Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-1121
La Trobe University research: network-based detection of SMB shared-storage ransomware encryption
Academic researchers at La Trobe University (Melbourne, Australia) published a network-wire detection framework — SMBv2 packet-size 'Region of Interest' signatures feeding a three-stage classifier culminating in a Random Committee machine-learning model — that identifies ransomware bulk-encrypting files on SMB-based shared network storage with ~99.6% accuracy in testing.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-1121, CVE-2020-1472 |
|---|---|
| Severity | INFO |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2020-1472 (added ) |
| EPSS | CVE-2020-1472: 99.3% (99.9th percentile) |
| Nation-state nexus | Russia |
| Malware | LockBit, LockBit 3.0 - S1202 |
| Tools | 7-Zip, Chocolatey, Cobalt Strike, FakeUpdates, FileZilla, Hicrypt, MEGA, ProDump, PuTTY Link (Plink), Random Committee classifier |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols, T1072 Software Deployment Tools, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1133 External Remote Services, T1189 Drive-by Compromise, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application and 9 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | government administration, finance, health, manufacturing, education, energy, transport, foodandagriculture |
| Target regions | North America, Europe, australia, Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 11 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-07-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1121 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 24 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: LockBit Post-Exploitation Toolset Execution (ProDump LSASS Dumper, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, Chocolatey)
Detects process execution of named LockBit-affiliate post-exploitation tooling documented in CISA AA23-075A: ProDump/ProcDump-style LSASS memory dumpers (credential access), SoftPerfect Network Scanner (network service discovery), and Chocolatey-based deployment of attack tooling.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1003.001, T1046, T1072
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security_eventlog
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
(Image="*\\procdump*.exe" OR Image="*\\prodump*.exe" OR OriginalFileName="ProcDump" OR CommandLine="*lsass*dump*" OR Image="*\\netscan.exe" OR Image="*SoftPerfect*" OR Image="*\\choco.exe" OR CommandLine="*chocolatey*")
| eval tool=case(match(Image,"(?i)procdump|prodump") OR match(CommandLine,"(?i)lsass.*dump"),"ProDump/ProcDump LSASS dumper", match(Image,"(?i)netscan|softperfect"),"SoftPerfect Network Scanner", match(Image,"(?i)choco") OR match(CommandLine,"(?i)chocolatey"),"Chocolatey package deployment", true(),"unclassified")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines by Computer, User, Image, tool
| eval risk_reason="Execution of known LockBit 3.0 affiliate post-exploitation tooling (ProDump/ProcDump LSASS dumping, SoftPerfect Network Scanner discovery, or Chocolatey-based tool deployment) per CISA AA23-075A"Microsoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("procdump.exe","prodump.exe","netscan.exe","choco.exe") or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("lsass","chocolatey","softperfect")
| extend Tool = case(FileName in~ ("procdump.exe","prodump.exe") or ProcessCommandLine has "lsass", "ProDump/ProcDump LSASS dumper", FileName == "netscan.exe" or ProcessCommandLine has "softperfect", "SoftPerfect Network Scanner", FileName == "choco.exe" or ProcessCommandLine has "chocolatey", "Chocolatey package deployment", "unclassified")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, Tool
| extend Verdict = "Execution of known LockBit 3.0 affiliate post-exploitation tooling per CISA AA23-075A"Sigma
title: LockBit Post-Exploitation Toolset Execution (ProDump / SoftPerfect / Chocolatey)
id: 1e5a8f44-1121-4d34-9f60-a1121cb1e004
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of ProDump/ProcDump-style LSASS dumpers, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or Chocolatey-based tool deployment documented as LockBit 3.0 affiliate post-exploitation tradecraft in CISA AA23-075A.
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/aa23-075a-stop-ransomware-lockbit.pdf
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/07/05
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.discovery
- attack.execution
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1046
- attack.t1072
- attack.tool.prodump
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_prodump:
Image|contains: 'procdump'
CommandLine|contains: 'lsass'
selection_softperfect:
Image|endswith: '\netscan.exe'
selection_choco:
Image|endswith: '\choco.exe'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Sysinternals ProcDump use by administrators/support engineers troubleshooting non-LSASS process crashes
- Authorized IT use of SoftPerfect Network Scanner or Chocolatey for routine asset inventory/software deployment
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate Sysinternals ProcDump use by administrators/support engineers troubleshooting unrelated process crashes.
- Authorized IT use of SoftPerfect Network Scanner or Chocolatey for routine asset inventory or software deployment.
