# Cavern Manticore: Iran-Linked Modular .NET C2 Framework Targeting Israeli Government and IT Sectors via SysAid RMM Abuse

> Check Point Research disclosed Cavern Manticore, an Iran-nexus, MOIS-linked threat actor with technical overlaps to OilRig subgroup Lyceum and MuddyWater, deploying a modular .NET-based C2 framework called Cavern (evolved from an earlier single-DLL 'Cav3rn' framework) against Israeli government and IT-sector organizations. Initial access involves abuse of SysAid RMM/ITSM software update mechanisms and multi-hop supply-chain compromise of IT providers, with active exploitation confirmed across multiple intrusions during the period of the U.S.-Israel 'Operation Epic Fury' military campaign against Iran.

- **Published:** 2026-07-06T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-06T20:12:28.279Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1137
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-cavern-manticore-sysaid-rmm-abuse-tl-2026-1137.webp?v=8a2d72fb (Threadlinqs threat intel: Cavern Manticore C2 via SysAid RMM: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1137) — High severity, 48 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1137
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Cavern Manticore (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 48 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2025-2775

## Description

Cavern Manticore is an Iran-nexus advanced persistent threat cluster tracked by Check Point Research (CPR) since early 2026, assessed to be linked to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) with technical and targeting overlaps to the OilRig subgroup Lyceum and to MuddyWater. The group's naming follows Check Point's 'Manticore' convention for Iran-aligned intrusion sets (cf. Educated Manticore, Nimbus Manticore, Scarred Manticore, Void Manticore). Cavern Manticore's primary victimology is Israeli government agencies and IT-sector organizations, with a distinctive tradecraft emphasis on multi-hop supply-chain compromise: the actor breaches IT providers/MSPs first and pivots through trusted administrative relationships to reach final government and enterprise targets.

Initial access in the campaign centers on abuse of SysAid RMM/ITSM software's update feature to push a trojanized WinDirStat package. The legitimate WinDirStat.exe utility, deployed to C:\ProgramData\WinDir\WinDirStat.exe, is used to sideload a malicious uxtheme.dll (the 'Cavern Agent'). This DLL exports 83 functions that mimic the legitimate Windows theming library (uxtheme.dll), with the export EnableThemeDialogTexture (ordinal #20/0x14) repurposed as the true operational entry point — each export is a tiny native stub rather than a genuine theming function, a hallmark of the Mixed-Mode C++/CLI compilation format.

The Cavern framework itself represents a significant evolution from the actor's earlier 'Cav3rn' toolset (a non-modular, single-DLL implementation that relied on steganographic PNG-based C2 transport using files with JPEG magic headers, e.g. .CvnC.png/.CvnA.png/.CvnR.png, and a webshell-style ASP.NET C2 handler named cac.aspx). The refactored Cavern framework is modular and deliberately compiled into three distinct .NET output formats specifically to frustrate reverse engineering: (1) standard .NET Framework IL-only modules (mhm.dll — file manager; db.dll — SQL Server browser; ode.dll — LDAP/Active Directory module) that retain full symbol metadata and are trivially decompilable with tools like ILSpy/dnSpyEx, sharing a common Command.Type enum with 61 distinct command IDs; (2) the Mixed-Mode C++/CLI Cavern Agent (uxtheme.dll) whose native stub exports require dual analysis with both a .NET decompiler and a native disassembler; and (3) NativeAOT .NET 8 modules (n-HTCommp.dll — communications; n-ten.dll — network reconnaissance; n-sws.dll — SOCKS5/WSS tunnel) that statically compile the entire .NET runtime into a single 3-6MB native PE with thousands of stripped framework functions, resolve P/Invoke APIs via runtime descriptor tables rather than the PE import table, and only materialize string literals at runtime from a 'hydrated' section rather than storing them as static strings.

