# Iran-Linked Actors Track US Military Personnel via SS7 Roaming Abuse and Ad-Tech Location Data

> US military personnel and contractors deployed across the Gulf were tracked before and during the Iran war through two parallel surveillance vectors: abuse of SS7 roaming-location queries against Middle Eastern telecom networks, and Iran-linked exploitation of commercial advertising/real-time-bidding (RTB) location data to geolocate phones in Iraqi Kurdistan. The campaign was documented by the Mobile Surveillance Monitor research initiative and reported by the Financial Times, with Citizen Lab Senior Research Fellow Gary Miller attributing at least some SS7 tracking attempts to an Iranian mobile network operator.

- **Published:** 2026-07-17T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-17T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1458
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-iran-ss7-ad-tech-troop-tracking-tl-2026-1458.webp?v=4c0eb291 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Iran-Linked SS7 Abuse Tracks US Troops: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1458) — High severity, 16 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1458
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 16

## Description

In the run-up to, and during, the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran in late February 2026 and Tehran's subsequent missile and drone retaliation against US forces in the Gulf, telecom networks across the Middle East recorded a sustained surge of SS7 (Signaling System 7) location-request traffic — commonly called 'SS7 pings' — targeting the phones of US military personnel and contractors roaming on regional carriers. SS7 is a decades-old inter-carrier signaling protocol still used globally to route calls and SMS between operators; it contains long-documented design weaknesses that let any party with legitimate (or abused) network signaling access query a subscriber's approximate real-time location by interrogating home-location-register (HLR) and visitor-location-register (VLR) records for a roaming device, without compromising the device itself.

Telecom data reviewed by the Financial Times and shared by the nonprofit Mobile Surveillance Monitor research project — founded by Citizen Lab Senior Research Fellow Gary Miller — showed regional carriers repeatedly fielding and, in some cases, blocking these location-request bursts against specific roaming subscribers. Analysis of the blocked requests produced a signaling 'fingerprint' that Miller linked to an Iranian mobile network operator, matching several other tracking attempts in the dataset. Miller characterized the pattern as 'very specific user targeting,' noting the actors were 'targeting specific devices' rather than conducting broad surveillance, and assessed that 'Iran absolutely has capabilities to get real-time, immediate, and continuous location information,' whether via SS7 abuse or other mobile network access in the region. Targeting concentrated on US personnel and contractors in Bahrain and Iraq, where tens of thousands of American troops are stationed, rather than against military communications systems directly — the campaign instead abused ordinary commercial roaming infrastructure that services any traveling subscriber's device.

A second, distinct tracking vector ran in parallel: a US official told the Financial Times that Iran-linked actors separately abused commercially available advertising/ad-tech location databases — the kind of granular device-location data harvested and brokered through mobile advertising SDKs and real-time-bidding (RTB) auction pipelines — to track phones belonging to US personnel specifically in Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region. This vector requires no telecom-level access at all; it exploits the ordinary advertising-identifier/location data-broker supply chain that most mobile apps feed by default, illustrating how commercial ad-tech has become a parallel, lower-barrier surveillance channel usable by state actors without any protocol exploitation.

US Central Command acknowledged receiving reports of the tracking activity but disclosed minimal detail on protective countermeasures taken; some US officials reportedly downplayed the operational significance of the tracking data to the FT. Researchers characterized the dual-vector campaign — combining a legacy telecom-signaling weakness with commercial ad-tech data supply chains — as reflecting a significant evolution and growing sophistication in Iran's use of both telecom infrastructure and commercial data markets for intelligence collection and, potentially, target identification supporting kinetic operations during an active conflict.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1591 Gather Victim Org Information
- T1596 Search Open Technical Databases
- T1585 Establish Accounts
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1102 Web Service
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1430.002 Impersonate SS7 Nodes
- T1449 Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS
- T1590 Gather Victim Network Information
- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1020 Automated Exfiltration

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SS7 MAP-Layer Location-Query Burst Against Roaming Subscriber (SPL)** (`TL-2026-1458-SPL-001`)

