# OAuth Client ID Spoofing Enables Stealthy Enumeration and Credential Validation Against Microsoft Entra ID (UNK_pyreq2323 / UNK_OutFlareAZ)

> Two distinct threat clusters — UNK_pyreq2323 and UNK_OutFlareAZ — are abusing the Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) OAuth 2.0 flow against Microsoft Entra ID by submitting spoofed/fabricated client IDs alongside candidate credentials. Because Entra ID returns distinct AADSTS error codes for invalid app IDs, invalid usernames, and invalid passwords, attackers can enumerate valid accounts and validate stolen credentials at scale while sign-in logs record only failed attempts with a blank application name field, blinding per-application detections.

- **Published:** 2026-07-14T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-14T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1321
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-unk-outflareaz-entra-ropc-abuse-tl-2026-1321.webp?v=9c360a58 (Threadlinqs threat intel: UNK_OutFlareAZ Entra ID ROPC Abuse: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1321) — High severity, 20 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1321
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UNK_pyreq2323
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 20 (1 shown free below)

## Description

Proofpoint threat research disclosed a stealthy account-enumeration and credential-validation technique that abuses Microsoft Entra ID's Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) OAuth 2.0 grant. Entra ID's token endpoint (login.microsoftonline.com) accepts a client_id parameter identifying the calling application. When an attacker submits an arbitrary or non-existent client_id together with a username/password pair, Entra ID does not reject the request outright even when the client_id is not a well-formed UUIDv4. Instead, it evaluates the credentials first and only then flags the unrecognized application, returning AADSTS700016 (application identifier not recognized) when the username and password are BOTH valid. Combined with AADSTS50034 (username does not exist, not written to the sign-in log) and AADSTS50126 (valid username, invalid password), the three distinct error codes give an attacker an oracle: they can enumerate which usernames exist in a tenant and separately confirm whether stolen/guessed passwords are correct, all without ever completing a successful sign-in event and without MFA ever being invoked (ROPC is a legacy non-interactive flow that predates modern MFA challenge support). Crucially, when the client_id is spoofed/unregistered, Entra ID's sign-in log entry is written with a BLANK application name field, so defenses and hunts that pivot on 'which app is failing logins' or scope Conditional Access policies to specific first-party application IDs never fire.

Two independent threat clusters were observed operationalizing this technique at internet scale. UNK_pyreq2323 (first observed 2026-01-14, active through early March 2026) operated from AWS-hosted infrastructure using the default python-requests/2.32.3 HTTP client user agent, generating spoofed client IDs by taking the legitimate Microsoft Exchange Online first-party application ID prefix (00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-) and randomizing the trailing six hex digits to a non-zero value, reusing each fabricated ID against as many as 12 different target usernames before rotating. The campaign targeted over 1 million unique user accounts across roughly 4,000 Entra ID tenants using 700,000+ distinct spoofed client IDs, and caused account lockouts (via Entra ID smart lockout / conditional access thresholds) for approximately 28% of targeted users — collateral damage consistent with brute-force/password-spray velocity rather than careful low-and-slow enumeration.

UNK_OutFlareAZ (first observed December 2025, continuing through at least March 2026 in two distinct waves — a December 2025 wave peaking near 242,000 targeted users and a second wave peaking around 2026-03-15 at roughly 720,000 targeted users) originated primarily from Cloudflare-fronted infrastructure and forged a Microsoft Outlook desktop client user agent string (Microsoft Office/16.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Microsoft Outlook 16.0.12026; Pro...)) to blend into legitimate Outlook ROPC traffic patterns still seen from older desktop mail clients. Rather than reusing a recognizable Microsoft application ID prefix, UNK_OutFlareAZ generated a fully random UUIDv4 client_id for every single authentication attempt (3.7 million distinct spoofed client IDs against 2 million+ targeted users), and enumerated common/generic username patterns (e.g., dsmith, msmith, jbrown-style first-initial-lastname handles) alphabetically across many tenants simultaneously — a pattern consistent with automated dictionary-driven enumeration rather than a targeted list.

Proofpoint assesses the two clusters as independently operated (distinct infrastructure, user-agent, client-ID-generation strategy, and targeting cadence) rather than a single actor, indicating that OAuth client ID spoofing against ROPC is becoming broadly adopted tradecraft rather than a single group's bespoke tooling. The technique is closely related to, and likely compounds, the ongoing large-scale ROPC password-spray activity against Microsoft 365/Entra ID and Azure CLI's well-known first-party client ID (04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46) reported separately by Huntress (81M+ login attempts, June 2026), underscoring that ROPC itself — a legacy, non-interactive, MFA-incompatible OAuth grant — remains a persistently attractive target surface across the identity threat landscape. No CVE applies: this is abuse of legitimate, documented OAuth 2.0 / Entra ID mechanics (RFC 6749 ROPC grant plus Entra ID's error-response behavior), not a software vulnerability, but it qualifies as an actively exploited technique at massive scale against widely used cloud identity infrastructure.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1585 Establish Accounts
- T1588 Obtain Capabilities
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1201 Password Policy Discovery
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1556 Modify Authentication Process
- T1090 Proxy
- T1119 Automated Collection

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**ROPC Credential-Validation Oracle Hit — AADSTS700016 with Blank Application Name** (`TL-2026-1321-SPL-001`)

