Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-1442
Siemens Ruggedcom ROX II Three-Stage Zero-Day Exploit Chain (CVE-2025-40948, CVE-2025-40947, CVE-2025-40949)
Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks), working with Siemens ProductCERT, disclosed a chainable trio of zero-day vulnerabilities in Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX II operational-technology switches: an unauthenticated-adjacent arbitrary file disclosure via xz utility abuse (CVE-2025-40948), a command injection in feature-key signature validation via gpgv (CVE-2025-40947), and a persistent root code execution flaw in the web UI task scheduler (CVE-2025-40949).
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-1442, CVE-2025-40948, CVE-2025-40947, CVE-2025-40949 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Three Steps to the Terminal, ROX II Zero-Day Trilogy |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| CVSS | 9.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
| EPSS | CVE-2025-40949: 0.6% (50.7th percentile); CVE-2025-40947: 0.4% (35.7th percentile); CVE-2025-40948: 0.2% (20.5th percentile) |
| Affected products | Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX II; Siemens RUGGEDCOM MX5000; Siemens RUGGEDCOM MX5000RE; Siemens RUGGEDCOM RX1400; Siemens RUGGEDCOM RX1500 series (RX1500, RX1501, RX1510, RX1511, RX1512, RX1524, RX1536); Siemens RUGGEDCOM RX5000 |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-88, CWE-78 |
| Tools | Palo Alto Networks Advanced Threat Prevention signature 97246, Palo Alto Networks Advanced Threat Prevention signature 97249, Palo Alto Networks Advanced Threat Prevention signature 97250 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T0813 Denial of Control, T0859 Valid Accounts, T0871 Execution through API, T1005 Data from Local System, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1211 Exploitation for Stealth, T1505 Server Software Component, T1528 Steal Application Access Token and 4 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | energy, electric utilities, rail transportation, oil and gas, manufacturing, critical infrastructure, industrial control systems |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-07-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1442 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 22 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Siemens ROX II xz Argument Injection via JSON-RPC (CVE-2025-40948) — SPL
Detects a root-privileged JSON-RPC configuration daemon on a RUGGEDCOM ROX II OT switch invoking xz with the attacker-abused -f/-c/-d flag combination, indicative of arbitrary file disclosure (config/credential/key material) outside a normal compression workflow.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1552.001, T1005
- Data sources: linux_secure, syslog, sysmon_for_linux
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=ot_linux sourcetype="linux_secure" OR sourcetype="syslog"
| regex _raw="(?i)(jsonrpc|json-rpc).{0,80}xz"
| eval has_flags=if(match(_raw, "-f") AND match(_raw, "-c") AND match(_raw, "-d"), 1, 0)
| where has_flags=1
| eval user=coalesce(user, "unknown"), host=coalesce(host, "unknown")
| table _time, host, user, process, _raw
| sort -_timeMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "xz"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "-f" and ProcessCommandLine has "-c" and ProcessCommandLine has "-d"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("jsonrpc", "json-rpc", "configd")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLineSigma
title: Siemens ROX II xz Argument Injection via JSON-RPC
id: c3a1e2f0-0948-4025-9948-000000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects xz invoked with -f -c -d flags by a JSON-RPC/configuration daemon on RUGGEDCOM ROX II, matching the CVE-2025-40948 arbitrary file disclosure primitive.
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/siemens-rox-ii-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
- https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-973901.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/07/17
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1552.001
- attack.t1005
- cve.2025.40948
logsource:
product: linux
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'xz'
- '-f'
- '-c'
- '-d'
ParentImage|contains: 'jsonrpc'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate compression/backup jobs that happen to use all three flags together (rare in OT firmware)
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate administrative backup/compression scripts that coincidentally combine -f -c -d flags on the same daemon
Tuning notes: Scope the parent-process filter to the actual ROX II config-daemon binary name in your environment; whitelist known scheduled backup jobs that legitimately invoke xz with these flags.
- Siemens ROX II xz Argument Injection via JSON-RPC (CVE-2025-40948) — KQL · unlock with TL Creds
- Siemens ROX II Feature-Key gpgv Command Substitution (CVE-2025-40947) — KQL · unlock with TL Creds
- Siemens ROX II Task Scheduler Command Injection Persistence (CVE-2025-40949) — KQL · unlock with TL Creds
- Siemens ROX II xz Argument Injection via JSON-RPC (CVE-2025-40948) — Sigma · unlock with TL Creds
- Siemens ROX II Feature-Key gpgv Command Substitution (CVE-2025-40947) — Sigma · unlock with TL Creds
- Siemens ROX II Task Scheduler Command Injection Persistence (CVE-2025-40949) — Sigma · unlock with TL Creds
- Siemens ROX II Feature-Key gpgv Command Substitution (CVE-2025-40947) — SPL · unlock with TL Creds
- Siemens ROX II Task Scheduler Command Injection Persistence (CVE-2025-40949) — SPL · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-07-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 22 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1442.
