# GigaWiper (BLUERABBIT) — Go-Based Modular Backdoor Bundles Raw Disk Wiper, Crucio-Derived Fake Ransomware, and FlockWiper Drive Overwriter Behind Espionage Tooling

> GigaWiper, tracked by Microsoft and also identified as BLUERABBIT by Binary Defense (via Google Threat Intelligence Group), is a Go-based Windows backdoor that consolidates a raw-disk wiper, a Crucio-derived fake ransomware (.candy extension), and a Golang reimplementation of the C-based FlockWiper drive overwriter into a single modular tool, alongside espionage features (screenshot/video capture, hidden VNC, keylogger stubs). It abuses legitimate cloud-native services — RabbitMQ (AMQP tasking), Redis (state/results), and MinIO (S3-compatible exfiltration) — for C2, masquerades as OneDrive via a scheduled task and firewall rule, and has targeted Israeli government and IT-sector organizations as part of a suspected Iran-nexus (IRGC-adjacent) destructive campaign whose operators appear to decide destructive intent (wipe vs. fake-ransom vs. espionage-only) post-compromise.

- **Published:** 2026-07-09T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-09T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1147
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-gigawiper-bluerabbit-go-backdoor-tl-2026-1147.webp?v=82205d01 (Threadlinqs threat intel: GigaWiper (BLUERABBIT) Go Backdoor: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1147) — High severity, 40 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1147
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** IRGC-adjacent cluster (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 40 (3 shown free below)

## Description

GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT is a modular, Go-language Windows backdoor first identified by Microsoft (destructive activity dated October 2025) and independently reported by Binary Defense as BLUERABBIT (first observed mid-to-late March 2026), citing Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) report 26-10016354 and linking it to the same Iran-nexus activity cluster that previously deployed BLUEWIPE and SEWERGOO in June 2025.

The malware's defining characteristic is command-driven modularity: a single backdoor exposes numbered commands that let the operator choose the outcome of a compromise after the fact rather than committing to a payload at build time. Command 1 (WipeMain) performs raw physical-disk wiping via WMI enumeration and IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK partition-table destruction followed by sequential randomized-buffer overwrite. Command 2 (BSOD) disables Windows recovery mechanisms via registry modification (CrashControl AutoReboot, WindowsUpdate AU NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers, Maintenance MaintenanceDisabled), takes ownership of boot-critical files (bootmgr, ntoskrnl.exe, winload) via takeown/icacls, and deletes them to force an unbootable state. Command 3 (RanMain / BigBangExtortMain) is a fake-ransomware routine derived from the Crucio codebase — files are AES-CBC encrypted in chunks with unsaved, randomly generated keys (no decryption is possible even if a ransom were paid), renamed with a .candy extension, and the desktop wallpaper is replaced with an AI-generated extortion image; this function shares code lineage with Crucio ransomware referenced in the December 2023 CISA/NSA/EPA/FBI/INCD joint advisory AA23-335A on IRGC-affiliated ('CyberAv3ngers') actors exploiting Unitronics Vision-series PLCs at US and international water/wastewater facilities. Command 12 (WipeCMain) is a multi-pass secure wipe of the Windows installation drive only, reimplementing the C-based FlockWiper tool (first seen on VirusTotal June 2025) in Go; PDB debug paths in FlockWiper and function names inside GigaWiper both contain a recurring 'GRAT' string suggesting a shared development framework or toolkit lineage across the malware families.

Beyond destructive capability, GigaWiper carries a full espionage/RAT suite: all-monitor screenshot capture, screen recording during active user sessions, hidden VNC for live desktop viewing and remote keyboard/mouse control, shell command execution, system/hardware/network/domain profiling, security-product and BitLocker-status detection, process and service enumeration/management, registry editing, Windows event-log wiping, and dormant keylogger stubs.

Command and control is unusually implemented atop legitimate, widely-deployed backend services rather than bespoke protocols: RabbitMQ over AMQP serves as the primary tasking channel (a device-named queue with the consumer tag set to the malware's own executable path; tasks delivered as JSON via a fanout 'All' exchange for broadcast operations and a 'Topic' exchange for routing-key-targeted deployment to specific victims), Redis (RESP protocol) handles state tracking and result/status reporting, and a MinIO S3-compatible object store is used for staging and exfiltrating large files — data is first written to GUID-named staging directories (a detection opportunity, since the malware's GUID generator uses the full A–Z/0–9 alphanumeric range rather than the hexadecimal-only characters used by legitimate Windows GUIDs) before upload via the MinIO client (mc), frequently invoked with the --insecure flag.

Persistence and masquerade center on impersonating Microsoft OneDrive: on first execution the malware checks/writes HKCU\SOFTWARE\OneDrive\Environment to track execution count, then establishes a scheduled task named 'OneDrive Update' via PowerShell/New-ScheduledTaskAction with a five-second initial delay and 60-second repeat interval, a startup trigger, AllowStartIfOnBatteries, hidden execution, automatic restart (up to three attempts), no execution time limit, and highest available run level. A Windows Firewall rule named 'Microsoft.Windows.CloudExperienceHost' is created to whitelist the malware's outbound traffic under a plausible-sounding built-in Windows component name.

