# Pro-Iran Hacktivist Ecosystem Uses Telegram to Coordinate DDoS, Hack-and-Leak, and Credential-Theft Campaigns (Handala, 313 Team, Cyber Fattah, Dark Storm, Keymous+, and Affiliated Personas)

> DomainTools Investigations documents a decentralized pro-Iran hacktivist ecosystem — including Handala, 313 Team, Cyber Fattah, Fatimiyoun/FAD Team, Dark Storm, CJM, Keymous+, DieNet, and supporting reconnaissance/doxxing cells — coordinating via Telegram channels, shared target lists, and the Beamed DDoS-for-hire platform to conduct high-volume DDoS, hack-and-leak, and credential-theft campaigns against government, critical-infrastructure, finance, and media organizations. Researchers assess several of these personas are interchangeable 'skins' operated by Iran's MOIS over shared technical infrastructure.

- **Published:** 2026-07-14T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-14T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1309
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-handala-pro-iran-hacktivist-personas-tl-2026-1309.webp?v=963d56b4 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Pro-Iran Hacktivist Ecosystem: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1309) — Medium severity, 16 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1309
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** VOID MANTICORE - G1055 (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 16 (3 shown free below)

## Description

DomainTools Investigations (DTI) analysts assess that a broad set of pro-Iran and 'Axis of Resistance' hacktivist identities operating on Telegram — Homeland Justice, Karma/KarmaBelow80, and Handala Hack among them — function as a single coordinated cyber-influence ecosystem aligned with Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), rather than as distinct grassroots hacktivist groups. These personas are described as interchangeable 'skins' layered over the same technical team, shared infrastructure, and common playbook, allowing Tehran to segment messaging and target sets across audiences while retaining centralized operational control.

The ecosystem's coordination and attack-tooling infrastructure spans Telegram (primary command, claim, and amplification channel), GitHub (tooling/target-list distribution), leak sites, and the commercially available 'Beamed' DDoS-for-hire/booter platform (marketed capability exceeding 3.5 Tbps, aliased in some claims as beamed.cc). Check-host[.]net is used across the ecosystem as a third-party 'proof-of-impact' validation service to lend credibility to DDoS claims.

Named collectives observed operating within this ecosystem include primary disruptors Handala (aka Homeland Justice, Karma/KarmaBelow80, linked to MOIS-attributed cluster Banished Kitten/Storm-0842/Void Manticore/Dune/Red Sandstorm), 313 Team (aka Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq), Cyber Fattah, Fatimiyoun/FAD Team, and Dark Storm (Dark Storm Team); secondary/opportunistic operators Keymous+, DieNet, NoName057(16), Killnet, and MONARCH; and enabling-function cells Evil Markhors (reconnaissance and credential harvesting) and Cyber Isnaad Front (doxxing and intimidation). Additional groups observed claiming activity in the same wartime wave include Nation of Saviors, Conquerors Electronic Army (operating under the Cyber Islamic Resistance/CIR umbrella), Sylhet Gang, APT Iran, PalachPro, and Hider Nex/Tunisian Maskers Cyber Force.

The ecosystem is low-sophistication by design: rather than novel intrusion tradecraft, it leans on high-volume/high-visibility DDoS floods, recycled or exaggerated breach data repackaged as new 'leaks,' website defacements, doxxing/identity-exposure campaigns, and propaganda amplification timed to kinetic events (e.g., the 2025-2026 Iran-Israel-US conflict). A representative high-profile action attributed to this ecosystem is the May 2026 DDoS campaign by 313 Team against Canonical/Ubuntu infrastructure: beginning around May 1, 2026, the group used the Beamed booter service against roughly 14 Ubuntu-related domains (ubuntu.com, Launchpad package repositories, and security-update API endpoints), disrupting site availability and package-update functionality. The action was accompanied by a Telegram-posted extortion/ceasefire demand and coincided with Canonical's disclosure of the high-severity 'Copyfail' Linux vulnerability, amplifying reputational impact; X/Twitter subsequently suspended the group's account.