Technical analysis
Chained end-to-end, an authenticated attacker escalates from a low-privileged session to full, reboot-surviving root control of critical OT network infrastructure.
Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX II is a ruggedized routing/switching operating system deployed on industrial switches and routers (MX5000, MX5000RE, RX1400, RX1500, RX1501, RX1510, RX1511, RX1512, RX1524, RX1536, RX5000) used in electric utility substations, rail signaling networks, oil & gas SCADA backhaul, and other OT/ICS environments. Unit 42's OT Threat Research Lab researchers Emmanuel Zhou, Adam Robbie, Rick Wyble, and Mehmet Balta documented a three-stage exploit chain against firmware prior to V2.17.1, publishing findings jointly with Siemens ProductCERT (Miguel Pereira) on 2026-07-17, following coordinated-disclosure advisories issued by Siemens on 2026-05-12.
Stage 1 (CVE-2025-40948, CWE-88 Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command / Argument Injection, CVSS 3.1 6.8 MEDIUM / CVSS 4.0 6.1 MEDIUM): the ROX II web server's JSON-RPC interface fails to validate input passed to the xz compression utility, which a privileged configuration daemon invokes with root privileges. By supplying attacker-controlled arguments including the -f, -c, and -d flags, an authenticated remote attacker coerces xz into disclosing arbitrary filesystem contents — configuration files, credential hashes, and cryptographic key material — with root-level read access, entirely outside the intended compression workflow.
Stage 2 (CVE-2025-40947, CWE-78 OS Command Injection, CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGH / CVSS 4.0 7.7 HIGH): the device's feature-key licensing mechanism verifies a cryptographic signature line by inserting the parsed signature string directly into a gpgv-invoking system command without sanitization during feature-key installation. An attacker first uploads a malicious script via the web management UI's file-upload functionality (e.g. a Python reverse-shell payload), then crafts a feature-key file whose signature field contains a command-substitution payload such as $(python /tmp/rev_shell.py). Installing this feature key executes the attacker's script with root privileges, yielding an immediate interactive root shell — an Abuse of Elevation Control Mechanisms via the trusted feature-key validation path.
Stage 3 (CVE-2025-40949, CWE-78 OS Command Injection, CVSS 3.1 9.1 CRITICAL / CVSS 4.0 8.9 HIGH): the web UI's task Scheduler function fails to sanitize user-supplied input before writing it into the task-scheduling backend (cron-equivalent) configuration. An authenticated attacker injects control characters and shell metacharacters into scheduled-task fields, causing arbitrary commands to execute as root on every subsequent scheduler tick. Because the payload lives in a persistent configuration file, this establishes root-level command execution that survives device reboots and firmware-level session resets — a durable OT implant primitive.
Chained together (Stage 1 credential/config harvesting via JSON-RPC argument injection -> Stage 2 root shell via feature-key/gpgv command injection -> Stage 3 persistent scheduler backdoor), the three flaws let any attacker who can authenticate to the ROX II web management interface (even with a low-privilege operator account, given CVE-2025-40947's PR:L requirement) pivot to complete, persistent root compromise of the OT switch — potentially enabling traffic interception, control-network pivoting, or destructive manipulation of substation/rail/pipeline communications. No in-the-wild exploitation or public attribution has been confirmed; this is a coordinated-disclosure PoC chain, not an observed intrusion. Siemens has patched all three flaws in firmware V2.17.1, available via the Siemens Industry Online Support portal, and Palo Alto Networks has published Advanced Threat Prevention signatures (97246, 97250, 97249) enabling virtual patching for customers unable to immediately upgrade firmware.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Impact
persistence
T0859 Valid Accounts; T1693.001 System Firmware
Execution
T0871 Execution through API; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Collection
Persistence
T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1505 Server Software Component
Privilege Escalation
T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation; T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Initial Access
Discovery
T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1211 Exploitation for Stealth
Credential Access
T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1552.001 Credentials In Files
Remediation
Patches
- Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX firmware V2.17.1 (fixes CVE-2025-40948, CVE-2025-40947, CVE-2025-40949)
Immediate actions
- Upgrade all Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX II devices to firmware V2.17.1 or later via https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/110002017/
- Restrict web management interface access to trusted management networks/VLANs only
- Disable or tightly ACL the JSON-RPC interface where not operationally required
- Audit existing task scheduler entries for unauthorized or unrecognized scheduled commands
- Review recent feature-key installation events for anomalous signature payloads or gpgv invocation anomalies
- Rotate credentials and cryptographic keys on any device suspected of file-disclosure exposure via CVE-2025-40948
Workarounds
- Restrict network access to the ROX II web management interface and JSON-RPC endpoint to dedicated management VLANs behind firewall ACLs
- Disable feature-key installation functionality via web UI where not actively needed
- Apply Palo Alto Networks NGFW virtual patching (signature IDs 97246, 97250, 97249) as interim mitigation
Longer-term hardening
- Segment OT switch management planes from general IT/OT data networks per IEC 62443 zone/conduit guidance
- Deploy virtual patching / IPS signatures (Palo Alto Advanced Threat Prevention IDs 97246, 97250, 97249) where immediate firmware upgrade is not feasible
- Enforce least-privilege operator accounts on ROX II web UI to reduce blast radius of PR:L-gated exploitation
- Implement configuration-integrity monitoring on scheduler/cron backend files
- Establish a firmware patch-management cadence for all RUGGEDCOM ROX fleet devices
Affected and fixed versions
- Siemens — RUGGEDCOM ROX II
Vulnerable versions: All versions prior to V2.17.1
Fixed in: V2.17.1 and later - Siemens — RUGGEDCOM MX5000
Vulnerable versions: < V2.17.1
Fixed in: V2.17.1 - Siemens — RUGGEDCOM MX5000RE
Vulnerable versions: < V2.17.1
Fixed in: V2.17.1 - Siemens — RUGGEDCOM RX1400
Vulnerable versions: < V2.17.1
Fixed in: V2.17.1 - Siemens — RUGGEDCOM RX1500 series (RX1500, RX1501, RX1510, RX1511, RX1512, RX1524, RX1536)
Vulnerable versions: < V2.17.1
Fixed in: V2.17.1 - Siemens — RUGGEDCOM RX5000
Vulnerable versions: < V2.17.1
Fixed in: V2.17.1
Timeline
- Siemens releases RUGGEDCOM ROX firmware V2.17.1 via the Siemens Industry Online Support portal, fixing all three chained vulnerabilities.
- CISA publishes ICS advisory ICSA-26-134-12 covering all three RUGGEDCOM ROX vulnerabilities for critical-infrastructure asset owners.
- Siemens ProductCERT publishes SSA-081142, disclosing CVE-2025-40949 (task scheduler command injection, CVSS 3.1 9.1 CRITICAL) with fix in firmware V2.17.1.
- Siemens ProductCERT publishes SSA-078743, disclosing CVE-2025-40947 (feature-key/gpgv command injection, CVSS 3.1 7.5) with fix in firmware V2.17.1.
- Siemens ProductCERT publishes SSA-973901, disclosing CVE-2025-40948 (arbitrary file disclosure via xz argument injection, CVSS 3.1 6.8) with fix in firmware V2.17.1.
- Threadlinqs Intelligence Platform ingests the Unit 42 disclosure via HUNT phase for threat-skeleton creation as TL-2026-1442.
- Palo Alto Networks publishes Advanced Threat Prevention detection signatures (IDs 97246, 97250, 97249) for the exploit chain, alongside NGFW virtual-patching guidance for OT Device Security customers.
- Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) OT Threat Research Lab researchers Emmanuel Zhou, Adam Robbie, Rick Wyble, and Mehmet Balta publish 'Three Steps to the Terminal: A Siemens ROX II Zero-Day Trilogy,' detailing the full three-stage exploit chain in coordination with Siemens ProductCERT (Miguel Pereira).
Sources cited
- ICSA-26-134-12: Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX CISA · Government advisory · 2026-05-12
- NVD CVE-2025-40949 Detail NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2026-05-12
- NVD CVE-2025-40947 Detail NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2026-05-12
- NVD CVE-2025-40948 Detail NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2026-05-12
- Three Steps to the Terminal: A Siemens ROX II Zero-Day Trilogy Unit 42 · Research · 2026-07-17
- SSA-973901: Siemens ProductCERT Advisory (CVE-2025-40948) cert-portal.siemens.com · Vendor report · 2026-05-12
- SSA-078743: Siemens ProductCERT Advisory (CVE-2025-40947) cert-portal.siemens.com · Vendor report · 2026-05-12
- SSA-081142: Siemens ProductCERT Advisory (CVE-2025-40949) cert-portal.siemens.com · Vendor report · 2026-05-12
- Siemens Industry Online Support - RUGGEDCOM ROX firmware download support.industry.siemens.com · Vendor report · 2026-05-12
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.