# GigaWiper (BLUERABBIT): Golang Backdoor Bundling Physical-Disk Wiping, Crucio-Derived Fake Ransomware, and FlockWiper-Derived Multi-Pass Wiping

> Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified GigaWiper, a Go-based backdoor active since October 2025 that fuses a standalone physical-disk wiper, a Crucio-ransomware-derived unrecoverable file-encryption command, and a reimplemented FlockWiper multi-pass drive-wiping routine into a single C2-controlled implant on Windows systems. Google Threat Intelligence Group and Binary Defense track the same malware as BLUERABBIT and assess it as part of an Iran-nexus cluster linked to prior IRGC-affiliated CyberAv3ngers activity (Crucio, December 2023 CISA advisory) that also produced BLUEWIPE and SEWERGOO. The implant gives operators on-demand choice between quiet espionage (screen capture/recording, keylogging, VNC-like remote access, system profiling) and destructive sabotage (raw sector wiping, BSOD triggering, .candy-extension fake ransomware, event-log deletion).

- **Published:** 2026-07-13T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-13T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1271
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-bluerabbit-gigawiper-disk-wiper-tl-2026-1271.webp?v=747a645c (Threadlinqs threat intel: GigaWiper Physical-Disk Wiper Backdoor: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1271) — High severity, 32 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1271
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** BLUERABBIT (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 32 (2 shown free below)

## Description

GigaWiper is a modular, Golang-compiled backdoor first observed conducting destructive wiping activity in October 2025 and publicly disclosed by Microsoft on 2026-07-09. It is architecturally distinctive for consolidating THREE previously distinct malware lineages into a single 20-command implant rather than deploying them as separate tools: (1) a standalone physical-disk wiper that is code-identical to the backdoor's own Command 1/WipeMain, suggesting the wiper was cannibalized into the backdoor or vice versa; (2) a file-encryption/destruction command (Command 3, internally named RanMain/BigBangExtortMain) whose code traces to Crucio ransomware, a malware family a December 2023 CISA advisory attributed to IRGC-affiliated cyber actors following attacks on US, UK, Irish, and Israeli water and energy infrastructure; and (3) a multi-pass secure-wipe command (Command 12, WipeCMain) that is a Golang reimplementation of FlockWiper, a C-language wiper that first surfaced on VirusTotal in June 2025, months before GigaWiper's own operational debut.

Attribution linkage across the three lineages rests on shared function naming (BigBangExtortMain appears in both Crucio and GigaWiper), identical code flow, string overlap, and a recurring "GRAT" tag that appears both in FlockWiper's PDB debug paths (A:\GRAT\CWipeNew\Release\CWipeNew.pdb and E:\files\new\GRAT\CWipe\Release\CWipe.pdb) and throughout GigaWiper's internal function names — indicating the existence of an undiscovered "GRAT" development framework shared across the toolset. Google Threat Intelligence Group and Binary Defense track the family as BLUERABBIT and assess it, per Binary Defense reporting, as an Iran-nexus cluster targeting Israeli organizations, part of the same operational grouping that deployed BLUEWIPE and SEWERGOO in June 2025. Microsoft's own reporting declines to attribute a specific nation-state. Binary Defense first observed BLUERABBIT samples in March 2026; Microsoft dates the destructive activity itself to October 2025.

Operationally, GigaWiper communicates over RabbitMQ (AMQP) for command tasking — using a fanout exchange named "All" for broadcast commands and a topic exchange named "Topic" for targeted commands managed via Command 8's bind/unbind routing — and over Redis on non-standard ports for status/result reporting (fields: error, target_ip, task_id, target_computer_name, output, pwd, time, status, work_status). Both channels use an encrypted, hard-coded AES configuration. Data can be exfiltrated via a bundled MinIO client (Command 4). Persistence is established via a scheduled task named "OneDrive Update" that runs every minute plus at startup, with execution counts tracked in HKCU\SOFTWARE\OneDrive\Environment; the implant masquerades a firewall rule as "Microsoft.Windows.CloudExperienceHost" to cloak its VNC-like remote-desktop command (Command 20).

