# FBI Seizes NetNut Residential Proxy Platform Tied to Popa Botnet (2M+ Devices) — Alarum Technologies, Kimwolf/Vo1d Convergence

> The FBI and IRS Criminal Investigation, with assistance from Google, Lumen, and Shadowserver, seized domains and infrastructure tied to NetNut, a residential proxy service operated by publicly-traded Alarum Technologies (NASDAQ: ALAR). NetNut/Popa distributed proxy-enlisting SDKs to Android-based smart TVs, streaming boxes, and pirated app ecosystems from LG, Samsung, and generic Android TV manufacturers, converting at least 2 million (researchers estimate 9-26 million total pool) devices into always-on residential proxy nodes used for content scraping, advertising fraud, and account takeover.

- **Published:** 2026-07-02T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-02T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1084
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-kimwolf-popa-netnut-proxy-seizure-tl-2026-1084.webp?v=1fb452cb (Threadlinqs threat intel: NetNut Proxy Seizure Tied to Popa Botnet: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1084) — High severity, 35 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1084
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** BOTNET
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 35 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Popa is a multi-year (operating since at least 2022), Android-based residential proxy botnet that silently enlists consumer smart TVs, Android TV boxes, and streaming devices as outbound traffic relays. Independent research from Synthient, Black Lotus Labs (Lumen Technologies), Nokia Deepfield, Spur, and Qurium converged in June 2026 to link Popa's control infrastructure to NetNut, the residential-proxy brand of publicly-traded Alarum Technologies Ltd (NASDAQ: ALAR), an Israeli company. Devices are enlisted via bundled or malicious SDKs embedded in pirated/free streaming apps (e.g., CRICFy, DooFlix, Sprozfy, RTS Tv, Flixoid, CyberFlix, Rapid Streamz, TvMob, HD/OceanStreams) and, per Spur's app-store analysis, in a startling proportion of official first-party apps — over 42% of LG webOS apps and more than 25% of Samsung Tizen apps were found to embed residential-proxy SDKs (e.g., Plainproxies Byteconnect-style bundlers). Once installed, the SDK establishes a persistent, encrypted communications layer capable of registering the device, maintaining long-lived C2 connections, and opening on-demand tunnels for NetNut's paying proxy customers — traffic resold to over 316 distinct clusters of threat actors observed by Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) using suspected NetNut exit nodes. Nokia Deepfield, monitoring a subset of relay infrastructure, measured 35,000-60,000 simultaneous clients per node and 750,000 unique proxy-egress sources in a 24-hour window; Black Lotus Labs measured 1.5-2.5 million distinct daily IPs against roughly 250-300 control infrastructure addresses. A related, technically distinct but operationally overlapping campaign — Kimwolf — was tracked separately by Synthient founder Benjamin Brundage beginning October 2025 and publicly disclosed by Krebs on Security and SecurityWeek in January 2026. Kimwolf propagates by mass-scanning for Android Debug Bridge (ADB) service exposed on TCP/5555 with no authentication, issuing `adb connect <ip>:5555` to obtain unrestricted root shell access, then using DNS manipulation of RFC-1918 address ranges to tunnel through victim home/enterprise networks and defeat domain-blocklist controls that assume proxy traffic cannot originate from private IP space. Kimwolf shares code and operational lineage with the AISURU DDoS botnet and carries a plugin component associated with the Vo1d botnet family, itself linked to the previously-dismantled Badbox 2.0 operation (Google/HUMAN Security/Trend Micro, July 2025) and to RoboVPN, a VPN app also attributed to NetNut/Alarum. Kimwolf's C2 uses DNS-over-TLS and blockchain-anchored ENS domains for resilience, elliptic-curve-signed and stack-XOR-obfuscated payloads, and has been observed issuing approximately 1.7 billion DDoS commands within a 3-day window, alongside credential-stuffing and residential-proxy-bandwidth monetization. Downstream corporate impact is severe: Infoblox found 65% of its enterprise customer base querying proxy-related domains, with 90% of pharmaceutical/food-and-beverage and 60% of government/banking customers exposed; a COAR survey found over 90% of monitored code repositories experiencing aggressive weekly bot scraping traffic, much of it feeding AI/LLM training pipelines. Following the public research disclosures, Alarum Technologies publicly disputed the findings as 'demonstrably inaccurate assertions and flawed deductions,' characterizing its SDKs as legitimate bandwidth-sharing tools rather than botnet malware. On July 2, 2026, the FBI and IRS Criminal Investigation, assisted by Google, Lumen Technologies, and the Shadowserver Foundation, executed a law-enforcement seizure of hundreds of NetNut-linked domains, disrupting the Popa proxy-resale infrastructure. A central individual named in the research is Moshe Yehuda Kramer (also referred to as Moishi Kramer), who registered NinjaTech SIA in 2020 and serves as SVP Research & Development at NetNut and Chief Strategy & Innovation Officer at Alarum Technologies; NinjaTech's control domain ninjatech[.]io was identified among Popa's control infrastructure despite Kramer's claim that NinjaTech ceased operations roughly five years prior.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1595 Active Scanning
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1072 Software Deployment Tools
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1505 Server Software Component
- T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1090 Proxy
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1070 Indicator Removal
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1568 Dynamic Resolution
- T1090 Proxy
- T1102 Web Service
- T1498 Network Denial of Service
- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service
- T1496 Resource Hijacking

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Mass ADB Port 5555 Scan-and-Connect (Kimwolf Exploitation)** (`TL-2026-1084-SPL-001`)