Tuning notes: Allowlist known IT/security-team accounts and hosts that routinely run ProcDump, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or Chocolatey; require the LSASS-targeting variant (CommandLine containing 'lsass') to escalate severity above the generic ProcDump match.
- SocGholish-Style Fake Browser-Update Loader Spawned From Browser Process · unlock with TL Creds
- Winlogon/Run-Key and Cron Persistence with Host/Locale Discovery Commands · unlock with TL Creds
- Plink SSH Tunneling and Cloud/FTP Exfiltration (rclone/MEGA/FileZilla) Consistent with LockBit C2 and Exfiltration Tradecraft · unlock with TL Creds
- External Remote-Service Logon from Unrecognized Source Consistent with Valid-Account Reuse · unlock with TL Creds
- Suspicious LSASS Process-Access Rights Mask Consistent with Mimikatz/ProDump-Style Credential Dumping · unlock with TL Creds
- Volume Shadow Copy / Backup Catalog Deletion Consistent with Ransomware Recovery Inhibition Ahead of Mass Encryption · unlock with TL Creds
- Citrix NetScaler Session-Hijack Pattern Consistent with CVE-2023-4966 (Citrix Bleed) — LockBit Initial Access · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] Region-of-Interest Packet-Size Pattern Consistent with Bulk-Encryption Ransomware on Shared Storage · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-07-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 24 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1121.
Technical analysis
LockBit, a globally active, financially motivated Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation tracked by CISA since 2020 and disrupted (but not eliminated) by the February 2024 'Operation Cronos' law-enforcement action, was used only as one illustrative test sample and was identified by the framework after roughly one-third of its encryption run had completed. The research itself discloses no new CVE, exploited vulnerability, malware sample, or C2 infrastructure; this record documents the detection methodology plus independently sourced background on the illustrative ransomware family so defenders have context for the reference.
La Trobe University researchers developed a network-wire detection framework for ransomware that bulk-encrypts files on SMB-based shared network storage. The method does not inspect file contents; it fingerprints SMB control-plane behavior. It first identifies a 'Region of Interest' by tracking directory/file-enumeration packets that hold a consistent size (~260 bytes on SMBv2), then examines control packets that stay a fixed size for specific SMB operations (e.g., ~410 bytes for new-file-creation responses); everything between two boundary packets becomes one unit of activity, removing bias introduced by fixed time-window analysis. Classification runs in three stages: (1) comparison against known indicators of compromise, (2) ransom-note size fingerprinting (each ransomware family tends to produce a recognizable note size), and (3) a Random Committee ensemble machine-learning classifier trained on the resulting packet-size feature set. Reported performance was ~99.6% accuracy on the researchers' test dataset with zero false negatives and a low false-positive rate; an early-detection variant tuned to trigger on minimal observed activity reported ~99.44% accuracy. Testing used a single-client/single-server testbed, and to stress benign-vs-malicious discrimination the researchers generated legitimate-but-attack-like traffic using Hicrypt, TeraCopy bulk file-copy operations, and WinRAR/7-Zip with encryption enabled, alongside real ransomware samples. LockBit was one of the ransomware samples used in testing and became identifiable by the framework after roughly one-third of its encryption run; encrypted SMBv3 traffic was evaluated as a separate dataset not detailed in the primary write-up, and the paper does not address production-network scalability beyond the single-testbed setup. The preprint is hosted at arxiv.org/abs/2606.30586.
This is a defensive detection-methodology publication, not an active-threat report: it discloses no CVE, no CVSS-scored vulnerability, no exploited flaw, no new ransomware variant or campaign, no C2 infrastructure, and no malware sample/hash of its own. It was surfaced by the HUNT phase and explicitly marked SKIP ('Does not meet HUNT threat-selection criteria: no CVE, no CVSS, no confirmed active exploitation, no public exploit PoC, no CISA KEV listing, no nation-state attribution/new TTPs, no supply-chain compromise, and no new ransomware variant or campaign'); independent WebFetch verification of the Help Net Security article confirms that determination.
