# GigaWiper: Multi-Stage Destructive Windows Backdoor Combining Disk Wiping, File Encryption, and Boot Sabotage (CyberAv3ngers/Crucio/FlockWiper Lineage)

> GigaWiper is a Golang-based Windows backdoor first observed by Microsoft in October 2025 that consolidates a standalone raw-disk wiper, Crucio-derived fake-ransomware encryption (.candy extension, no retained keys), and a reimplemented FlockWiper multi-pass wiper into a single 20-command RabbitMQ/Redis-tasked platform alongside VNC-style remote control, screen surveillance, and event-log wiping. Binary Defense independently tracked the same file set as BLUERABBIT in March 2026 and assesses an Iran-nexus actor (Crucio/CyberAv3ngers lineage) targeting Israeli organizations.

- **Published:** 2026-07-10T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-10T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1167
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-gigawiper-destructive-backdoor-tl-2026-1167.webp?v=03e56571 (Threadlinqs threat intel: GigaWiper CyberAv3ngers Lineage: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1167) — High severity, 28 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1167
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

GigaWiper is a modular, Golang-compiled Windows backdoor that Microsoft Threat Intelligence disclosed on July 9, 2026, tracing destructive wiping incidents back to October 2025. Unlike single-purpose wipers, GigaWiper is architected as a full command-and-control implant with 20 distinct operator commands spanning destructive, reconnaissance, and surveillance categories, delivered over a RabbitMQ message broker (AMQP, fanout exchange "All" for broadcast and topic exchange "Topic" for targeted routing-key tasking) with results and output returned via Redis as a structured cmd.Result object (error, target_ip, task_id, computer_name, output, pwd, time, status, work_status).

The malware establishes persistence by using PowerShell to register a scheduled task named "OneDrive Update" that runs at both system startup and on a one-minute interval, masquerading as legitimate OneDrive telemetry. A registry value at HKCU\SOFTWARE\OneDrive\Environment tracks execution count to prevent redundant re-initialization.

Destructive capability is delivered through three related-but-distinct code paths that Microsoft assesses were authored by the same developer(s) and stitched together into GigaWiper:

1. Command 1 (WipeMain) performs physical-disk-level destruction: it enumerates physical drives via WMI (Win32_DiskDrive), identifies which drive hosts the Windows installation, strips partition references from the remaining drives via IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK (DeviceIoControl), overwrites raw disk content in 10MB (0xA00000-byte) chunks with a crypto/rand-randomized first byte followed by zero-fill, and forces an immediate, zero-delay reboot.
2. Command 12 (WipeCMain) is a reimplementation of the standalone FlockWiper C tool (first seen on VirusTotal in June 2025, PDB path A:\GRAT\CWipeNew\Release\CWipeNew.pdb) — a multi-pass secure wipe of the Windows installation drive specifically, cycling through 0x00, 0xFF, and random byte patterns with pass-timing telemetry.
3. Command 3 (RanMain / BigBangExtortMain) is fake ransomware whose function name and logic Microsoft matched to the Crucio ransomware family documented in a December 2023 CISA advisory on IRGC-affiliated actors exploiting PLCs (the same lineage publicly tied to CyberAv3ngers water/energy-sector intrusions in the US, UK, and Ireland). It generates a random AES-CBC key/IV that is never persisted anywhere, encrypts files (excluding .exe/.dll), appends a .candy extension, deletes the plaintext originals, and drops a wallpaper image (image_danger.jpg) — producing ransomware-style victim messaging with zero possibility of recovery since no key exists to recover.

Command 2 triggers a BSOD via boot-file deletion; Command 19 wipes System, Setup, Application, Security, and ForwardedEvents Windows Event Logs via `wevutil clear-log`, falling back to direct deletion of C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Security.evtx if the utility call fails — clearing forensic evidence ahead of or during destructive operations.

Beyond destruction, GigaWiper functions as a full-featured espionage/RAT platform: Command 9 captures per-monitor screenshots; Command 10 records the screen opportunistically when the session is unlocked and the user has been active for more than 10 seconds; Command 20 opens a direct TCP listener providing VNC-like live remote desktop control (screen streaming plus keyboard/mouse injection), protected by a firewall rule deceptively named after the legitimate Windows component "Microsoft.Windows.CloudExperienceHost"; Command 7 executes arbitrary PowerShell with persistent working-directory state; Command 15 collects system information (IP, CPU, OS, and installed antivirus products enumerated via `Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\SecurityCenter2`); Commands 16-18 provide full process, service, and interactive registry management; Command 5 performs bulk AES-256-CBC file encryption/decryption with attacker-supplied keys (a legitimate-use variant of the ransomware primitive); Command 4 exfiltrates files to attacker-controlled storage via a MinIO client; Command 8 manages RabbitMQ Topic-exchange routing-key bindings for individually targeted tasking; and Commands 6/11/13/14 are unused placeholder structures suggesting additional wiper/keylogger modules exist but were not recovered in analyzed samples.

Unstripped GigaWiper PE binaries allowed Microsoft to recover Golang package/function names (rabbit_tools_*, rabbit_bin, cmd_* modules) and identify the recurring debug string "GRAT" across both GigaWiper and FlockWiper artifacts, indicating a shared, still partially unidentified development framework and a probable single threat-actor lineage spanning Crucio (2023), FlockWiper (June 2025), and GigaWiper (October 2025-present).

