# Multi-Actor Espionage Campaign Weaponizes Balochistan Police Complaint Management Portal (PlugX, ShadowPad, Cobalt Strike, Remcos/TAG-179)

> SentinelLABS documented converging China-nexus (PlugX, ShadowPad, Cobalt Strike) and India-nexus (TAG-179/Remcos, overlapping Mysterious Elephant/APT-C-08/SideWinder/Confucius/Bitter TTPs) espionage clusters that separately compromised Pakistani law enforcement networks, including Balochistan Police, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police, Islamabad Police, and the Punjab Safe Cities Authority, between February 2024 and April 2026. The China-nexus actor weaponized the public-facing Balochistan Police Complaint Management System (cms.balochistanpolice.gov.pk) by uploading a custom implant (cms_plugin.exe) disguised as a portal update, compromising both police staff and citizen users.

- **Published:** 2026-07-11T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-11T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1239
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-balochistan-police-cms-implant-tl-2026-1239.webp?v=b8c9e648 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Balochistan Police Portal Implant: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1239) — High severity, 43 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1239
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** TAG-179 (China, India)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 43 (3 shown free below)

## Description

SentinelOne's SentinelLABS (researcher Aleksandar Milenkoski) published "One Target, Two Flags: Rival Espionage Actors Converge On Pakistani Law Enforcement," documenting a multi-year, multi-actor cyberespionage campaign against Pakistani police infrastructure. Two distinct, unrelated nation-state-nexus actor clusters independently compromised overlapping victim infrastructure: a suspected China-nexus cluster deploying PlugX (Feb 27-Sep 28, 2024), ShadowPad (Nov 5-Dec 1, 2024), and Cobalt Strike (Oct 12, 2024-Dec 2025); and a suspected India-nexus cluster tracked by Recorded Future as TAG-179, overlapping with Kaspersky's Mysterious Elephant (APT-K-47/APT-C-08) and related SideWinder/Confucius/Bitter TTP-sharing groups, deploying Remcos RAT (Jan 13-Apr 9, 2026) via a decoy document themed around Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) repatriation operations.

The most significant new development is the China-nexus actor's compromise of the Balochistan Police Complaint Management System (CMS), a public-facing web application at cms.balochistanpolice.gov.pk that is used both by police staff (restricted ps-[district] logins) and by ordinary citizens filing complaints. The attackers uploaded two variants of a custom implant named cms_plugin.exe to the portal's client-scripts directory, disguised as a routine portal update: a Rust-based stager and a .NET executable masquerading as the legitimate Chinese antivirus process 360Safe.exe (Qihoo 360). The .NET variant reflectively loads an embedded AsyncRAT client that calls back to 41.216.188.140. Compromised Chinese-language PDB paths (D:\codedome\case\six\Client\Client2\obj\Debug\Client2.pdb), the term "xinshi" (new variant), and Simplified Chinese log strings indicate a Chinese-speaking developer.

Beyond the CMS, the China-nexus actors compromised Balochistan Police web servers hosting the First Information Report (FIR) system, the Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS), the Anti-Vehicle Lifting System (AVLS), HotelEye (hotel/tenant tracking with NADRA national-ID integration), the Criminal Record Management System (CRMS, biometric records), the Tenant Registration System (TRS), two network appliances, and a Fortinet FortiMail email gateway appliance — all part of an EU-supported "Smart Police Station" digitalization initiative that was turned into an intelligence-collection vector.

SentinelLABS assesses with high confidence that the China-nexus activity is motivated by Beijing's concern for the safety of Chinese nationals connected to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), following deadly attacks on Chinese personnel including the October 2024 Karachi airport bombing and a March 2024 suicide bombing, both attributed to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA); China sought independent insight into Pakistan's internal security posture ahead of a January 2026 China-Pakistan counterterrorism coordination agreement. The India-nexus/TAG-179 activity is assessed as driven by the long-running India-Pakistan security rivalry and interest in Balochistan's insurgency dynamics and cross-border militancy dynamics. Victimology for the broader PlugX/ShadowPad/Cobalt Strike and TAG-179/Mysterious Elephant clusters spans government, foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, academic/research, telecommunications, NGO, and manufacturing targets across South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka), Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan), East Asia (China, Taiwan — including Tibetan Buddhist organizations), the Middle East/Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran), and Southeast Europe.

No CVEs were disclosed in the source reporting; initial access to the CMS and internal networks appears to rely on compromised credentials, direct web-application upload access, and trust in a public-facing government portal rather than a specific software vulnerability.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1591 Gather Victim Org Information
- T1587.001 Malware
- T1583.004 Server
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1106 Native API
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary
- T1505.003 Web Shell
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1187 Forced Authentication
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1123 Audio Capture
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1114 Email Collection
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1008 Fallback Channels
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1020 Automated Exfiltration
- T1565 Data Manipulation

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**AV-Masquerading Binary (360Safe.exe-style) Executing from User Temp with Run-Key Persistence** (`TL-2026-1239-SPL-002`)

