# Operation ShadowRecruit: APT36-Linked SheetAgent RAT Campaign Abuses ControlR RMM and Google Sheets C2 to Target Indian Government Job Seekers

> Seqrite's APT Research Team disclosed Operation ShadowRecruit, a recruitment-themed espionage campaign targeting applicants for a Cabinet Secretariat 'Senior Field Officer (Technical)' posting in India. A malicious LNK file masquerading as a Microsoft Edge document triggers a four-stage infection chain that installs the legitimate ControlR RMM agent for remote access alongside a custom .NET SheetAgent RAT that uses the Google Sheets API as a resilient, low-noise C2 channel. The campaign is attributed with medium confidence to APT36 (Transparent Tribe) based on targeting overlap and TTP similarity to the Zscaler-documented SheetCreep/Firepower/MailCreep cloud-C2 toolset.

- **Published:** 2026-07-14T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-14T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1297
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-apt36-shadowrecruit-sheetagent-tl-2026-1297.webp?v=8acfdc65 (Threadlinqs threat intel: APT36 ShadowRecruit SheetAgent RAT: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1297) — High severity, 23 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1297
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** APT36 (Pakistan)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 23 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Operation ShadowRecruit begins with a spearphishing lure themed around a genuine Cabinet Secretariat 'Senior Field Officer (Technical)' recruitment notice (Employment News, issue dated 13-19 June 2026) delivered to Indian government job applicants. The initial artifact is a Windows shortcut file, Document-24062026-Y6352634.lnk, disguised with a Microsoft Edge icon and a benign-sounding description ('Install ControlR Agent'). Executing the LNK invokes PowerShell in hidden mode to run a downloader script, JT-agenda.ps1, which retrieves the legitimate, Bitbound-signed ControlR RMM agent installer directly from demo.controlr.app and silently enrolls the victim endpoint into an attacker-controlled ControlR tenant using hardcoded enrollment credentials (Tenant ID, Key ID, Key Secret). This abuse of a legitimate, signed commercial RMM tool grants the operators full remote-hands-on-keyboard access while evading many security-tool trust heuristics that flag unsigned or unknown remote-access binaries.

In parallel, a 32-bit .NET dropper (Document.exe) stages a second, custom implant tracked as SheetAgent, extracting it (as agent.exe / WindowsDefenderSyncService.exe / MicrosoftSyncService.exe) into a working directory at %APPDATA%\Microsoft\WinSyncDefender\, alongside a decoy PDF-rendering shortcut (Document.lnk) that opens the genuine recruitment notice to distract the victim while the malware installs. The dropper establishes dual persistence via a scheduled task ('WindowsDefenderSyncService', triggered at logon and re-fired every three minutes) and a Startup-folder shortcut (WindowsDefenderSync.lnk), both masquerading as Windows Defender components.

SheetAgent is a custom .NET RAT whose most notable feature is its command-and-control channel: rather than (or in addition to) beaconing to a traditional C2 server, it authenticates to the Google Sheets and Google Drive APIs using a hardcoded Google Cloud service-account private key (service@sheet12-500308.iam.gserviceaccount.com, project sheet12-500308) and registers each victim as a row in a shared spreadsheet. Column A holds the victim hostname, B a timestamp, C attacker-issued commands, D command output, E the victim's public IP, F an ONLINE/ERROR status flag, H alerts, and J a URL-monitoring list. The implant polls Column C for new commands and writes results back to Column D, giving operators an encrypted-in-transit (HTTPS-to-Google), reputationally 'clean' C2 channel that blends into normal cloud/SaaS traffic and is difficult to block without disrupting legitimate Google Workspace usage. A second attacker-controlled server (38.242.157.89) hosts a decoy PDF plus three exposed web panels: SecureMonitor on port 9000, a 'PrivateRat' dashboard (developer alias 'HeartMelt') on port 7000, and an unnamed management interface on port 8000 - indicating this actor also operates or resells a broader RAT panel product alongside the bespoke SheetAgent tooling.

SheetAgent embeds an unusually extensive 14-point virtualization/sandbox-detection routine, checking WMI system-manufacturer strings, BIOS information, VM-associated disk-drive and GPU identifiers, running VMware/VirtualBox processes, VM-signature registry keys, VM-associated MAC address OUI prefixes, VM-specific drivers and installation directories, common sandbox analyst usernames, and known Any.Run and Triage sandbox artifacts, plus VM-specific devices/services. On positive detection the malware self-destructs via a dropped cleanup.bat that force-deletes the RAT executable, its service.json configuration file, and the batch script itself, minimizing forensic residue in automated analysis environments.

Seqrite attributes the campaign to APT36 (Transparent Tribe) with medium confidence, citing the recurring pattern of targeting Indian government job seekers, the multi-stage .NET malware architecture consistent with the group's known tradecraft, and - most significantly - the use of Google Sheets as a C2 channel, which overlaps with Zscaler ThreatLabz's prior reporting on the APT36-attributed SheetCreep, Firepower, and MailCreep cloud-abuse backdoor family targeting Indian government and diplomatic entities. APT36 (aka Transparent Tribe, Mythic Leopard, Earth Karkaddan, ProjectM, COPPER FIELDSTONE) is a Pakistan-aligned cyber-espionage actor active since at least 2013 with a long history of recruitment- and government-notice-themed lures against Indian military, diplomatic, and public-sector personnel, and has increasingly diversified its toolkit toward abuse of legitimate cloud APIs (Google Sheets/Drive, Microsoft Graph) for C2 to blend into normal SaaS traffic.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1106 Native API
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1548.004 Elevated Execution with Prompt
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1027.011 Fileless Storage
- T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories
- T1070.004 File Deletion
- T1497.001 System Checks
- T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service
- T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1614.001 System Language Discovery
- T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1102 Web Service
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1585.003 Cloud Accounts
- T1584.006 Web Services