Operationally, the Cavern Agent communicates over HTTP (verbs get/send/cget/cpost/upload against /profile for polling and /gallery for result submission) using XOR (key 0x48) plus Base64 encoding of the request body, a fixed Microsoft Edge User-Agent string, and a custom X-User-token header combining the agent ID with a '00' suffix. The framework can pivot to WebSocket/WSS transport via a self-command (004) using verbs ws/getws/sendws/closews, with XOR applied to frames including the initial handshake. Custom field/argument delimiters (_;;_ and _,_) structure the protocol. Post-exploitation capability is extensive: file operations with DPAPI-protected credential decryption support; SQL Server enumeration, querying, and JSON-based data export; LDAP bind testing, AD user/group enumeration with paged searches (1,000-item pages) and configurable-delay brute-forcing; network reconnaissance (DNS resolution, interface enumeration, ping, netstat, port scanning); SMB credential brute-forcing; and a full SOCKS5-over-WebSocket/WSS tunneling capability supporting both server and client proxy modes.

Anti-forensic design is a defining feature: each module loads inside a dedicated .NET AppDomain and is unloaded from memory after execution, startup routines enumerate and delete all files except the Communication Module, config.txt, and logs, and the agent supports hot-swap self-update (renaming its own DLL, loading the new version, and signaling completion via signalCode=200). Configuration is stored in config.txt (keys i, xd, int) with legacy Cav3rn variants using Cvn.cfg.A/Cvn.cfg.U for alive-time configuration, and command/result exchange occurring through inpt/outpt working directories. Persistence/execution artifacts include hardcoded mutex names MYMUTEX123HELLP, MYMUTEX123HELLP02, and MYMUTEX123HELLP04. The majority of observed samples score zero or very low detection rates on VirusTotal.

Infrastructure includes the domain hospitalinstallation[.]com (registered through Iranian hosting provider Fars Data) with subdomains auth.hospitalinstallation[.]com (older agent C2) and google.com.hospitalinstallation[.]com (newer agent C2, using a visual-obfuscation subdomain designed to resemble google.com at a glance), plus legacy Cav3rn HTTP-module endpoints on adserviceupdate[.]com and hygienehistory[.]com, both fronting the cac.aspx webshell-style C2 handler. A developer PDB path (C:\Users\rick\Desktop\Modules\cavern\) and human artifacts — frustrated developer error strings ('What is this sh*t?! where is get_version?!?', 'DLL not found...Maybe you didn't upload it!!!'), typos ('tunnel message receivecd', 'handeling connect ms'), and a malformed SQL query string — lead CPR to assess Cavern as human-authored, plausibly with AI assistance for routine code but shaped throughout by a single developer rather than generated end-to-end.

CPR's disclosure situates Cavern Manticore's cyber operations against Israeli government and IT-sector targets as running concurrently with the U.S.-Israel joint kinetic military campaign known as 'Operation Epic Fury' (opened February 28, 2026, kinetic phase concluding May 5, 2026) against Iranian leadership, missile infrastructure, and air defenses — indicating a cyber-espionage operation tempo disciplined and sustained through a period of active regional conflict. No CVE is cited by CPR for the SysAid abuse; the technique described is trust/update-mechanism abuse rather than exploitation of a specific unpatched vulnerability, though separately, unrelated XXE vulnerabilities in SysAid On-Prem (CVE-2025-2775, CVE-2025-2776) have previously been added to the CISA KEV catalog after being exploited in the wild by other threat actors, underscoring SysAid as a recurring target of MOIS-nexus operations against Israeli infrastructure providers (including prior MuddyWater activity).

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1505.003 Web Shell
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1070.004 File Deletion
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1087.002 Domain Account
- T1069.002 Domain Groups
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1132.001 Standard Encoding
- T1008 Fallback Channels
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1090.001 Internal Proxy
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1583.001 Domains
- T1587.001 Malware
- T1583.006 Web Services
- T1129 Shared Modules
- T1106 Native API
- T1569.002 Service Execution
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1027.003 Steganography
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1187 Forced Authentication
- T1069.001 Local Groups
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1049 System Network Connections Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Cavern Manticore C2 — XOR+Base64 HTTP Beacon, WSS Pivot & SOCKS5 Tunnel to Cavern/Cav3rn Infrastructure (SPL Primary)** (`TL-2026-1137-SPL-003`)