Detects the Kimwolf initial-access pattern: mass TCP/5555 (Android Debug Bridge) scanning followed by successful unauthenticated `adb connect` sessions against consumer/IoT-segment hosts, matching the technique used to obtain root shell access to smart TVs and Android TV boxes.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1595.001, T1133
- **Data sources:** network_traffic, firewall_logs, netflow
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=network sourcetype="cisco:asa" OR sourcetype="pan:traffic" OR sourcetype="netflow" dest_port=5555
| bin _time span=5m
| stats dc(dest_ip) as unique_targets count as attempts values(action) as actions by src_ip, _time
| where unique_targets >= 10 OR (attempts >= 5 AND actions="allowed")
| eval risk="ADB mass-scan / unauthenticated adb connect"
| table _time, src_ip, unique_targets, attempts, actions, risk
| sort -attempts
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemotePort == 5555
| summarize UniqueTargets = dcount(RemoteIP), Attempts = count() by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| where UniqueTargets >= 10 or Attempts >= 5
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, UniqueTargets, Attempts
| order by Attempts desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Mass Outbound Connection Attempts to ADB Port 5555
id: c1a2b3d4-1084-4001-9001-tl20261084spl1
status: experimental
description: Detects mass scanning and connection attempts to TCP/5555 (Android Debug Bridge), consistent with the Kimwolf botnet's unauthenticated adb connect technique used against exposed Android TV/STB/proxy-network devices.
references:
    - https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/01/the-kimwolf-botnet-is-stalking-your-local-network/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-02
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1595.001
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.tool.kimwolf
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        dst_port: 5555
        connection_state: 'established'
    timeframe: 5m
    condition: selection | count(dst_ip) by src_ip > 10
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Android developer/QA workflows using ADB over TCP within a controlled lab network
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate ADB-over-TCP usage during authorized Android development/QA in a lab or CI environment

**Tuning notes:** Baseline against known internal QA/CI subnets that legitimately use adb-over-TCP; raise the unique_targets threshold in large IoT/consumer VLANs to reduce noise from benign device discovery broadcasts.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Residential-Proxy SDK Device Check-in / Botnet Registration (Popa) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- On-Demand Proxy Tunnel / Resource Hijacking from Consumer Device Segment (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Credential-Stuffing Burst via Residential-Proxy-Attributed Source IPs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Network Service Discovery / Scanning of ADB Port Range (Kimwolf) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unauthenticated ADB Root Shell Session Establishment (Kimwolf Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Obfuscated Payload / Elliptic-Curve-Signed C2 Artifact Indicator Removal (Kimwolf) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Kimwolf/Popa Disguised Persistence Process ([indicator] / [indicator]) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DNS-over-TLS Beacon to ENS/.eth Blockchain-Resolved C2 (Kimwolf) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 35)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `85.234.91[.]247`
- Domain: `gmslb[.]net`
- URL: `hxxps://www[.]cisa[.]gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json`

Full set of 35 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [FBI Seizes NetNut Proxy Platform, Popa Botnet](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/07/fbi-seizes-netnut-proxy-platform-popa-botnet/)
- ['Popa' Botnet Linked to Publicly-Traded Israeli Firm](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/06/popa-botnet-linked-to-publicly-traded-israeli-firm/)
- [The Kimwolf Botnet is Stalking Your Local Network](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/01/the-kimwolf-botnet-is-stalking-your-local-network/)
- [Kimwolf Android Botnet Grows Through Residential Proxy Networks](https://www.securityweek.com/kimwolf-android-botnet-grows-through-residential-proxy-networks/)
- [Kimwolf botnet leverages residential proxies to hijack 2M+ Android devices](https://securityaffairs.com/186559/malware/kimwolf-botnet-leverages-residential-proxies-to-hijack-2m-android-devices.html)
- [Kimwolf Android Botnet: Massive Infection of Smart TVs, IoT Devices, and TV Boxes via Exposed ADB and Residential Proxy Networks](https://www.rescana.com/post/kimwolf-android-botnet-massive-infection-of-smart-tvs-iot-devices-and-tv-boxes-via-exposed-adb-an)
- [Kimwolf Android Botnet Infects Over 2 Million Devices via Exposed ADB and Proxy Networks](https://thehackernews.com/2026/01/kimwolf-android-botnet-infects-over-2.html)
- [Popa Botnet Linked to NetNut/Alarum Technologies: Inside the Residential Proxy Network Fueling AI Scraping](https://zerodai.com/en/news/popa-botnet-linked-to-publicly-traded-israeli-firm-1l9qxg)
- [Security Researchers Link 'Popa' Botnet to Israeli Proxy Provider NetNut](https://www.wespeakiot.com/security-researchers-link-popa-botnet-to-israeli-proxy-provider-netnut/)
- [Your Smart TV Is Secretly Routing Hacker Traffic](https://www.gblock.app/articles/popa-botnet-smart-tv-proxy-alarum)
- [Kimwolf Android Botnet: Massive Android TV Box and IoT Malware Threat Exploiting Global Networks](https://www.rescana.com/post/kimwolf-botnet-massive-android-tv-box-and-iot-malware-threat-exploiting-global-networks)
- [Kimwolf Android Botnet Exploits Residential Proxies to Breach Internal Networks](https://botcrawl.com/kimwolf-android-botnet/)
- [public-research/cecbot report](https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/cecbot/report.md)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1084
