Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-1197
Six AirDrop and Quick Share Proximity File-Transfer Vulnerabilities (Apple, Google, Samsung) — 'Protocol Prying' Research
CISPA Helmholtz researchers Arash Ale Ebrahim and Nils Ole Tippenhauer reverse-engineered Apple AirDrop and Google/Samsung Quick Share, publishing 'Protocol Prying' (arXiv:2606.26967) and disclosing six vulnerabilities exploitable by an unpaired, wireless-proximity attacker across roughly five billion macOS, iOS, Android, and Windows devices.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-1197 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Protocol Prying, AirDrop/Quick Share Proximity Vulnerabilities |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| Affected products | Apple AirDrop / sharingd (Sharing.framework); Apple Foundation framework (XML property list parser); Apple Network.framework (HTTP/1.1 parser); Samsung Quick Share (Android, GMS PcpManager / EndpointChannelManager dispatcher); Google Quick Share for Windows |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-248, CWE-674, CWE-476, CWE-306, CWE-319, CWE-416, CWE-362 |
| Tools | AirFuzz |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1040 Network Sniffing, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1129 Shared Modules, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution, T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services, T1211 Exploitation for Stealth, T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1587 Develop Capabilities, T1588 Obtain Capabilities, T1592 Gather Victim Host Information and 1 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | all sectors consumer enterprise apple and android samsung device users, government administration, finance, health, technology, education |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 13 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-07-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1197 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: AirDrop sharingd Crash via Unrecognized HTTP Path (V1 fatalError DoS)
Detects sharingd process termination (SIGABRT/fatalError) shortly after an inbound HTTP/1.1 request over the awdl0 link to a path outside the documented AirDrop endpoint allowlist (/Discover, /Hello, /Ask, /Upload, /Exchange, /SharedIdentity, /Error). Exploiting this pre-authentication crash disables AirDrop, AirPlay, Handoff, Universal Clipboard, and Continuity Camera as collateral, and can be looped for persistent DoS.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1499.004, T1190
- Data sources: macos:unifiedlog, osquery:process_events, endpoint EDR process telemetry
- Severity: medium
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=endpoint sourcetype="macos:unifiedlog" OR sourcetype="osquery:process_events" (process_name="sharingd" OR Image="*/sharingd")
| eval crash_signal=if(match(_raw, "SIGABRT|fatalError"), 1, 0)
| where crash_signal=1
| stats count as crash_count min(_time) as first_crash max(_time) as last_crash by host, process_name
| where crash_count > 0
| table host, process_name, crash_count, first_crash, last_crashMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has "sharingd"
| where ProcessTerminationCode has_any ("SIGABRT", "6")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessId, ProcessTerminationCode, InitiatingProcessFileName
| summarize CrashCount = count() by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| where CrashCount > 0Sigma
title: AirDrop sharingd Crash via Unrecognized HTTP Path (V1)
id: 3f8a1b2c-1197-4a2e-9b7d-tlintel1197001
status: experimental
description: Detects sharingd daemon abort (SIGABRT/fatalError) consistent with an unauthenticated proximity peer sending an HTTP request to an unrecognized AirDrop path, triggering a Swift fatalError in the Sharing.framework path-routing switch.
references:
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.26967
- https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/06/30/apple-airdrop-google-samsung-quick-share-vulnerabilities/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-10
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1499.004
- attack.t1190
- cve.2026.pending
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_crash:
Image|endswith: '/sharingd'
selection_signal:
ExitCode: 'SIGABRT'
condition: selection_crash and selection_signal
falsepositives:
- Legitimate AirDrop misconfiguration or unrelated sharingd crash
level: mediumKnown false positives:
- Legitimate AirDrop misconfiguration or an unrelated sharingd crash unconnected to attacker-controlled HTTP traffic
Tuning notes: Correlate with awdl0 interface HTTP traffic capture if available; raise confidence when the crash follows a request to a path outside the documented seven-endpoint allowlist within a 5-second window.