Detects the Cavern Manticore C2 protocol fingerprint: HTTP polling to /profile and /gallery URI paths with verb= parameters (get/send/cget/cpost/upload) and a custom X-User-token header carrying an XOR(0x48)+Base64 encoded body and a spoofed Microsoft Edge User-Agent, the self-command 004 pivot to WebSocket/WSS transport (ws/getws/sendws/closews), SOCKS5-over-WSS tunneling used to reach lateral targets, direct contact with known Cavern/Cav3rn infrastructure (hospitalinstallation.com family, adserviceupdate.com, hygienehistory.com), and requests to the legacy cac.aspx webshell-style C2 handler.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.001, T1132.001, T1572, T1090.001, T1008, T1021.002, T1570, T1041, T1505.003
- **Data sources:** proxy_logs, dns_logs, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, windows_security_event_log
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
( index=proxy (sourcetype="pan:traffic" OR sourcetype="bluecoat:proxysg" OR sourcetype="stream:http")
  (url="*/profile*" OR url="*/gallery*")
  (http_user_agent="*Edg/*" AND http_user_agent="*Chrome*")
  | rex field=url "verb=(?<c2_verb>get|send|cget|cpost|upload|ws|getws|sendws|closews)"
  | where isnotnull(c2_verb) OR isnotnull('req_header.X-User-token')
  | eval signal="http_c2_beacon" )
APPEND
[ search index=proxy (sourcetype="pan:traffic" OR sourcetype="stream:http")
  (url="*wss:*" OR (url="*/gallery*" AND http_method="GET" AND cs_upgrade="websocket"))
  | eval signal="wss_pivot_socks5_tunnel" ]
APPEND
[ search index=dns (sourcetype="stream:dns" OR sourcetype="infoblox:dns")
  query IN ("*hospitalinstallation.com","*adserviceupdate.com","*hygienehistory.com")
  | eval signal="cavern_domain_contact" ]
APPEND
[ search index=proxy url="*/cac.aspx" (dest="adserviceupdate.com" OR dest="hygienehistory.com")
  | eval signal="cac_aspx_webshell_handler" ]
| stats count values(signal) as signals_triggered values(url) as uris earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by src, dest, http_user_agent
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let CavernDomains = dynamic(["hospitalinstallation.com","auth.hospitalinstallation.com","google.com.hospitalinstallation.com","adserviceupdate.com","hygienehistory.com"]);
let HttpBeacon = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("/profile","/gallery")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("msedge.exe","chrome.exe","iexplore.exe","firefox.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, InitiatingProcessFileName, Signal = "http_c2_beacon_nonbrowser";
let DomainContact = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (CavernDomains)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, InitiatingProcessFileName, Signal = "cavern_domain_contact";
let WebshellHandler = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has "/cac.aspx"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, InitiatingProcessFileName, Signal = "cac_aspx_webshell_handler";
HttpBeacon
| union DomainContact
| union WebshellHandler
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Cavern Manticore HTTP/WSS C2 Beacon, SOCKS5 Tunnel and Known-Infrastructure Contact
id: 9c2f5a3e-8d1b-4e6f-a2c3-cavernmanticore1137c
status: experimental
description: Detects the Cavern Manticore C2 protocol fingerprint - HTTP polling to /profile and /gallery with verb= parameters and an X-User-token header (XOR 0x48 + Base64 encoded body, spoofed Microsoft Edge User-Agent), the self-command 004 pivot to WebSocket/WSS transport, SOCKS5-over-WSS tunneling, and direct contact with known Cavern/Cav3rn C2 infrastructure including the legacy cac.aspx webshell-style handler.
references:
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-06
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1132.001
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090.001
    - attack.t1008
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1041
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.tool.cavern_manticore
logsource:
    category: proxy
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_uri:
        c-uri|contains:
            - '/profile'
            - '/gallery'
    selection_header:
        cs-header-x-user-token|exists: true
    selection_verb:
        c-uri-query|contains:
            - 'verb=get'
            - 'verb=send'
            - 'verb=cget'
            - 'verb=cpost'
            - 'verb=upload'
            - 'verb=ws'
            - 'verb=getws'
            - 'verb=sendws'
            - 'verb=closews'
    selection_domain:
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'hospitalinstallation.com'
            - 'adserviceupdate.com'
            - 'hygienehistory.com'
    selection_webshell:
        c-uri|contains: '/cac.aspx'
    condition: selection_uri and (selection_header or selection_verb) or selection_domain or selection_webshell
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate internal applications reusing generic '/profile' or '/gallery' API paths without the X-User-token header or verb= parameter pattern
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate applications using generic '/profile' or '/gallery' URI paths unrelated to Cavern — verify the X-User-token header format and XOR+Base64 body structure before alerting
- Authorized red-team/security-testing tooling reusing generic SOCKS5-over-WebSocket tunneling — check engagement/change records
- CDN or domain-fronting edge cases producing false hits on Edge UA + generic URI overlap without the custom header

