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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-1156

Multi-Malware Campaign Targeting Poorly Secured Linux SSH Servers — XMRig, ShellBot, MIG LogCleaner, XHide, and Go-based Propagation Tool

mediumACTIVE

ASEC's Q2 2026 statistical report documents an ongoing campaign of brute-force/dictionary attacks against poorly managed Linux SSH servers. Following successful authentication, operators deploy XMRig (disguised as `mysql`), the Perl-based ShellBot IRC DDoS bot, MIG LogCleaner, the XHide process-name obfuscator, and a Go-based propagation tool (`meta`) that rescans SSH ports and reuses harvested credentials to self-propagate.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1156
Also known asLinux SSH Server Attack Distributing XMRig, ShellBot, and Other Malware
SeverityMEDIUM
Affected productsGeneric Linux servers running OpenSSH with weak/default/reused credentials
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-521, CWE-1188
MalwareMIG LogCleaner, PerlBot, xmrig
ToolsXHide
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1018 Remote System Discovery, T1021.004 SSH, T1027.004 Compile After Delivery, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1053.003 Cron, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer and 8 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsany internet-facing linux server population no sector-specific targeting reported
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1156 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 34 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: SSH Brute-Force/Dictionary Attack Followed by Successful Authentication

Detects a burst of failed SSH password attempts from a single source followed by an accepted login, matching the campaign's dictionary/brute-force initial-access pattern against poorly secured Linux SSH servers.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1110.001, T1110.002, T1078
  • Data sources: linux_secure, syslog, auth.log
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=linux sourcetype=linux_secure OR sourcetype=syslog ("Failed password" OR "Invalid user") sshd
| bin _time span=5m
| stats count(eval(match(_raw,"Failed password|Invalid user"))) AS fail_count count(eval(match(_raw,"Accepted password"))) AS accept_count values(user) AS users by src_ip, _time
| where fail_count >= 10 AND accept_count >= 1
| table _time src_ip fail_count accept_count users
| sort -fail_count

Microsoft KQL

let Threshold = 10;
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ProcessName == "sshd"
| extend Outcome = case(SyslogMessage has "Failed password", "fail", SyslogMessage has "Invalid user", "fail", SyslogMessage has "Accepted password", "accept", "other")
| where Outcome in ("fail","accept")
| summarize FailCount = countif(Outcome=="fail"), AcceptCount = countif(Outcome=="accept") by HostIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)
| where FailCount >= Threshold and AcceptCount >= 1
| project TimeGenerated, HostIP, FailCount, AcceptCount

Sigma

title: SSH Dictionary Brute-Force Followed by Successful Login
id: 6b1e2a3c-1156-4c11-9a01-tlintel1156e1
status: experimental
description: Detects a burst of SSH authentication failures from one source IP followed by a successful login within a short window, consistent with dictionary/brute-force initial access against exposed Linux SSH servers.
references:
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/94396/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/07/09
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1110.001
    - attack.t1110.002
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auth
detection:
    selection_fail:
        message|contains:
            - 'Failed password'
            - 'Invalid user'
    selection_accept:
        message|contains: 'Accepted password'
    timeframe: 5m
    condition: selection_fail | count() by src_ip >= 10 and selection_accept
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate users mistyping credentials repeatedly before a correct login
    - Automated configuration-management tools retrying stale credentials
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate admin repeatedly mistyping a password before succeeding
  • Shared jump-host accounts with high normal failed-login volume

Tuning notes: Tune fail_count threshold to local baseline (10 is conservative for internet-facing hosts); exclude known VPN/bastion source ranges and vulnerability-scanner IPs.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • SSH Authorized_keys Modification Shortly After Login from Unfamiliar Source IP · unlock with TL Creds
  • Suspicious Cron Persistence Entry Referencing /tmp or /var/tmp Binaries Post-SSH-Auth · unlock with TL Creds
  • Auth Log Truncation or Deletion Following SSH Session ([indicator] LogCleaner Pattern) · unlock with TL Creds
  • IRC-Style Outbound Beacon on Non-Standard Port from Non-IRC Process (ShellBot C2) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SSH Propagation Tool Config Artifacts ([indicator]/[indicator]) Consistent with [indicator] Go Binary · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound SSH Scan Burst from a Recently Compromised Host (Worm-like Propagation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ingress Tool Transfer of Staged Payloads ([indicator]/[indicator]/[indicator]) After SSH Login · unlock with TL Creds
  • XMRig Masquerading as [indicator] — CPU-Heavy Process Outside Standard [indicator] Path · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 34 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1156.

