Threat reportCybercrimeTL-2026-1174
Former Ransomware Negotiator Angelo Martino Sentenced to 70 Months for Insider Collusion with BlackCat/ALPHV Affiliates Ryan Goldberg and Kevin Martin
Angelo John Martino III, a former ransomware negotiator at DigitalMint, was sentenced to 70 months in federal prison for conspiring with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware affiliates Ryan Goldberg (ex-Sygnia incident-response manager) and Kevin Martin (ex-DigitalMint negotiator) to extort at least ten U.S. companies for a combined $75.3+ million between April and December 2023.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-1174 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Ransomware Negotiator Insider Case, DigitalMint Insider Collusion Case, Operation Riptide |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| Affected products | N/A Ransomware incident-response / negotiation trust relationship |
| Attribution | ALPHV, BlackCat (high confidence) |
| Malware | ALPHV/BlackCat, BlackCat (Windows) |
| Tools | Cobalt Strike, FileZilla, WinSCP, evilginx2 - S9003 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1055 Process Injection, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1112 Modify Registry, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery and 6 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | nonprofit, financial services, hospitality, health, professional services, incident response negotiation firms |
| Target regions | united states of america |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 15 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-07-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1174 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 17 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Evilginx2-style AiTM Session-Cookie Reuse from New IP/ASN for Privileged/Negotiator Account
Detects reuse of an authenticated session cookie/token for a privileged or IR-negotiator account from a new IP address or ASN not previously associated with that user, the downstream signature of Evilginx2 adversary-in-the-middle MFA/session theft used by ALPHV/BlackCat affiliates against negotiation-firm targets.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1557, T1539, T1566
- Data sources: azuread_signinlogs, o365_activity, identity_provider_logs
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=o365 OR index=azuread sourcetype="azuread:signinlogs"
| eval asn=coalesce(AutonomousSystemNumber, asn)
| eventstats dc(asn) as asn_count, values(asn) as seen_asns by user
| where asn_count > 1
| eval is_new_asn=if(NOT asn IN (mvindex(seen_asns,0)), 1, 0)
| where is_new_asn=1 AND ConditionalAccessStatus="success" AND AuthenticationRequirement="singleFactorAuthentication"
| lookup ir_vendor_accounts.csv user OUTPUT is_ir_vendor
| where is_ir_vendor=1 OR isPrivileged=1
| table _time, user, src_ip, asn, AppDisplayName, is_new_asn
| sort -_timeMicrosoft KQL
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ResultType == 0
| where AuthenticationRequirement == "singleFactorAuthentication" or isnotempty(TokenIssuerType) and TokenIssuerType == "AzureAD"
| summarize ASNs = make_set(AutonomousSystemNumber), IPs = make_set(IPAddress) by UserPrincipalName
| mv-expand ASNs
| where array_length(ASNs) > 1
| join kind=inner (SigninLogs | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)) on UserPrincipalName
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, AutonomousSystemNumber, AppDisplayName
| where AutonomousSystemNumber !in (ASNs)Sigma
title: AiTM Session Cookie Reuse from Anomalous ASN for Negotiator or Privileged Account
id: 8a1c9d2e-3f4b-4c5d-9e6f-2b3c4d5e6f7a
status: experimental
description: Detects reuse of a stolen/replayed session token for a ransomware-negotiator or privileged account from an ASN not previously seen for that identity, matching the Evilginx2 AiTM technique used by ALPHV/BlackCat affiliates (TL-2026-1174).
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-353a
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-10
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1557
- attack.t1539
- attack.tool.evilginx2
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
ResultType: 0
filter_new_asn:
AutonomousSystemNumber|new_for_user: true
condition: selection and filter_new_asn
falsepositives:
- Legitimate travel or new corporate egress IP for the account
- VPN/proxy provider rotation
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate travel, new office egress IP, or corporate VPN/proxy rotation causing a first-seen ASN for a genuine user session
Tuning notes: Baseline each user's historical ASN set over a rolling 90-day window before enabling in blocking mode; pair with Conditional Access token-protection/sign-in risk signals to reduce false positives from legitimate travel.
- Cobalt Strike-style Run-Key Persistence via Rundll32 (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- WMI-based Host/Domain Discovery Followed by Event-Log Clearing (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Rust-based Encryptor Mass File Rename Preceded by Cloud Exfiltration Staging (Post-Exploitation/Impact) · unlock with TL Creds
- Cobalt Strike Beacon C2 — Named-Pipe and Beaconing Jitter Pattern (C2/Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
- Suspicious Exfiltration Staging to Cloud Storage Prior to Encryption ([indicator]/Dropbox Pattern) · unlock with TL Creds
- Split-Wallet Cryptocurrency Layering Following Ransom Payment (Financial Theft / Laundering) · unlock with TL Creds
- Insider IR/Negotiator Account Accessing Insurance or Negotiation Data Outside Case Scope · unlock with TL Creds
- Insider Data Leak to External Contact During Active Ransomware Negotiation · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-07-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 17 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1174.