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SheetAgent Post-Exploitation — Defender-Masquerading Scheduled Task with Sub-5-Minute Re-Fire** (`TL-2026-1297-SPL-002`)

Detects creation of a scheduled task named to impersonate Windows Defender (e.g. WindowsDefenderSyncService) with an unusually short re-fire interval (~3 minutes), plus companion Startup-folder persistence and the %APPDATA%\Microsoft\WinSyncDefender\ working directory containing service.json — the SheetAgent dropper's dual-persistence mechanism.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1053.005, T1547.001, T1036.004, T1036.005, T1027.011
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=1 Image="*\\schtasks.exe" CommandLine="*WindowsDefenderSync*") OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\Microsoft\\WinSyncDefender\\*") OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\WindowsDefenderSync*.lnk")
| eval detection_reason=case(Image="*schtasks.exe*","scheduled_task_masquerade", TargetFilename="*WinSyncDefender*","working_dir_masquerade", TargetFilename="*Startup*WindowsDefenderSync*","startup_persistence")
| table _time, ComputerName, User, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename, detection_reason
| sort - _time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "WindowsDefenderSync"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| union (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FolderPath has @"\Microsoft\WinSyncDefender\" or FolderPath has "WindowsDefenderSync"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath
)
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Scheduled Task or Startup Persistence Masquerading as Windows Defender Sync Component
id: 3f2e9a11-7bd4-4a0e-8f2c-2b6d1e7c9a3d
status: experimental
description: Detects scheduled task creation or file-drop activity masquerading as a Windows Defender sync service, consistent with SheetAgent's WindowsDefenderSyncService persistence and WinSyncDefender working directory
references:
    - https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-shadowrecruit-a-recruitment-themed-malware-campaign-leveraging-controlr-and-google-sheets-to-target-indian-job-seekers/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-14
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.004
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_task:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'WindowsDefenderSync'
    selection_path:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\WinSyncDefender\'
            - 'WindowsDefenderSync'
    condition: selection_task or selection_path
falsepositives:
    - Genuine Microsoft Defender maintenance tasks (verify parent process is MpCmdRun.exe/MsMpEng.exe and task binary is Microsoft-signed)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Genuine Microsoft Defender platform update/maintenance scheduled tasks — verify the task action binary is Microsoft-signed and located under %ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\

**Tuning notes:** Cross-reference task action binary path/hash against known-good Defender platform paths to eliminate legitimate matches; alert with higher confidence when the working directory also contains service.json or cleanup.bat.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Rogue ControlR RMM Tenant Enrollment via Bitbound-Signed Installer (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SheetAgent Config/Cleanup Artifact Drop and Anti-Forensic Self-Deletion (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SheetAgent Sandbox/VM Fingerprinting Discovery Sequence Prior to Payload Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Malicious LNK Masquerading as Microsoft Edge Document Triggering RMM/Downloader Chain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ControlR RMM Remote-Hands-On-Keyboard Session from Rogue Tenant Enrollment (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Connection to Known ShadowRecruit C2 Infrastructure or Exposed RAT Panel Ports (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SheetAgent Initial Access — LNK-Triggered Hidden-Window PowerShell Downloader (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SheetAgent Cloud C2 — Anomalous Non-Office Process Beaconing to Google Sheets/Drive API (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 23)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `38.242.157[.]89`
- Domain: `demo[.]controlr[.]app`
- File hash: `434243e615b93a1b948c26ad55902bd78f9fa18e42375c15790634375c1ad3f4`

Full set of 23 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Operation ShadowRecruit: A Recruitment-Themed Malware Campaign Leveraging ControlR and Google Sheets to Target Indian Job Seekers](https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-shadowrecruit-a-recruitment-themed-malware-campaign-leveraging-controlr-and-google-sheets-to-target-indian-job-seekers/)
- [SHEETCREEP, FIREPOWER, and MAILCREEP Analysis](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt-attacks-target-indian-government-using-sheetcreep-firepower-and)
- [SHEETCREEP C# RAT Abuses Google Sheets API as C2 to Target Diplomatic Organizations](https://cybersecuritynews.com/sheetcreep-c-rat-abuses-google-sheets-api/)
- [Hackers Use UAE-India Diplomatic Lure to Deliver SHEETCREEP RAT via Google Sheets](https://gbhackers.com/uae-india-diplomatic-lure/)
- [APT36: A Nightmare of Vibeware](https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/apt36-nightmare-vibeware)
- [Transparent Tribe Uses AI to Mass-Produce Malware Implants in Campaign Targeting India](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/transparent-tribe-uses-ai-to-mass.html)
- [APT36: A Phishing Campaign Targeting Indian Government Entities](https://www.cyfirma.com/research/apt36-a-phishing-campaign-targeting-indian-government-entities/)
- [APT36 : Multi-Stage LNK Malware Campaign Targeting Indian Government Entities](https://www.cyfirma.com/research/apt36-multi-stage-lnk-malware-campaign-targeting-indian-government-entities/)
- [APT Profile: Transparent Tribe aka APT36](https://www.cyfirma.com/research/apt-profile-transparent-tribe-aka-apt36/)
- [APT36 Targets Indian Government with Golang-Based DeskRAT Malware Campaign](https://thehackernews.com/2025/10/apt36-targets-indian-government-with.html)
- [Investigation Report: APT36 Malware Campaign Using Desktop Entry Files and Google Drive Payload Delivery](https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/investigation-report-apt36-malware-campaign-using-desktop-entry-files-and-google-drive-payload-delivery)
- [Dark Web Profile: APT36](https://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-apt36/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1297
