# Qilin Ransomware Abuses DCSync (MS-DRSR) to Harvest AD Domain Credentials Including KRBTGT

> A Qilin ransomware intrusion abused the DCSync technique against the Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR) to impersonate a domain controller, harvesting the KRBTGT hash and NTLM password hashes for every account in the domain — enabling Golden Ticket forgery and domain-wide compromise ahead of encryption.

- **Published:** 2026-07-14T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-14T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1310
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-qilin-dcsync-krbtgt-theft-tl-2026-1310.webp?v=c78be46d (Threadlinqs threat intel: Qilin DCSync KRBTGT Credential Theft: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1310) — High severity, 23 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1310
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Qilin (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 23

## Description

Security researcher Maurice Fielenbach identified a Qilin ransomware intrusion in which the attackers, after escalating to the built-in Administrator account, performed a DCSync operation against a target domain controller. DCSync abuses the Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR) to simulate a domain controller requesting a normal Active Directory replication cycle; a caller holding the 'Replicating Directory Changes' and 'Replicating Directory Changes All' extended rights (commonly held by Domain Admins/Enterprise Admins, or granted via ACL misconfiguration) can retrieve the full NTDS.dit-equivalent credential material remotely, without ever touching disk on the DC, making the technique attractive because it evades traditional file-based credential-dumping detections (e.g. LSASS memory access alerts).

Windows Security Event ID 4662 ("An operation was performed on an object") logged the abuse: legitimate Azure AD Connect / Entra Connect synchronization activity from an MSOL_* service account produced a baseline of 4662 events with ObjectServer=DS and AccessMask=0x100 at 01:19, 01:21, and 01:23. At 01:25 the same event signature spiked into the hundreds, but this time the Subject account was the built-in Administrator — not a domain controller computer account and not an approved MSOL_* sync account — a clear anomaly signaling an unauthorized DCSync replication request. The abused extended rights map to the Active-Directory control-access GUIDs DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2) and DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2).

The operation harvested the KRBTGT account's current and historical password hashes as well as NTLM password hashes for every account in the domain. KRBTGT hash possession lets an adversary forge Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (Golden Tickets) that grant domain-wide, persistent, and difficult-to-revoke authentication as any user including Domain Admins — independent of subsequent password resets for ordinary accounts. Mimikatz's lsadump::dcsync module (and its NetSync companion for legacy replication) is the tool most commonly associated with weaponizing this technique, and is called out in the source reporting as the tool that popularized DCSync abuse.

Qilin (also tracked under the earlier Agenda ransomware lineage) is a Russian-speaking-attributed ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation, active since August 2022, that recruits affiliates for up to 80-85% of ransom proceeds and has become the most active ransomware operation tracked in 2026 by MOXFIVE, with over 1,500 claimed victims since launch and more than 500 in 2026 alone, across Manufacturing, Professional Services, Retail/Hospitality, Technology, Construction/Engineering, Healthcare, Education, and Pharmaceutical sectors, concentrated in North America and Western Europe (notable victims include NHS-affiliated London hospitals in 2024, automotive supplier Yanfeng, UK's Big Issue, Japan's Asahi brewery in October 2025, and US-based Inotiv). Qilin's original ransomware payload (Agenda) was written in Go; the operation introduced a Rust-based variant in late 2022 explicitly to make static and dynamic analysis harder for defenders.

Across its broader campaign history (beyond this specific intrusion), Qilin affiliates gain initial access via phishing with user-executed malicious attachments, exploitation of public-facing applications (FortiGate and SAP NetWeaver vulnerabilities have been observed), exposed RDP and unprotected VPN portals, and dark-web-purchased stolen credentials. Once inside, credential-based access is the highest-frequency vector, achieved via brute forcing, Mimikatz memory-resident credential dumping, and Group Policy scripts that harvest saved Google Chrome credentials. Defense evasion includes BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) techniques for access-token manipulation, masquerading via legitimate system administration/RMM tooling to blend in, and Linux ransomware encryptors executed inside the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) specifically to bypass Windows-native detections. Lateral movement to domain controllers is achieved with PsExec and RDP, with CobaltStrike deployed as a lateral tool-transfer and C2 support platform. Data staging and exfiltration is performed via CyberDuck prior to double-extortion. Ahead of and during encryption, Qilin operators delete Volume Shadow Copies and target Veeam backup infrastructure to inhibit system recovery, and clear Windows Event Logs to remove forensic evidence — then follows through with the double-extortion encryption/exfiltration for which Qilin is broadly known (the group has also added DDoS capability and a 'Call Lawyer' negotiation-panel feature as additional extortion levers in 2025-2026). The DCSync-based domain credential harvest documented in this specific intrusion sits squarely in that broader Qilin credential-access and privilege-escalation tradecraft, performed after escalation to Administrator-equivalent privilege and ahead of the encryption phase.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1204 User Execution
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1070 Indicator Removal
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1020 Automated Exfiltration
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Unauthorized DCSync Replication Request Against MS-DRSR (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All)** (`TL-2026-1310-SPL-001`)

