# NetNut Residential Proxy Botnet (aka Popa) Disrupted by Google and FBI — 2 Million Devices Used for Password-Spraying and C2 Masking

> Google, the FBI, Lumen, and the Shadowserver Foundation disrupted NetNut (aka "Popa"), a residential proxy botnet operated on infrastructure tied to Alarum Technologies (NASDAQ: ALAR) that enrolled an estimated 2 million devices worldwide via trojanized apps and Badbox 2.0-linked proxy plugins. Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) observed 316 distinct cybercriminal and espionage threat clusters using suspected NetNut exit nodes in a single week in June 2026 to mask password-spraying attacks and other malicious traffic; the FBI seized the netnut.com domain and hundreds of related domains while Google disabled operator accounts and C2 services on its infrastructure.

- **Published:** 2026-07-03T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-06T23:28:54.577Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1112
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-netnut-316-threat-clusters-proxy-tl-2026-1112.webp?v=ddd943eb (Threadlinqs threat intel: NetNut Proxy Masked 316 Threat Clusters: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1112) — High severity, 51 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1112
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** IOT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Popa Proxy-as-a-Service Operators
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 51 (3 shown free below)

## Description

NetNut, publicly marketed as a commercial residential-proxy provider by Israeli Nasdaq-listed Alarum Technologies (ALAR), is tracked by independent researchers under the malware family name "Popa" (with related SDK labels Loopop, Neupop, Moneytiser, Hopanet, and Popanet). The underlying proxyware SDK is bundled — without meaningful consent disclosure — into third-party streaming, IPTV, utility, and pirated/modified TV applications such as CRICFy, DooFlix, Sprozfy, RTS Tv, Flixoid, CyberFlix, Rapid Streamz, TvMob, HD/OceanStreams, and the VPN app RoboVPN. Independent testing (Spur) found that roughly 42% of ~3,000 sampled LG webOS apps and 25%+ of sampled Samsung Tizen apps contained proxy SDKs, illustrating how deeply the enrollment mechanism penetrated consumer smart-TV app ecosystems. Enrollment also occurs via pre-installed firmware on cheap, uncertified, off-brand Android TV boxes, streaming media boxes, and IPTV devices, frequently overlapping with the BadBox 2.0 and Vo1d Android-TV backdoor ecosystems.

Technically, an enrolled device does not connect directly to a fixed C2 server. Instead it first reaches a rotating set of load-balancer domains (observed by Qurium Media Foundation as gmslb.net, safernetwork.io, tera-home.com, ninjatech.io, phonemesh.org, linkmob.org, peercon.org, phonegrid.org, lbk-sol.com, sklstech.com, and kyc-holdings.com, each exposing an "lb." subdomain), which return the address of an operational backend server of the form s####.<backend_domain>. Communication with the backend then proceeds over TCP port 6000 using a proprietary tunneling/multiplexing scheme researchers call "Popa TLV" (Type-Length-Value framed metadata injected into proxied traffic), implemented via two observed native libraries — libneunative and libalphasdk — that differ only in how they resolve their peer backend server. Related BadBox 2.0 samples load a native library (libanl.so) from the package com.hs.app that decrypts and loads p.jar (module downloader) and q.jar (persistence), invoking Java classes com.hs.cld.Main and com.hs.q.Main; a known BadBox 2.0 C2 domain is catmore88.com. Android package identifiers linked to the Popa SDK variants include io.moneytise, io.popanet, io.nn.lp, io.nn.neunative, and io.nn.nativesdk.

The resulting proxy pool — GTIG estimates at least 2 million devices, with Nokia Deepfield separately measuring 1.5–2.5 million daily active exit IPs and roughly 250–300 controlling internet addresses — is heavily abused by third parties. In a single week in June 2026, GTIG observed 316 distinct cybercriminal and espionage threat clusters using suspected NetNut exit nodes to mask the origin IP address of victim-environment access, infrastructure access, and password-spray attacks. Other documented abuse includes mass content scraping, advertising fraud, and account-takeover campaigns. NetNut's own reseller/white-label program means many ostensibly independent residential-proxy brands (e.g., ProxyJet, DiviNetworks, and Live Proxies, whose CEO is a NetNut alumnus) are, per Google's assessment with high confidence, actually reselling capacity from the same underlying device pool — meaning a single takedown ripples across brands that appear unrelated.