Sample indicators (3 of 34)

  • IP address: 143.20.185[.]252
  • Domain: download[.]xrpl[.]city
  • File hash: 0d01bd11d1d3e7676613aacb109de55f

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 34 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

34 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

AhnLab Security Emergency response Center (ASEC) reports continued exploitation of Linux servers running poorly secured SSH services, consistent with campaigns it has tracked since at least 2018 (ShellBot/PerlBot lineage). Threat actors scan the internet for hosts with SSH (TCP/22) exposed, then run dictionary/brute-force attacks against weak or default credentials. Upon successful login, the attacker downloads a first-stage component named `run` from attacker infrastructure at download.xrpl.city, which in turn retrieves compressed archives (`auto.Jpg`, `pack.Jpg`) containing Shc-compiled shell scripts and ELF payloads. The payload set installs: (1) XMRig, a legitimate open-source Monero miner renamed/disguised as `mysql` to blend in with normal server processes and hijack CPU resources for cryptojacking; (2) ShellBot, distributed here under the `.b0t` alias, a Perl-based IRC bot capable of DDoS (HTTP/TCP/UDP flood commands) and remote command execution via IRC channel messages; (3) a Go-based propagation utility named `meta` that reads `ranges` (target IP/subnet lists) and `pass` (harvested/dictionary credential lists) configuration files to conduct further SSH port scanning and credential-stuffing against new targets, extending the botnet automatically; (4) MIG LogCleaner, a log-wiping utility used to erase authentication and shell history evidence of the intrusion; and (5) XHide, a process-name spoofing tool used to rename malicious processes to innocuous-looking names to evade casual `ps`/`top` inspection by administrators. No CVE or software vulnerability is involved — compromise is entirely credential-based (weak/default/reused SSH passwords), consistent with long-running Linux SSH cryptojacking/botnet campaigns such as Outlaw, Kinsing, and TeamTNT, which similarly combine SSH brute-forcing, XMRig deployment, and worm-like lateral propagation. ASEC recommends enforcing strong, periodically rotated SSH passwords, applying the latest OS/service patches, and restricting SSH exposure via firewalls and access-control products.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery

Lateral Movement

T1021.004 SSH

Defense Evasion

T1027.004 Compile After Delivery; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.004 File Deletion

Persistence

T1053.003 Cron; T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys

Execution

T1059.004 Unix Shell

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1571 Non-Standard Port

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts

Credential Access

T1110.001 Password Guessing; T1110.002 Password Cracking

Impact

T1496.001 Compute Hijacking; T1498 Network Denial of Service

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

Reconnaissance

T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks

defense-impairment

T1685.006 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Rotate all SSH account passwords to strong, unique, non-dictionary values immediately on any internet-facing Linux host
  • Audit SSH authorized_keys files and crontab entries on exposed hosts for unauthorized additions
  • Block outbound/inbound traffic to download.xrpl.city and the listed C2 domains/IPs at the perimeter firewall
  • Hunt for processes named mysql, meta, or unusual Shc-compiled binaries under /tmp, /var/tmp, and user home directories
  • Search for and remove artifacts named run, auto.Jpg, pack.Jpg, ranges, pass, mig, .b0t

Workarounds

  • Rate-limit or geofence SSH access where business requirements allow
  • Change default SSH listening port as a low-value speed bump against mass scanners (not a substitute for credential hygiene)

Longer-term hardening

  • Disable SSH password authentication in favor of key-based authentication with passphrase-protected keys
  • Deploy fail2ban or equivalent brute-force lockout tooling on all SSH-exposed hosts
  • Restrict SSH exposure to VPN/bastion access only; remove direct internet exposure of port 22 where possible
  • Deploy EDR/behavioral monitoring on Linux fleets capable of detecting cryptomining process behavior and process-name spoofing
  • Implement centralized, tamper-evident (remote/immutable) logging to defeat log-cleaner tools

Affected and fixed versions

  • Generic — Linux servers running OpenSSH with weak/default/reused credentials
    Vulnerable versions: Any Linux distribution with internet-exposed SSH (TCP/22) using weak, default, or reused account passwords
    Fixed in: Not applicable — credential-hygiene issue, not a software vulnerability

Timeline

  • ASEC's Q2 2026 observation window begins; campaign activity against poorly secured Linux SSH servers is ongoing/ambient during this period.
  • Following authentication, the attacker downloads the first-stage `run` component from locked-ioc-11.
  • Threat actors conduct brute-force/dictionary attacks against internet-exposed Linux SSH services with weak account credentials, gaining initial access upon success.
  • ShellBot (distributed as `.b0t`) is installed and establishes an IRC-based command-and-control channel supporting DDoS and remote-command functionality.
  • XMRig is deployed disguised as a `mysql` binary and begins Monero mining, consuming host CPU resources.
  • Compressed Shc-compiled archives `locked-ioc-19` and `locked-ioc-20` are retrieved from attacker infrastructure and unpacked on the compromised host.
  • XHide is used to rename malicious process names to evade casual administrator inspection via `ps`/`top`.
  • MIG LogCleaner is run to erase authentication and shell-history log evidence of the intrusion.
  • The Go-based propagation tool `meta` executes, reading `ranges` and `pass` configuration files to scan additional SSH targets and reuse harvested credentials for further spread.
  • Close of ASEC's Q2 2026 statistical observation period covering this SSH malware campaign.
  • ASEC publishes its Q2 2026 statistical report documenting this campaign, including malware samples, IOCs, and recommended mitigations.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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