# Six AirDrop and Quick Share Proximity File-Transfer Vulnerabilities (Apple, Google, Samsung) — 'Protocol Prying' Research

> CISPA Helmholtz researchers Arash Ale Ebrahim and Nils Ole Tippenhauer reverse-engineered Apple AirDrop and Google/Samsung Quick Share, publishing 'Protocol Prying' (arXiv:2606.26967) and disclosing six vulnerabilities exploitable by an unpaired, wireless-proximity attacker across roughly five billion macOS, iOS, Android, and Windows devices. Three AirDrop crash bugs (sharingd fatalError, Foundation XML plist stack exhaustion, HTTP parser NULL-pointer dereference) and three Quick Share flaws (Samsung pre-authentication state-machine bypass, Samsung/Google encryption-check bypass, Google Quick Share for Windows use-after-free) were found; Apple and Google have shipped or are shipping fixes, a Samsung-specific bypass remains under investigation at Google.

- **Published:** 2026-07-10T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-10T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1197
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-protocol-prying-proximity-flaws-tl-2026-1197.webp?v=b79ef5d3 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Protocol Prying AirDrop Quick Share Flaws: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1197) — Medium severity, 20 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1197
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** VULNERABILITY
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 20

## Description

In late June 2026, researchers at the CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security published 'Protocol Prying: Systematic Vulnerability Research in the Apple AirDrop and Android Quick Share Proximity Transfer Protocols' (arXiv:2606.26967), the first systematic cross-platform reverse-engineering and protocol-aware fuzzing study of both proprietary proximity file-transfer stacks. The team reconstructed AirDrop's seven-layer protocol stack (AWDL/BLE link, IPv6 link-local network, self-signed TLS 1.2/1.3 security layer with no client auth, HTTP/1.1 transport, binary plist encoding, DVZip/gzip adaptive compression, and CPIO newc/BOM archive), and reverse-engineered the previously undocumented DVZip adaptive chunked compression format. They built AIRFUZZ, a nine-layer protocol-aware fuzzer (HTTP, binary plist, DVZip, CPIO, DER, havoc, memcorrupt, and field-level mutation strategies) with a key innovation of mutating raw CPIO archives prior to DVZip compression, raising server-side acceptance of malformed inputs from under 1% to over 90%.

Six vulnerabilities (V1-V6) resulted. Three affect AirDrop, all reachable pre-authentication over wireless proximity (10-30 meters) against a device set to 'Everyone for 10 Minutes' visibility, with no pairing, contact exchange, or shared network required: V1 is a Swift fatalError() in the Sharing.framework HTTP path-routing switch statement, triggered by any request to an unrecognized path, which aborts the sharingd daemon and simultaneously disables AirDrop, AirPlay, Handoff, Universal Clipboard, and Continuity Camera; looped requests produce a persistent denial of service. V2 is unbounded recursive descent in Foundation's XMLPlistScanner.scanDict(), where an XML property list of roughly 200 nested <dict> elements (about 6KB, ~2,960 bytes of stack per nesting level) exhausts the thread stack and causes a SIGBUS crash; because Foundation is shared infrastructure, any Apple app that deserializes untrusted XML plists is affected across macOS, iOS, watchOS, tvOS, and visionOS. V3 is a NULL-pointer dereference in Network.framework's nw_protocol_http1_connect(), triggered by malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with negative or duplicate Content-Length/Transfer-Encoding chunk headers, producing a SIGSEGV in an unmapped zero page.

