# GigaWiper (aka BLUERABBIT): Golang-Based Destructive Backdoor Combining Wiper, Fake Ransomware, and C2 Capabilities

> Microsoft identified GigaWiper, a Golang-based backdoor that unifies command-and-control with multiple destructive payloads — physical disk wiping, non-recoverable AES-256-CBC file encryption (fake ransomware), and boot/recovery sabotage triggering BSOD. Microsoft assesses the same developer built GigaWiper, Crucio ransomware, and FlockWiper, consolidating three previously distinct malware families into one modular framework.

- **Published:** 2026-07-10T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-10T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1158
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-gigawiper-golang-disk-wiper-tl-2026-1158.webp?v=d51df69e (Threadlinqs threat intel: GigaWiper Golang Wiper, Fake Ransomware: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1158) — Critical severity, 28 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1158
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Cyber Av3ngers (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

GigaWiper is a Golang-compiled backdoor first observed conducting destructive activity in October 2025 and publicly documented by Microsoft Threat Intelligence on 2026-07-09 (independently tracked as BLUERABBIT by Binary Defense since March 2026). The malware receives tasking over RabbitMQ (AMQP, port 5544) using a fanout exchange named "All" for broadcast commands and a topic exchange for targeted tasking, reports status/output via Redis (port 7542), and can exfiltrate files to attacker-controlled MinIO object storage — all legitimate open-source message-broker/storage technologies repurposed as camouflaged C2 transport. Hard-coded C2 credentials and configuration are protected with AES decryption.

The backdoor exposes 20 numbered command codes to the operator, ranging from routine RAT functionality (PowerShell execution with directory persistence, process/service/registry management, system and security-software enumeration, idle-aware screenshot/screen-recording capture, VNC-like remote desktop control via Command 20, Windows event log clearing across System/Setup/Application/Security/ForwardedEvents channels, and firewall rule manipulation) to three distinct destructive payloads that were previously separate malware families: Command 1 (WipeMain) performs physical-disk-level wiping via DeviceIoControl with IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK, overwriting raw disk content in 0xA00000-byte chunks; Command 2 disables Windows Recovery and deletes critical boot/kernel files to force a BSOD/unbootable state; Command 3 (BigBangExtortMain) is fake ransomware — AES-256-CBC encryption with randomly generated, never-persisted keys/IVs, appending a `.candy` extension and dropping a hard-coded wallpaper (`./image_danger.jpg`) — code Microsoft found 'heavily based on' Crucio ransomware, sharing the identical BigBangExtortMain function name; and Command 12 (WipeCMain) is a Golang re-implementation of FlockWiper, a standalone C-language multi-pass wiper first uploaded to VirusTotal in June 2025, targeting only the Windows installation drive with multiple secure overwrite passes.

Microsoft ties all three malware families (GigaWiper, Crucio, FlockWiper) to a single developer based on PDB-path and function-naming overlap referencing the string "GRAT" in both FlockWiper and GigaWiper, suggesting the possible existence of a related, still-undocumented "GRAT" framework component. Crucio ransomware was previously documented by CISA in December 2023 in connection with IRGC-affiliated cyber actors (the CyberAv3ngers persona) that exploited internet-exposed Unitronics Vision-series PLCs at U.S. water/wastewater facilities; subsequent open-source reporting (Binary Defense / Google Threat Intelligence Group) assesses the same Iran-nexus actor conducted destructive GigaWiper/BLUERABBIT operations primarily against Israeli organizations, consistent with the CyberAv3ngers group's broader pattern of destructive operations against US, Israeli, UK, and Irish water and energy-sector targets from 2023-2026. Persistence is achieved via a scheduled task named "OneDrive Update" that runs at system startup and every minute thereafter, invoking PowerShell with hidden-window execution parameters and tracked via a benign-looking registry key (HKCU\SOFTWARE\OneDrive\Environment). Defense evasion includes masquerading a firewall rule as the legitimate Windows component "Microsoft.Windows.CloudExperienceHost" and direct deletion of Windows Security event log files. Dormant/unused code paths include keylogger stubs and additional wiper-module scaffolding not yet activated in observed samples, indicating the framework is under active development.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1070 Indicator Removal
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1571 Non-Standard Port
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1561 Disk Wipe
- T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1491 Defacement

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GigaWiper Destructive Payload Trigger — Disk Wipe, Recovery Sabotage, Fake Ransomware, and Log Clearing** (`TL-2026-1158-SPL-002`)