Attribution work by Synthient (founder Benjamin Brundage), Qurium Media Foundation, and Krebs on Security — published June 17–19, 2026 — technically confirmed the Popa-to-NetNut link, including a controlled test in which traffic sent into NetNut's commercial gateway egressed through a device independently confirmed to be Popa-enrolled, and the discovery that C2 domain ninjatech.io is registered to Moishi Kramer, who holds the VP of R&D role at NetNut. Kramer's public response attributed the connection to third-party licensing of legacy code rather than direct operational control. On July 2, 2026, the FBI (with IRS Criminal Investigation) seized netnut.com and hundreds of associated domains, including reseller/supply domains proxyjet.io and divinetworks.com; Alarum Technologies disclosed the seizures in SEC/press filings and stated it would cooperate with law enforcement. Google simultaneously disabled Google accounts and services used by NetNut for C2 (a Terms of Service/Acceptable Use Policy violation), updated Google Play Protect to flag apps bundling NetNut/Popa SDKs, and shared SDK/C2 technical intelligence with platform providers and researchers. This action follows Google's January 2026 disruption of the comparable IPIDEA residential proxy network (550+ threat groups observed abusing it in one week, including China-, DPRK-, Iran-, and Russia-linked clusters) and sits within a broader 2025–2026 enforcement wave against Android-proxy-abuse botnets including BadBox 2.0, Vo1d, and the DDoS-focused Aisuru/Kimwolf/JackSkid/Mossad family (disrupted by DOJ court order in March 2026). Despite the netnut.com seizure, the netnut.io storefront reportedly remains operational, and downstream white-label resellers continue operating, indicating substantial residual risk from this device-enrollment ecosystem beyond the single domain seizure.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1595 Active Scanning
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1204 User Execution
- T1129 Shared Modules
- T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1599 Network Boundary Bridging
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1090 Proxy
- T1571 Non-Standard Port
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1568 Dynamic Resolution
- T1001 Data Obfuscation
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1496 Resource Hijacking
- T1586 Compromise Accounts
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1014 Rootkit
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1102 Web Service
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1498 Network Denial of Service
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Popa/NetNut LB Rendezvous, TCP/6000 TLV Tunnel & Proxy-Masked Password Spray — Network/Auth Telemetry** (`TL-2026-1112-SPL-003`)