Detects execution of a binary named to impersonate a legitimate antivirus process (e.g. 360Safe.exe/Qihoo 360) running from a temp/download staging path, paired with creation of a Registry Run-key value — matching the .NET cms_plugin.exe implant's masquerading and autostart-persistence behavior.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1036.005, T1547, T1620
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_events, edr_registry_events
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
(EventCode=1 Image="*\\360Safe.exe" (CommandLine="*\\Temp\\*" OR CommandLine="*\\Downloads\\*"))
OR (EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*")
| eval detection_leg=if(EventCode=1, "masquerade_exec", "runkey_persist")
| stats values(detection_leg) as legs count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by host, Image, CommandLine, TargetObject, Details, User
| where mvcount(legs) > 0
| table first_seen, last_seen, host, User, Image, CommandLine, TargetObject, Details, legs
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let lookback = 24h;
let exec = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where FolderPath endswith "\\360Safe.exe"
| where FolderPath has_any ("\\Temp\\", "\\Downloads\\")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName;
let persist = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where RegistryKey has "CurrentVersion\\Run"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName;
exec
| join kind=inner (persist) on DeviceName
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName, AccountName
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Suspicious AV-Masquerading Binary Written to User Temp with Run-Key Persistence
id: 9d2c7b1a-4e6f-4a2e-8b1d-6f0e1a2c3d04
status: experimental
description: Detects a binary named to match a legitimate antivirus product (360Safe.exe) executing from a temp/download path, and/or Run-key persistence creation, matching the Balochistan Police CMS cms_plugin.exe implant behavior.
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/one-target-china-india-espionage-converge-on-pakistani-law-enforcement/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-11
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547
    - attack.tool.qihoo_360_impersonation
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_process:
        Image|endswith: '\\360Safe.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\\Temp\\'
            - '\\Downloads\\'
    selection_regkey:
        TargetObject|contains: '\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\'
    condition: selection_process or selection_regkey
falsepositives:
    - Genuine Qihoo 360 antivirus installation running from a non-standard but legitimate path during IT deployment
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate Qihoo 360 antivirus deployment from an unusual but authorized install/staging path

**Tuning notes:** Correlate with hash/signature verification of the actual 360Safe.exe binary against the known-good Qihoo 360 certificate/hash to cut false positives from real AV installs; extend Image match to other commonly-spoofed AV process names.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Government Portal Trusted-Relationship Abuse: New Executable Served from Update Path (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Reflective Assembly Load Following New Binary Execution with No On-Disk Payload (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Remcos-Style Decoy Document Spawning Living-off-the-Land Script Interpreter (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [Sigma] AV-Masquerading Binary Executing from Update/Temp Staging Path (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [Sigma] Autostart Persistence Registered by Portal-Download-Origin Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [Sigma] Low-and-Slow HTTPS Beaconing to Newly-Seen C2 IP with No Prior DNS History (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Trojanized Portal-Update Executable Uploaded to client-scripts Directory (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fallback-Channel Beaconing to Known PlugX/ShadowPad/Cobalt Strike/Remcos/AsyncRAT C2 Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 43)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `142.171.183[.]8`
- Domain: `cms[.]balochistanpolice[.]gov[.]pk`
- File hash: `23f6781919a50b118d8d4e6a7e9ae63b71ecc885`

Full set of 43 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [One Target, Two Flags | Rival Espionage Actors Converge On Pakistani Law Enforcement](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/one-target-china-india-espionage-converge-on-pakistani-law-enforcement/)
- [Hackers Weaponize Balochistan Police Portal in Espionage Campaign](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/hackers-weaponize-balochistan-police.html)
- [China, India ran separate spying campaigns against same Pakistani police force](https://therecord.media/china-india-ran-separate-spy-campaigns-against-same-police-force)
- [SentinelLABS Pakistan Police Cyberespionage Report Findings](https://www.technadu.com/sentinellabs-pakistan-police-cyberespionage-report-findings/630728/)
- [Chinese and Indian State-Linked Hackers Target Pakistani Police Networks in Multi-Year Cyber Espionage Campaign](https://www.aryanage.com/article/40989/chinese-and-indian-state-linked-hackers-target-pakistani-police-networks-in)
- [SentinelOne Report Alleges China-India Linked Hackers Targeted Pakistan's Police Networks](https://themedialine.org/headlines/sentinelone-report-alleges-china-india-linked-hackers-targeted-pakistans-police-networks/)
- [China and India-Linked Hackers Target Pakistan Police Networks, SentinelLABS Report Reveals](https://pragativadi.com/china-and-india-linked-hackers-target-pakistan-police-networks-sentinellabs-report-reveals/)
- [APT-K-47 "Mysterious Elephant", a new APT organization in South Asia](https://paper.seebug.org/3002/)
- [Mysterious Elephant APT: TTPs and tools](https://securelist.com/mysterious-elephant-apt-ttps-and-tools/117596/)
- [Mysterious Elephant: The Stealthy Hacker Group Targeting Asia's Diplomatic Circles](https://the420.in/mysterious-elephant-apt-hackers-asia-pacific-cyberattacks-2025/)
- [South Asia's Cyber Arms Race Intensifies as New APTs Emerge](https://the420.in/south-asia-cyber-espionage-mysterious-elephant-transparent-tribe-deskrat/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1239