Separately, the FBI (IC3 alert, ref. 260320, published March 23, 2026) documented Iranian state-linked actors — assessed as connected to the Handala persona and broader MOIS-run operations — using Telegram bot infrastructure as command-and-control against political dissidents, opposition figures, and journalists critical of the Iranian regime. The technique involves social-engineering victims (impersonating known contacts or tech support) into installing trojanized apps disguised as legitimate Telegram/WhatsApp builds; once installed, Telegram's own Bot API is abused as a C2 channel to remotely command the implant, exfiltrate files, capture screenshots, and record video calls — blending malicious C2 traffic with legitimate Telegram network traffic to evade detection.

During the February 28-March 5, 2026 hacktivist surge tied to the Iran-Israel-US conflict, 149 DDoS claims were logged against 110 distinct organizations across 16 countries, with Keymous+, DieNet, and NoName057(16) responsible for nearly 70% of claimed activity in the peak Feb 28-Mar 2 window. Targeting concentrated heavily on the Middle East (107 of 149 claims), led by Kuwait (28%), Israel (27.1%), and Jordan (21.5%), with Europe absorbing 22.8% of remaining activity; government entities represented 47.8% of targets, followed by finance (11.9%) and telecommunications (6.7%).

Handala itself (established December 18, 2023, in the weeks following the October 7, 2023 attacks) has a documented history beyond pure DDoS, including the HamsaUpdate wiper deployment (December 2023), high-profile email/data breaches of senior Israeli officials (Ehud Barak, Gadi Eisenkot, Benny Gantz, Naftali Bennett), an alleged Shin Bet personnel-data infiltration (~30,000 records), an alleged 197GB exfiltration from Soreq Nuclear Research Center, a March 2026 attack claim against Stryker Corporation (healthcare device manufacturer, allegedly affecting data tied to 150 million patients), and a claimed compromise of FBI Director Kash Patel's personal email account. US DOJ and FBI attribution places a Handala-linked MOIS unit under identified leadership, including Yahya Hosseini Panjaki, reported killed during the June 2025/2026 Iran war.

Overall, DomainTools and downstream reporting (Cyberpress, SOCRadar, Unit 42, Rapid7, Sophos, Infosecurity Magazine, GBHackers, The Hacker News) characterize this as a durable, reusable wartime cyber-influence apparatus: personas can be spun up, retired, or rebranded quickly, infrastructure (Telegram channels, booter services, leak sites) is shared and recycled across identities, and impact is measured as much in psychological/propaganda terms as in technical damage — while still producing real operational disruption against government, critical-infrastructure, financial, healthcare, and media targets globally.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.005 Botnet
- T1587.001 Malware
- T1585.001 Social Media Accounts
- T1584.006 Web Services
- T1593.002 Search Engines
- T1589.001 Credentials
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1505.003 Web Shell
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1056.004 Credential API Hooking
- T1598 Phishing for Information
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1125 Video Capture
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication
- T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy
- T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1498.001 Direct Network Flood
- T1498.002 Reflection Amplification
- T1499.004 Application or System Exploitation
- T1491.002 External Defacement
- T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation
- T1485 Data Destruction
- T1046 Network Service Discovery

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Booter/Stresser DDoS Client Command-Line Invocation (Beamed-style)** (`TL-2026-1309-SPL-001`)

Detects local process command-line patterns consistent with a booter/stresser DDoS client launch, matching 313 Team's Beamed-powered campaign against Canonical/Ubuntu infrastructure (--target/--method reflect-amp flags). Fires on process creation telemetry with flood-tool argument signatures.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1583.005, T1498.001, T1498.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_telemetry
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)--target\s+\S+") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)--method\s+(reflect-amp|flood|udp-flood|syn-flood)")
| eval flood_indicator=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)--threads\s+\d+"), "high_thread_count", "unknown")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as commandlines by Computer, User, Image
| where count > 0
| table Computer, User, Image, commandlines, first_seen, last_seen, flood_indicator
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "--target" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("reflect-amp", "flood", "udp-flood", "syn-flood")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "--method"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), Commands=make_set(ProcessCommandLine) by DeviceName, AccountName
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Booter/Stresser DDoS Client Command-Line Pattern
id: 7a1e2c44-3b5a-4f7d-9e2a-1c8f6d0b4a11
status: experimental
description: Detects command-line arguments consistent with booter/stresser DDoS client tooling (e.g. Beamed-style flood clients) used by pro-Iran hacktivist ecosystem actors (313 Team, Conquerors Electronic Army).
references:
    - https://www.hendryadrian.com/threat-intelligence-report-the-pro-iran-hacktivist-ecosystem-2026/
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/149-hacktivist-ddos-attacks-hit-110.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-14
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.005
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1498.001
    - attack.t1498.002
    - attack.tool.beamed_booter
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--target'
            - '--method'
            - 'reflect-amp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Authorized internal load-testing or DDoS-simulation tooling using similar CLI flag naming
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Authorized internal DDoS/load-testing tools using similarly-named CLI flags (--target/--method)