Microsoft Defender detects components of this malware family under the names Giga, Wiper, FlockWiper, and CutBrooch (antivirus signatures) and WprFlock, WprCree, FlockWiper, and GigaWiper (Defender for Endpoint), alongside generic 'Possible ransomware activity' / 'Ransomware behavior detected' alerts. Attribution in both reports points to a suspected Iran-nexus, IRGC-adjacent actor cluster; GTIG links the current wave to the same cluster's June 2025 BLUEWIPE and SEWERGOO deployments, and both Microsoft and Binary Defense connect the Crucio-derived ransomware function to the CyberAv3ngers persona associated with the 2023 Unitronics PLC intrusions against US, Israeli, UK, and Irish water/energy infrastructure. Current targeting (per Binary Defense/Infosecurity Magazine reporting) is concentrated on Israeli government and IT-sector organizations, consistent with the broader escalation of Iran-linked destructive operations against Israel observed through 2025-2026.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification
- T1070 Indicator Removal
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1007 System Service Discovery
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1125 Video Capture
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1074 Data Staged
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1102 Web Service
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1485 Data Destruction
- T1561 Disk Wipe
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot
- T1491 Defacement

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT OneDrive-Masquerade Scheduled Task Persistence (SPL)** (`TL-2026-1147-SPL-001`)

Detects creation of the 'OneDrive Update' scheduled task via PowerShell New-ScheduledTaskAction with the hidden/AllowStartIfOnBatteries flag combination and the accompanying HKCU\SOFTWARE\OneDrive\Environment registry write, the initial-access/persistence establishment step for GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1053.005, T1547, T1036
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)New-ScheduledTaskAction") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)OneDrive Update") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)-Hidden") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)AllowStartIfOnBatteries")
| eval risk="high"
| table _time, ComputerName, User, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine, risk
| sort - _time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "New-ScheduledTaskAction" and ProcessCommandLine has "OneDrive Update" and ProcessCommandLine has "-Hidden" and ProcessCommandLine has "AllowStartIfOnBatteries"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT OneDrive Update Scheduled Task Persistence
id: 8f1c2e10-1a2b-4c3d-9e4f-5a6b7c8d9e0f
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDrive Update' with hidden/AllowStartIfOnBatteries flags, used by GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT for persistence via OneDrive masquerade.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/09/gigawiper-anatomy-of-a-destructive-backdoor-assembled-from-multiple-malware/
    - https://binarydefense.com/resources/blog/bluerabbit-a-golang-based-backdoor-with-ransomware-and-destructive-capabilities
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/07/09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1547
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.defense_evasion
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_task:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'New-ScheduledTaskAction'
            - 'OneDrive Update'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-Hidden'
            - 'AllowStartIfOnBatteries'
    condition: selection_task and selection_flags
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate IT automation scripts that happen to name a task similarly (rare)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate administrative scripting that names a scheduled task similarly, though the combination of OneDrive Update naming with hidden/battery flags is rare in benign automation

**Tuning notes:** If the organization uses legitimate OneDrive maintenance automation, baseline the exact task name/publisher and exclude signed Microsoft-published task registrations; retain the flag-combination logic as the primary discriminator.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT Firewall Rule Masquerade & OneDrive Registry Tracking (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT Anti-Recovery Registry Tampering + Event Log Clearing (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT Non-Hex Pseudo-GUID Staging Directory & Cloud Storage Exfil (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT [indicator] Scheduled Task Persistence (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT Crucio-Derived Mass .candy Rename & Wallpaper Defacement (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT RabbitMQ/Redis C2 Beaconing from Endpoint Subnets (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT Boot File Ownership Seizure Preceding Deletion (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT MinIO Exfiltration & AMQP/Redis C2 Beaconing (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 40)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.182.193[.]21`
- File hash: `633d4cbd496b1094495da89a64f5e6c31a0f6d4d1488411db5b0cba1cfe42001`
- IP address: `212.8.248[.]104`

Full set of 40 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [New GigaWiper Windows Backdoor Bundles Destructive Wiper, Fake Ransomware, and Espionage Tools](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/new-gigawiper-windows-backdoor-bundles.html)
- [GigaWiper: Anatomy of a Destructive Backdoor Assembled from Multiple Malware](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/09/gigawiper-anatomy-of-a-destructive-backdoor-assembled-from-multiple-malware/)
- [BLUERABBIT: A Golang-Based Backdoor with Ransomware and Destructive Capabilities](https://binarydefense.com/resources/blog/bluerabbit-a-golang-based-backdoor-with-ransomware-and-destructive-capabilities)
- [Hackers Use BLUERABBIT Backdoor to Encrypt Files and Wipe Disks Across Windows Systems](https://cybersecuritynews.com/hackers-use-bluerabbit-backdoor/)
- [BLUERABBIT Backdoor Encrypts Files, Wipes Windows Systems](https://gbhackers.com/bluerabbit-backdoor-encrypts-files/)
- [BLUERABBIT Backdoor Targets Windows Systems With File Encryption](https://cyberpress.org/bluerabbit-targets-windows-files/)
- [New Iran-Nexus Hacking Group Targets Israel Government and IT Sectors](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/new-iran-hacking-group-targets/)
- [IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities (AA23-335A)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-335a)
- [Iran-Linked CyberAv3ngers Sets Sights on Water Utilities and Industrial Controllers](https://www.cryptika.com/iran-linked-cyberav3ngers-sets-sights-on-water-utilities-and-industrial-controllers/)
- [CyberAv3ngers: FAQ About Iran-Linked Threat Group Targeting U.S. Critical Infrastructure](https://www.tenable.com/blog/what-to-know-about-cyberav3ngers-the-irgc-linked-group-targeting-critical-infrastructure)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1147