Detects the core UNK_pyreq2323/UNK_OutFlareAZ oracle abuse: an Entra ID sign-in event using the ROPC grant that returns AADSTS700016 (unrecognized application identifier) while the application-display-name field is blank. Because Entra ID validates username/password BEFORE checking client_id legitimacy, this specific combination means the attacker's submitted credentials were BOTH valid — this is functionally a successful credential-stuffing hit disguised as a failed login.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1078.004, T1110.003
- **Data sources:** azure_ad_signin_logs, entra_id_audit_logs
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=azure_ad sourcetype="azure:aad:signin" AuthenticationProtocol="ROPC" ResultDescription="*AADSTS700016*"
| eval blank_app=if(isnull(AppDisplayName) OR AppDisplayName=="", 1, 0)
| where blank_app=1
| eval spoofed_prefix_match=if(match(ClientId, "^00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-"), "exchange_online_prefix_spoof", "other")
| table _time, UserPrincipalName, ClientId, AppDisplayName, ResultDescription, IPAddress, UserAgent, spoofed_prefix_match
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where AuthenticationProtocol == "ROPC"
| where ResultDescription has "AADSTS700016"
| where isempty(AppDisplayName)
| extend SpoofedPrefixMatch = iif(ClientAppUsed has "Exchange" or tostring(AppId) startswith "00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-", "exchange_online_prefix_spoof", "other")
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, AppId, AppDisplayName, ResultDescription, IPAddress, UserAgent, SpoofedPrefixMatch
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Entra ID ROPC Sign-In With Blank Application Name and Unrecognized Client ID (AADSTS700016)
id: 8f2c1e3a-8f2c-4e3a-9b1d-6a2f8c1e3a90
status: experimental
description: Detects Entra ID ROPC sign-in events returning AADSTS700016 (unrecognized client_id) with a blank application display name, which indicates a valid username/password pair was submitted against a spoofed/unregistered OAuth client_id (UNK_pyreq2323 / UNK_OutFlareAZ credential-validation oracle abuse).
references:
    - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/oauth-client-id-spoofing-why-fake-client-ids-are-gaining-traction-stealthy
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-14
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1110.003
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
category: authentication
detection:
    selection_error:
        ResultDescription|contains: 'AADSTS700016'
    selection_blank_app:
        AppDisplayName: ''
    selection_protocol:
        AuthenticationProtocol: 'ROPC'
    condition: selection_error and selection_blank_app and selection_protocol
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate first-party apps mid-registration (rare)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate first-party or line-of-business ROPC applications caught mid-registration where AppDisplayName has not yet propagated (rare and short-lived)

**Tuning notes:** Allow-list known, registered ROPC client_id values used by legitimate legacy automation; investigate every remaining hit as a probable credential compromise and force a password reset regardless of MFA status, since ROPC bypasses MFA challenge.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Exchange Online Client-ID-Namespace Spoofing in ROPC Requests (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Alphabetical/Dictionary-Pattern Username Sweep With Smart-Lockout Correlation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Per-Request Randomized UUIDv4 Client-ID Rotation on ROPC From Cloud/CDN Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [Sigma] Entra ID ROPC Sign-In With Blank Application Name and Unrecognized Client ID ([indicator]) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [Sigma] High-Volume ROPC Enumeration With Rotating or Randomized Client IDs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [Sigma] Cross-Tenant ROPC Enumeration From Hosting-Provider Infrastructure With Masqueraded Legacy Client Traffic (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- High-Volume ROPC Username Enumeration From a Single Source ([indicator]/50126 Burst) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Masqueraded Legacy-Auth Traffic From Cloud-Hosted Proxy Infrastructure Targeting ROPC (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (1 of 20)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- URL: `hxxps://login[.]microsoftonline[.]com/common/oauth2/v2.0/token`

Full set of 20 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [OAuth Client ID Spoofing: Why Fake Client IDs Are Gaining Traction for Stealthy Enumeration](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/oauth-client-id-spoofing-why-fake-client-ids-are-gaining-traction-stealthy)
- [Hackers Spoof OAuth Client IDs](https://cybersecuritynews.com/hackers-spoof-oauth-client-ids/)
- [OAuth Client ID Spoofing Lets Attackers Validate Stolen Microsoft Entra Credentials](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/oauth-client-id-spoofing-lets-attackers.html)
- [Fake Client IDs Are Gaining Traction for Stealthy Enumeration](https://securitymea.com/2026/07/13/fake-client-ids-are-gaining-traction-for-stealthy-enumeration/)
- [Fake OAuth client IDs are helping attackers slip past sign-in logs](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/07/13/entra-id-oauth-client-id-spoofing/)
- [Millions of Microsoft Entra Accounts Targeted in OAuth Client ID Spoofing Campaigns](https://hackread.com/microsoft-entra-accounts-oauth-client-id-spoofing/)
- [Hackers Abuse Fake OAuth Client IDs to Validate Microsoft Entra Accounts and Passwords](https://cyberpress.org/hackers-validate-entra-credentials/)
- [Cybercriminals exploit OAuth client ID spoofing to bypass cloud security](https://www.scworld.com/brief/cybercriminals-exploit-oauth-client-id-spoofing-to-bypass-cloud-security)
- [Novel OAuth Client ID Spoofing Technique Targets Cloud Environments](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/novel-spoofing-technique-targets/)
- [Entra ID OAuth ROPC Grant Login Detected](https://detection.fyi/elastic/detection-rules/integrations/azure/initial_access_entra_id_unusual_ropc_login_attempt/)
- [Massive Password Spray Campaign Targeting Azure CLI](https://f4n6.co.uk/security-feed/massive-password-spray-campaign-targeting-azure-cli/)
- [Massive Password Stealing Attack Targeting Microsoft 365 Users With 81 Million Login Attempts](https://cybersecuritynews.com/microsofts-azure-password-spray-attack/)
- [Abusing ROPC to Bypass MFA — and How I Built a Detection for It in Microsoft Sentinel](https://detect.fyi/abusing-ropc-to-bypass-mfa-and-how-i-built-a-detection-for-it-in-microsoft-sentinel-135e46aeb7c9)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1321
