Skip to navigation

Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-1262

Critical Authentication Bypass in WordPress OAuth Single Sign-On (SSO) Plugin by miniOrange (CVE-2026-57807)

criticalACTIVE

The WordPress OAuth Single Sign-On (SSO) OAuth Client plugin by miniOrange (versions through 38.5.8) contains a CWE-288 authentication bypass in its password-recovery path that lets an unauthenticated remote attacker authenticate as any user, including administrators. CVSS 9.8, no official vendor patch as of disclosure; Patchstack expects mass-exploit campaigns consistent with the pattern seen against other unauthenticated WordPress plugin admin-takeover flaws in 2026.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1262, CVE-2026-57807, CVE-2023-2982, CVE-2026-0352
Also known asminiOrange OAuth SSO Password Recovery Bypass
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Exploitation statusPublic proof-of-concept exploit for a linked CVE
EPSSCVE-2023-2982: 46.2% (98.7th percentile); CVE-2026-57807: 0.4% (34.5th percentile)
Affected productsminiOrange Security Software Pvt Ltd. OAuth Single Sign On - SSO (OAuth Client)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-288
ToolsPatchstack virtual patch / WAF rule for CVE-2026-57807
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1046 Network Service Discovery, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1098 Account Manipulation, T1102 Web Service, T1136.001 Local Account, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1491 Defacement, T1505.003 Web Shell, T1518 Software Discovery and 4 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstechnology, news - media, ecommerce, education, government administration, health, finance
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources11 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-13, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1262 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 16 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Anomalous WordPress Administrator Account Creation Following Forged Session (Post-Exploitation)

Detects new/modified administrator-role rows in wp_users/wp_usermeta or REST API user-creation calls occurring shortly after an anomalous admin session with no prior valid-credential submission, indicating persistence via account creation/manipulation after CVE-2026-57807 exploitation.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1136.001, T1098, T1078
  • Data sources: web_server_access_logs, wordpress_database_audit_log, wp_users_wp_usermeta_change_log
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=web sourcetype=access_combined uri_path="/wp-json/*/users*" http_method="POST" (uri_path="*users*" OR form_data="*administrator*")
| eval has_admin_role=if(match(form_data, "(?i)administrator"), 1, 0)
| where has_admin_role=1
| join type=left src_ip [ search index=web sourcetype=access_combined uri_path="/wp-login.php" | stats count as prior_login_count by src_ip ]
| where isnull(prior_login_count) OR prior_login_count=0
| table _time, src_ip, uri_path, http_method, status, form_data
| sort -_time

Microsoft KQL

let window = 1h;
let susSessions = WebRequests
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where UrlPath == "/wp-login.php"
| summarize PriorLogins=count() by ClientIP;
WebRequests
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where UrlPath has "/wp-json/" and UrlPath has "/users"
| where HttpMethod == "POST"
| where RequestBody has "administrator"
| join kind=leftouter (susSessions) on ClientIP
| where isnull(PriorLogins) or PriorLogins == 0
| project TimeGenerated, ClientIP, UrlPath, HttpStatusCode, RequestBody
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma

title: WordPress REST API Administrator Account Creation Following Unauthenticated Session
id: 8f2a1c42-1262-4a01-9c11-cve202657807c
status: experimental
description: Detects POST requests to /wp-json/*/users creating an administrator-role account shortly after an anomalous/forged session, consistent with chaining CVE-2026-57807 auth bypass into privilege persistence.
references:
    - https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/miniorange-oauth-oidc-single-sign-on/vulnerability/wordpress-oauth-single-sign-on-sso-oauth-client-plugin-38-5-8-broken-authentication-vulnerability
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
    - attack.t1098
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1078
    - cve.2026.57807
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: wordpress
detection:
    selection:
        request.path|contains: '/wp-json/'
        request.path|contains: '/users'
        request.method: 'POST'
        request.body|contains: 'administrator'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator onboarding performed by an already-authenticated site administrator
    - Automated provisioning scripts run by site operators (e.g. WP-CLI, Terraform WordPress providers)
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate administrator onboarding by an already-authenticated admin
  • Automated provisioning via WP-CLI or IaC tooling run by site operators