Detects the C2/lateral-movement footprint of an active NetNut/Popa-enrolled device: DNS queries to rotating 'lb.' subdomains of known load-balancer and BadBox2 C2 domains (gmslb.net, safernetwork.io, tera-home.com, ninjatech.io, phonemesh.org, linkmob.org, peercon.org, phonegrid.org, lbk-sol.com, sklstech.com, kyc-holdings.com, catmore88.com), outbound TCP/6000 connections carrying the proprietary Popa-TLV tunneling protocol, and password-spray authentication patterns sourced from residential-proxy exit nodes that mask the true attacker origin (TL-2026-1112).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1568, T1090.002, T1571, T1001, T1573, T1110.003, T1599, T1496, T1041
- **Data sources:** dns_logs, firewall, edr_network_connection, sysmon, authentication_logs, proxy_logs
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=dns sourcetype="dns"
| eval lb_hit=if(match(lower(query), "^lb\.(gmslb\.net|safernetwork\.io|tera-home\.com|ninjatech\.io|phonemesh\.org|linkmob\.org|peercon\.org|phonegrid\.org|lbk-sol\.com|sklstech\.com|kyc-holdings\.com)") OR match(lower(query), "catmore88\.com"), 1, 0)
| where lb_hit=1
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by src_ip, query
| eval detection="Popa/NetNut Load-Balancer Rendezvous DNS Query"
| append
    [ search index=firewall OR index=network sourcetype IN ("pan:traffic","cisco:asa","fortinet_utm") dest_port=6000 action=allowed
      | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port
      | eval detection="Outbound TCP/6000 Connection Consistent with Popa-TLV Tunnel" ]
| append
    [ search index=auth sourcetype IN ("okta","azuread","o365:management") action=failure
      | bucket _time span=1h
      | stats dc(user) as distinct_users count as attempt_count values(user) as users by src_ip, _time
      | where distinct_users >= 5 AND attempt_count >= 10
      | eval detection="Password-Spray Pattern via Suspected Residential-Proxy Exit Node" ]
| sort - last_seen
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DnsEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Name has_any ("lb.gmslb.net","lb.safernetwork.io","lb.tera-home.com","lb.ninjatech.io","lb.phonemesh.org","lb.linkmob.org","lb.peercon.org","lb.phonegrid.org","lb.lbk-sol.com","lb.sklstech.com","lb.kyc-holdings.com","catmore88.com")
| project TimeGenerated, SourceComputer=Computer, Indicator=Name, SourceIP=ClientIP, DetectionReason="lb_rendezvous_dns"
| union (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where RemotePort == 6000
    | project TimeGenerated=Timestamp, SourceComputer=DeviceName, Indicator=strcat(RemoteIP, ":", tostring(RemotePort)), SourceIP=LocalIP, DetectionReason="tcp_6000_tlv_tunnel"
)
| union (
    SigninLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h) and ResultType !in ("0")
    | summarize FailedAttempts=count(), DistinctUsers=dcount(UserPrincipalName) by IPAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
    | where DistinctUsers >= 5 and FailedAttempts >= 10
    | project TimeGenerated, SourceComputer=IPAddress, Indicator=strcat("spray:", tostring(FailedAttempts), "_attempts_", tostring(DistinctUsers), "_users"), SourceIP=IPAddress, DetectionReason="password_spray_via_proxy_exit_node"
)
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: NetNut/Popa Load-Balancer DNS Rendezvous Preceding TCP/6000 TLV Backend Tunnel
id: 8f2a1e10-6b1a-4b1e-9b1a-netnut1112004
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries to rotating 'lb.' subdomains of known NetNut/Popa load-balancer and BadBox2 C2 domains, the first-stage rendezvous mechanism used before a Popa-enrolled device connects to an operational backend over TCP/6000 using the proprietary Popa-TLV tunneling protocol.
references:
    - https://www.qurium.org/forensics/finding-popa/
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/google-continued-disruption-residential-proxy-networks
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-05
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1568
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1090.002
    - attack.t1571
    - attack.t1001
    - attack.t1573
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1110.003
    - attack.tool.netnut
    - attack.tool.popa
logsource:
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection:
        query|startswith: 'lb.'
        query|contains:
            - 'gmslb.net'
            - 'safernetwork.io'
            - 'tera-home.com'
            - 'ninjatech.io'
            - 'phonemesh.org'
            - 'linkmob.org'
            - 'peercon.org'
            - 'phonegrid.org'
            - 'lbk-sol.com'
            - 'sklstech.com'
            - 'kyc-holdings.com'
    selection_c2:
        query|contains: 'catmore88.com'
    condition: selection or selection_c2
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers or threat-intel analysts actively resolving these domains for investigation
    - Passive DNS/sinkhole infrastructure resolving seized/monitored domains
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Security researchers or threat-intel analysts intentionally resolving/connecting to these domains for investigation
- Legitimate applications using non-standard TCP/6000 for unrelated internal services (verify against asset inventory)
- Genuine mass account-lockout events from a misconfigured application rather than a spray attack