- Malformed HTTP/1.1 Chunked/Content-Length Request Triggering Network.framework NULL-Deref (V3) · unlock with TL Creds
- Quick Share OfflineFrame Dispatch Before UKEY2 Handshake Complete (V4 Pre-Auth Bypass) · unlock with TL Creds
- Quick Share Post-Handshake Frame Received Without SecureMessage Encryption (V5 Encryption Bypass) · unlock with TL Creds
- Looped [indicator] Crash-Restart Consistent With Persistent V1 DoS Loop · unlock with TL Creds
- Proximity Vulnerability-Scanning Recon Against AirDrop/Quick Share Endpoints · unlock with TL Creds
- Adversary-in-the-Middle Quick Share Session Injection Following Encryption Bypass (V5 Follow-On) · unlock with TL Creds
- Foundation XML Plist Recursive Stack-Exhaustion Crash (V2) · unlock with TL Creds
- Quick Share for Windows Use-After-Free Crash Near [indicator] (V6) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-07-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1197.
Technical analysis
Three AirDrop crash bugs (sharingd fatalError, Foundation XML plist stack exhaustion, HTTP parser NULL-pointer dereference) and three Quick Share flaws (Samsung pre-authentication state-machine bypass, Samsung/Google encryption-check bypass, Google Quick Share for Windows use-after-free) were found; Apple and Google have shipped or are shipping fixes, a Samsung-specific bypass remains under investigation at Google.
In late June 2026, researchers at the CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security published 'Protocol Prying: Systematic Vulnerability Research in the Apple AirDrop and Android Quick Share Proximity Transfer Protocols' (arXiv:2606.26967), the first systematic cross-platform reverse-engineering and protocol-aware fuzzing study of both proprietary proximity file-transfer stacks. The team reconstructed AirDrop's seven-layer protocol stack (AWDL/BLE link, IPv6 link-local network, self-signed TLS 1.2/1.3 security layer with no client auth, HTTP/1.1 transport, binary plist encoding, DVZip/gzip adaptive compression, and CPIO newc/BOM archive), and reverse-engineered the previously undocumented DVZip adaptive chunked compression format. They built AIRFUZZ, a nine-layer protocol-aware fuzzer (HTTP, binary plist, DVZip, CPIO, DER, havoc, memcorrupt, and field-level mutation strategies) with a key innovation of mutating raw CPIO archives prior to DVZip compression, raising server-side acceptance of malformed inputs from under 1% to over 90%.
Six vulnerabilities (V1-V6) resulted. Three affect AirDrop, all reachable pre-authentication over wireless proximity (10-30 meters) against a device set to 'Everyone for 10 Minutes' visibility, with no pairing, contact exchange, or shared network required: V1 is a Swift fatalError() in the Sharing.framework HTTP path-routing switch statement, triggered by any request to an unrecognized path, which aborts the sharingd daemon and simultaneously disables AirDrop, AirPlay, Handoff, Universal Clipboard, and Continuity Camera; looped requests produce a persistent denial of service. V2 is unbounded recursive descent in Foundation's XMLPlistScanner.scanDict(), where an XML property list of roughly 200 nested <dict> elements (about 6KB, ~2,960 bytes of stack per nesting level) exhausts the thread stack and causes a SIGBUS crash; because Foundation is shared infrastructure, any Apple app that deserializes untrusted XML plists is affected across macOS, iOS, watchOS, tvOS, and visionOS. V3 is a NULL-pointer dereference in Network.framework's nw_protocol_http1_connect(), triggered by malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with negative or duplicate Content-Length/Transfer-Encoding chunk headers, producing a SIGSEGV in an unmapped zero page.
Three affect Quick Share. V4 is a pre-authentication state-machine bypass in the Samsung GMS PcpManager dispatcher: OfflineFrame messages (KEEP_ALIVE, BANDWIDTH_UPGRADE, CONNECTION_RESPONSE) are dispatched immediately after ConnectionRequest Step 1, before the UKEY2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange completes, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to manipulate protocol state before secrets are established. V5 is an encryption-check bypass in the Samsung device-to-device (D2D) EndpointChannelManager dispatcher: three of seven post-handshake frame types (CONNECTION_RESPONSE, BANDWIDTH_UPGRADE, KEEP_ALIVE) are still processed when sent as plaintext instead of wrapped in the mandatory SecureMessage encryption envelope, letting an on-path Wi-Fi attacker on the same LAN maintain sessions and inject state without ever completing the cryptographic handshake. V6 is a use-after-free race condition in Google Quick Share for Windows (client v1.0.2472.1) endpoint management: when two connections collide on the same endpoint identifier and nonce within an approximately 11-second registration/teardown window, the collision handler tears down the endpoint object while a concurrent thread's OnEncryptionFailed callback in encryption_runner.cc still holds a stale pointer; the resulting comparison dereferences freed memory, causing an ACCESS_VIOLATION with potential exploitability toward remote code execution (vtable hijack) given no Control Flow Guard on the affected path. A source-code comment at the vulnerable site reads 'We had a bug here, caused by a race with EncryptionRunner,' indicating a prior, related fix at the same location.