Three affect Quick Share. V4 is a pre-authentication state-machine bypass in the Samsung GMS PcpManager dispatcher: OfflineFrame messages (KEEP_ALIVE, BANDWIDTH_UPGRADE, CONNECTION_RESPONSE) are dispatched immediately after ConnectionRequest Step 1, before the UKEY2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange completes, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to manipulate protocol state before secrets are established. V5 is an encryption-check bypass in the Samsung device-to-device (D2D) EndpointChannelManager dispatcher: three of seven post-handshake frame types (CONNECTION_RESPONSE, BANDWIDTH_UPGRADE, KEEP_ALIVE) are still processed when sent as plaintext instead of wrapped in the mandatory SecureMessage encryption envelope, letting an on-path Wi-Fi attacker on the same LAN maintain sessions and inject state without ever completing the cryptographic handshake. V6 is a use-after-free race condition in Google Quick Share for Windows (client v1.0.2472.1) endpoint management: when two connections collide on the same endpoint identifier and nonce within an approximately 11-second registration/teardown window, the collision handler tears down the endpoint object while a concurrent thread's OnEncryptionFailed callback in encryption_runner.cc still holds a stale pointer; the resulting comparison dereferences freed memory, causing an ACCESS_VIOLATION with potential exploitability toward remote code execution (vtable hijack) given no Control Flow Guard on the affected path. A source-code comment at the vulnerable site reads 'We had a bug here, caused by a race with EncryptionRunner,' indicating a prior, related fix at the same location.

Disclosure status as of report date: Apple has shipped a fix for one AirDrop issue (V1) with a CVE assigned but the advisory remains private/unpublished; V2 and V3 remain under coordinated disclosure with no public CVE. Google has merged a fix for the Windows use-after-free (V6), paid a bug-bounty award, and a CVE is pending. The Samsung pre-authentication (V4) and encryption-bypass (V5) issues were reported to Samsung, transferred to Google, and remain under investigation with no fix confirmed at report time. The researchers frame the root cause as an architectural pattern common to proximity protocols: privileged daemons must parse complex, attacker-controlled serialized content (binary plists, CPIO archives, Protocol Buffers, UKEY2 handshake messages) before authentication or user consent occurs, and security-critical invariants (depth limits, encryption enforcement, state-machine ordering) were not centralized at a single dispatcher boundary. This mirrors a broader pattern in Quick Share's history: SafeBreach disclosed a 10-bug, code-execution-capable attack chain in 2024 (CVE-2024-38271, CVE-2024-38272), Google shipped fixes, and SafeBreach returned in 2025 to demonstrate a patch bypass (CVE-2024-10668), requiring a second Google fix.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1595 Active Scanning
- T1592 Gather Victim Host Information
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
- T1211 Exploitation for Stealth
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service
- T1588 Obtain Capabilities
- T1129 Shared Modules
- T1040 Network Sniffing

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**AirDrop sharingd Crash via Unrecognized HTTP Path (V1 fatalError DoS)** (`TL-2026-1197-SPL-001`)

Detects sharingd process termination (SIGABRT/fatalError) shortly after an inbound HTTP/1.1 request over the awdl0 link to a path outside the documented AirDrop endpoint allowlist (/Discover, /Hello, /Ask, /Upload, /Exchange, /SharedIdentity, /Error). Exploiting this pre-authentication crash disables AirDrop, AirPlay, Handoff, Universal Clipboard, and Continuity Camera as collateral, and can be looped for persistent DoS.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1499.004, T1190
- **Data sources:** macos:unifiedlog, osquery:process_events, endpoint EDR process telemetry
- **Severity:** medium
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=endpoint sourcetype="macos:unifiedlog" OR sourcetype="osquery:process_events" (process_name="sharingd" OR Image="*/sharingd")
| eval crash_signal=if(match(_raw, "SIGABRT|fatalError"), 1, 0)
| where crash_signal=1
| stats count as crash_count min(_time) as first_crash max(_time) as last_crash by host, process_name
| where crash_count > 0
| table host, process_name, crash_count, first_crash, last_crash
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has "sharingd"
| where ProcessTerminationCode has_any ("SIGABRT", "6")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessId, ProcessTerminationCode, InitiatingProcessFileName
| summarize CrashCount = count() by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| where CrashCount > 0
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: AirDrop sharingd Crash via Unrecognized HTTP Path (V1)
id: 3f8a1b2c-1197-4a2e-9b7d-tlintel1197001
status: experimental
description: Detects sharingd daemon abort (SIGABRT/fatalError) consistent with an unauthenticated proximity peer sending an HTTP request to an unrecognized AirDrop path, triggering a Swift fatalError in the Sharing.framework path-routing switch.
references:
    - https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.26967
    - https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/06/30/apple-airdrop-google-samsung-quick-share-vulnerabilities/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-10
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.004
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2026.pending
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_crash:
        Image|endswith: '/sharingd'
    selection_signal:
        ExitCode: 'SIGABRT'
    condition: selection_crash and selection_signal
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate AirDrop misconfiguration or unrelated sharingd crash
level: medium
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate AirDrop misconfiguration or an unrelated sharingd crash unconnected to attacker-controlled HTTP traffic