Detects the post-exploitation destructive-command cluster unique to GigaWiper: DeviceIoControl calls with IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK from unsigned/newly-dropped Golang binaries (Command 1/12 wiper), disabling of Windows Recovery / bcdedit boot-config tampering (Command 2), mass file renames to the '.candy' extension with a dropped image_danger.jpg wallpaper (Command 3 / BigBangExtortMain), and direct deletion of Security.evtx and related event-log channels used to erase forensic evidence before/after destructive action.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1561, T1490, T1486, T1070, T1529, T1491
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, windows_system_log
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=windows (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode IN (1,11,23) OR sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=1102)
| eval is_wipe_ioctl=if(match(CallTrace, "(?i)IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK") OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK"), 1, 0)
| eval is_recovery_disable=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)bcdedit.*(recoveryenabled|bootstatuspolicy)") OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)wbadmin.*delete.*catalog"), 1, 0)
| eval is_candy_rename=if(match(TargetFilename, "(?i)\.candy$"), 1, 0)
| eval is_logclear=if(EventCode=1102 OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)wevtutil.*(cl|clear-log)"), 1, 0)
| eval destructive_signal=is_wipe_ioctl+is_recovery_disable+is_candy_rename+is_logclear
| where destructive_signal > 0
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(is_wipe_ioctl) as wipe_ioctl values(is_recovery_disable) as recovery_disable values(is_candy_rename) as candy_rename values(is_logclear) as logclear by ComputerName Image
| where count > 0
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let wipe = DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "IoControlRequest" and AdditionalFields has "IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK";
let recovery = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("bcdedit.exe","wbadmin.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine has "recoveryenabled" or ProcessCommandLine has "bootstatuspolicy" or ProcessCommandLine has "delete catalog");
let candy = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName endswith ".candy";
let logclear = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "wevtutil.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("cl ", "clear-log");
union wipe, recovery, candy, logclear
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: GigaWiper Destructive Payload — Disk Wipe, Recovery Sabotage, Candy Ransom Rename, or Log Clearing
id: 8c1e2f4a-1b2c-4d3e-9f10-a1b2c3d4e5f2
status: experimental
description: Detects the destructive-command cluster shared by GigaWiper Commands 1/2/3/12 (physical disk wipe, recovery/boot sabotage, fake-ransomware .candy rename, Security.evtx deletion), heavily based on Crucio and FlockWiper code reuse.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/09/gigawiper-anatomy-of-a-destructive-backdoor-assembled-from-multiple-malware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-10
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1561.002
    - attack.t1490
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.t1070.001
    - attack.tool.crucio
    - attack.tool.flockwiper
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_wipe:
        CallTrace|contains: 'IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK'
    selection_recovery:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bcdedit.exe'
            - '\wbadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'recoveryenabled'
            - 'bootstatuspolicy'
            - 'delete catalog'
    selection_candy:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.candy'
    selection_logclear:
        Image|endswith: '\wevtutil.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cl '
            - 'clear-log'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Authorized disk-imaging or DR/backup tooling invoking IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK
    - Legitimate WSUS/enterprise recovery-policy management via bcdedit
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate disk-imaging/backup software using IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK
- Enterprise recovery-policy scripts modifying bcdedit settings
- Sanctioned event-log rotation/archival scripts using wevtutil

**Tuning notes:** Treat a single indicator as medium severity for triage; escalate to critical/page-immediately when 2+ of the four destructive signals co-occur on the same host within a short window, or when the process image is unsigned/newly-dropped Go binary.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- GigaWiper Discovery Sweep — System, Process, and Security-Software Enumeration Preceding Destructive Action (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Tamper-Protection Bypass and Idle-Aware Screenshot Capture to ProgramData\output (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Hidden-Window PowerShell C2-Tasked Execution with Persistence Registry Correlation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Firewall Rule Masquerade as [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Windows Event Log Deletion (Security, System, Setup, Application, ForwardedEvents) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper MinIO/S3-Style Exfiltration to Non-Corporate Object Storage Endpoint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper [indicator] Scheduled Task + CloudExperienceHost Firewall Masquerade — Initial Persistence (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Message-Broker C2 Beaconing (RabbitMQ/Redis) and VNC-Style Remote Control (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.182.193[.]21`
- File hash: `633d4cbd496b1094495da89a64f5e6c31a0f6d4d1488411db5b0cba1cfe42001`
- IP address: `212.8.248[.]104`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [GigaWiper: Anatomy of a destructive backdoor assembled from multiple malware](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/09/gigawiper-anatomy-of-a-destructive-backdoor-assembled-from-multiple-malware/)
- [New GigaWiper Windows Backdoor Bundles Disk Wiping, Fake Ransomware, and Spyware](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/new-gigawiper-windows-backdoor-bundles.html)
- [Microsoft Warns of GigaWiper Backdoor Built to Destroy Windows PCs](https://hackread.com/microsoft-gigawiper-backdoor-destroy-windows-pcs/)
- [IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-335a)
- [CISA and Partners Release Joint Advisory on IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploiting PLCs](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/12/01/cisa-and-partners-release-joint-advisory-irgc-affiliated-cyber-actors-exploiting-plcs)
- [IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers (Joint Advisory PDF)](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-12/aa23-335a-irgc-affiliated-cyber-actors-exploit-plcs-in-multiple-sectors-1.pdf)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1158