Tuning notes: Correlate with wp_users/wp_usermeta change auditing (if available) to confirm the created account actually received wp_capabilities=administrator; add an allow-list for known CI/CD or IaC service accounts that legitimately create users via REST API.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • miniOrange OAuth SSO Plugin Fingerprinting and Alternate-Channel Probe (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Web Shell Drop Following Forged WordPress Admin Session (Post-Exploitation Persistence) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound C2 Beacon or Data Exfiltration From Compromised WordPress Host (C2/Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
  • miniOrange OAuth SSO Alternate Password-Recovery Endpoint Invocation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Account Manipulation via wp_usermeta Capability Escalation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • WordPress Host Outbound Web-Service C2 Beacon After Auth-Bypass Exploitation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • miniOrange OAuth SSO Alternate Password-Recovery Channel Invocation (CVE-2026-57807 Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Forged WordPress Admin Session Without Prior Credential Submission or OAuth Handshake (C2/Session Hijack Indicator) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-13, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 16 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1262.

16 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

CVE-2026-57807 is a critical unauthenticated authentication-bypass vulnerability (CWE-288, Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel) in the OAuth Single Sign On - SSO (OAuth Client) plugin for WordPress, developed by miniOrange Security Software Pvt Ltd. (plugin slug miniorange-oauth-oidc-single-sign-on). The plugin implements OAuth/OIDC-based SSO for WordPress sites and additionally ships its own password-recovery flow as a fallback account-recovery mechanism. That fallback path fails to enforce the authentication controls that gate the plugin's primary OAuth login flow: it exposes an 'alternate path or channel' (per NVD's CWE-288 classification) that a remote, unauthenticated attacker can invoke directly to trigger or manipulate the password-recovery/account-provisioning logic for an arbitrary target account, including site administrators, without ever presenting valid IdP-issued credentials or completing the intended OAuth handshake.

Because the flaw sits in the recovery/provisioning logic rather than in the OAuth token-validation path itself, standard OAuth hardening (redirect_uri allow-listing, state/PKCE validation, JWT signature checks) does not mitigate it — the attacker never touches the OAuth code-exchange step at all. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) reflects a fully remote, low-complexity, zero-privilege, zero-interaction attack with complete confidentiality/integrity/availability impact, consistent with a full site takeover once an admin-level session is forged.

The vulnerability was reported to Patchstack by independent researcher Kim Dvash on 2026-06-06 and publicly disclosed by Patchstack on 2026-07-09, with NVD publication on 2026-07-10. As of disclosure, miniOrange has not shipped an official patch; Patchstack has issued a virtual-patch/WAF rule to its customers to block exploitation attempts pending a vendor fix. No confirmed active exploitation or public PoC had been observed at time of writing, but Patchstack explicitly flagged this as high-priority and likely to see mass, automated exploitation given the pattern of 2026 WordPress plugin auth-bypass campaigns (e.g., CVE-2026-8181 in Burst Statistics, CVE-2026-0352 in UpdraftPlus), where botnets fingerprint the vulnerable plugin slug/version via passive HTTP probing within hours of disclosure and complete automated admin takeover in seconds once a target is confirmed vulnerable.

miniOrange's WordPress authentication plugin family has a recurring history of authentication-bypass defects: CVE-2023-2982 in the related Social Login and Register plugin (CVSS 9.8, ~30,000+ installs, insufficient encryption of the supplied login identifier) and earlier OAuth-client authentication issues (CVE-2022-2133, CVE-2022-34858), indicating a systemic pattern of insufficiently validated alternate-authentication paths across the vendor's product line rather than an isolated defect.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Privilege Escalation

T1078 Valid Accounts

Defense Evasion

T1078.004 Cloud Accounts

Persistence

T1098 Account Manipulation; T1136.001 Local Account; T1505.003 Web Shell

Command and Control

T1102 Web Service

Credential Access

T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access; T1606 Forge Web Credentials