**Tuning notes:** Correlate with awdl0 interface HTTP traffic capture if available; raise confidence when the crash follows a request to a path outside the documented seven-endpoint allowlist within a 5-second window.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Malformed HTTP/1.1 Chunked/Content-Length Request Triggering Network.framework NULL-Deref (V3) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Quick Share OfflineFrame Dispatch Before UKEY2 Handshake Complete (V4 Pre-Auth Bypass) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Quick Share Post-Handshake Frame Received Without SecureMessage Encryption (V5 Encryption Bypass) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Looped [indicator] Crash-Restart Consistent With Persistent V1 DoS Loop (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Proximity Vulnerability-Scanning Recon Against AirDrop/Quick Share Endpoints (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Adversary-in-the-Middle Quick Share Session Injection Following Encryption Bypass (V5 Follow-On) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Foundation XML Plist Recursive Stack-Exhaustion Crash (V2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Quick Share for Windows Use-After-Free Crash Near [indicator] (V6) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

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## Sources

- [AirDrop and Quick Share vulnerabilities affect protocols on five billion devices as fixes begin](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/06/30/apple-airdrop-google-samsung-quick-share-vulnerabilities/)
- [Protocol Prying: Systematic Vulnerability Research in the Apple AirDrop and Android Quick Share Proximity Transfer Protocols (arXiv:2606.26967)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.26967)
- [Protocol Prying — full HTML paper](https://arxiv.org/html/2606.26967v1)
- [Three AirDrop vulnerabilities discovered, with Apple working on a full fix](https://9to5mac.com/2026/06/30/three-airdrop-vulnerabilities-discovered-with-apple-working-on-a-full-fix/)
- [New AirDrop security flaws are significant, but aren't a giant threat](https://appleinsider.com/articles/26/06/30/new-airdrop-security-flaws-are-significant-but-arent-a-giant-threat)
- [AirDrop and Quick Share Flaws Let Nearby Attackers Trigger Crashes and Bypass Checks](https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/airdrop-and-quick-share-flaws-let.html)
- [AirDrop and Quick Share security vulnerabilities unveiled](https://cybernews.com/security/airdrop-quick-share-vulnerabilities-unveiled/)
- [Multiple Vulnerabilities Found in Apple AirDrop and Android Quick Share](https://www.privacyguides.org/news/2026/07/01/multiple-vulnerabilities-found-in-apple-airdrop-and-android-quick-share/)
- [AirDrop and Quick Share Flaws Allow Attackers to Crash Nearby Devices](https://securityboulevard.com/2026/07/airdrop-and-quick-share-flaws-allow-attackers-to-crash-nearby-devices/)
- [Multiple AirDrop and Quick Share Vulnerabilities Allow Attackers to Crash Devices](https://cybersecuritynews.com/airdrop-and-quick-share-vulnerabilities/)
- [Google Patches Quick Share Vulnerability Enabling Silent File Transfers Without Consent (historical precedent)](https://thehackernews.com/2025/04/google-patches-quick-share.html)
- [RCE Attack Chain on Quick Share (SafeBreach 2024 disclosure, historical precedent)](https://www.safebreach.com/blog/rce-attack-chain-on-quick-share/)
- [Google Released Second Fix for Quick Share Flaws After Patch Bypass](https://www.securityweek.com/google-released-second-fix-for-quick-share-flaws-after-patch-bypass/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1197
