# UNC1151 (Ghostwriter/FrostyNeighbor) Real-Time WebSocket MFA-Bypass Credential-Phishing Campaign Targets Belarusian Opposition Politician Yury Hubarevich

> UNC1151, tracked as Ghostwriter/FrostyNeighbor/PUSHCHA/Storm-0257/TA445/UAC-0051 and assessed with high confidence to be aligned with Belarusian government interests (with possible Russian coordination), ran Russian-language spear-phishing operations impersonating Google account-security warnings against Belarusian pro-democracy politician Yury Hubarevich and broader Ukrainian webmail-portal users (I.UA, bigmir.net, META.UA). Fake login pages used a real-time WebSocket relay to intercept credentials and OTP/SMS MFA codes synchronously, letting the operator hijack the live session before the victim finished the flow, all staged through compromised Ukrainian websites and obfuscated behind Bunny CDN.

- **Published:** 2026-07-11T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-11T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1223
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-ghostwriter-websocket-otp-phishing-tl-2026-1223.webp?v=148905ea (Threadlinqs threat intel: UNC1151 Ghostwriter WebSocket Phishing: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1223) — High severity, 27 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1223
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UNC1151 (Belarus)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)

## Description

In late April 2026, UNC1151 (publicly tracked as Ghostwriter by Mandiant, FrostyNeighbor by ESET, PUSHCHA/Storm-0257/TA445 by other vendors, and UAC-0051 by CERT-UA) stood up a new wave of credential-phishing infrastructure hosted by Datagear (AS200758) in Poland. The primary campaign, documented by Censys and CyberSecurityNews on 26-29 June 2026, targeted Belarusian opposition politician Yury Hubarevich with a Russian-language email spoofing a Google 'suspicious account activity' warning. Clicking the embedded link routed the victim through a compromised Ukrainian website before landing on a pixel-accurate fake Google login page hosted at account.check-profile.digital. Unlike static credential-harvesting kits, the phishing page's client-side JavaScript streamed every keystroke over a WebSocket (wss://account-emails-verification.cc.cd/ws) to the attacker's backend in real time. This converted an otherwise asynchronous OTP-capture problem (where a one-time SMS/app code expires or is consumed before the attacker can act) into a synchronous adversary-in-the-middle capture: the attacker immediately replayed the captured username, password, and second factor against the real Google service to establish a session while the victim was still staring at a fake 'verification in progress, check back in 24 hours' confirmation screen.

Infrastructure analysis (certificate pivoting off a TLS certificate exposed on 45.194.44.44 before Bunny CDN obfuscation was layered on) surfaced a much broader operation: at least four IPs (45.194.44.44, 45.194.44.46, 45.197.133.104, 111.88.74.246) and nine-plus phishing domains, including direct impersonations of Ukrainian webmail portals I.UA (i-ua.cc.cd) and bigmir.net (bigmir-net.cc.cd), and META.UA (meta-ua.cc.cd) — the same portals UNC1151 targeted in a 2022 campaign. A distinctive fingerprint (HTTP 404 'VPS2 endpoint only for WebSocket' on ports 3001/3002) let researchers pivot to additional related hosts.

The same actor cluster (tracked by ESET as FrostyNeighbor and separately reported by TheHackerNews/SecurityAffairs) has run a parallel, more technically involved campaign against Ukrainian government, defense, and military targets since March 2026: geofenced malicious PDFs impersonating Ukrtelecom serve a benign decoy to any non-Ukrainian IP, while Ukrainian-geolocated victims receive a RAR archive containing a JavaScript-launched PicassoLoader stage. PicassoLoader fingerprints the host (beaconing every 10 minutes) and, following manual operator review, drops a JavaScript-based Cobalt Strike Beacon loader as a third stage — with njRAT also previously observed in the group's toolkit. This is consistent with UNC1151's long operating history: active since at least March 2017, publicly exposed by Mandiant in November 2021 as the group behind the Belarus-aligned 'Ghostwriter' disinformation-and-hack-and-leak operation (assessed with high confidence to align with Belarusian government interests, without ruling out Russian contribution), and previously profiled by CERT Polska, Google TAG, and AttackIQ for repeated credential-phishing and disinformation operations against Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1591 Gather Victim Org Information
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1588 Obtain Capabilities
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1566 Phishing
- T1204 User Execution
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1090 Proxy
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1614 System Location Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1102 Web Service
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**UNC1151 Ghostwriter Spearphishing-Link Click-Through to Fake Google/Webmail Login (Lookalike TLD)** (`TL-2026-1223-SPL-001`)