Technical analysis
Martino abused his negotiator access to leak victims' confidential negotiating positions and insurance policy limits to the attackers in exchange for a cut of the ransom.
Between April and December 2023, three former cybersecurity professionals — Angelo John Martino III (a ransomware negotiator employed by incident-response/negotiation firm DigitalMint), Kevin Tyler Martin (also a DigitalMint negotiator), and Ryan Clifford Goldberg (an incident-response manager at Sygnia) — conspired to deploy ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware against and extort at least ten U.S. companies. Martino used his trusted position as a professional ransomware negotiator, hired by victim organizations specifically to resolve ransomware incidents, to secretly act as a 'double agent': he passed BlackCat operators confidential information about his own clients' negotiating strategy, financial capacity, and cyber-insurance policy limits, allowing the attackers to calibrate ransom demands for maximum extraction. In return, Martino and his co-conspirators received a share of the ransom proceeds paid to ALPHV/BlackCat administrators (the RaaS operators reportedly retained roughly a 20% affiliate cut of ransom payments under the group's ransomware-as-a-service model). Separately, Martin and Goldberg directly deployed BlackCat ransomware against additional victims, netting further payments including approximately $1.2 million in Bitcoin from one target and roughly $1.3 million from a medical firm. Overall, prosecutors identified at least five negotiated-victim companies extorted for a combined $75.3 million (a nonprofit paid $26.8M, a financial services firm paid $25.7M, a hospitality company paid $16.5M, and two others paid $6.1M and $213,000, respectively) tied to Martino's insider leaks, plus additional deployment-based extortion attributed to Martin and Goldberg. The group laundered cryptocurrency ransom proceeds through split wallets and converted funds into real estate, vehicles, a food truck, and a luxury fishing boat. The FBI's Miami Field Office, with U.S. Secret Service support, investigated the case under 'Operation Riptide'; when Goldberg attempted to flee the country, the FBI tracked him across ten nations before his arrest. Goldberg and Martin each pleaded guilty in December 2025 to conspiracy to obstruct commerce through extortion and were sentenced in May 2026 to four years each. Martino pleaded guilty in April 2026 to the same charge and was sentenced in July 2026 to 70 months (nearly six years) — the statutory maximum was 20 years. Law enforcement seized approximately $10 million in assets from Martino alone, including two residences (a $1.68 million Bayfront home and a $396,000 second residence), cryptocurrency wallets, vehicles, a food truck, and a 29-foot fishing boat. A restitution hearing was scheduled for September 17, 2026. The case underscores a novel insider-threat vector distinct from a typical technical intrusion: it did not require the attackers to breach the negotiator firm's systems — it relied entirely on trusted-insider betrayal of the incident-response/negotiation trust relationship, a role explicitly created to protect ransomware victims. ALPHV/BlackCat itself is a Rust-based, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, VMware ESXi) ransomware-as-a-service operation first identified in November 2021, notorious for triple-extortion tactics (encryption, data-leak-site threats, and DDoS/harassment of victims), extensive use of Cobalt Strike beacons for C2, Evilginx2 adversary-in-the-middle phishing kits to steal MFA/session cookies, and Mega.nz/Dropbox/FileZilla/WinSCP for data exfiltration prior to encryption. The FBI disrupted ALPHV/BlackCat's infrastructure in December 2023, releasing a decryption tool that helped hundreds of victims and reportedly prevented roughly $1 million in further ransom payments before the group later resurfaced amid the high-profile Change Healthcare 'exit scam.'
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
Defense Evasion
T1055 Process Injection; T1070 Indicator Removal
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566 Phishing
Persistence
Collection
T1213 Data from Information Repositories
Impact
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft
Credential Access
T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Resource Development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Audit and restrict incident-response/negotiator third-party access to victim negotiation data, insurance policy limits, and financial capacity information
- Require dual-control or need-to-know compartmentalization for any external negotiator or IR consultant handling active ransomware cases
- Rotate credentials and revoke third-party consultant access immediately upon incident closure
- Review cyber-insurance policy disclosure practices to limit which parties can view full coverage limits during active negotiations
Workarounds
- Engage multiple independent negotiation/legal advisors for high-value ransomware incidents to reduce single-point-of-trust risk
- Require law-enforcement (FBI) notification and involvement before authorizing large ransom payments
Longer-term hardening
- Establish contractual insider-threat monitoring and background-vetting requirements for third-party incident-response and ransomware-negotiation vendors
- Implement segregation of duties so no single negotiator has unilateral, unmonitored access to both attacker communications and internal financial/insurance data
- Deploy behavioral analytics/DLP on IR vendor communications channels to detect anomalous data exfiltration to attacker-controlled contacts
- Adopt CISA #StopRansomware AA23-353A mitigations for ALPHV/BlackCat: phishing-resistant MFA, network segmentation, offline immutable backups, and monitoring for Cobalt Strike/Evilginx2 activity
Affected and fixed versions
- N/A — Ransomware incident-response / negotiation trust relationship
Vulnerable versions: Third-party ransomware negotiator access model
Timeline
- ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware-as-a-service operation is first identified, offering affiliates a Rust-based, cross-platform encryptor and roughly an 80/20 profit split favoring affiliates.