The destructive tier gives the operator three distinct escalation levers on a single infected host: Command 1 (WipeMain) enumerates physical drives via WMI, removes non-Windows-drive partition metadata via IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK, and overwrites raw sectors in 0xA00000-byte chunks with a randomized (or fallback constant "1") first byte and zero-padded remainder, then forces an immediate zero-delay reboot; Command 2 triggers a BSOD via registry/boot-file deletion; Command 3 (RanMain/BigBangExtortMain) performs AES-CBC encryption in chunks with a randomly generated key/IV that is never persisted anywhere (making the encryption cryptographically unrecoverable — a "fake ransomware" that drops no ransom note and excludes .exe/.dll from encryption, deleting originals after encrypting), applying the .candy extension and dropping ./image_danger.jpg as a wallpaper; Command 12 (WipeCMain) performs FlockWiper-style multi-pass secure wiping restricted to the Windows drive — pass 1 zeros, pass 2 0xFF bytes, pass 3 random bytes, with inter-pass timing reported back to the operator.

Espionage/management tradecraft includes Command 5 (AES-256-CBC file encrypt/decrypt utility, key stored in key.txt), Command 7 (PowerShell execution appending a directory-tracking marker ";"|?????|$pwd""), Command 9 (per-monitor PNG screenshot capture), Command 10 (screen recording to C:\ProgramData\output when the user is active and the system unlocked), Command 11 (an unpopulated keylogger stub), Command 15 (system/network/firmware/AV profiling), Command 16 (process manager), Command 17 (service manager), Command 18 (interactive registry manager), Command 19 (deletion of System, Setup, Application, ForwardedEvents, and Security Windows event logs), and Command 20 (VNC-like remote desktop). Commands 6, 13, and 14 are unpopulated/unimplemented placeholders reserved for future wiper or escalation logic, underscoring the implant's modular, still-evolving design.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1547.005 Security Support Provider
- T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols
- T1571 Non-Standard Port
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1021.005 VNC
- T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe
- T1485 Data Destruction
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall
- T1685.002 Disable or Modify Cloud Log
- T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1012 Query Registry
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1125 Video Capture
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GigaWiper Raw Disk IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK + Mass Windows Event Log Clearing — Post-Exploitation** (`TL-2026-1271-SPL-002`)

Detects the destructive-tier post-exploitation signature: WMI physical-drive enumeration followed by IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK partition-metadata-stripping handle access, and/or mass clearing of System, Setup, Application, ForwardedEvents, and Security event logs within a short window — GigaWiper Command 1 (WipeMain) staging plus Command 19 anti-forensics.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1561.002, T1070.001, T1529
- **Data sources:** windows_security_log, sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
(index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4656 ObjectName="*\\Device\\Harddisk*" AccessMask="*0x2*")
OR (index=wineventlog (sourcetype="WinEventLog:System" OR sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" OR sourcetype="WinEventLog:Application" OR sourcetype="WinEventLog:Setup" OR sourcetype="WinEventLog:ForwardedEvents") EventCode=1102)
| eval indicator=if(EventCode=4656,"raw_disk_ioctl","log_clear")
| stats count as event_count, dc(sourcetype) as logs_cleared, values(indicator) as indicators by ComputerName, _time span=10m
| where event_count>0
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let diskAccess = DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "DeviceObjectHandleAccess" or AdditionalFields has "IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK"
| where AdditionalFields has "Harddisk";
let logClears = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventID == 1102;
diskAccess
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType
| union (logClears | project Timestamp=TimeGenerated, DeviceName=Computer, ActionType="EventLogCleared")
| summarize Events=make_set(ActionType), Count=count() by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 10m)
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: GigaWiper Raw Disk IOCTL and Mass Event Log Clearing
id: 7c1a9e3e-2b41-4f6a-9d0e-1a2b3c4d5e04
status: experimental
description: Detects raw physical-disk IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK handle access and/or mass Windows event log clearing consistent with GigaWiper Command 1 (WipeMain) and Command 19 anti-forensics.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/09/gigawiper-anatomy-of-a-destructive-backdoor-assembled-from-multiple-malware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-13
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1561.002
    - attack.t1070.001
    - attack.malware.gigawiper
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: driver_load
detection:
    selection_disk:
        EventID: 4656
        ObjectName|contains: '\Device\Harddisk'
        AccessMask|contains: '0x2'
    selection_logclear:
        EventID: 1102
    condition: selection_disk or selection_logclear
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate disk-management tooling (e.g. diskpart, backup software) issuing IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK during authorized repartitioning
    - Scheduled/authorized log-retention housekeeping clearing individual channels
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Authorized disk-management/backup software issuing IOCTL_DISK_CREATE_DISK during legitimate repartitioning
- Scheduled/authorized log-retention housekeeping clearing individual event log channels one at a time

