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Threat reportCybercrimeTL-2026-1174

Former Ransomware Negotiator Angelo Martino Sentenced to 70 Months for Insider Collusion with BlackCat/ALPHV Affiliates Ryan Goldberg and Kevin Martin

mediumRESOLVED

Angelo John Martino III, a former ransomware negotiator at DigitalMint, was sentenced to 70 months in federal prison for conspiring with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware affiliates Ryan Goldberg (ex-Sygnia incident-response manager) and Kevin Martin (ex-DigitalMint negotiator) to extort at least ten U.S. companies for a combined $75.3+ million between April and December 2023.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1174
Also known asRansomware Negotiator Insider Case, DigitalMint Insider Collusion Case, Operation Riptide
SeverityMEDIUM
Affected productsN/A Ransomware incident-response / negotiation trust relationship
AttributionALPHV, BlackCat (high confidence)
MalwareALPHV/BlackCat, BlackCat (Windows)
ToolsCobalt Strike, FileZilla, WinSCP, evilginx2 - S9003
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1055 Process Injection, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1112 Modify Registry, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery and 6 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsnonprofit, financial services, hospitality, health, professional services, incident response negotiation firms
Target regionsunited states of america
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources15 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1174 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 17 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Evilginx2-style AiTM Session-Cookie Reuse from New IP/ASN for Privileged/Negotiator Account

Detects reuse of an authenticated session cookie/token for a privileged or IR-negotiator account from a new IP address or ASN not previously associated with that user, the downstream signature of Evilginx2 adversary-in-the-middle MFA/session theft used by ALPHV/BlackCat affiliates against negotiation-firm targets.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1557, T1539, T1566
  • Data sources: azuread_signinlogs, o365_activity, identity_provider_logs
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=o365 OR index=azuread sourcetype="azuread:signinlogs"
| eval asn=coalesce(AutonomousSystemNumber, asn)
| eventstats dc(asn) as asn_count, values(asn) as seen_asns by user
| where asn_count > 1
| eval is_new_asn=if(NOT asn IN (mvindex(seen_asns,0)), 1, 0)
| where is_new_asn=1 AND ConditionalAccessStatus="success" AND AuthenticationRequirement="singleFactorAuthentication"
| lookup ir_vendor_accounts.csv user OUTPUT is_ir_vendor
| where is_ir_vendor=1 OR isPrivileged=1
| table _time, user, src_ip, asn, AppDisplayName, is_new_asn
| sort -_time

Microsoft KQL

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ResultType == 0
| where AuthenticationRequirement == "singleFactorAuthentication" or isnotempty(TokenIssuerType) and TokenIssuerType == "AzureAD"
| summarize ASNs = make_set(AutonomousSystemNumber), IPs = make_set(IPAddress) by UserPrincipalName
| mv-expand ASNs
| where array_length(ASNs) > 1
| join kind=inner (SigninLogs | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)) on UserPrincipalName
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, AutonomousSystemNumber, AppDisplayName
| where AutonomousSystemNumber !in (ASNs)

Sigma

title: AiTM Session Cookie Reuse from Anomalous ASN for Negotiator or Privileged Account
id: 8a1c9d2e-3f4b-4c5d-9e6f-2b3c4d5e6f7a
status: experimental
description: Detects reuse of a stolen/replayed session token for a ransomware-negotiator or privileged account from an ASN not previously seen for that identity, matching the Evilginx2 AiTM technique used by ALPHV/BlackCat affiliates (TL-2026-1174).
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-353a
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-10
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557
    - attack.t1539
    - attack.tool.evilginx2
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 0
    filter_new_asn:
        AutonomousSystemNumber|new_for_user: true
    condition: selection and filter_new_asn
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate travel or new corporate egress IP for the account
    - VPN/proxy provider rotation
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate travel, new office egress IP, or corporate VPN/proxy rotation causing a first-seen ASN for a genuine user session