Collection

T1213 Data from Information Repositories

Impact

T1491 Defacement; T1531 Account Access Removal

Reconnaissance

T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • No official miniOrange patch available as of 2026-07-13; monitor plugins.miniorange.com and the WordPress.org plugin changelog for a fixed release above 38.5.8

Immediate actions

  • Deactivate the OAuth Single Sign On - SSO (OAuth Client) plugin (slug miniorange-oauth-oidc-single-sign-on) on all WordPress sites running version 38.5.8 or earlier until a vendor patch is available
  • Block or restrict direct access to the plugin's password-recovery / account-provisioning endpoints at the reverse proxy or WAF layer
  • Deploy Patchstack's published virtual-patch/WAF rule for this vulnerability if using Patchstack
  • Force-reset credentials and invalidate active sessions for all administrator accounts on affected sites
  • Review wp_users and wp_usermeta for unexpected new administrator accounts or privilege escalations since 2026-06-06 (report date)
  • Enable MFA for all administrator accounts as defense-in-depth against forged sessions

Workarounds

  • Patchstack virtual patch / WAF rule (available to Patchstack customers) blocking exploitation of the alternate password-recovery path
  • Temporary plugin deactivation is the only complete workaround absent a vendor patch

Longer-term hardening

  • Migrate to vendor-supported SSO/authentication mechanisms once a patched plugin version is released
  • Implement WAF rules that specifically monitor and rate-limit password-recovery and account-provisioning endpoints on all installed WordPress authentication plugins
  • Adopt a WordPress plugin inventory/SBOM process with automated CVE monitoring (e.g., WPScan, Patchstack, Wordfence feeds) given miniOrange's recurring auth-bypass history across its plugin family
  • Apply least-privilege and network segmentation for WordPress administrative interfaces (wp-admin) independent of plugin-level authentication

Affected and fixed versions

  • miniOrange Security Software Pvt Ltd. — OAuth Single Sign On - SSO (OAuth Client)
    Vulnerable versions: <= 38.5.8

Timeline

  • miniOrange patches three edition-specific 'IdP Deletion via CSRF' vulnerabilities (CVSS 5.4) in the Standard (fixed 28.4.9), Premium (fixed 38.4.9), and Enterprise (fixed 48.4.9) tracks of the same OAuth Single Sign On plugin family, establishing an earlier documented weakness in the plugin's authentication/IdP-management logic.
  • miniOrange patches an 'Incorrect Authorization to Sensitive Information Exposure' flaw (CVSS 5.3) across five concurrently-maintained version tracks of the plugin (fixed in 30.5.4, 38.5.4, 40.5.4, 48.5.4, 50.5.4), showing the vendor actively maintains multiple parallel release branches — relevant because CVE-2026-57807 affects the 38.x branch up to 38.5.8, a version above this prior fix.
  • Independent researcher Kim Dvash reports the authentication-bypass flaw in the miniOrange OAuth Single Sign On - SSO (OAuth Client) plugin to Patchstack.
  • Cyber Security News publishes coverage of the vulnerability, prompting the initial hunt/ingestion of this threat record.
  • Patchstack publicly discloses CVE-2026-57807 (Patchstack ID a3890a0fcaf2) and rates it high-priority, warning of expected mass-exploit campaigns; no official miniOrange patch exists at disclosure, and the plugin has no Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) with Patchstack.
  • TheHackerWire and other outlets publish secondary analysis of the authentication-bypass mechanism and expected exploitation risk.
  • NVD publishes the CVE-2026-57807 record (source identifier audit@patchstack.com) with CVSS 3.1 base score 9.8 (Critical), exploitability sub-score 3.9, impact sub-score 5.9, and CWE-288 classification.
  • Threadlinqs Intelligence Platform compiles this research record; no vendor patch, no confirmed public PoC, and no CISA KEV listing observed as of this date.

Sources cited

Previous and next in vulnerability

    Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated —.

    Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

    // threat_feed
    $ sort --newest
    Showing all threats

    Live intelligence console

    Threat level

    Latest Threats