**Tuning notes:** Add newly observed Cavern/Cav3rn infrastructure to the domain watchlist as additional subdomains/registrar reuse is discovered; validate the X-User-token header against a regex (agent-id + literal '00' suffix) rather than mere presence to cut noise; correlate HTTP beacon hits with a subsequent WSS pivot from the same source IP within a short window to prioritize alerts.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Cavern Manticore Initial Access — Trojanized WinDirStat/[indicator] DLL Side-Load via SysAid Update Abuse (KQL Primary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Manticore Post-Exploitation — Anti-Forensic Config Artifacts, Hardcoded Mutex & AD/Credential Reconnaissance (KQL Primary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Manticore C2 — XOR+Base64 HTTP Beacon, WSS Pivot & SOCKS5 Tunnel to Cavern/Cav3rn Infrastructure (KQL Primary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Manticore Initial Access — Trojanized WinDirStat/[indicator] DLL Side-Load via SysAid Update Abuse (Sigma Primary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Manticore Post-Exploitation — Anti-Forensic Config Artifacts, Hardcoded Mutex & AD/Credential Reconnaissance (Sigma Primary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Manticore C2 — XOR+Base64 HTTP Beacon, WSS Pivot & SOCKS5 Tunnel to Cavern/Cav3rn Infrastructure (Sigma Primary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Manticore Initial Access — Trojanized WinDirStat/[indicator] DLL Side-Load via SysAid Update Abuse (SPL Primary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Manticore Post-Exploitation — Anti-Forensic Config Artifacts, Hardcoded Mutex & AD/Credential Reconnaissance (SPL Primary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 48)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `hospitalinstallation[.]com`
- File hash: `37e123bd7998af4eae32718ce254776f36365a80ba56952593dab46f536d4066`
- Domain: `adserviceupdate[.]com`

Full set of 48 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Cavern Manticore: Exposing Iran-Linked Modular C2 Framework](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/)
- [New Iran-Nexus Hacking Group Targets Israel Government and IT Sectors](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/new-iran-hacking-group-targets/)
- [OilRig, COBALT GYPSY, IRN2, APT34, Helix Kitten, Evasive Serpens, Hazel Sandstorm, EUROPIUM, ITG13, Earth Simnavaz, Crambus, TA452, Group G0049](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049/)
- [MuddyWater, Earth Vetala, MERCURY, Static Kitten, Seedworm, TEMP.Zagros, Mango Sandstorm, TA450, MuddyKrill, Group G0069](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069/)
- [CISA Warns of SysAid Vulnerability Exploitation](https://www.securityweek.com/cisa-warns-of-sysaid-vulnerability-exploitation/)
- [CVE-2025-2775: SysAid On-Prem XXE Vulnerability](https://www.sentinelone.com/vulnerability-database/cve-2025-2775/)
- [CVE-2025-2775 Detail](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2025-2775)
- [CVE-2025-2775 | Arctic Wolf](https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/cve-2025-2775/)
- [Escalation in the Middle East: Tracking 'Operation Epic Fury' Across Military and Cyber Domains](https://flashpoint.io/blog/escalation-in-the-middle-east-operation-epic-fury/)
- [Operation Epic Fury and the Remnants of Iran's Nuclear Program](https://www.csis.org/analysis/operation-epic-fury-and-remnants-irans-nuclear-program)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1137