Because the source article names LockBit specifically as its illustrative ransomware sample, this record documents LockBit's independently sourced background as threat-intelligence context for defenders evaluating the detection approach. LockBit was first observed in September 2019 operating under the '.abcd' file extension (tracked by some vendors as ABCD Ransomware), rebranded to LockBit and adopted a Ransomware-as-a-Service affiliate model in 2020, released LockBit 2.0 in July 2021 (adding Active Directory group-policy abuse to auto-encrypt Windows domains), and released LockBit 3.0 / LockBit Black in June 2022 (adding anti-analysis techniques, password-gated execution, and a ransomware bug-bounty program). CrowdStrike tracks the operator as BITWISE SPIDER; other vendors use the aliases Syrphid and Water Selkie. Per CISA/FBI/MS-ISAC joint advisory AA23-165A (2023-06-14), LockBit was the most active global ransomware/RaaS operation by claimed-victim count in 2022, with affiliates attacking organizations across financial services, food and agriculture, education, energy, government/emergency services, healthcare, manufacturing, and transportation sectors since January 2020. CISA/FBI advisory AA23-075A (2023-03-16, 'StopRansomware: LockBit 3.0') documents affiliate tooling and MITRE ATT&CK-mapped TTPs including Cobalt Strike beacons, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, ProDump-based LSASS credential dumping, PuTTY Link (Plink) tunneling, rclone/MEGA/FileZilla-based exfiltration, and Chocolatey-based tool deployment. A follow-on advisory, AA23-325A (2023-11-21), documented LockBit 3.0 affiliates actively exploiting CVE-2023-4966 ('Citrix Bleed', in Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances) for initial access — including the confirmed breach of Boeing Distribution Inc. — with some intrusions additionally leveraging CVE-2020-1472 ('Zerologon') for rapid privilege escalation to Domain Admin via tools such as Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1/SharpZeroLogon. On 2024-02-19/20, the NCA-, FBI-, and Europol-led international task force 'Operation Cronos' seized LockBit's primary data-leak-site infrastructure and 34 servers across the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, France, Switzerland, Australia, the US, and the UK, recovered 1,000+ victim decryption keys, indicted Russian nationals, and froze 200+ associated cryptocurrency accounts. LockBit affiliate nationality in these indictments is Russian, though LockBit is a financially motivated criminal RaaS operation, not a confirmed state-sponsored actor. Despite Operation Cronos, LockBit has resurged: it formed a strategic alliance with the Qilin and DragonForce ransomware operations around October 2025, and LockBit 5.0 ranked as the fourth most active ransomware operation in Q1 2026 with 163 recorded victims — underscoring continued relevance of network-based SMB detection research such as the La Trobe University framework documented in this record.
Net assessment: no new vulnerability, exploit, malware sample, or campaign is being reported here. The record exists to catalog a promising defensive detection technique and to give analysts sourced, verifiable background on the one ransomware family the researchers used to illustrate it.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
Lateral Movement
T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1070.004 File Deletion; T1480.001 Environmental Keying
Discovery
T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1614.001 System Language Discovery
Command and Control
T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
Execution
T1072 Software Deployment Tools
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1566 Phishing
Impact
T1485 Data Destruction; T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
Persistence
T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Privilege Escalation
T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Exfiltration
Remediation
Patches
- Apply vendor patches for CVE-2023-4966 (Citrix Bleed) on all Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances.
- Apply Microsoft patches for CVE-2020-1472 (Zerologon) on all Windows domain controllers.
Immediate actions
- No direct remediation is required from this record alone — it discloses no new vulnerability, exploit, or active campaign; treat it as background threat-intelligence context for a defensive detection technique.
- Maintain standard LockBit-related hardening: ensure internet-facing Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances are patched against CVE-2023-4966 (Citrix Bleed) and domain controllers are patched against CVE-2020-1472 (Zerologon), both historically exploited by LockBit affiliates for initial access and privilege escalation respectively.
- Restrict, log, and monitor SMBv1/v2/v3 traffic to shared network storage; disable SMBv1 where still enabled.
Workarounds
- Where patching is delayed, force session-token invalidation and re-authentication with MFA on Citrix NetScaler appliances to reduce Citrix Bleed session-hijack exposure.
- Enable SMB signing and disable legacy SMBv1 to reduce viable lateral-movement paths onto shared storage.
Longer-term hardening
- Evaluate network-based SMB traffic analytics (packet-size / Region-of-Interest signature detection plus Random Committee ML classification) as a complementary control to endpoint EDR/DFIR tooling for detecting bulk file-encryption behavior against shared network storage.
- Continue monitoring academic literature (arXiv:2606.30586) for maturation of this detection technique toward production tooling and multi-client/multi-server scalability validation beyond the single-testbed study.
- Maintain detection coverage for LockBit's post-Operation-Cronos resurgence (LockBit 5.0, Qilin/DragonForce alliance) given continued victim activity reported in Q1 2026.
Timeline
- LockBit ransomware first observed in the wild, initially operating under the '.abcd' file extension (tracked by some vendors as ABCD Ransomware) before adopting the LockBit brand.
- The operation rebrands from ABCD to LockBit and adopts a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) affiliate model; CISA reports affiliate attacks beginning this year across multiple critical-infrastructure sectors.