Disclosure status as of report date: Apple has shipped a fix for one AirDrop issue (V1) with a CVE assigned but the advisory remains private/unpublished; V2 and V3 remain under coordinated disclosure with no public CVE. Google has merged a fix for the Windows use-after-free (V6), paid a bug-bounty award, and a CVE is pending. The Samsung pre-authentication (V4) and encryption-bypass (V5) issues were reported to Samsung, transferred to Google, and remain under investigation with no fix confirmed at report time. The researchers frame the root cause as an architectural pattern common to proximity protocols: privileged daemons must parse complex, attacker-controlled serialized content (binary plists, CPIO archives, Protocol Buffers, UKEY2 handshake messages) before authentication or user consent occurs, and security-critical invariants (depth limits, encryption enforcement, state-machine ordering) were not centralized at a single dispatcher boundary. This mirrors a broader pattern in Quick Share's history: SafeBreach disclosed a 10-bug, code-execution-capable attack chain in 2024 (CVE-2024-38271, CVE-2024-38272), Google shipped fixes, and SafeBreach returned in 2025 to demonstrate a patch bypass (CVE-2024-10668), requiring a second Google fix.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1040 Network Sniffing; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Discovery
T1046 Network Service Discovery
Execution
T1129 Shared Modules; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
Initial Access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Lateral Movement
T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
Defense Evasion
T1211 Exploitation for Stealth
Impact
T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service
Resource Development
T1587 Develop Capabilities; T1588 Obtain Capabilities
Reconnaissance
Remediation
Patches
- Apple: sharingd/Sharing.framework fix for V1 (fatalError on unrecognized HTTP path) shipped; advisory/CVE not yet public
- Google: Quick Share for Windows v1.0.2472.1+ fix for V6 endpoint-collision use-after-free merged; CVE pending
Immediate actions
- Set AirDrop visibility to 'Contacts Only' or 'Receiving Off' instead of 'Everyone for 10 Minutes' when not actively transferring files
- Disable Quick Share visibility ('Hidden' / 'No one') when not actively receiving on Android/Samsung devices
- Restrict Quick Share for Windows use on untrusted or public Wi-Fi networks pending Google's patch rollout
- Apply Apple's shipped sharingd/AirDrop update (V1 fix) via standard macOS/iOS software update as soon as it is available on the device
- Apply Google's Quick Share for Windows client update once the endpoint-management use-after-free fix (V6) is generally available
- Monitor CISA KEV, Apple security releases, and Android/Google security bulletins for public CVE assignment and patch confirmation on V1-V6
Workarounds
- Keep AirDrop set to 'Contacts Only' rather than 'Everyone'
- Keep Quick Share visibility set to 'Hidden'/'No one' rather than 'Everyone' or 'Contacts'
- Avoid using Quick Share for Windows on untrusted/shared LANs until V6 patch is confirmed installed
Longer-term hardening
- Vendors: centralize authentication and encryption enforcement at a single dispatcher/boundary layer rather than per-frame-type checks
- Vendors: enforce recursion/nesting depth limits in all plist/XML/serialized-format parsers shared across privileged daemons
- Vendors: integrate protocol-aware fuzzing (e.g., AIRFUZZ-style pre-compression mutation) into the standard development lifecycle for proximity protocols
- Enterprises: consider MDM policy to force AirDrop/Quick Share to 'Contacts Only' or fully disabled on managed fleets in high-risk environments
- Enterprises: treat proximity-protocol daemons (sharingd, Nearby Share service) as part of the wireless attack surface in mobile threat models
Affected and fixed versions
- Apple — AirDrop / sharingd (Sharing.framework)
Vulnerable versions: macOS (all versions prior to fix); iOS (all versions prior to fix)
Fixed in: Software update addressing V1 (fatalError path routing); V2/V3 unpatched as of report date - Apple — Foundation framework (XML property list parser)
Vulnerable versions: macOS; iOS; watchOS; tvOS; visionOS — all versions with unbounded XMLPlistScanner recursion - Apple — Network.framework (HTTP/1.1 parser)
Vulnerable versions: macOS; iOS — versions with nw_protocol_http1_connect() NULL pointer dereference - Samsung — Quick Share (Android, GMS PcpManager / EndpointChannelManager dispatcher)
Vulnerable versions: Samsung Quick Share Android implementation, version under investigation - Google — Quick Share for Windows
Vulnerable versions: v1.0.2472.1 and prior
Fixed in: Post-1.0.2472.1 build with endpoint-collision use-after-free fix merged; CVE pending
Timeline
- SafeBreach discloses a 10-bug, code-execution-capable attack chain in Google Quick Share (CVE-2024-38271, CVE-2024-38272), establishing historical precedent for repeated vulnerability discovery in the same protocol family.
