# APT-C-60 2026 Campaign: SpyGlace Backdoor Delivered via LNK Files and Abused Legitimate Services

> JPCERT/CC reports a July 2026 APT-C-60 campaign against Japanese organizations that shifts initial access to Proton Drive-hosted spear-phishing RAR archives containing LNK files, which invoke mshta.exe to run obfuscated JavaScript fetching payloads from jsDelivr and executing them via legitimate git.exe. GitHub, GitLab, jsDelivr, Codeberg, and Bitbucket are abused for C2 and payload staging to deploy SpyGlace backdoor versions 3.1.15, 3.1.17, and 3.1.18.

- **Published:** 2026-07-13T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-13T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1249
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-apt-c-60-spyglace-developer-hosts-tl-2026-1249.webp?v=c882621b (Threadlinqs threat intel: APT-C-60 SpyGlace 3.1.15/3.1.17/3.1.18: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1249) — High severity, 35 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1249
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** APT-C-60 (South Korea)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 35 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2024-7262

## Description

APT-C-60 (aka APT-Q-12), a South Korea-aligned cyber-espionage group tracked since 2021 and linked to the broader DarkHotel cluster, has continued targeting Japanese and East Asian organizations with its custom SpyGlace backdoor. JPCERT/CC's July 2026 report documents a new initial-access chain: spear-phishing emails from Proton Drive-registered senders (asako.t1011@protonmail.com, ayuko0328@protonmail.com) deliver links to RAR archives containing LNK (shortcut) files. When opened, the LNK copies itself and invokes mshta.exe to execute embedded, obfuscated JavaScript. That JavaScript downloads a component (contributing[1].txt) from the jsDelivr CDN, decodes/extracts it, and uses the legitimate git.exe binary to execute scripts from the extracted folder — a living-off-the-land technique that masks malicious activity behind trusted developer tooling. GitHub, GitLab, jsDelivr, Codeberg, and (per prior 2025 campaigns) Bitbucket and Statcounter are abused as C2 channels and payload-staging infrastructure, with attacker-controlled repositories (e.g. github.com/mei1990789/class125, gitlab.com/sapphire689/dnaluakxit, codeberg.org/ochi_ma992/3tv9239irfn83) hosting downloader components and exfiltrated victim-identification data. The campaign deploys three updated SpyGlace backdoor builds (v3.1.15, v3.1.17, v3.1.18) that JPCERT/CC assesses show no major functional differences from the immediately preceding Q3 2025 releases (v3.1.12-v3.1.14), which themselves disabled the 'prockill'/'proclist' commands and added a module load/execute/unload ('uld') command. SpyGlace communicates with C2 using BASE64 encoding layered over a modified RC4 stream cipher (triple KSA cycles, custom key material), with downloaded files separately protected by AES-128-CBC. Seven C2 IP addresses are documented for the 2026 campaign. GitHub repositories used for staging were found to contain Windows Volume Serial Numbers and computer names from at least 24 compromised Japanese devices, confirming successful compromises. The group's 2025 campaigns used VHDX-attachment lures impersonating job applicants/researchers targeting HR and recruitment staff, executing scripts via the Git binary gcmd.exe and establishing persistence through COM hijacking of CLSID {566296fe-e0e8-475f-ba9c-a31ad31620b1}. APT-C-60 has previously exploited a WPS Office zero-day (CVE-2024-7262) for initial access, underscoring a pattern of combining novel exploitation with abuse of trusted software supply-chain and developer-service infrastructure to evade network and endpoint detection.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1598 Phishing for Information
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1566 Phishing
- T1204 User Execution
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1546 Event Triggered Execution
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1102 Web Service
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1132 Data Encoding
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**APT-C-60 mshta.exe Spawned from Explorer Following LNK Open** (`TL-2026-1249-SPL-001`)

Detects mshta.exe launched as a child of explorer.exe with an obfuscated inline JavaScript command line, matching the APT-C-60 2026 initial-access chain where a phished LNK file invokes mshta.exe to run obfuscated JS that fetches a downloader from jsDelivr.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.002, T1204.002, T1218, T1218.005
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_telemetry
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where match(ParentImage, "(?i)\\\\explorer\\.exe$") AND match(Image, "(?i)\\\\mshta\\.exe$")
| eval susp_cmd=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)javascript:|eval\\(|unescape\\(|String\\.fromCharCode"), 1, 0)
| where susp_cmd=1
| table _time, ComputerName, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, ProcessGuid
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "mshta.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("javascript:", "eval(", "unescape(", "fromCharCode")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessId
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: mshta.exe Spawned from Explorer with Obfuscated JavaScript (APT-C-60)
id: 7a2e4c10-1f3b-4d5e-9a6c-1249001aptc60
status: experimental
description: Detects mshta.exe launched from explorer.exe with inline obfuscated JavaScript, matching the APT-C-60 2026 LNK-triggered initial-access chain reported by JPCERT/CC.
references:
    - https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2026/07/apt-c-60_2026.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1218.005
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
    selection_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'javascript:'
            - 'eval('
            - 'unescape('
            - 'fromCharCode'
    condition: selection_parent and selection_cmd
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate HTA-based internal tooling launched manually from Explorer
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Internal HTA-based admin tools manually double-clicked from Explorer or a shortcut on a legitimate IT-managed desktop

**Tuning notes:** If the environment has legitimate mshta-based kiosk/HTA tooling, add an allow-list on hash or signed-publisher for the specific HTA file; otherwise treat any explorer.exe->mshta.exe with inline script content as high-fidelity.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- APT-C-60 Spear-Phishing Sender / Proton Drive Share-Link Delivery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- APT-C-60 Victim Fingerprint / SpyGlace Filename Artifact Drop (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- APT-C-60 SpyGlace Sample Hash / Mutex Match (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- APT-C-60 mshta.exe Outbound Connection to Code-Hosting/CDN Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- APT-C-60 Attacker-Controlled Repository Path Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- APT-C-60 C2 IP Beacon Connection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- APT-C-60 COM Hijack Persistence via SpyGlace CLSID (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- APT-C-60 git.exe/gcmd.exe LOLBin Executing Staged Script Content (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 35)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `31.58.136[.]207`
- URL: `hxxps://github[.]com/mei1990789/class125`
- File hash: `669c268e4e1ced22113e5561a7d414a76fcd247189ed87a8f89fbbd61520966a`

Full set of 35 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Update on Attacks by Threat Group APT-C-60 in 2026](https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2026/07/apt-c-60_2026.html)
- [Update on Attacks by Threat Group APT-C-60](https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2025/11/APT-C-60_update.html)
- [Attack Exploiting Legitimate Service by APT-C-60](https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2024/12/APT-C-60.html)
- [APT-C-60 Deploys Updated SpyGlace Malware In Japan Espionage](https://cyble.com/blog/apt-c-60-deploys-updated-spyglace-malware-in-japan/)
- [APT-C-60 Hackers Exploit StatCounter and Bitbucket in SpyGlace Malware Campaign](https://thehackernews.com/2024/11/apt-c-60-exploits-wps-office.html)
- [Attack Group APT-C-60 Targets Japan Using Trusted Platforms](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/aptc60-targets-japan-using-trusted/)
- [APT-C-60 (Threat Actor) profile](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/apt-c-60)
- [APT-C-60 Group Exploit WPS Office Flaw to Deploy SpyGlace Backdoor](https://thehackernews.com/2024/08/apt-c-60-group-exploit-wps-office-flaw.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1249