Detects Event ID 4662 operations against ObjectServer=DS with AccessMask=0x100 referencing the DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2) and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2) control-access GUIDs, where the Subject account is neither a domain controller computer account nor an approved MSOL_*/ADSync sync account. This is the exact fingerprint of the Qilin intrusion: a legitimate MSOL_* baseline of ~3 events/2min spiked to hundreds within one minute under the built-in Administrator account, indicating Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or an equivalent DCSync tool impersonating a domain controller to harvest KRBTGT and domain-wide NTLM hashes.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1003.006, T1078.002
- **Data sources:** windows_security_eventlog, wineventlog, domain_controller_audit_log
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4662 ObjectServer="DS"
| eval accessmask_hex=lower(AccessMask)
| where accessmask_hex="0x100"
| eval has_replication_guid=if(match(Properties, "(?i)1131f6a[ad]-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"), 1, 0)
| where has_replication_guid=1
| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, "(?i)^(MSOL_|ADSync|AAD_)") AND NOT match(SubjectUserName, "\$$")
| bin _time span=1m
| stats count as replication_events, values(SubjectUserName) as subject_accounts, values(Computer) as target_dc, dc(SubjectUserName) as distinct_subjects by _time
| where replication_events >= 5
| eval risk_note="Anomalous DCSync-style replication burst outside approved sync baseline"
| sort -replication_events
| table _time, replication_events, subject_accounts, target_dc, risk_note
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventID == 4662
| where ObjectServer == "DS"
| where AccessMask == "0x100"
| where Properties has_any ("1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2", "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2")
| where SubjectUserName !startswith "MSOL_" and SubjectUserName !startswith "ADSync" and SubjectUserName !endswith "$"
| summarize ReplicationEventCount = count(), Subjects = make_set(SubjectUserName), TargetDC = make_set(Computer) by bin(TimeGenerated, 1m)
| where ReplicationEventCount >= 5
| project TimeGenerated, ReplicationEventCount, Subjects, TargetDC
| order by ReplicationEventCount desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Unauthorized DCSync Replication Request Against MS-DRSR
id: 7b9f1e12-4a3d-4f77-9c8e-1b2c3d4e5f61
status: stable
description: Detects a DCSync-style Active Directory replication request (Event ID 4662, ObjectServer=DS, AccessMask=0x100) invoking DS-Replication-Get-Changes/-All extended rights from a Subject account that is not a domain controller computer account or an approved MSOL_*/ADSync sync account, consistent with Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync abuse observed in the Qilin ransomware intrusion.
references:
    - https://cybersecuritynews.com/qilin-ransomware-dcsync-active-directory/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-14
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.006
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1078.002
    - attack.tool.mimikatz
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4662
        ObjectServer: 'DS'
        AccessMask: '0x100'
        Properties|contains:
            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
    filter_known_sync_accounts:
        SubjectUserName|startswith:
            - 'MSOL_'
            - 'ADSync'
    filter_dc_computer_accounts:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Azure AD Connect / Entra Connect synchronization from approved MSOL_*/ADSync service accounts
    - Legitimate domain controller-to-domain controller replication
    - Authorized AD recovery/forensics tooling using replication rights
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate Azure AD Connect / Entra Connect sync from approved MSOL_*/ADSync accounts
- Legitimate DC-to-DC replication traffic
- Authorized backup/forensics tooling holding replication rights

**Tuning notes:** Maintain an explicit allow-list of approved replication-capable service accounts and DC computer accounts (regex on SubjectUserName) rather than relying solely on naming prefix; tune the 5-events/1-minute burst threshold to the environment's real sync cadence to avoid missing slow-and-low DCSync attempts.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Domain Account Enumeration Preceding Anomalous Replication Rights Invocation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Pre-Encryption Anti-Forensics: Volume Shadow Copy Deletion and Veeam Backup Targeting (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CyberDuck/File-Transfer-Client Data Staging and Exfiltration Following Domain Compromise (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Potential DCSync Attack Against Active Directory (Replication Rights Abuse) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Golden Ticket Usage Indicated by Anomalous Kerberos Ticket Encryption Type (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Windows Security/System Event Log Cleared Immediately Before Ransomware Deployment (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- KRBTGT-Derived Golden Ticket Usage — Anomalous Kerberos TGT Encryption/Lifetime (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PsExec/Cobalt Strike Lateral Movement Toward Domain Controllers Post-Privilege-Escalation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

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## Sources

- [New Qilin Ransomware Attack Uses DCSync Technique to Abuse AD Replication Protocol](https://cybersecuritynews.com/qilin-ransomware-dcsync-active-directory/)
- [OS Credential Dumping: DCSync (T1003.006)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006/)
- [Qilin Threat Actor Profile: TTPs, IOCs & Attacks](https://www.huntress.com/threat-library/threat-actors/qilin)
- [Qilin Ransomware: Group Profile, TTPs, IOCs & Defense (2026)](https://www.dexpose.io/qilin-ransomware/)
- [Qilin Ransomware 2026: TTPs, Victims and Defense Guide](https://www.moxfive.com/blog/qilin-ransomware-2026-ttps-victims-and-defense-guide)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1310