Microsoft's public blog does not assign country attribution, but independent researcher Binary Defense tracked identical files as "BLUERABBIT" starting March 2026 and assesses an Iran-nexus actor targeting Israeli organizations, consistent with the historical CyberAv3ngers/IRGC-linked Crucio lineage against critical infrastructure. Observed C2 infrastructure: 185.182.193[.]21 (RabbitMQ on TCP/5544, Redis on TCP/7542) with 212.8.248[.]104 as apparent backup/secondary C2.

Microsoft Defender AV/EDR detects the family under Giga, Wiper, FlockWiper, and CutBrooch naming, with behavioral detections WprFlock and WprCree, and has published a Threat Analytics "Tool profile: GigaWiper" report. Recommended mitigations focus on tamper protection (blocking AV/EDR disablement and exclusion changes), disabling GPO-based local-admin AV exclusion merges, cloud-delivered protection, EDR in block mode, and attack-surface-reduction rules blocking unsigned/low-prevalence executables — alongside treating any confirmed GigaWiper intrusion as a business-continuity emergency requiring immediate isolation, backup verification, and C2 blocking before destructive commands can propagate.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
- T1070 Indicator Removal
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1007 System Service Discovery
- T1012 Query Registry
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1074 Data Staged
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1106 Native API
- T1569 System Services
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1561 Disk Wipe
- T1485 Data Destruction
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot
- T1491 Defacement
- T1489 Service Stop
- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service
- T1056 Input Capture

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GigaWiper OneDrive-Masqueraded Scheduled Task Persistence** (`TL-2026-1167-SPL-001`)

Detects creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDrive Update' (or similar) via schtasks.exe/PowerShell with both an AtStartup trigger and a one-minute repetition interval, plus the accompanying HKCU\SOFTWARE\OneDrive\Environment execution-count registry write used by GigaWiper for persistence and defense evasion.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1053.005, T1547.005
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
  (Image="*\\schtasks.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe")
  CommandLine="*OneDrive Update*" (CommandLine="*/sc minute*" OR CommandLine="*Register-ScheduledTask*" OR CommandLine="*RepetitionInterval*")
| eval technique="T1053.005,T1547.005"
| table _time, ComputerName, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, technique
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("schtasks.exe", "powershell.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "OneDrive Update" and (ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/sc minute", "Register-ScheduledTask", "RepetitionInterval"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: GigaWiper-style Scheduled Task Persistence Masquerading as OneDrive Update
id: 7a2c1e10-4b3a-4e2a-9f2b-01a1c3d4e5f6
status: experimental
description: Detects a scheduled task created via schtasks.exe or PowerShell named 'OneDrive Update' with a minute-interval trigger, matching GigaWiper's persistence mechanism
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/09/gigawiper-anatomy-of-a-destructive-backdoor-assembled-from-multiple-malware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1547.005
    - attack.tool.gigawiper
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_task:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'OneDrive Update'
    selection_interval:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/sc minute'
            - 'RepetitionInterval'
            - 'Register-ScheduledTask'
    condition: selection_task and selection_interval
falsepositives:
    - Genuine OneDrive maintenance tasks (verify publisher/signature and true task schedule)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate OneDrive update scheduled tasks — verify binary signature/path and true minute-interval schedule before alerting

**Tuning notes:** Baseline legitimate Microsoft OneDrive task names/paths in your environment and exclude signed OneDriveSetup.exe-registered tasks; tighten to exact task name 'OneDrive Update' if false positives from other 'OneDrive*' tasks are observed.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- GigaWiper HKCU OneDrive Execution-Count Registry Masquerade (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Pre-Wipe Antivirus/EDR Discovery via SecurityCenter2 WMI Query (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Fake-Ransomware .candy Rename Burst Preceding Zero-Delay Reboot (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper CloudExperienceHost-Masqueraded Firewall Rule for VNC-style C2 Listener (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Tamper-Protection Bypass and AV Exclusion / Service Manipulation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Raw Disk Multi-Pass Overwrite and Zero-Delay Forced Reboot (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Windows Event Log Clearing and Security.evtx Deletion Fallback (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper RabbitMQ/Redis C2 Beaconing to Known Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.182.193[.]21`
- File hash: `633d4cbd496b1094495da89a64f5e6c31a0f6d4d1488411db5b0cba1cfe42001`
- IP address: `212.8.248[.]104`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [GigaWiper Malware Attacking Windows Systems](https://cybersecuritynews.com/gigawiper-malware-attacking-windows-systems/)
- [GigaWiper: Anatomy of a destructive backdoor assembled from multiple malware](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/09/gigawiper-anatomy-of-a-destructive-backdoor-assembled-from-multiple-malware/)
- [New GigaWiper Windows Backdoor Bundles Disk Wiping, Fake Ransomware, and Spyware](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/new-gigawiper-windows-backdoor-bundles.html)
- [GigaWiper Merges Three Malware Families Into One Destructive Backdoor](https://securityaffairs.com/195068/malware/gigawiper-merges-three-malware-families-into-one-destructive-backdoor.html)
- [Microsoft Warns of GigaWiper Backdoor Built to Destroy Windows PCs](https://hackread.com/microsoft-gigawiper-backdoor-destroy-windows-pcs/)
- [Microsoft details GigaWiper destructive backdoor assembled from older tools](https://www.scworld.com/brief/microsoft-details-gigawiper-destructive-backdoor-assembled-from-older-tools)
- [Microsoft Warns GigaWiper Merges Crucio and FlockWiper Code Into Destructive Backdoor](https://cyberpress.org/microsoft-flags-gigawiper-backdoor/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1167