Tuning notes: Baseline each user's historical ASN set over a rolling 90-day window before enabling in blocking mode; pair with Conditional Access token-protection/sign-in risk signals to reduce false positives from legitimate travel.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Cobalt Strike-style Run-Key Persistence via Rundll32 (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • WMI-based Host/Domain Discovery Followed by Event-Log Clearing (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Rust-based Encryptor Mass File Rename Preceded by Cloud Exfiltration Staging (Post-Exploitation/Impact) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cobalt Strike Beacon C2 — Named-Pipe and Beaconing Jitter Pattern (C2/Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Suspicious Exfiltration Staging to Cloud Storage Prior to Encryption ([indicator]/Dropbox Pattern) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Split-Wallet Cryptocurrency Layering Following Ransom Payment (Financial Theft / Laundering) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Insider IR/Negotiator Account Accessing Insurance or Negotiation Data Outside Case Scope · unlock with TL Creds
  • Insider Data Leak to External Contact During Active Ransomware Negotiation · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 17 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1174.

17 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Martino abused his negotiator access to leak victims' confidential negotiating positions and insurance policy limits to the attackers in exchange for a cut of the ransom.

Between April and December 2023, three former cybersecurity professionals — Angelo John Martino III (a ransomware negotiator employed by incident-response/negotiation firm DigitalMint), Kevin Tyler Martin (also a DigitalMint negotiator), and Ryan Clifford Goldberg (an incident-response manager at Sygnia) — conspired to deploy ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware against and extort at least ten U.S. companies. Martino used his trusted position as a professional ransomware negotiator, hired by victim organizations specifically to resolve ransomware incidents, to secretly act as a 'double agent': he passed BlackCat operators confidential information about his own clients' negotiating strategy, financial capacity, and cyber-insurance policy limits, allowing the attackers to calibrate ransom demands for maximum extraction. In return, Martino and his co-conspirators received a share of the ransom proceeds paid to ALPHV/BlackCat administrators (the RaaS operators reportedly retained roughly a 20% affiliate cut of ransom payments under the group's ransomware-as-a-service model). Separately, Martin and Goldberg directly deployed BlackCat ransomware against additional victims, netting further payments including approximately $1.2 million in Bitcoin from one target and roughly $1.3 million from a medical firm. Overall, prosecutors identified at least five negotiated-victim companies extorted for a combined $75.3 million (a nonprofit paid $26.8M, a financial services firm paid $25.7M, a hospitality company paid $16.5M, and two others paid $6.1M and $213,000, respectively) tied to Martino's insider leaks, plus additional deployment-based extortion attributed to Martin and Goldberg. The group laundered cryptocurrency ransom proceeds through split wallets and converted funds into real estate, vehicles, a food truck, and a luxury fishing boat. The FBI's Miami Field Office, with U.S. Secret Service support, investigated the case under 'Operation Riptide'; when Goldberg attempted to flee the country, the FBI tracked him across ten nations before his arrest. Goldberg and Martin each pleaded guilty in December 2025 to conspiracy to obstruct commerce through extortion and were sentenced in May 2026 to four years each. Martino pleaded guilty in April 2026 to the same charge and was sentenced in July 2026 to 70 months (nearly six years) — the statutory maximum was 20 years. Law enforcement seized approximately $10 million in assets from Martino alone, including two residences (a $1.68 million Bayfront home and a $396,000 second residence), cryptocurrency wallets, vehicles, a food truck, and a 29-foot fishing boat. A restitution hearing was scheduled for September 17, 2026. The case underscores a novel insider-threat vector distinct from a typical technical intrusion: it did not require the attackers to breach the negotiator firm's systems — it relied entirely on trusted-insider betrayal of the incident-response/negotiation trust relationship, a role explicitly created to protect ransomware victims. ALPHV/BlackCat itself is a Rust-based, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, VMware ESXi) ransomware-as-a-service operation first identified in November 2021, notorious for triple-extortion tactics (encryption, data-leak-site threats, and DDoS/harassment of victims), extensive use of Cobalt Strike beacons for C2, Evilginx2 adversary-in-the-middle phishing kits to steal MFA/session cookies, and Mega.nz/Dropbox/FileZilla/WinSCP for data exfiltration prior to encryption. The FBI disrupted ALPHV/BlackCat's infrastructure in December 2023, releasing a decryption tool that helped hundreds of victims and reportedly prevented roughly $1 million in further ransom payments before the group later resurfaced amid the high-profile Change Healthcare 'exit scam.'