**Tuning notes:** Escalate to critical only when >=3 distinct log channels are cleared within 10 minutes on the same host, or when a disk IOCTL event is followed by an unplanned reboot (EventID 6006/1074) within 5 minutes.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- GigaWiper CloudExperienceHost Firewall Rule Masquerade + Registry Execution Counter — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper [indicator] Fake-Ransomware Encryption + [indicator] Wallpaper Drop — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper MinIO-Based Exfiltration + VNC-Like Remote Access Session — C2/Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Scheduled-Task + Firewall-Masquerade Persistence Chain — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper Multi-Pass Wipe + Forced Reboot / BSOD — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper RabbitMQ Fanout/Topic Exchange Tasking Pattern — C2/Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper '[indicator]' Scheduled Task Persistence — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GigaWiper AMQP/Redis C2 on Non-Standard Ports (RabbitMQ Tasking + Result Reporting) — C2/Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (2 of 32)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.182.193[.]21`
- IP address: `212.8.248[.]104`

Full set of 32 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [GigaWiper: Anatomy of a destructive backdoor assembled from multiple malware](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/09/gigawiper-anatomy-of-a-destructive-backdoor-assembled-from-multiple-malware/)
- [GigaWiper: Threat actors choose their own destructive attack](https://www.darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/gigawiper-threat-actors-choose-their-own-destructive-attack)
- [New GigaWiper Windows Backdoor Bundles Disk Wiping, Fake Ransomware, and Spyware](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/new-gigawiper-windows-backdoor-bundles.html)
- [GigaWiper: Modular Windows Backdoor Combines Disk Wiper, Fake Ransomware, Spyware](https://www.techtimes.com/articles/320093/20260710/gigawiper-modular-windows-backdoor-combines-disk-wiper-fake-ransomware-spyware.htm)
- [Microsoft uncovers GigaWiper, a backdoor designed for destruction on demand](https://www.csoonline.com/article/4195470/microsoft-uncovers-gigawiper-a-backdoor-designed-for-destruction-on-demand.html)
- [GigaWiper Combines Multiple Malware for System-Level Sabotage](https://www.securityweek.com/gigawiper-combines-multiple-malware-for-system-level-sabotage/)
- [Microsoft Warns GigaWiper Merges Crucio and FlockWiper Code Into Destructive Backdoor](https://cyberpress.org/microsoft-flags-gigawiper-backdoor/)
- [Microsoft Exposes GigaWiper Backdoor's Triple Threat](https://osintsights.com/microsoft-exposes-gigawiper-backdoors-triple-threat)
- [Microsoft Warns of GigaWiper Backdoor Built to Destroy Windows PCs](https://hackread.com/microsoft-gigawiper-backdoor-destroy-windows-pcs/)
- [Destructive Windows backdoor stuffs multiple wipers and ransomware code into a single package](https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/07/10/destructive-windows-backdoor-stuffs-multiple-wipers-and-ransomware-code-into-a-single-package/5270053)
- [CISA Advisory: IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors (Crucio ransomware, water/energy infrastructure attacks)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1271
