment Tools

Privilege Escalation

T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1102 Web Service; T1568 Dynamic Resolution; T1573 Encrypted Channel

command-and-control

T1090 Proxy

Credential Access

T1110 Brute Force

Collection

T1119 Automated Collection; T1213 Data from Information Repositories

Initial Access

T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

Impact

T1496 Resource Hijacking; T1498 Network Denial of Service; T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service

Persistence

T1505 Server Software Component; T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1587 Develop Capabilities

Reconnaissance

T1595 Active Scanning

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • No vendor patch applies; mitigation is configuration (disable ADB), app removal, and network-layer blocking
  • IPIDEA implemented ADB-exploitation-related security patches on 2025-12-25 after coordinated disclosure

Immediate actions

  • Block outbound connections to identified Popa/Kimwolf C2 domains and IP ranges at the perimeter and DNS resolver level
  • Audit and disable ADB (port TCP/5555) on all Android TV boxes, streaming devices, and IoT endpoints; ADB should never be reachable from the network
  • Segment and firewall consumer/IoT devices (smart TVs, streaming boxes, digital photo frames) onto an isolated VLAN separate from corporate and sensitive home-network assets
  • Uninstall known malicious/pirated streaming apps (CRICFy, DooFlix, Sprozfy, RTS Tv, Flixoid, CyberFlix, Rapid Streamz, TvMob, HD/OceanStreams) and any app requesting excessive background network permissions
  • Reset router DNS settings to trusted resolvers and check for unauthorized DNS configuration changes pointing to RFC-1918 ranges

Workarounds

  • Factory-reset and avoid installing third-party APKs or unofficial streaming apps on Android TV/streaming devices
  • Disable or firewall TCP/5555 on all consumer Android devices

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy network detection/EDR capable of flagging encrypted long-lived tunnel connections and residential-proxy SDK check-in patterns
  • Vendor due diligence: LG, Samsung, and Android TV OEMs should audit app-store submissions for bundled residential-proxy SDKs (e.g., Plainproxies Byteconnect-style bundlers)
  • Web application operators should deploy bot-mitigation and residential-proxy IP reputation feeds to detect scraping/credential-stuffing/account-takeover traffic riding NetNut/Popa exit nodes
  • Enterprises should monitor for and block DNS queries to known proxy-provider domains identified in Infoblox/GTIG telemetry
  • Track legal/regulatory outcomes of the FBI/IRS-CI seizure and any related SEC disclosure obligations for Alarum Technologies (NASDAQ: ALAR)

Affected and fixed versions

  • LG — webOS Smart TV app ecosystem
    Vulnerable versions: apps distributed via LG Content Store containing bundled proxy SDKs (~42% of analyzed apps)
  • Samsung — Tizen Smart TV app ecosystem
    Vulnerable versions: apps distributed via Samsung app store containing bundled proxy SDKs (>25% of analyzed apps)
  • Generic/unbranded — Android TV boxes and streaming devices (e.g., X96 Mini Box, Superbox, and unbranded models)
    Vulnerable versions: all models shipping with ADB enabled on TCP/5555 and no authentication
  • Various — Digital photo frames running the Uhale app
    Vulnerable versions: Android-based photo frame firmware bundling residential-proxy SDKs
  • Alarum Technologies / NetNut — NetNut residential proxy platform and reseller network
    Vulnerable versions: entire NetNut proxy resale infrastructure prior to 2026-07-02 seizure

Timeline

  • Moshe Yehuda Kramer registers NinjaTech SIA, later identified with a control domain (locked-ioc-11) used by Popa infrastructure.
  • Popa botnet begins enlisting Android-based smart TVs and streaming boxes as residential proxy relay nodes, per multi-firm research timelines.
  • Google, HUMAN Security, and Trend Micro coordinate to dismantle Badbox 2.0 control domains, a botnet family closely associated with Vo1d, which shares a plugin component with Popa.
  • XLab and Synthient founder Benjamin Brundage begin tracking the Kimwolf Android botnet, distinct from but operationally overlapping with Popa.
  • Kimwolf's ADB-based exploitation of IPIDEA proxy-network endpoints is confirmed by researchers.
  • Security researchers notify 11 residential-proxy providers, including IPIDEA, of the ADB exposure enabling Kimwolf infections.
  • IPIDEA implements security patches addressing the ADB exploitation vector following coordinated disclosure.
  • Google legal action leads to the seizure of IPIDEA control domains (China-based competitor proxy network to NetNut).
  • Krebs on Security, SecurityWeek, The Hacker News, and Security Affairs publicly disclose the Kimwolf botnet, reporting 2M+ infected devices and ADB-based ADB-port-5555 exploitation.
  • Qurium identifies mass content-scraping activity using more than 1.4 million residential proxy IPs later linked to Popa/NetNut infrastructure.
  • Spur publishes analysis finding residential-proxy SDKs bundled in over 42% of LG webOS apps and more than 25% of Samsung Tizen apps.
  • Synthient, Black Lotus Labs (Lumen), Nokia Deepfield, and other researchers jointly release findings linking the Popa botnet to NetNut and parent company Alarum Technologies (NASDAQ: ALAR).
  • Krebs on Security publishes 'Popa Botnet Linked to Publicly-Traded Israeli Firm,' naming Moshe Yehuda Kramer and NinjaTech SIA and detailing control domains locked-ioc-12, locked-ioc-7, locked-ioc-8, and locked-ioc-11.
  • Alarum Technologies publicly disputes the research findings, calling them 'demonstrably inaccurate assertions and flawed deductions' and denying its SDKs constitute botnet malware.
  • FBI and IRS Criminal Investigation, assisted by Google, Lumen, and Shadowserver, execute a law-enforcement seizure of hundreds of NetNut-linked domains, disrupting the Popa proxy-resale infrastructure.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 13 sources; published ; last updated —.

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