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

execution

T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation

Defense Evasion

T1055 Process Injection; T1070 Indicator Removal

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566 Phishing

Persistence

T1112 Modify Registry

Collection

T1213 Data from Information Repositories

Impact

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Resource Development

T1585 Establish Accounts

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Audit and restrict incident-response/negotiator third-party access to victim negotiation data, insurance policy limits, and financial capacity information
  • Require dual-control or need-to-know compartmentalization for any external negotiator or IR consultant handling active ransomware cases
  • Rotate credentials and revoke third-party consultant access immediately upon incident closure
  • Review cyber-insurance policy disclosure practices to limit which parties can view full coverage limits during active negotiations

Workarounds

  • Engage multiple independent negotiation/legal advisors for high-value ransomware incidents to reduce single-point-of-trust risk
  • Require law-enforcement (FBI) notification and involvement before authorizing large ransom payments

Longer-term hardening

  • Establish contractual insider-threat monitoring and background-vetting requirements for third-party incident-response and ransomware-negotiation vendors
  • Implement segregation of duties so no single negotiator has unilateral, unmonitored access to both attacker communications and internal financial/insurance data
  • Deploy behavioral analytics/DLP on IR vendor communications channels to detect anomalous data exfiltration to attacker-controlled contacts
  • Adopt CISA #StopRansomware AA23-353A mitigations for ALPHV/BlackCat: phishing-resistant MFA, network segmentation, offline immutable backups, and monitoring for Cobalt Strike/Evilginx2 activity

Affected and fixed versions

  • N/A — Ransomware incident-response / negotiation trust relationship
    Vulnerable versions: Third-party ransomware negotiator access model

Timeline

  • ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware-as-a-service operation is first identified, offering affiliates a Rust-based, cross-platform encryptor and roughly an 80/20 profit split favoring affiliates.
  • Between April and September 2023, five companies whose negotiations Martino compromised pay a combined $75.3 million in ransom (nonprofit $26.8M, financial services firm $25.7M, hospitality company $16.5M, plus $6.1M and $213,000 from two others).
  • Angelo Martino, a ransomware negotiator at DigitalMint, begins secretly sharing confidential client negotiating positions and insurance policy limits with ALPHV/BlackCat operators; Kevin Martin and Ryan Goldberg begin directly deploying BlackCat ransomware against additional victims.
  • Martin and Goldberg's direct BlackCat deployment campaign against additional U.S. victims, including a medical firm extorted for roughly $1.3 million, concludes.
  • FBI disrupts ALPHV/BlackCat infrastructure and releases a decryption tool, aiding hundreds of victims and preventing an estimated $1 million in further ransom payments.
  • CISA, FBI, and HHS publish updated joint #StopRansomware advisory AA23-353A detailing ALPHV/BlackCat TTPs and IOCs current as of December 6, 2023.
  • Ryan Goldberg and Kevin Martin plead guilty to conspiracy to obstruct commerce through extortion.
  • Angelo Martino pleads guilty to conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce through extortion.
  • Ryan Goldberg and Kevin Martin are each sentenced to four years in federal prison.
  • Angelo Martino is sentenced to 70 months in federal prison; law enforcement has seized roughly $10 million in his assets, including two residences, cryptocurrency, vehicles, a food truck, and a fishing boat.
  • Restitution hearing scheduled to determine victim compensation.

Sources cited

More from ALPHV

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 15 sources; published ; last updated —.

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