**Tuning notes:** Treat authentication attempts sourced from known residential-proxy IP ranges (NetNut/ProxyJet/DiviNetworks/Live Proxies exit nodes) as elevated risk regardless of geo/IP reputation per the remediation guidance, since proxy abuse defeats IP-reputation-only controls; tune the spray threshold (distinct_users/attempt_count) per tenant baseline and correlate DNS + port-6000 + auth-failure hits on the same source within a rolling 1-hour window to reduce single-signal false positives before paging on-call.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Trojanized Streaming/IPTV/VPN App & Popa SDK Package Artifact Detection — Microsoft Defender Telemetry (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Popa/BadBox2 Autostart Persistence & Native Proxy-SDK Module Load — Microsoft Defender Telemetry (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Popa/NetNut LB Rendezvous, TCP/6000 TLV Tunnel & Proxy-Masked Password Spray — Sentinel Telemetry (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Trojanized Streaming/IPTV/VPN App Install Consistent with Popa/NetNut SDK Supply-Chain Compromise (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cron Persistence Entry Consistent with BadBox2/Popa Device Enrollment (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Outbound Connection on TCP/6000 Consistent with Popa-TLV Proxy Tunnel (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Trojanized Streaming/IPTV/VPN App & Popa SDK Package Artifact Detection — Endpoint Telemetry (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Popa/BadBox2 Autostart Persistence & Native Proxy-SDK Module Load — Endpoint Telemetry (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 51)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `netnut[.]com`
- Domain: `netnut[.]io`
- Domain: `proxyjet[.]io`

Full set of 51 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [NetNut cracked as Google and FBI target 2 million-device botnet](https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/07/03/netnut-cracked-as-google-and-fbi-target-2-million-device-botnet/5266414)
- [NetNut proxy network disrupted, 2 million infected devices cut off](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/netnut-proxy-network-disrupted-2-million-infected-devices-cut-off/)
- [FBI Seizes NetNut Proxy Platform, Popa Botnet](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/07/fbi-seizes-netnut-proxy-platform-popa-botnet/)
- ['Popa' Botnet Linked to Publicly-Traded Israeli Firm](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/06/popa-botnet-linked-to-publicly-traded-israeli-firm/)
- [Google's Continued Disruption of Malicious Residential Proxy Networks](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/google-continued-disruption-residential-proxy-networks)
- [Disrupting the World's Largest Residential Proxy Network (IPIDEA)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/disrupting-largest-residential-proxy-network)
- [Google Disrupts NetNut Residential Proxy Network Spanning 2 Million Home Devices](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/google-disrupts-netnut-residential.html)
- [FBI, Google Take Down NetNut Proxy Network Used by Cyber Threat Actors](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/fbi-google-take-down-netnut-proxy/)
- [Google, FBI Disrupt NetNut Residential Proxy Network Powered by Millions of Devices](https://www.securityweek.com/google-fbi-disrupt-netnut-residential-proxy-network-powered-by-millions-of-devices/)
- [Popa: From Sourcing to Distribution](https://synthient.com/blog/popa-from-sourcing-to-distribution)
- [Finding "Popa": When Your Smart TV Stops Being Yours](https://www.qurium.org/forensics/finding-popa/)
- [Qurium traced the global scraping campaign to Popa, a residential proxy network hidden inside consumer devices](https://www.qurium.org/press-releases/qurium-traced-the-global-scraping-campaign-to-popa-a-residential-proxy-network-hidden-inside-consumer-devices/)
- [Alarum Technologies Responds to Inquiry into Residential Proxy Networks](https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/07/02/3321607/0/en/Alarum-Technologies-Responds-to-Inquiry-into-Residential-Proxy-Networks.html)
- [Alarum Technologies Provides Update Regarding Recent Law Enforcement](https://www.stocktitan.net/news/ALAR/alarum-technologies-provides-update-regarding-recent-law-enforcement-clmvbub7bdjk.html)
- [Satori Threat Intelligence Disruption: BADBOX 2.0 Targets Consumer Devices with Multiple Fraud Schemes](https://www.humansecurity.com/learn/blog/satori-threat-intelligence-disruption-badbox-2-0/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1112