- Google ships a second fix for Quick Share after SafeBreach demonstrates a bypass of the 2024 patch (CVE-2024-10668).
- CISPA Helmholtz researchers Arash Ale Ebrahim and Nils Ole Tippenhauer publish 'Protocol Prying' (arXiv:2606.26967), documenting six new vulnerabilities (V1-V6) across AirDrop and Quick Share found via the AIRFUZZ protocol-aware fuzzer and targeted reverse engineering.
- Coverage across outlets (Help Net Security, The Hacker News, Cybernews) converges on an estimate of roughly five billion active macOS, iOS, Android, and Windows devices collectively exposed to at least one of the six V1-V6 flaws given the ubiquity of AirDrop and Quick Share as OS-bundled features.
- Help Net Security and other outlets (9to5mac, AppleInsider, The Hacker News, Cybernews) publish coverage of the six vulnerabilities, confirming Apple has shipped a fix for V1 with a private/embargoed CVE, and Google has merged a fix for the Windows use-after-free (V6) with a bounty paid and CVE pending.
- Additional outlets (PrivacyGuides, Security Boulevard, CybersecurityNews) republish and analyze the disclosure, reiterating that Samsung's pre-authentication (V4) and encryption-bypass (V5) issues remain under investigation at Google.
- Samsung's pre-authentication state-machine bypass (V4) and encryption-check bypass (V5), originally reported to Samsung, are confirmed to have been transferred to Google for investigation as the party responsible for the underlying Nearby Connections/Quick Share protocol stack; no fix is confirmed at report time.
- TL-Intel Harness RESEARCH phase compiles and normalizes public reporting and the primary arXiv research paper into a structured threat record; no public CVE numbers exist yet for any of the six vulnerabilities.
Sources cited
- Protocol Prying: Systematic Vulnerability Research in the Apple AirDrop and Android Quick Share Proximity Transfer Protocols (arXiv:2606.26967) arxiv.org · Research · 2026-06-25
- Protocol Prying — full HTML paper arxiv.org · Research · 2026-06-25
- RCE Attack Chain on Quick Share (SafeBreach 2024 disclosure, historical precedent) safebreach.com · Research · 2024-08-01
- Multiple Vulnerabilities Found in Apple AirDrop and Android Quick Share privacyguides.org · Blog · 2026-07-01
- AirDrop and Quick Share Flaws Allow Attackers to Crash Nearby Devices securityboulevard.com · Blog · 2026-07-01
- AirDrop and Quick Share vulnerabilities affect protocols on five billion devices as fixes begin Help Net Security · News · 2026-06-30
- Three AirDrop vulnerabilities discovered, with Apple working on a full fix 9to5mac.com · News · 2026-06-30
- New AirDrop security flaws are significant, but aren't a giant threat appleinsider.com · News · 2026-06-30
- AirDrop and Quick Share Flaws Let Nearby Attackers Trigger Crashes and Bypass Checks The Hacker News · News · 2026-06-30
- AirDrop and Quick Share security vulnerabilities unveiled cybernews.com · News · 2026-06-30
- Multiple AirDrop and Quick Share Vulnerabilities Allow Attackers to Crash Devices cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-07-01
- Google Patches Quick Share Vulnerability Enabling Silent File Transfers Without Consent (historical precedent) The Hacker News · News · 2025-04-01
- Google Released Second Fix for Quick Share Flaws After Patch Bypass SecurityWeek · News · 2025-04-01
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 13 sources; published ; last updated —.