Detects a mail-client-spawned browser navigating to a newly-registered lookalike credential-phishing domain (cc.cd/.digital TLDs combined with brand keywords account/verify/secure/login/mail impersonating Google or I.UA/bigmir.net/META.UA), consistent with UNC1151's T1566.002 spearphishing-link delivery and T1036 masquerading of the fake 'suspicious account activity' login page.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.002, T1036, T1204.001
- **Data sources:** proxy, web_gateway, sysmon, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy sourcetype="proxy:web" OR sourcetype="stream:http" (dest_domain="*.cc.cd" OR dest_domain="*.digital") (dest_domain="account*" OR dest_domain="*verify*" OR dest_domain="*secure*" OR dest_domain="*login*" OR dest_domain="mail*" OR dest_domain="i-ua*" OR dest_domain="bigmir*" OR dest_domain="meta-ua*")
| join type=inner host [ search index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\OUTLOOK.EXE" (Image="*\\chrome.exe" OR Image="*\\msedge.exe" OR Image="*\\firefox.exe") | rename ComputerName as host ]
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen values(dest_domain) as phishing_domains by host, user
| where count > 0
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let LookalikeDomains = dynamic(["account.check-profile.digital","account-emails-verification.cc.cd","mail.service-support.digital","check-account.digital","mail-secure-login.digital","accounts-verification.cc.cd","i-ua.cc.cd","bigmir-net.cc.cd","meta-ua.cc.cd"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE", "outlook.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe")
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where RemoteUrl has_any (LookalikeDomains) or RemoteUrl matches regex @"(?i)\.(cc\.cd|digital)\b"
) on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, RemoteUrl
| summarize count(), make_set(RemoteUrl) by DeviceName, AccountName
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: UNC1151 Ghostwriter Spearphishing-Link Click-Through to Lookalike Login Page
id: 3a1e2f10-1223-4a01-9d01-tl20261223s01
status: experimental
description: Detects a browser spawned from a mail client navigating to a lookalike phishing domain (cc.cd/.digital TLDs with brand keywords) consistent with UNC1151/Ghostwriter's fake Google/webmail login pages.
references:
    - https://censys.com/blog/unc1151-phishing-email-campaign/
    - https://cybersecuritynews.com/unc1151-ghostwriter-hackers-target-belarusian-politician/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.tool.ghostwriter
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
    condition: selection_parent
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate links clicked from email leading to non-malicious sites (requires correlation with network destination filter for high fidelity)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate marketing/verification domains using similar keyword patterns on uncommon TLDs; requires domain-age or reputation enrichment to reduce noise

**Tuning notes:** Feed a live threat-intel domain-age/reputation lookup to suppress benign cc.cd/.digital hosts; extend the brand-keyword list per target organization's own webmail/SSO branding; correlate with DNS logs for newly-registered-domain scoring.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Real-Time WebSocket Credential/OTP Exfiltration Immediately After Login-Form Submission (AiTM Relay) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PicassoLoader Periodic Host-Fingerprint Beacon (~10-Minute Cadence) Prior to Cobalt Strike/njRAT Drop (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AiTM Session Hijack: Rapid Real Google/Webmail Login Immediately After WebSocket-Relayed Credential Capture (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HTTP 404 'VPS2 endpoint only for WebSocket' Infrastructure Fingerprint (Exploitation-Stage Recon Pivot) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Geofenced PDF-to-RAR Delivery Chain with Ukrtelecom Lure Theme (Post-Exploitation Staging) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Bunny CDN / External Proxy-Fronted Connection to Certificate-Pivotable UNC1151 Phishing Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Geofenced Malicious PDF to RAR-Archive JavaScript Dropper Chain (PicassoLoader Staging) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cobalt Strike Beacon / njRAT Outbound C2 Following JavaScript Dropper Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `45.194.44[.]44`
- Domain: `account[.]check-profile[.]digital`
- File hash: `4b80681cd444cf9679d7e4d715489f6ddbe4580a9d110bd1952e54e8193afefd`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [UNC1151 (Ghostwriter) Hackers Target Belarusian Politician in Gmail Phishing Campaign](https://cybersecuritynews.com/unc1151-ghostwriter-hackers-target-belarusian-politician/)
- [UNC1151 Phishing Email Targeting Belarusian Politician Points to Multi-National Campaign](https://censys.com/blog/unc1151-phishing-email-campaign/)
- [Ghostwriter Hackers Use Real-Time WebSocket Relay to Bypass SMS and OTP MFA](https://gbhackers.com/websocket-relay-to-bypass-sms/)
- [Ghostwriter Phishing Infrastructure Targets Gmail and Ukrainian Email Portal Users](https://cyberpress.org/ghostwriter-targets-email-users/)
- [Case Study — UNC1151 Gmail Phishing ("Suspicious account activity") Targeting Belarusian Pro-Democracy Politician](https://resident.ngo/lab/writeups/targeted-gmail-phishing-suspicious-account-activity-from-unc1151-ghostwriter-may-2026/)
- [Ghostwriter Targets Ukrainian Government With Geofenced PDF Phishing, Cobalt Strike](https://thehackernews.com/2026/05/ghostwriter-targets-ukrainian.html)
- [Ghostwriter group resumes attacks on Ukrainian Government targets](https://securityaffairs.com/192196/apt/ghostwriter-group-resumes-attacks-on-ukrainian-government-targets.html)
- [ESET details new Ghostwriter activity targeting Ukrainian government](https://www.scworld.com/brief/eset-details-new-ghostwriter-activity-targeting-ukrainian-government)
- [UNC1151 Assessed with High Confidence to have Links to Belarus, Ghostwriter Campaign Aligned with Belarusian Government Interests](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc1151-linked-to-belarus-government/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1223