Detects a burst of MAP-layer ProvideSubscriberInfo / AnyTimeInterrogation-class location-request queries against a single roaming IMSI within a short window, consistent with SS7 'ping' location-tracking abuse fingerprinted to an Iranian mobile network operator in the TL-2026-1458 campaign against US personnel roaming in Bahrain/Iraq.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1450, T1590
- **Data sources:** telecom_signaling_gateway_logs, map_layer_event_log, signaling_firewall_logs
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=telecom_signaling sourcetype="map_signaling:events" EventCode=7770
| regex Message="(?i)(ProvideSubscriberInfo|AnyTimeInterrogation|SendRoutingInfo)"
| rex field=Message "target_imsi=(?<target_imsi>\S+)"
| rex field=Message "origin_gt=(?<origin_gt>\S+)"
| rex field=Message "roaming_network=(?<roaming_network>\S+)"
| bin _time span=1m
| stats count as query_count dc(origin_gt) as distinct_origins values(roaming_network) as networks by target_imsi, _time
| where query_count > 5
| sort - query_count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
TelecomSignalingLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventID == 7770
| where Message has_any ("ProvideSubscriberInfo", "AnyTimeInterrogation", "SendRoutingInfo")
| extend target_imsi = extract(@"target_imsi=(\S+)", 1, Message)
| extend origin_gt = extract(@"origin_gt=(\S+)", 1, Message)
| summarize QueryCount = count(), DistinctOrigins = dcount(origin_gt) by target_imsi, bin(TimeGenerated, 1m)
| where QueryCount > 5
| project TimeGenerated, target_imsi, QueryCount, DistinctOrigins
| order by QueryCount desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Suspicious SS7 MAP-Layer Location-Query Burst Against Roaming Subscriber
id: 8f3c1a2e-4b7d-4e11-9c2a-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects repeated MAP-layer ProvideSubscriberInfo/AnyTimeInterrogation-class location queries against a single roaming subscriber, consistent with SS7-based real-time location tracking (SS7 ping) abuse.
references:
    - https://citizenlab.ca/us-military-smartphones-targeted-through-roaming-and-ad-tech/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-17
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1450
    - attack.t1590
    - attack.tool.ss7_ping
logsource:
    category: application
    product: telecom_signaling
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 7770
        Message|contains:
            - 'ProvideSubscriberInfo'
            - 'AnyTimeInterrogation'
            - 'SendRoutingInfo'
    timeframe: 1m
    condition: selection | count(target_imsi) by target_imsi > 5
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate roaming authentication bursts during handset network re-registration or handover
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate roaming authentication/re-registration bursts during normal handset network handover or roaming-partner reconciliation jobs

**Tuning notes:** Tune the 5-query/1-minute threshold against baseline roaming re-registration volume per carrier; allowlist known roaming-partner GTs with documented high-frequency legitimate polling.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- SS7 MAP-Layer Location-Query Burst Against Roaming Subscriber (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Advertising-Identifier Multi-Region RTB Correlation Consistent With Pattern-of-Life Tracking (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Exfiltration-Pattern Automated Collection Handoff From RTB Broker Pipeline to External Web Service (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Suspicious SS7 MAP-Layer Location-Query Burst Against Roaming Subscriber (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MAP-Layer Global Title Masquerade Detected by Signaling Firewall (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Advertising Identifier Correlated Across Repeated RTB Bid Records for Same Device (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Signaling Firewall Global-Title Masquerade Detection (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cross-Border SS7 Query Fingerprint Recurrence Against Military-Adjacent Roamers (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [US military smartphones targeted through roaming and ad tech](https://citizenlab.ca/us-military-smartphones-targeted-through-roaming-and-ad-tech/)
- [Financial Times: US military smartphones targeted through roaming and ad tech (Congressman Pat Harrigan media reprint)](https://harrigan.house.gov/media/in-the-news/financial-times-us-military-smartphones-targeted-through-roaming-and-ad-tech)
- [US Troops Tracked Through Mobile Phones During Iran Conflict: Report](https://thedefensepost.com/2026/07/15/us-troops-tracked-phones-iran/)
- [Middle Eastern Telecom Networks Targeted in Cyber Campaign to Track US Personnel During War: FT](https://www.outlookindia.com/international/middle-eastern-telecom-networks-targeted-in-cyber-campaign-to-track-us-personnel-during-war-ft)
- [Iran used roaming systems, ad tech to track US troops in Gulf: Report](https://www.turkiyetoday.com/business/iran-used-roaming-systems-ad-tech-to-track-us-troops-in-gulf-report-3223907)
- [Iran Hacked Middle-East Mobile Networks To Track US Personnel During War — Report](https://saharareporters.com/2026/07/14/iran-hacked-middle-east-mobile-networks-track-us-personnel-during-war-report)
- [Iran Tracked US Troops Using Cellular Flaws and Ad Brokers](https://www.sofx.com/iran-tracked-us-troops-using-cellular-flaws-and-ad-brokers/)
- [Iran Used Mobile Phone Tracking to Hunt US Troops Before Strikes During War](https://www.ibtimes.sg/iran-used-mobile-phone-tracking-hunt-us-troops-before-strikes-during-war-89785)
- [US personnel faced phone-tracking campaign during Iran war – FT](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202607146253)
- [Iran Reportedly Abused SS7 Mobile Network Flaws to Locate US Military](https://www.technadu.com/iran-exploited-ss7-mobile-network-flaws-to-track-us-troops-coinciding-with-strikes-on-us-forces-report-says/631178/)
- [Iran Exploited Telecom Flaws to Track US Military Personnel, Researchers Say](https://securityboulevard.com/2026/07/iran-exploited-telecom-flaws-to-track-us-military-personnel-researchers-say/)
- [Report: Iran-linked actors exploited mobile networks, ad tech to track US personnel during Gulf conflict](https://diyatvusa.com/report-iran-linked-actors-exploited-mobile-networks-ad-tech-to-track-us-personnel-during-gulf-conflict/)
- [How Surveillance Companies track you using SS7 on Mobile Networks](https://www.enea.com/insights/how-surveillance-companies-track-you-using-mobile-networks/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1458