- Between April and September 2023, five companies whose negotiations Martino compromised pay a combined $75.3 million in ransom (nonprofit $26.8M, financial services firm $25.7M, hospitality company $16.5M, plus $6.1M and $213,000 from two others).
- Angelo Martino, a ransomware negotiator at DigitalMint, begins secretly sharing confidential client negotiating positions and insurance policy limits with ALPHV/BlackCat operators; Kevin Martin and Ryan Goldberg begin directly deploying BlackCat ransomware against additional victims.
- Martin and Goldberg's direct BlackCat deployment campaign against additional U.S. victims, including a medical firm extorted for roughly $1.3 million, concludes.
- FBI disrupts ALPHV/BlackCat infrastructure and releases a decryption tool, aiding hundreds of victims and preventing an estimated $1 million in further ransom payments.
- CISA, FBI, and HHS publish updated joint #StopRansomware advisory AA23-353A detailing ALPHV/BlackCat TTPs and IOCs current as of December 6, 2023.
- Ryan Goldberg and Kevin Martin plead guilty to conspiracy to obstruct commerce through extortion.
- Angelo Martino pleads guilty to conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce through extortion.
- Ryan Goldberg and Kevin Martin are each sentenced to four years in federal prison.
- Angelo Martino is sentenced to 70 months in federal prison; law enforcement has seized roughly $10 million in his assets, including two residences, cryptocurrency, vehicles, a food truck, and a fishing boat.
- Restitution hearing scheduled to determine victim compensation.
Sources cited
- Two Americans Who Attacked Multiple U.S. Victims Using ALPHV BlackCat Ransomware Sentenced to Prison justice.gov · Advisory · 2026-05-04
- Florida Man Working as a Ransomware Negotiator Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Deploy Ransomware and Extort U.S. Victims justice.gov · Advisory · 2026-04-21
- #StopRansomware: ALPHV Blackcat (AA23-353A) CISA · Government advisory · 2024-03-07
- FBI Releases IOCs Associated with BlackCat/ALPHV Ransomware CISA · Government advisory · 2022-04-22
- Response to the Revised CISA Advisory (AA23-353A): ALPHV BlackCat attackiq.com · Vendor report · 2024-03-07
- The Anatomy of a BlackCat Ransomware (ALPHV) Attack sygnia.co · Vendor report · 2023-01-01
- ALPHV's Downfall? The 2023 Crackdown on BlackCat Ransomware flashpoint.io · Research · 2023-12-19
- Ransomware Negotiator Sentenced cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-07-10
- Former DigitalMint ransomware negotiator who duped clients sentenced to 70 months in jail cyberscoop.com · News · 2026-07-09
- Ransomware Negotiator Gets 70 Months in Prison for Aiding BlackCat Attacks The Hacker News · News · 2026-07-10
- Two cybersecurity pros get prison time for helping ransomware gang Help Net Security · News · 2026-05-04
- American Cybersecurity Professionals Given Jail Terms for BlackCat Ransomware Attacks hipaajournal.com · News · 2026-05-04
- Ransomware Negotiator Pleads Guilty to Working For BlackCat Cyber Gang infosecurity-magazine.com · News · 2026-04-21
- Ransomware negotiator admits role in attacks he was hired to resolve Help Net Security · News · 2026-04-21
- Four Years in Prison for Cybersecurity Pros Turned Ransomware Attackers bitdefender.com · News · 2026-05-04
More from ALPHV
- HHS OCR Settles Ransomware Investigation of Lehigh Valley Health Network (ALPHV/BlackCat)
- Unit 42: Retail Peak Season Cyber Threats - Ransomware/Extortion, DDoS, Digital Skimming, Account Takeover and AI-Assisted Intrusion (CVE-2024-34102, CVE-2021-44228)
- BlackCat/ALPHV Ransomware Abuses Azure Storage Account Keys via Sphynx Encryptor to Mass-Encrypt Cloud Storage
- Four Methods for Azure Blob Storage Ransomware: Client-Side Bulk Encryption, CPK, Encryption Scope, and CMK Abuse
- Azure Blob Storage Ransomware: Four Storage-Encryption Abuse Methods (BlackCat/ALPHV, STORM-0501)
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 15 sources; published ; last updated —.