**Tuning notes:** Tune the --method value list to the specific booter families observed in your telemetry (reflect-amp, udp-flood, syn-flood); allowlist known load-testing hosts/service accounts by Computer/DeviceName.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Masqueraded Telegram/WhatsApp Installer From Non-Official Source (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- External Remote Services Check-In Following Masqueraded Installer Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Recycled Breach-Data Leak Claim Re-Publication Pattern (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Telegram Bot API Long-Poll C2 Beaconing from Non-Telegram Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Screen/Video Capture Process Activity Immediately Following Masqueraded Installer (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cloud-Storage Exfiltration Following Bot-API C2 Beacon Activity (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- High-Rate Outbound Connection Flood to Single External Destination (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unverified 'Proof of Impact' Claim Artifact Pattern ([indicator]-style) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 16)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `beamed[.]cc`
- Domain: `handala-hack[.]tw`
- Domain: `ubuntu[.]com`

Full set of 16 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Pro-Iran Hacktivists Use Telegram Coordinated DDoS](https://cybersecuritynews.com/pro-iran-hacktivists-use-telegram-coordinated-ddos/)
- [Threat Intelligence Report: The Pro-Iran Hacktivist Ecosystem 2026 (DomainTools Investigations summary)](https://www.hendryadrian.com/threat-intelligence-report-the-pro-iran-hacktivist-ecosystem-2026/)
- [Iran's Digital Proxy Army Turns DDoS Attacks and Data Leaks Into Wartime Psychological Weapons](https://cyberpress.org/irans-digital-proxy-warfare/)
- [Government of Iran Cyber Actors Deploy Telegram C2 to Target Dissidents, Journalists (IC3 Advisory 260320)](https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260320.pdf)
- [FBI says Iranian hackers are using Telegram to steal data in malware attacks](https://techcrunch.com/2026/03/23/fbi-says-iranian-hackers-are-using-telegram-to-steal-data-in-malware-attacks/)
- [149 Hacktivist DDoS Attacks Hit 110 Organizations in 16 Countries After Middle East Conflict](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/149-hacktivist-ddos-attacks-hit-110.html)
- [Pro-Iran Hackers Hit Ubuntu's Canonical With DDoS, Float Extortion Demand](https://tech.yahoo.com/cybersecurity/articles/pro-iran-hackers-hit-ubuntus-174000175.html)
- [Ubuntu Hit by DDoS Attack: Pro-Iran 313 Team Claims Responsibility](https://thecybrdef.com/ubuntu-hit-by-ddos-attack-pro-iran-313-team-claims-responsibility/)
- [Handala Hack Team - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handala_Hack_Team)
- [Dark Web Profile: Mr Hamza](https://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-mr-hamza/)
- [Telegram Hacktivist Activity Timeline of Iran - Israel & US War](https://socradar.io/blog/telegram-activity-timeline-iran-israel-us-war/)
- [Threat Brief: Escalation of Cyber Risk Related to Iran (Updated April 17)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/iranian-cyberattacks-2026/)
- [Iran's Cyber Playbook in the Escalating Regional Conflict](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-iran-cyber-playbook-escalating-regional-conflict/)
- [How hacktivist cyber operations surged amid Israeli-Iranian conflict](https://outpost24.com/blog/hacktivist-cyber-operations-iran-israel/)
- [Hacktivist campaigns increase as United States, Iran, and Israel conflict intensifies](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/hacktivist-campaigns-increase-as-united-states-iran-and-israel-conflict-intensifies)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1309