- LockBit 2.0 officially released, adding the ability to abuse Active Directory group policy to automatically encrypt Windows domains.
- LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) launched, adding anti-analysis techniques, password-gated execution, command-line augmentation, and the first ransomware bug-bounty program.
- CISA/FBI publish joint advisory AA23-075A ('#StopRansomware: LockBit 3.0'), detailing affiliate tooling (Cobalt Strike, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, ProDump, rclone, MEGA, FileZilla, Plink, Chocolatey) and MITRE ATT&CK-mapped TTPs.
- CISA/FBI/MS-ISAC publish joint advisory AA23-165A, 'Understanding Ransomware Threat Actors: LockBit,' documenting LockBit as the most active global ransomware/RaaS operation by claimed-victim count in 2022.
- CISA/FBI advisory AA23-325A warns that LockBit 3.0 affiliates are actively exploiting CVE-2023-4966 (Citrix Bleed) for initial access, including the confirmed breach of Boeing Distribution Inc.; some intrusions additionally leveraged CVE-2020-1472 (Zerologon) for privilege escalation.
- International task force 'Operation Cronos' (NCA, FBI, Europol, and partners) seizes LockBit's primary data-leak-site infrastructure and 34 servers across the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, France, Switzerland, Australia, the US, and the UK.
- Operation Cronos publicly announced; law enforcement releases 1,000+ recovered decryption keys, indicts Russian nationals, and freezes 200+ cryptocurrency accounts linked to the group.
- LockBit forms a strategic alliance with the Qilin and DragonForce ransomware operations, signaling resurgence following the Operation Cronos disruption.
- Industry reporting places LockBit 5.0 as the fourth most active ransomware operation in Q1 2026, with 163 recorded victims despite the 2024 law-enforcement takedown.
- Help Net Security publishes coverage of La Trobe University's SMB shared-storage ransomware detection research, which cites LockBit as an illustrative test sample identified by the framework after roughly one-third of its encryption run.
Sources cited
- CISA AA23-165A: Understanding Ransomware Threat Actors: LockBit CISA · Government advisory · 2023-06-14
- CISA AA23-075A: #StopRansomware: LockBit 3.0 CISA · Government advisory · 2023-03-16
- CISA AA23-325A: LockBit 3.0 Ransomware Affiliates Exploit CVE-2023-4966 Citrix Bleed Vulnerability CISA · Government advisory · 2023-11-21
- Region-of-Interest SMB ransomware detection preprint (La Trobe University) arxiv.org · Research · 2026-06-01
- CISA Alert AA23-075A: The Latest LockBit Ransomware Variant - LockBit 3.0 (TTP/IOC analysis) picussecurity.com · Vendor report · 2023-03-20
- LockBit 3.0, Software S1202 MITRE · Research · 2022-06-01
- Unveiling the Fallout: Operation Cronos' Impact on LockBit Following Landmark Disruption Trend Micro · Vendor report · 2024-04-01
- A Timeline of Events: Operation Cronos and LockBit slcyber.io · Blog · 2024-02-21
- LockBit Ransomware: Attack Methods and 2026 Status cybelangel.com · Blog · 2026-03-01
- New detection method could help stop ransomware in shared storage systems Help Net Security · News · 2026-07-02
- LockBit Ransomware Operation Shut Down; Criminals Arrested; Decryption Keys Released The Hacker News · News · 2024-02-20
Other reports on CVE-2020-1472
- Operation Escaneo: MexicanMafia (PanchoVilla) Intrusion Campaign Against Mexican Government Agencies and Latin American Financial Institutions
- Ransomware Incidents Surge 4.7% in Japan H1 2026: The Gentlemen and Qilin Lead, AI-Assisted Tooling Observed
- Rhysida Ransomware Campaign Targeting German Public Administration (Stuttgart and Berlin, 2026)
- Rhysida Ransomware Claims Berlin State Government Breach Ahead of September Election
- LockBit 5.0 Ransomware Extortion Claim Against US Bank (U.S. Bancorp)
- Capita Black Basta Ransomware Incident (March 2023) — Record £14M UK ICO Fine for 6M+ Affected Individuals
Previous and next in threat intel
- Nebula — AI-Integrated Open-Source Penetration Testing Tool (BerylliumSec) — Dual-Use Tool Tracking, No CVE/Active Exploitation Previous report
- ClickFix / KongTuke Clipboard-Hijacking Social-Engineering Technique (MITRE T1204.004) — Fake-CAPTCHA Lures Delivering Infostealers, RATs, and Ransomware Next report
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated —.